



# The DEMANDS Of NATIONAL SECURITY



**K**EEPING tabs of defense developments abroad, one is aware that General Maxwell D. Taylor, U.S. Army chief of staff, has been reported as proposing an increase in the armed forces build-up of the U.S. by several divisions. The ability of the U.S. to muster the required number of divisions cannot be denied, American resources, economic and others, being vast. The Americans are in a position to achieve the necessary force build-up within reasonable time limits. The nation's capability in any-

thing that concerns defense had been proved many times.

A fact to illustrate it is the North Korean aggression in 1950, for which the U.S. was considered ill-prepared, major emphasis of her postwar defense being on preparation for an atomic fight. U.S. unpreparedness was no more obvious than by the fact that in the week the North Koreans attacked, the last of America's 14 large carrier air groups was being decommissioned. The 24th Division alone was available for immediate



**Build-up of adequately strong and modernized defense forces is demanded by national security amidst present-day developments in modern warfare**

defense action. Against Russian-built T-34 tanks used by the North Koreans, only the 3.5 inches Bazooka was effective. But pressed by necessity, the U.S. displayed remarkable speed in mobilizing her manpower and material. The American congress not only approved readily a request to extend for one year the draft but also passed, in what has since been considered record time, the Defense Production Bill that gave the U.S. President extraordinary powers of expanding the industrial war ef-

forts and setting up priorities on all defense contracts, including the powers to "dole out materials as he thought necessary;" and to fine and imprison hoarders. '

There is, however, a lesson for other free nations gleaned from the reported proposal of General Taylor. It is that even a highly capable nation is in need of stepping up her defense forces right now. It is because the people in the Kremlin and those threatening to "liberate" Taiwan, are ceaselessly and assiduously reinforcing their arms and fighting forces. No free nation, desirous of remaining free, can rightfully neglect to keep in stride.

#### **P.I. and U.S. Compared**

As a global power, the U.S. is directly and actively concerned with the peace of the whole world. She is with both NATO for the security of free Europe and neighbors, and SEATO for the safety of free Southeast Asia and neighbors. The responsibility of a world power is global. Her preparations to carry out such responsibility are necessarily gigantic in proportions.

The Philippines, linked with the U.S. by ties of friendship, a mutual defense treaty, and the SEATO, is theoretically concerned with, aside from her own security, that of the U.S. and SEATO member nations. Her task, compared with that of the U.S., is small; but she is a small nation, and so the work is as onerous. Lacking a heavy industry capable of producing arms, the Philippines, like any other small SEATO member, looks up to the U.S. and powerful allies

for supplies and equipment and could at most contribute qualified manpower to the collective defense work.

It would seem assistance enough to the U.S. if the Philippines, or any other free Southeast Asia nation, is able to contribute such manpower and reasonably take care of her own internal peace. It would seem, in other words, that the U.S. does not ask for more. Thus it is that the P.I. is to be greatly concerned with the security of free Southeast Asia, upon which her own security immediately depends. While the U.S. can contribute men and materials for such security, as illustrated concretely in the recent SEATO exercises, the Philippines has to help herself, too. She has to build up her forces, especially her reserve force, from which the bulk of manpower contribution is to be drawn. And she has to undertake this defense build-up commensurate with her economy and yet adequately enough for meeting the challenge or threat of the proximate potential aggressor.

#### Red Threat in SEA

It is obvious from where on this side of the globe arises the danger to peace. Not once but many times has Red China announced her intention to invade Formosa, which is a springboard for a thrust into the Philippines. Preparations for such an action have been made obvious by the Chinese Reds since October, 1951, when the industrial development of Red China was postponed in favor of building up a heavy industrial war machine.

Addressing the National Commit-

tee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference that October, Premier Chou En-lai said the Chinese Red Army must struggle "for the establishment and building up of a strong and modernized national defense force. Production in our country must serve the purpose of strengthening our national defense forces."

The Chinese Reds label their forces as for national defense. However, it is a fact that such forces are greatly in excess of what are needed to defend Red China. A fact to illustrate these surplus forces is the sending of "volunteers" to Korea during the war there. When Chou urged additional build-up of Red China's forces, the Chinese Communist army was publicly announced to have already a strength of 5,000,000 men. It was already backed by a militia from Chinese towns, villages and countryside numbering 12,800,000 men, hastened by 7,500 militia training courses operating throughout Red China. Chou called the militia "an important force for consolidating the people's democratic dictatorship and safeguarding the fruits of the emancipation." The militia is, in fact, the force from which reserves are drawn.

