



The Role of Intelligence

IN PSY-WAR OPERATIONS

By Major R. DE LA FUENTE

Two soldiers printing psy-war handbills on a portable mimeograph in the field during an operation.

IN February 1953, I attended a conference of S-2s of IMA at Camp Holmes, Baguio as a representative of the AC of S, G-2, GHQ. One of the subjects so ably discussed by the Area CAO of IMA, Capt Pagkalinawan, was the "Use of CAO Agencies for Intelligence Purposes." Civil Affairs Officers have, indeed, accomplished a great deal and the long list of surrenderees and captured dissidents stand as an eloquent testimonial to the effectiveness of our CAOs. But every one agreed that better results can be achieved if:

1. Coordination between S-2s, S-3s, and CAOs is improved, and

2. The S-2, S-3, and CAO exert more effort to get a better understanding of their respective functions in the conduct of Psy-war. In other words, a little more give and take is indicated.

What can Intelligence do for the Psy-War Officer? Plenty! In fact, I am wondering how we can ever conduct Psy-war without it. I shall go into greater detail than just merely defining "Intelligence," since an understanding of the Role of Intelligence in Psy-War is premised on an understanding of the nature of intelligence itself.

What is Intelligence? The prognostications taken out of a crystal ball? The "stuff" turned out by the 2s? There is

a lot of understandable mystery associated with Intelligence but actually, it is a simple, self-evident thing. All of us engage in intelligence work in one way or other. It can be so informal and instinctive, that we fail to recognize it as such—like consulting a color chart in determining the right necktie to go with the rest of our attire. Sometimes it takes painstaking research work—as in the preparation of a thesis. But in essence, Intelligence is nothing more than the systematic search for the single best answer. We talk of Intelligence as an extension of this search for knowledge. But it takes on a more serious stature if we say that it is the search for knowledge essential to the success of an operation—or at our level here at GHQ—the search for knowledge VITAL to our national survival.

A more authoritative definition of "Intelligence" and one we'll find occasion to refer to is the following: "*Intelligence is knowledge acquired by the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation of all available information concerning a possible or actual enemy or areas of operation. It includes deductions concerning current and future enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action which can affect the accomplishment of our mission. It is the basis for all operational plans and estimates.*"

From the foregoing definition let us see how intelligence is produced. Production of military intelligence is a science — a matter of logic. It is governed by principles which are universal in their application. Without an understanding of these principles, the production and use of Intelligence become a confused maze of unrelated and useless notions or presumptions.

The fundamental principle of Military Intelligence is embodied in the relationship among four major features: 1) the collection of information, 2) the processing of information to produce intelligence, 3) the use of the resulting intelligence, and 4) the direction of the collection effort. Let me illustrate this principle from our own military history.

Collection

On 21 July 1951, Lt Col Luis Villareal, then G-2 of IMA, received accurate information from an undercover agent, (an American named David Jones who volunteered for the job) of the existence of a large enemy camp called Lagrimas, in the Zambales mountains southwest of Clark AFB. The existence of this camp had come to the attention of Lt Col Villareal since 9 Feb 1951 and he had been patiently

building up this particular situation ever since. This feat of Jones provided the first clear break in the situation, however.

The information given by Jones was incomplete but whatever information he revealed was evaluated and interpreted by Lt Col Villareal and integrated with the other information already available at that time.

Based on the processed information then available, Lt Col Villareal prepared an estimate which he presented orally to Brig Gen Alfonso Arellano, the Area Commander, who used this intelligence in arriving at a decision to organize a Task Force to surround and destroy this enemy concentration as soon as more definite information of its exact location is known. Based on this decision an Operation Directive was issued on 23 July 1951 with tentative D-Day set for early August.

The initial information was necessary to arrive at a definite decision. Accordingly, Gen Arellano directed Lt Col Villareal to obtain additional information. (In the trade, this is called EEI). The most important among these obviously is,



Five Huks convalescing at the V. Luna general hospital. They and many of their comrades who have been captured or surrendered have been largely won back to the ways of democracy and peace by psy-war campaign being waged by the Armed Forces.

"Where exactly is Camp Lagrimas?" The first estimated location of Lagrimas happened to fall on a blank portion of the map — since the area is largely unexplored. So one can imagine what a difficult problem faced the G-2. The G-2 made plans for the collection of information and among the operations were the taking of numerous air photographs of the objective area and the plotting of magnetic azimuths of important landmarks in said area.

The task of obtaining the desired photographs was given to the PAF. Fortunately, the main HMB camp was located just above a twin waterfall which provided our air platoon units with a conspicuous landmark. In the meantime, further interrogation of Jones and other recently surrendered HMB prisoners revealed further clues as to the exact location of Lagrimas.

All the information thus gathered were evaluated, interpreted, correlated, and integrated into a more or less clear picture of the enemy situation. From photographs and aerial observations, it was possible to make a rough sketch of the area and by painstaking analysis the exact location of Camp Lagrimas, including approaches to it, were established. It was even possible to pinpoint the coordinates of Lagrimas—quite an achievement — considering that there were only blank coordinate squares in the map of the area and the only information available on the map was the following discouraging note: "Mountainous and Unexplored."

