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**PRINCESS BEATRIX
VISITS MANILA**

(In background, President Macapagal)

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PANORAMA

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"HATE IS ALWAYS TRAGIC"

Those who adhere to the method of nonviolent direct action recognize that legislation and court orders tend only to declare rights; they can never thoroughly deliver them. Only when the people themselves begin to act are rights on paper given life blood.

The method of nonviolent resistance is effective in that it has a way of disarming the opponent; it exposes his moral defenses, it weakens his morale and at the same time it works on his conscience.

Nonviolent resistance also provides a creative force through which men can channelize their discontent. It does not require that they abandon their discontent. This discontent is sound and healthy. Nonviolence saves it from degenerating into morbid bitterness and hatred.

Hate is always tragic. It is as injurious to the hater as it is to the hated. It distorts the personality and scars the soul.

Psychiatrists are telling us now that many of the inner conflicts and strange things that happen in the subconscious are rooted in hate. So they are now saying, "Love or perish." This is the beauty of nonviolence. It says you can struggle without hating; you can fight war without violence.

Freedom is like life. You cannot be given life in installments. You cannot be given breath but not body, nor a heart but no blood vessels. Freedom is one thing — you have it all, or you are not free. — Martin Luther King, American Negro Leader

- Without economic security, the common man would remain the hopeless captive of iron necessities, a tool of other minds and a helpless pawn in the game of selfish politics.

THE COMMON MAN AND THE RULE OF LAW

PERFECTO FERNANDEZ

In the manifold ways with which a government may deal with its citizens, certain procedures are available which are thought to be more civilized than others. In dealing with political dissenters, for example, England is supposed to have more sane, if not more humane, approach than either Russia or China, in that English oppositionists merely lose elections, while Russian or Chinese "deviationists" are said to lose their liberty, if not their heads. Again, when it comes to criticism in the press, our government is supposed to be more responsible than Ngo Diem's regime, as with us the administration counters press criticism through the press itself, while in South Vietnam reports have it that for an answer to an attack in the

press, a full press is applied on the editor's desk.

In assessing certain procedures as more civilized than others, the verdict, whatever it be, is necessarily open to question. What is civilized, in this connection, is nowhere as nearly certain as two plus two. The absence of a mathematically precise standard precludes, so long as we choose to be reasonable, a dogmatic result. This is specially true of particular techniques. For example, by no accepted criterion can a unanimous conclusion be reached that the jury system is more civilized than the system of trial by a judge only. Indeed, the issue between these competing procedures relates more to expediency than to the question of inherent justness of either of them.

On a more general level, however, there is a standard which for all its admitted imprecision, commands widespread acceptance in testing how civilized is the over-all conduct of a government toward its citizens. This standard is the rule of law. In this short and simple phrase lies compressed fundamental ideas of civility by which for over a thousand years governments have been judged to be good or bad. Of course, a verdict of guilty binds no one, least of all the government adjudged guilty. Hitler's persecution of the Jews, for example, was condemned again and again as inhuman and uncivilized, but it went on, nevertheless, and did not stop until Germany was crushed by force of arms. A contemporary illustration is furnished by South Africa, where a dominant white minority had stripped colored persons, Negroes and Asians alike, of basic rights and fundamental liberties in the interest of a continuing white primacy. For such lapses from civilized standards, South Africa has been denounced and rebuked by turns, but *apartheid* remains

entrenched. The rule of law, as applied to the conduct of independent governments, rests its appeal not on force but on "the vaguer sanctions of conscience." Its function, in this regard, has not been the redress of grievances but to indict the measure as well as direction of needed political and other basic reforms.

In societies, of course, which are sworn to an observance of the rule of law by a fundamental charter or constitution, the rule of law is basically a stimulant to the process of self-correction and peaceful reform. The constitutional history of England and the United States furnish striking illustrations of such process. The gradual enfranchisement of the English working classes in the case of the first and the steady accretion of civil and political rights enjoyed by Negroes and other minorities in the case of the second, are highlights in a general evolution towards a more fair and equal allocation of rights, civil and political, in two societies.