Military training age is lower in Red China. Recruited for training for the Red Chinese Army are youths of 16 "and under." Seventeen-year-old youths are trained in schools of the air force, army, and navy, and, if a few months below 17 but "tall, healthy and strong," they are trained just the same.

As for the Chinese Red navy and air force, there is also a continuous build-up. The navy was created in the summer of 1949 and composed then of a hundred torpedo boats and escort destroyers, "of mixed U.S., Japanese and Russian types, and a few U.S. and Japanese landing craft, some armed trawlers and thousands of motor-driven junks with reinforced decks to take artillery." The present strength of the Chinese Red navy is unknown, but since the force was created "the Soviet Union has been

nese Red air force was conservatively estimated to have a strength of 1,000 aircraft, 500 of which were MIG-15's. Many of these MIG's, despite their privileged Manchurian sanctuary, were shot down by U.S. planes during the Korean War. But it is to be believed that they not only have been replaced but reinforced in quantity, if not quality, from Soviet production plants. During the Korean War, Russian instructors were training Red Chinese air force personnel at schools in




*Created in the summer of 1949, Navy of Red China is being built up continuously. Chinese Red sailors are shown parading in Peking.*

training men of the Chinese Navy and many of the Soviet Navy ships and submarines to be seen in Chinese ports have probably been handed over or lent for training. Nor are reinforced motor-driven junks to be despised. They are almost unassailable by gunfire; and they proved their worth in the taking of several small North Korean islands in December 1950, in the face of opposition from the guns of the British Navy."

Early in the Korean War, the Chi-

Manchuria. Today, it is to be expected that they are doing so in schools throughout the Chinese mainland.

The reason for this vast war machine is gleaned from the statements of Chou as early as that October of 1951. He said the Chinese people have "determined to liberate Formosa from the grip of the American aggressors and will never relax until they have achieved that end."



*Standing force of the Philippines is publicly known to have some 54,000 officers and men, 41,000 of whom are classified ground troops.*

### P.I. Situation

The danger to the Philippines posed by the Chinese Reds needs no elucidation. What needs elucidation is what the endangered nation is doing to insure maintenance of her national security.

The U.S. 7th Fleet is patrolling the Formosa strait. Although the strength of the 7th Fleet is undisputable, it is illogical for the Philippines to pin all her hopes on it. The Philippines, as mentioned earlier, has a treaty with the U.S. for mutual defense and with the U.S. again and some free South and Southwestern Pacific nations for collective defense. Again, it is improper to bank on these treaties alone. In the first place, there is need for the Philip-


pinnes to take care of national defense through 'self-help; and, in the second place, both treaties will demand defense contributions, likely manpower, from the Philippines.

It is publicly known that the present standing force of the Philippines has a strength of more or less 54,000 officers and men. This number includes the personnel of all the major commands. Thirty-five thousand of these men are army ground troops. Six thousand are service personnel. Four thousand are navy personnel. Three thousand are air force personnel, and 7,000 are personnel of the Philippine Constabulary which has recently been made independent from the Armed Forces.

There are said to be 300,000 graduates of the six-month trainee course, 15,000 graduates of the Reserve Officers Training Corps, and some 300,000 war veterans, guerrillas and others, who can all be considered as reserves. However, as there have been many changes in the military art since the last war, due to new weapons and technological advances, and many of these men have either aged, undergone no retraining, or become otherwise incapacitated, it is questionable whether the considered figures would stand. It is said that should a war break out, the Philippines can mobilize 500,000 officers and men. Had World War II not interrupted the training program, there would be today 400,000 men in the first reserve and 200,000 in the

second reserve. These, together with other mobilizable personnel, will have provided a force of more or less 1,000,000 officers and men.

The Navy is known to have more or less 100 craft. In 1948, 50 major vessels were turned over by the U.S. naval authorities at Subic Bay, Olongapo. Eight others were added later. There are more or less 30 patrol craft, increased recently by more or less four. A couple of mine sweepers will be turned over by the U.S. in the near future, together with two gunboats. However, it is to be expected that not all of the vessels of the PN are sea-worthy by now. There have also been many technological changes in naval craft. These vessels are of the World War II types.