This intelligence was used by Gen Arellano to confirm his initial decision and to organize Task Force "CG" to be commanded by Col T G Fajardo. Elements of sixth BCTs were to be thrown into the assault. The area was to be attacked initially by the PAF while ground units were to execute a tightening encirclement of the objective.

The improved picture was, however, still incomplete and detailed information was required. The G-2 was again directed to get such information through its collecting agencies. Information turned in as to location of outposts, *modus operandi* of the enemy, sources of supply, etc. were collected, processed, and used as fast as they were reported and more

and more information was called for. By 4 August 1951, the enemy picture was fairly complete and a final written estimate was prepared and submitted to Gen Arellano. Based on this estimate, Gen Arellano issued his operation orders and Operation "OMAHA" was launched.

I have dwelt at length only on a single selected item of information prior to the operation, i.e., the location of Camp Lagrimas and the routes leading to it. Clearly, this was not the only information sought, received, or processed by Col Villareal before, during, and even after this operation. But the securing of this information serves to illustrate how intelligence is produced by tracing the steps relative to one item of information. It must also be remembered that while I have discussed the production of intelligence in the above-mentioned operation by steps, the four steps of the Intelligence cycle are simultaneous and not mutually exclusive.

Each of these steps is essential to the entire procedure. Anyone confronted with a mission must use all available intelligence in order to make a decision. Invariably, certain information will be lacking, so he directs a search for such information through the intelligence officer. The intelligence officer organizes the search and issues directives in the name of the CO for the collection of information. The information collected and submitted by information-collecting agencies are processed by the intelligence officer and then submitted to his CO in such form which will permit the latter to use it. This cycle: *use, direction, collection, processing*, and back to *use* again is the fundamental structure of Intelligence. The relationship expressed in this cycle constitutes the basic principle of military intelligence.

Intelligence and Psy-War

Intelligence and operations (any operations) are inter-dependent and complementary. A psy-war officer who deliberately violates this principle conducts psy-war by mere intuition or guess work. But Psychological Warfare without intelligence is liable to be more "psycho" than "logical."

Psy-war has been defined as "the planned use during peace or war of all

measures exclusive of armed conflict, designed to influence the thought, morale, or behavior of a given group of people, through logic or fear in such a way as to support the accomplishment of our military or national aims." The military application of Psy-War is more limited—i.e., "the use of propaganda against the enemy together with other operational measures of a military nature for specific strategic or tactical purposes." If we are, however, to consider the nature of the operations we are currently engaged in and the economic, political, social and ideological aspects which can not be solved by military action alone, I believe we have to think of Psy-war in terms of the broader definition.

Psy-war is directed towards specific goals and must consider the intelligence of the audience. Therefore, all information concerning audience opinion, reactions, fads, slang, humor, customs, superstitions, and traditions must be relayed to the propagandist.

The successful conduct of psy-war operations is dependent on a timely and constant flow of voluminous specialized intelligence dealing principally with social and political conditions. That time is of the essence in these operations is illustrated by the following historical data.

Credit has been given to, but little is known about, a highly successful Psy-War Operation conducted during the last war against Japan under the direction of Rear Admiral Ellis N Zacharias, formerly with ONI. Psy-War operations against the Japanese could have ended the war much sooner — soon enough to have prevented Okinawa, Iwo Jima and Yalta, if official support of the operation had been more enthusiastic and prompt. Intelligence knew that as early as in December 1944, Japan was already a physically-beaten nation. But the Japanese spirit was not yet ready to accept the idea of surrender. Without necessarily deprecating the armed effort which, of course, was the prime factor in Japan's collapse, it can be said that the Japanese were so influenced by the 14 surrender broadcasts that it actually hastened their decision to surrender precisely as envisioned in the Open Plan prepared by Admiral Zacharias. Now, how could Admiral Zacharias

have been as accurate as that? The answer is, Intelligence. Timely, accurate intelligence. This feat of Admiral Zacharias was the result of painstaking research and a lifelong study of the Japanese mind plus a continuous flow of current, timely intelligence. Intelligence had revealed the existence of a "peace party" in Japan, a group of pacifist elements close to the Emperor, who were merely waiting for an opportunity to obtain peace terms. This potentially influential group was made the target of intensive propaganda so that their influence was enhanced while the High Command was discredited. In this, Psy-War was successful and when the "peace party" rose to power it immediately, albeit covertly, took steps to end the war exactly as it was predicted the pacifists would.