As a standard in assessing the conduct of government, the rule of law is compre-

hensive in reach. This is understandable, as it is its office to pinpoint and expose situations of the most grievous injustice and arbitrary conduct. The amplitude of its grasp is clearly indicated in what is perhaps the most authoritative statement of the rule to date. This is found in the Declaration of Delhi, which was adopted by the International Congress of Jurists in its conference at New Delhi, India in 1959. In this Declaration, the rule of law was defined as follows: "The principles, institutions and procedures, not always identical, but broadly similar, which the experience and traditions of lawyers in different countries of the world, often having themselves varying political structures and economic background, have shown to be important to protect the individual from arbitrary government and to enable him to enjoy the dignity of man."

The Declaration further states that "the Rule of Law is a dynamic concept for the expansion and fulfillment of which jurists are primarily responsible and which should be employed not only to safe-

guard and advance the civil and political rights of the individual in a free society, but also to establish social, economic, educational and cultural conditions under which his legitimate aspirations and dignity may be realized."

From this, it is clear that in aspiration and effect, the rule of law operates to limit the power of the government over its citizens and inhabitants.

Instances of arbitrary or high-handed exercise of public powers, of oppressive acts, of violations of human dignity, and of patent discrimination by various governments of the earth against their citizens and subjects abound not only in history but in the contemporary scene. All these, however, although exhibiting an infinite variety, may be grouped into four distinct categories or situations of basic injustice.

First is the situation of despotism. Here, the authority of government, whether concentrated in a king, emperor, dictator, or in a junta or other group, is theoretically without limit. The will of the ruler, whether individual

or collective, is absolute. Correspondingly, the citizens and inhabitants are at the mercy of the ruler, holding their lives and possessions at his pleasure, subject to all sorts of abuses and injustice. Such situation depicts what the textbooks call a government of men and not of laws. The basic defect is that power is not limited by law. Examples of this condition are so common and familiar that mention of them need not be made.

The second situation is marked by strict adherence to existing law, but the law itself is bad. A familiar example is the case of South Africa. From a purely formal viewpoint, its government ostensibly adheres to the rule of law. No citizen is restricted as to his opportunity or liberty, except by authority of a duly enacted statute. But the statutes passed by its legislature are undeniably discriminatory. Hewing close to a policy *apartheid*, these legislative enactments deny civil and political rights to colored people merely because they are colored.

As carefully pointed out in the 1960 Report of the Inter-

national Commission of Jurists, a statute does not satisfy the standard of justice prescribed in the Rule of Law merely because it is a statute. A bad law is perhaps as bad as no law, or even more so in certain situations.

Observed the Commission:

"It is readily apparent that viewed from the standpoint of the lawyers' broad civic responsibility the formal correctness of a legislative measure does not per se assure its compliance with the Rule of Law; the absence of the social content in an Act and its incompatibility with the basic principles of human rights makes it devoid of those ethical and moral values that have become an indispensable corollary of legal craftsmanship and do in the final analysis set it apart from an indiscriminate exercise of power.

The Commission holds that the application of the principle of apartheid which has come under scrutiny in this Report is morally reprehensible and violates the Rule of Law. The evil of the policy of separation of races lies in the presumption of racial superiority translated into the deliberate infliction of an inferior way of life on all who are tainted by non-white skins. Not permitted to choose their own way of life, the non-white population are reduced to permanent poli-

tical, social, economic and cultural inferiority.

The impact of apartheid extends to virtually all aspects of life in the Union. At church, at home, at school or university, the cinema, on the beach, in the courts, in hospitals, at the polls; in fact in all conceivable forms of human relations a ruthless discrimination against the non-white population has become the law. The humiliation inflicted by such measures is the testimony on which apartheid can be judged. Its price in terms of human degradation will never be known, but it is one which is high enough to outweigh any of the benefits which it is claimed to bring.

As part of this human suffering, both whites and non-whites have been exposed to a steady encroachments on their basic freedoms. Liberty of expression, movement and association are but three of these freedoms which have been drastically curtailed. Judges who alleviate injustice by refusing to interpret the law in the spirit motivating the Government are vilified openly. x x x

The denial of civil and religious liberties in which apartheid has resulted is reflected with equal intensity in the economic disparity between the races, in the discrimination in the use of public services, in the enjoyment of social rights, and in the deliberate denial of opportunities in education. Whilst the

white population do not suffer from economic or social injustice, their opposition to apartheid may entail grave restrictions of their civil liberties. Injustice has been inflicted on the liberal white element in the interest of advancing a separate and supreme white community." (South Africa and the Rule of Law, pp. 6-7.)