Four thousand officers and men of the Philippine Navy are known to be equipped with some one hundred light vessels accumulated since after World War II.


With regard to the air force, there are said to be more or less 200 planes, including four T-33 trainer jet craft received recently. Most of the single-engine planes are of the Mustang type, depleted tremendously by constant crashes due to engine failure. Some civilians reasonably call them flying coffins now.

It is as clear as daylight that men as well as materials of the Armed Forces of the Philippines are inadequate. And it is heartening to learn that U.S. Senator Mansfield has urged recently his nation to send the Philippines and South Vietnam aid "in quantities and of a kind they can use effectively to meet a genuine military threat."

#### Pressing Necessity

Unlike the U. S., the Philippines cannot put herself in a sufficient war footing upon short notice. She has no sizable industrial war efforts to expand. Under the circumstances, she has to depend on the U.S. for equipment and supplies. One thing, however, she can do now — bolster the strength of her reserve force, officers and men of which will be needed to make use of equipment and supplies from the U.S.

The Philippine standing and reserve forces are clearly small. The nation cannot afford to shoulder financially a big standing force in peace time. However, there is no reason, if there is as much of the needed financial backing for the reserve training program, why the necessary number of 20-year-old youths cannot be trained every year. Last year only 3,000 20-year-olds were trained. This




*Philippine Air Force is powered by air craft of them that are T-33 trainer jet planes recen*

year, the 3rd Infantry Training Division originally planned to train 7,200 trainees, but because of lack of funds, revised its plan and decided to train, instead of two regiments, only one. The military training of the necessary number of young people is a pressing necessity. It is indispensable, as attested by the nation's tragic lessons in World War II. It cannot be by-passed without sabotaging future national security.

#### Other Needs

The Philippines also needs ade-



*that are all propeller-driven, except four  
ly acquired from the United States.*

quate air and naval power. There is a need for jet planes to replace the propeller-driven craft, and for powerful ships like cruisers and destroyers. These powerful ships and planes are necessary, but a fair number of them would be found hard to maintain by the Philippines, should the nation get no maintenance support. The cost of maintaining one destroyer is two million pesos a year.

The immediate need of the Philippines is for really powerful and modern planes and ships, one or a few

of each kind, for training purposes, as a proper step to having Filipino officers and men know how to man them should a war, break out and great numbers of these craft are turned over to the nation for use. The Philippines also needs further insurance that such equipment would be present the moment the need for them arises. With one or a few of each type of modern plane and ship in peace time, the AFP can arrange its training program in such a way that officers and men can learn, in shifts or rotations, how to operate these craft.

Arrangements are necessary whereby officers and men of the AFP can undergo, individually or in groups, practical training aboard U.S. craft in actual operations. Some officers and men can get practical training, by arrangements, aboard ships of the 7th Fleet, in submarines, and other craft. These officers and men can later on be instructors to train other officers and men of the AFP.

It is a fact that the air force is now following a program of transition to the jet stage. A number of officers have undergone training in U.S. air bases and are now able to fly the T-33 jet trainers. These officers are in turn intended to be utilized in the training of other officers. Such training, and others, are urgently necessary.

#### Conclusion

Big and strong, the U.S. loses no time in building up her forces for national defense. The necessity of such build-up is applicable as well to the Philippines. Great financial sup-



port is needed for the expansion and training of the Philippine reserve force, from which the bulk of manpower is to be drawn in the event of a showdown. More than that, a standing force, small but well-rounded on all aspects of modern war, is demanded by current developments, as a fulcrum force around which the reserve forces shall revolve. To achieve this, there is need for modern training equipment, facilities, and arrangements whereby well-selected officers and men are to be enabled to learn operations of power-

ful weapons and craft, like the modern jet planes and naval vessels, including, if possible, submarines, destroyers, and other major craft.

There is, in other words, a need for strengthening and consolidating national defense forces and resources, for studying and mastering new techniques and skill on the coordinated use of modern arms, for raising further the level of local military science and precision on all aspects of present-day warfare, and for the build-up of adequately strong and really modernized defense forces.

— ACS



*Nation's reserve force that needs extensive expansion is not making desired headway because of dearth of training funds experienced annually by the Armed Forces.*