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feeling from the imperialism that Kipling hymned America into nearly forty years ago. It came out in editorials. It was heard in Congress. Religious bodies felt it, associations internationally minded debated it. Movement ran in that direction, and men said right along that majorities in both houses of Congress were ready to vote the Philippines free—their viewpoint being the welfare of the United States, dis-entangling her in the Far East.

This had assumed such volume as to shift responsibility for further delaying independence, from Washington, where it commonly rests, to Manila and Malacañan. Men seeking political advantage over President Quezon promptly capitalized this; they said independence could be obtained at a date earlier than 1945, and began blaming him for not doing so. Had this situation been permitted to persist, Commonwealth politics would have degenerated very rapidly. It would have been impossible to found and build a state designed to become independent, or even to fulfill the functions of a commonwealth as such, with the platform issue in all campaigns reduced to shouts by the out's that the in's were postponing independence because they were either too cowardly or too venal to demand it. The in's could only have replied, they were proceeding lawfully under the Tydings-McDuffie act toward independence in 1945 when the country should be prepared for it; and this, however honest, would have seemed weak, the in's could not have won elections with it, as the history of popular politics here shows with eloquent consistency.

Government would have rapidly broken down, the morale of the administration could not have been sustained. For instance, every official who should have been disciplined would have gone over to the side of the out's; he would have been out for revenge, if for nothing else than to throw the public off his own trail, and so he would have emitted *revelations* of trucking by Malacañan by the yard. This process would have metamorphosed the Nacionalista party into an American party, and at the same time the false position it would have placed him in would have been intolerable to President Quezon, he could have counted upon defeat at the polls.

Dynamic in politics, Quezon never chooses the defensive, always carries the fight to the other fellow. Faced with the situation just described therefore, he threw down the gauntlet at Washington and invited America to translate sentiment into action. It was no vain gesture, no bluff on four cards. Quezon held a winning hand when he made that call, because he is, we believe, prepared, himself, to take independence naked of any trade benefits.

Further truth is, President Quezon is equally prepared to carry on with the Commonwealth in due faith to his oath of office; his statement cleared the field in that direction, by sweeping it clean in the other; it indeed spiked every cannon that had been aimed toward him, here and at Washington.

No out's, of whatever ability, in the Philippines, can now have either Quezon or his party on the defensive. His own partisans have his own words as the strongest possible party slogan. No Congressmen, however fearful of eastern entanglements, can say that Quezon has not given him a blade sharpened to sever at a blow the last ties between the Islands and America. Quezon has refused to remain in an equivocal attitude toward independence. He had discerned before ever leaving Manila that, cloyed by this question, the Commonwealth could not proceed. A bit of frank dynamism blew the question out of the way.

With no preparation for the Quezon-Sayre statement, so much immediate harm was done as to make it seem as if President Quezon had impulsively ruined his own administration—discouragement was sown broadcast. It was hardly possible to avoid this, the element of surprise was necessary; and far from wishing real harm to ensue upon his proposal, Quezon took the longer view of it and counted upon permanent benefits. This can be defended, with ease: responsibility for delay of Philippine independence no longer seems to rest in Malacañan—it never did really rest there: it is redeposited in Washington, plain for everyone to see.

FINESSE AT WASHINGTON

Somewhere else in this issue of the *Journal* appears comment on economic effects of the Quezon-Sayre statement of March 19 that brought forward the potentiality of Philippine independence from the United States either on December 31, 1938, or July 4, 1939. Here it is desired to discuss other phases of the question, phases that should quiet the misgivings the statement precipitated. President Quezon himself obliged the country with a half-hour discussion of the background of the statement, by radio, Monday morning, April 5. It is here proposed to penetrate that background. President Quezon's most pungent remark was, "Don't forget that I am prepared if necessary to get independence for the Philippines even if I should fail to secure for our products the benefits of the market of the United States."

The undersigned believes President Quezon's statement sincere, but not made without the knowledge beforehand that he does not have to accept independence with no commercial advantages. He knows that should a new bill for independence be presented, he could bargain for trade advantages—and get them. However, this does not modify the sincerity of his statement.

The purpose of the Quezon-Sayre statement has not come out. It must be sought. The statement did much harm, is still committing undue mischief, and these effects could have been foreseen, as no doubt they were. It must, then, have been thought that these evils would be shortlived, and that the ultimate good gained by clarifying the question would more than offset them.