In the third situation, the authority of the government is limited by law and the law is on the whole fair, just and reasonable, but injustice nevertheless results because the law is unfairly or unjustly applied. Here, the basic defect lies in the administration of justice. This problem besets all societies, including the most advanced and the most free. It tends, of course, to be more serious in less developed and less literate societies, such as the emerging nations in Asia and Africa, where the traditions of civility are merely beginning to take root. Still, it is a constant problem everywhere, in the United States no less than in Nigeria. The struggle against injustice, within the very temple of justice itself, never ends, as it is itself a struggle against human weakness, corruption and perfidy. Lawyers and

judges, in all lands and climes, are open to the sins and temptations which beset us all, and when they succumb, their fall or surrender pollutes the stream of justice.

In the fourth situation, the basic injustice is subtle and not immediately apparent. The authority of the government is exercised according to law, nor in the existing law, nor in the manner of its application. It lies, rather, in this: that by reason of extreme disparity in economic condition, aggravated by prevailing social ills, the law is precluded from giving justice in cases similar in virtually all material respects to cases in which the law has already given, and continues to give, adequate redress. The defect is that like cases are not given a like redress, not because the law is unfairly applied, but because some cases are brought to court, while the others are not. Thus, due to socio-economic conditions, some violations of law or private right are properly redressed, while other violations are not.

This kind of basic injustice flourishes in many countries of the world, specially in the

so-called free countries where poverty is prevalent. There is no need, however, to go far afield for a example, because our country is one of these. We are the living illustration of that paradox: poverty amidst riches, squalor in a setting of bountiful resources, penury in a land of great natural wealth. Observation no less than statistics confirms the great economic imbalance which divides our people in two groups: the few who have enough or more than enough, and the great many who have less than is needful for a civilized existence.

Poverty, of course, inflicts more and greater evils than merely hampering our full conformity with the rule of law. For the moment, however, it is our task to ascertain how it brings about a basic defect in our system of justice. The key lies in how we put our system to work in a particular case. In order to operate as to a particular case, our legal machinery must be put in motion, or it does not move at all. It declines the role of a busybody; it will give redress only to those who seek its remedies;

its intervention must be invoked in the prescribed fashion, before its eyes open to see what wrong has been done. This step is crucial, for unless it is taken, the law sleeps and sees no wrong.

It is in the taking of this step that socio-economic conditions spell a fundamental difference. It matters very much, for practical purposes, whether the person wronged belongs to the "haves" or to the "have-nots". As a rule, the members of our wealthy, well-to-do, or middle classes are quick to invoke the aid of the law. Possessed of adequate means, usually literate, and conscious of their rights and prerogatives, these solid citizens lose little time in betaking themselves to some lawyer and having a complaint filed.

On the other hand, this is usually not the case where the party wronged or offended belongs to the economically submerged groups, such as landless peasantry or the great army of the unemployed and underemployed. It is not merely a question of money, for lawyers can always be found who will fight for a contingent fee. It is more

often a question of the courage and the will to fight for what the law recognizes in him as his rights. Under the circumstances, it is understandable if his courage fails and his will to fight falters.

Frequently, illiterate, ignorant of what is due him as a citizen, impelled mostly by the never-ending search for necessities, sapped of his drive and energy by disease, malnutrition and excessive labor, beset by the anxiety of today and the insecurity of tomorrow, and lastly, conditioned to subservience and humiliation by his economic and social status, would this common *tao*, whether a *kasama* or *obrero*, have the gumption and the stamina to fight, especially if the other party happens to be more fortunate? Most unlikely, for the total impact of his experience has brought about his degradation and a deep-seated sense of acute inferiority.