Even a piece of spot intelligence can achieve far-reaching results if exploited promptly for propaganda purposes. In the spring of 1946, Czechoslovakia was on the eve of its first postwar general elections. By that time, the "Cold War" was beginning and Czechoslovakia was already lined for Russian conquest. Moscow had directed the Czech Communist party to win the elections by an absolute majority but had cautioned that no visible interference with the election was to be shown because the eyes of the world were then focused on Czechoslovakia. At the behest of Czech Red leader, Klement Gottwald, the 3d Mechanized Army of Marshal Konev which was then preparing to return to Russia from Austria was directed to change its route and to so time its return that it will pass through Czechoslovakia just before the elections. On the day before the elections, May 25, the Army was to bivouac, its elements stretched from one end of the country to the other, ostensibly a purely innocent rest period as part of the long journey home. Then rumors were to spread that Konev would stay unless the communist party won! A young American officer got wind of this information just a few hours after the Soviet move had been decided upon in great secrecy. After confirming the fact that Konev's army had changed its itinerary and would detour through Czechoslovakia, the officer re-

ported his information to his superiors. All they had to do was to publish the news! The publication which exposed the Russian attempt to influence the elections was calculated to stop Konev's tanks in their tracks. It did! A few hours before departure time, Konev received the order not to pass via Czechoslovakia. Two years later Czechoslovakia fell, but that is another story. The point is, even a single item of intelligence, properly and promptly exploited can yield tremendous propaganda results!

The success of military psy-war operations is dependent largely on a voluminous flow of timely accurate intelligence dealing primarily with the military situation and enemy morale. Prompt recognition and exploitation is important.

Let us see examples of military Psy-War on the tactical level and the role of intelligence in achieving success. Prior to the *blitzkrieg* in 1940, German tactical propaganda showed its masterful hand.

A week after the start of the war, French soldiers were unloading barges at Strassbourg when they were suddenly caught in the glare of German searchlights! Before they could hide, a German voice boomed through a loudspeaker: "Don't be afraid, Kamaraden! We turned on the lights so you can see better. We have the same work on our side and we know how difficult it is!" On other occasions, the supposedly secret arrivals on the line of French units were announced by German loudspeakers a few hours after they had taken the place. The Germans would announce the name of every member of the newly-arrived unit, his hometown and the names of his officers. The result was so demoralizing that the units had to be immediately withdrawn and replaced.

How did the Germans get such accurate intelligence? By intuition? If so, at least it must have been some intelligence officer's intuition!

On 24 April 1953, a group of 11 HMBs was surrounded by troops of the 6th BCT in Tangle, Mexico, Pampanga. Lt Ricardo Viray, CAO of the 6th BCT invited the HMBs to surrender by loudspeakers.

The CAO officer was able to carry out his psy-war mission on this particular occasion mainly because of the prompt and effective coordination of the S-2 and

the CAO in the area. Lt Viray had been alerted by the S-2 seconds after the operation was mounted.

The task of intelligence is to discover sources of weakness in the enemy's morale, to anticipate situations in which psy-war may be employed, and to furnish psy-war agencies with facts required to exploit a situation. Information to gauge the effectiveness of our own psy-war is also indispensable. To get the information desired, it may be necessary for special psy-war interrogators to interview prisoners for special information. —Psy-war officers themselves have to interview HMB prisoners to get information and also to gain an insight into the Huk mind.

Intelligence in Counter-Propaganda

It is also the responsibility of G-2 to assist in the planning and supervision of training designed to nullify the effects of enemy propaganda. This is counter-propaganda. G-2 derives intelligence from an analysis of enemy propaganda. This is one reason why Psy-War officers should look more kindly on the efforts of the security-conscious S-2 to censor the information they plan to reveal at a mass rally or in a press release.

Propaganda is at times used as an effective means of deception. For example, German propaganda prior to the Battle of the Bulge clearly hinted that Germany was no longer capable of mounting a counter-offensive! The Allies fell for it. In the local scene, the Huks are adept in the use of similar deception. Before the HMB attack on Apalit, Pampanga in April 1947, they announced their intention to raid the place with 1,000 men in a letter they wrote to the town mayor. Actually there were only 50 HMBs in the raid but they succeeded in raising the panic among the town's defenders. Deception measures lie in the field of counter-intelligence which, in turn, is a branch of intelligence.


How can one make use of intelligence effectively? Lt General Manton S Eddy, former commandant of the US Army Command and General Staff College has this piece of advice: "Know the value of accurate intelligence, the methods by which it is produced, the manner in which it is used — and then insist on good service." As a staff officer, coordinate

with your S-2.

Intelligence and operations — psy-war operations — are, we have said, interdependent and complementary. The success of psy-war operations is dependent upon a voluminous flow of timely accurate intelligence. The task of Intelligence is to discover weaknesses in the enemy's morale, to anticipate situations where psy-war may be employed; and to furnish the psy-war officer with facts to exploit a situation. It must gather information to gauge the effectiveness of our own psy-war operations while at the same time assist in the training of our own men so

as to nullify the effects of enemy psy-war operations.

Sun Tzu, ancestor of military proverbialists, saw this used for invaluable coordination of psy-war and intelligence operations. On psy-war, he says, "...to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting." And on intelligence he quips, "What enables the good general to strike and to conquer and to achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men is foreknowledge."



PEFTOK soldiers in Korea man a gun emplacement and stand ready for any enemy charge.

Communism is a doctrine of hate. Its leaders must always seek to tear down, wreck, destroy or liquidate anything or anybody blocking their path toward world domination. They cannot tolerate good will among peoples. That would mean independence, freedom to think and act, each on his own. They accord no such right to any people. They recognize no law, no restraint, save those they themselves impose to maintain and extend their despotic domination over other human beings.

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