A situation had developed that was doing no one any good.

In the United States, much sentiment was voiced to the effect that America should rid herself of the Islands as soon as possible. It was sentiment, it was feeling—a revulsion of

Quezon challenged every Congressman who feels he wants the United States free of the Philippines, to vote that way; and to do more, to round up his fellows and get all them to vote with him. Doing so, he challenged such Congressmen to do the impossible. Whatever the feeling, and the undersigned shares this feeling strongly, it is not possible to translate that feeling into deliberate action. It is not possible for any Congress and presidential executive of the United States to withdraw America from the Philippines in the Islands' present unprepared condition.

The pressure of international influence is too great, if not on Congress itself, then on the White House. Quezon's action let it be known that none of this decisive pressure derives from the Philippines. Whoever campaigns against him here will have to attack his policies, discuss the state of the Commonwealth and how to better it: harangues for earlier independence will fall of their own weight. Thus the Commonwealth will be able to proceed. And since no bill embodying American feeling that America should get out of the Islands can become law, for the simple reason that nothing will be done at Washington to help a great Oriental Power wallop the West or any part of it, what does the situation resolve itself into? It becomes a situation well designed for the Philippines to urge upon Congress and President Roosevelt the commercial provisions of the Commonwealth act, the Tydings-McDuffie law of 1934.

This is foreseen in the most cogent statement High Commissioner Paul Vories McNutt has made since his appointment to Manila: "... economic independence before political independence." Right there is a plain declaration of policy, and reassignment at Washington of full responsibility for the ultimate date, if ever reached, when Philippine independence will be voted.

-W. R.

Our Plight . . .

(Continued from page 6)

free, the English live nearby neighbors who have gone on breeding booms to create cannon fodder for strafing purposes: Germany and Italy. Italy's and Germany's birthrates rise, England's falls; and the English tend to become a race of oldish folk. If peace were assured the world, little difference this. But that's the rub, peace is not at all assured.

So the English have more to worry about, were they given much to worry, than the considerable that has been cited.

There are a million childless homes in England; in a population, bear in mind, of forty-five million. There are 2,500,000 one-child homes; families in which the generation is not

renewed number 3,500,000. In recent years the annual birthrate has dropped by 282,723; nine persons of a generation ago have produced but six children; only 120,000 children a year are born.

In 1901, births to every 1,000 women in England numbered 28.5 a year; in 1935, only 14.6 a year. Twelve years ago, lives suppressed in England numbered 150,000 a year, they now total 290,000 a year. The English are faced with doing something about this, as they are concerning all that has been mentioned—much more that might be. Yet English morale is far from wavering. That his capital might be shelled is something the Britisher is willing to shoulder taxes to correct, not something that will take his sleep or foreshorten his weekends. He faces changing circumstances, adjusts himself to them. It is something all the world is doing, under the compunctions of our pyrotechnic times, during which blow-ups are to be expected momentarily almost in any quarter.

We have not spoken of England's struggle to keep her markets open, her goods moving, her supplies coming in, her people housed and fed—as little from dole as possible—but these ends are of course her chief preoccupations.

If we now turn back to our own situation, it may seem more agreeable. If independence comes, there is to be a trade treaty with the United States along with it. The status of independence is to be agreed upon among the Powers. Should the Islands go over to another country, it would be by means of peaceful penetration; the war establishment, we are assured every day, is never to be large—it is now no great drain on taxation; Manila, our metropolis, hovers over no great proportion of the insular population—the draws people from the provinces but slowly.

It will be a long time before the Philippines live in hourly prospect of possible attack; the day never will dawn when gas makes become a part of the regular household furnishings. Independence means death to our sugar, unless the trade treaty takes care of it; but the problem even here is no more acute than England's that involves her heavy industries, or Germany's in trying to get food enough for 66,000,000 inhabitants while arming a third of them for war. Other countries face the problems that masses of urban populations provoke. The Philippines has not a single one of these problems, and therefore have moderate taxes. Beside that, whenever a major political calamity threatens these Islands, invariably it blows away on the same ethereal breezes that lumbered it into view. Population increases here, 2% a year. Yet sixty million acres of public domain are yet to be claimed by man. Sixty per cent of the land is still forested; while

(Please turn to page 13)

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