The conclusion that we are to draw is confirmed by common experience. Rare, indeed, is the peasant or laborer who dares to joust with a landlord or a businessman, or professional, or politician. This is true, even

in criminal cases which the law forbids to be compromised. The killing of a tenant's child through the reckless driving by a politician's son, the injuries to a peasant resulting from a threshing by an irate or drunken landlord, the abuse of a laborer's daughter by a rich and spoiled delinquent — these and other crimes hardly reach our courts. The blame does not always attach to our fiscals and other prosecuting officers. For if the injured party, or his parent, declines to make a complaint, or desists from one already made, or refuses to give evidence on the matter, what alternative is there for the public prosecutor but to drop the case, assuming it reaches his office in the first place? Hence, a host of injuries, which are normally cognizable in the courts of law, are borne by the aggrieved without recourse to the courts. Normally, a substantial sum is paid by the wrongdoer in satisfaction of the jury inflicted. Thus, the compounding of crimes, which the law officially forbids, prevents the redress which the law intends.

Such extra-judicial settlements are assisted in a great measure by the institutionalized habits and attitudes of our people. First is that the common *tao* does not fully trust our law. Many causes, in themselves obvious, may be assigned to explain this attitude. For one thing, our law is for the most part a mystery to them — very much akin, from their situation, to the commands of an unknown god speaking in an unknown tongue. Illiteracy and want of opportunity frequently cooperate to bar the great mass of our people from familiarity, or even a nodding acquaintance, with our law and how it works. Ignorance is naturally not all conducive to confidence, it breeds fear and mistrust. I need hardly add that this perhaps applies as much to the lawyers as to the law itself. Then, there is the historical explanation. For several centuries, law as our people knew it had always been imposed from above, an instrument of colonial power, a tool by which the ruler preserved mastery over the ruled. And so, now, our Constitution regardless, the feeling is wanting that

our law is the creature of our people, springing from their needs, fashioned to suit their interests. There is no deep-seated conviction in our people that our law at present is their own, subject to their control, amenable to changes that they may wish. The law remains to them alien and strange, as of old.

Second, there is the persistence of habits associated with the feudal order. Even today, the feeling of security of the average Filipino from the antagonisms of his fellow citizens or society itself is chiefly built on connections. Kinship or other relationship to someone prestigious and powerful is the key to personal security. It pays to have the law on your side, it is true, but at the same time, it is vastly more important to have a patron or protector. This may be a relative, a *compadre*, a friend, or benefactor. In the absence of someone better, the relative of a relative will do, or the friend of a friend. It is sometimes incredible, but even the most tenuous and accidental relationships will serve the purpose — such as being provincemates, or of-

ficemates. With such a connection, all sorts of problems may be tackled with confidence — the getting of a job, the keeping of one, obtaining a promotion, securing a loan, etc. Such a technique, applied with success in many difficulties, is also made to apply to personal entanglement with the law. In many cases, a peasant or *obrero* is persuaded to refrain from bringing a suit or to desist from a pending suit, through the intervention of his landlord, or employer, or whoever is the protector or patron whose suggestion he would have no face to refuse. What is vital in such cases is locating the patron or protector of the injured or aggrieved party and securing his good offices in bringing about a settlement, usually for a consideration. Much as the peasant or laborer would wish to vindicate his rights in court, how could he refuse his patron or protector, the man to whose will he is chained by that indestructible institution, *utang na loob*?

By no means, of course, are extra-judicial settlements condemned. In fact, a settlement out of court is an excellent

way of bringing disputes to an end and it is the policy of the law to encourage the parties to settle their dispute among themselves whenever they can. But this goes only for fair settlements. Such fair settlements are highly unlikely when an ignorant or illiterate peasant or worker bargains with a more fortunate citizen. A fair deal is possible as a rule only where the parties are approximately equal in bargaining strength, but not, as in such cases, where one of the parties is clearly at a disadvantage. In addition, it is to be deplored that many of the cases compromised are criminal cases, which the law is supposed to deal with regardless of any private arrangements. Crimes against citizens must be met with equal penalties. To the extent that extra-judicial settlements preclude this result, the protection of our law is unequal and therefore violative of the rule of law and our Constitution.

From our analysis of the basic situations of injustice, which offend the rule of law, it becomes clear that a full observance of this standard is possible only in the context

of a truly democratic order. There must be democracy not only as to the order of power in society, but as to the order of goods or property if you please, as well. Only a democratic order of power, with a basic framework of a limited and truly representative government, can stave off the injustice of discrimination or inequality in the law itself, and the injustice of its unfair or unequal application.

At the same time, a democratic order of goods is imperative. This means a more equitable distribution of income and a substantial improvement in the standard of living for the common man. Without adequate means, the average citizen cannot be a free and intelligent participant in the democratic order of power. Without economic security, he would remain the hopeless captive of iron necessities, a tool of other minds and a helpless pawn in the game of selfish politics. Of course, the making of a free man needs more than bread. But without bread, he would neither be a man nor free. He would only be a little more than a beast, concerned only with

necessities, heedless of his higher birthright. Such is the present plight of the great mass of our people. Economic despair leads them to barter their freedoms. Hence, the sale of votes, the disposal

of their political rights. And hence, the bargaining away of civil rights which the law recognizes in them. For without the wherewithal of existence, what are rights and what is dignity?

ON JUDGMENT

We must necessarily base our judgment upon what we know and what we can reasonably hope to know. Our philosophy is what life has taught us; our principles of literature are what our literary experience has taught us. We cannot expect to establish a code of literary laws for others; we ought not to hope that others will make a code of literary laws for us. Our worth as literary critics largely depends upon our ability to free our minds from cant, obsolete psychology, unexamined contradictions, docile acceptance of fashion and insolent defiance of fashion, words masquerading as ideas and metaphors masquerading as thoughts, a sense of superiority to the past and a sense of inferiority of the present. If these are our aims, the absence of definable "standards" (whether ethical or esthetic) becomes less disturbing. — From Casell's Encyclopedia of World Literature.

- The teacher must see more, think more, and understand more than the average man or woman of the society in which he lives.

DILEMMA OF THE TEACHER OF ENGLISH

The instructor of English in college here is impaled on the horns of a dilemma. He is expected to help students master a foreign language they have not learned to speak and write correctly, let alone intelligently. The failure from the yearly crop of freshmen in our reputable universities and colleges is estimated at about one-half. It is a safe bet that in 9 cases out of 10 failure is directly traceable to deficiency in English. One need not labor the point that since language is the key to knowledge, proficiency in language is necessary if one is to keep up with any course, be it mathematics, or literature. Language is part of the individual's makeup and if he neglects it, he stagnates.

The average college student's woeful lack of understanding of English can be better appreciated if we compare his basic training in this

language with that of his American counterpart. The American student who enters college has had at least 12 years in grammar school and high school to gain a basic command of his native language, English. The Filipino student enters college with only 10 years of instruction in this foreign tongue. Yet, it is now standard complaint of American education authorities that "students could not read or write adequately, and could not express themselves orally with either clarity or precision." It is now standard practice in graduate schools in the United States to require an examination in basic command of the English language before admission to these schools. When such a requisite is deemed necessary for candidates for the Ph.D., there must be something fundamentally wrong with the teaching of the language in grammar

school and high school as well as in college. That is why there is a general clamor among educators in the United States today for a sweeping revision of language teaching methods to the end that what has come to be known as the "English problem" may be solved.

This observation underscores only too clearly the appalling lack of preparation of the Filipino college student in the language of instruction, which has become the bane and nightmare of the instructor of English. What is the solution? Every means in the book has been tried. Yet, every year each succeeding crop of freshmen seems to be progressively worse off than the last as far as this "English problem" is concerned. Many students simply cannot express themselves in intelligible English, much less write a simple sentence without running afoul of some rule of syntax or grammar. This is because they have not learned to read. They have not developed the thirst for reading. They therefore do not utilize the best means they have to pick up the language.

Reading, to most students, has become a lost art. It is the most neglected of the three R's. Carlyle had the right idea when he confidently prophesied a century ago that in a hundred years all education would be carried on by the University of Books. This is as it should be. Man has left his imprint on the pages of history through the books. But Carlyle did not reckon with the present-day instruments of communication which we call the mass media, notably the radio, television and the cinema. Against the lure of a Hollywood "classic" in technicolor, what chance has a book? When Hollywood can rehash, to cite only one notable example, *The Brothers Karamasov* to give it a happy ending and make a gaping movie audience acclaim it as the Dostoyevsky masterpiece, why bother read the book? Or any book, for that matter?

Here is where the teacher comes in. The chief function of the teacher, it has been said, is that of being an opener of doors. To quote an authority, the teacher "constantly opens new doors to his stu-

dents, thus permitting them to see vistas previously undreamed of, to enter exciting areas of experience, to find new roads in the search for and pursuit of truth." And this can be done only through books. The teacher must help the students discover, and revel in, the wonderful new world of books. To do this, the teacher must see more, think more and understand more than the average

man or woman of the society in which he lives. He must be able to inspire the learner in such fashion that he really *wants* to learn. This means that the teacher must spend the whole of his career widening the horizons of his spirit. This he cannot do unless he has the urge to seek truth—through books. Reading, says Bacon, maketh a full man. To keep alive, one must simply read.

WE FOOT THE BILL, ALWAYS . . .

The much-ballyhooed \$10 million credit loan from Spain is a hoax. We will pay interest on it but we may never get it at all. The condition of the loan is that we can get it only after we have exhausted all our borrowing potentials in the USA, the World Bank and the IMF. Since we won't be able to do that in the next five years, the Spanish "loan" will just earn interest for Spain. It was all a publicity stunt to make the Spain visit look like something fruitful but it is we who will pay. — Teodoro Valencia.

- A university student, moved by Rizal's writings, delves into the many facets of Filipino society and finds it wanting.

RIZAL AND OUR LOST IDENTITY

"The Filipino as Spaniard, the Filipino as American, the Filipino as Japanese — when is the Filipino going to be himself? He has worn so many masks, appearance is hard to distinguish from reality. The mimic, no matter how expert, must eventually be himself. The act must stop, when the lights go out, in the loneliness of his room, in the loneliness of his soul."

— Teodoro Locsin

OSCAR VALENZUELA

I

For centuries, like the bamboo that sways with each lash of the angry wind, the Filipino had to show different faces to those who came to conquer and rule. Each face was different from the other. Each face sought the gaze of a different eye.

Consider the face so common during the Spanish reign:

"He always joined anyone, who would speak ill of the natives considering himself above such reproach and not one of the natives. Thinking himself far above the half-caste Chinese and Spaniards, he would be with anyone who disliked them. When-

ever new taxes had to be imposed, or a new special assessment made, he was always first to speak in favor of it, more so when he could sense a lucrative contract. On occasions of victory, celebration of birthdays, feastdays, births, or funerals in the family of the important officials, he had a special orchestra ready at his beck and call to play for them. He would cause eulogies written, hymns composed and sung in honor of 'the generous and much loved governor' or 'the just and courageous judge.'

Such was the typical face then, as seen through Rizal's *Kapitan Tiago*. And then there was *Doña Victorina*,

who, "... in the ecstasies of contemplating herself had looked with disdain on her many Filipino admirers, since her aspirations were toward another race."

There were different masks, each one a misfit. There was the liberal mask which in reality offered liberalism only in so far as the tyrant allows it. There was the mask of reform, well-meaning but hopeless. There were many voices begging for due process of law under a despotism, as if those voices could persuade the tiger to change its stripes and thus cease to be a tiger. In the end, the despot began to tighten its hold, squeezing the lifeblood of an unfortunate race, drop by precious drop.

Then suddenly, just as the sea was quieting down, another wave, a bigger one came rushing in. This new regime in turn produced, not fear but a feeling of inferiority and incompetence in the Filipino. Before such astounding ability to build and create, he only felt overwhelmed. Was there any way possible by which he could be as good as the Americans? By asking them to teach him

how to build? No, three centuries of a farcical education was enough for him. Perhaps if Filipinas was turned into a state of America. . . But that requires an act of Congress. Then how? If he could not be one, he could seem to be one. Yes, he could be a brown American and in the dark no one would know he only "seemed" American.

Hence there was the beginning of the imitation of the American way, a beginning that appeared to desire no end and until now has not quite begun to end. With the case of the Americans, the motive was not to hide but to show an imitation complete with the stateside accent. Not fear but hero-worship was the compulsion.

Time later showed us that nowhere else had a people ever come under a foreign rule and accepted it with such bubbling enthusiasm as the Filipinos did for the brother American. When independence came, there was no deafening cheer of jubilation, there was no great rejoicing for soon the six-footer friend must go. How sad, So full of nostalgia and regret.

Anyway, the "good old days" were recalled with a passion possible only when a young republic has not yet learned how to fully dedicate itself to the public good. For when independence came, who were they who seemed to hold the world in their pockets just because the people elected to give the reign of power to them? Not just ordinary men. Beasts. The corruptors. The *caciques* of Rizal's San Diego come to life again — and more powerful, more sinister perhaps.

"I prefer a government run like hell by Filipinos to a government run like heaven by Americans." This was the bombastic cry of President Quezon. And what a tumultuous hell!

The old days that were not really so good seemed good indeed.

So at last another mask was taken off — the American mask. It did not fit too well but just the same it had been put on willingly. The American regime resulted in a self-willed depreciation. Perhaps, since the Americans can do everything, the Filipinos can do nothing. But of course there must be compensation.

The Filipinos must be superior in some other field — let it then be vice: Filipinos may be entirely incapable of building things but surely they must be superior to Americans in drinking, in gambling, in accumulating mistresses! Filipinos may be entirely worthless but they are superior to Americans in vice. What other booster does the national ego desire than this? To be the worse of two bad things?

It is true that admiration is harmless, but it is also useless. Always, the thing admired is not the same as the admirer. In spite of having elevated Brother American to a marble pedestal higher than those of the fallen heroes, Filipinos eventually realized that they are not Americans at all.

Then what is he? He feels an overwhelming desire to belong but always there is only the sense of not belonging. They would think wistfully of home but where is their home? What is their native land? What is their Pilipinas? What are they, the Filipinos? Imitators. . .

This Americanization of the Filipinos experienced an

interruption when the new rulers, the Japanese, came. Before their very eyes, their brother Americans suffered. They were only human after all. But still, the ties that bound the master race and the imitation master race held fast, even bringing the two closer than ever before. For how can they not feel closer when they had to share the same humiliation, the same misery, the same suffering? Once more love for the brother American took possession of the Filipino soul.

Some, it is true, rejoiced, but the masses lost their hearts to Americans out of compassion perhaps or the sharing of a common woe. The two races were one against the enemy. Truly they were brothers. Failure and defeat has united them.

But meanwhile a man must live — a very difficult process. Life became more tolerable through resistance or collaboration. Perhaps those who were afraid to die somehow managed to live. The price of survival, as in other tyrant rules, was no longer imitation but pretense. But there were exceptions. It is quite ironic to remember that some

Filipinos became more Japanese than the Japanese themselves. It became so difficult to distinguish those who seemed and those who were.

The new mask was not worn for long for soon the Japanese were driven away. Then came the new era of independence and the common mask was taken off. Definite mimicry passed away. At least for the whole race there ceased to be one common disguise. Instead there came a jumble of many masks, each individual being free to wear that which he thinks fits him or enhances his appearance best.

After four centuries of foreign domination, a certain national ambivalence has taken root. The race has managed to live through those centuries fooling their foreign rulers by being what it is not. A skill in make-up has developed. We have become slippery characters — like a *dahong palay* which is green with the grass and brown with the mud. The Filipino eludes the foreigners' understanding. The Filipino eludes the foreigners' grasp. Is it possible that this uncertainty of character can be a

portrait of the Filipino as a people?

But sadly, this same character is as elusive to Filipinos themselves as to the foreigners. Take away the different masks, take away the many disguises — what is a Filipino? So foreign has he become to himself that the Filipino can not be blamed for feeling desolate. Perhaps he can not be blamed for all his bad acts. But then, who is to blame?

II

Right now our identity as a people is "Nobody." But we can not go on forever being nobody. We must find our identity. We have had a great man who knew of the loss of identity of our unfortunate race. We have his legacy — a treasury of writings with which perhaps he sought to find for his people an identity of which they could be proud. And we need not accept his writings as a synthesis of the travails of a Filipino society, if such a society ever existed. What is important is to see the difference between our society and that of Rizal. We have to believe that the problems of his

epoch were much similar to ours, although framed in a more complex, a more painful futility.

Between Rizal's society and ours, it is easy to see that there is not much great difference. The society that was, still is today. Whatever we were, we are today — a people without a portrait. Whatever we pretended to be we have become in time — imitations.

Our masks have become our nature. When we try to remove them, we find we can not. And if we could, the face would still be the same. The Filipino has become all he has tried to be — the masks he has put on. The Filipino is much more than the mountain primitive. To be a Filipino is not a simple thing. It is a great bewilderment, a matter too complex for the Filipino to understand completely. Being a Filipino is another way of describing what it is to be a man. There is the inescapable and difficult problem of being. There is an inevitable awakening into harsh reality. The man after trying to find himself in many different things returns but only

to himself, the inescapable one. He is like Mitya who sought escape and the reality of his being in many things, in debauchery, in sensual lust, in all the vile avenues toward recovery or lifelong damnation of the spirit. Eventually, Mitya found only the goodness in his soul. He found his self in him. As with the Filipino, when the mask is off eventually there is only himself.

Having accepted the sad plight of our race — its loss of identity — let us turn our attention to the man who might yet bring the restoration of our portrait as a people — Jose Rizal. You speak of Rizal as dead? You must know there are no dead. Nearness to a beloved patriot is not mere proximity of body, but nearness to the spirit. Just as Rizal was contemporaneous with his epoch, Rizal is very much alive and contemporaneous with us. At least, in the hearts of some good men, Rizal is the ultimate center which one must try to approximate in order to find the secret of being. Perhaps, if we are lucky enough, if those good men are strong enough, we might

find an identity similar to that of Rizal. In reality, we are not the people Rizal envisioned. He was wrong when he spoke of a people happy and free, after centuries of misery and degradation. He was wrong when he thought of the place in the sun which his people shall make. We have not found our place in the sun. We have to find ourselves first. Then we could all be Rizals, true Filipinos.

It is disheartening to know that from Rizal's time to ours there has not been much improvement in our character as a people. Through *Tasio*, the Sage, he says:

"Ah, we were speaking of the present condition of the Philippines. Yes we are now entering upon a period of strife, or rather, I should say that you are, for my generation belongs to the night, we are passing away. This strife is between the past, which seizes and strives with curses to cling to the tottering feudal castle, and the future, whose song of triumph may be heard from afar amid the splendors of the coming dawn, bringing the messages of Good News

from other lands. Who will fall and be buried in the smouldering ruins?"

Our present was the future being spoken of. The song of triumph was just the rustle of leaves of time scattered by the winds of history. The dawn was without a brilliant sun. We could very much say what Tasio said. We could hope as Rizal hoped, with the same optimism. Or, on the other hand, we could be more realistic, we could be pessimists predicting the inevitable death of an accursed people. Either way there is the danger of falling into cynical inaction. Perhaps so many have fallen into it. In time they will prove to be the greatest obstacles that will hinder the restoration of a race to a pedestal worthy of such lofty idealisms as possessed by the scant few but true Filipinos.

It is unrealistic to ignore reality, but it is unnatural to condemn one's countrymen. A nation may rise as high as the sky and the people may sink to the lowest depths of infamy and degradation but never below the reach of the patriot's love. "... love of

country is never effaced once it has penetrated the heart because it carries with it a divine stamp which renders it eternal and imperishable," Rizal wrote.

III

With his eloquent pen Rizal created ideals living through the noble characters in his novels, Elias, Tasio, Isagani. . . . He said the things the people wanted to say but which they could not because centuries of shackled silence have rendered the tongue ineffectual, dumb. Through his writings his patriotic sentiments shine out. "It is said that love is the most powerful force behind the most sublime actions. Well then, of all loves, that of country is the greatest, the most heroic, and the most disinterested." And he exhorts: "whatever our condition might be then, let us love her always and let us wish nothing but her welfare."

And just as he was great in writing, in deeds he was greater. He resolved to expose the truth about his country and the strange malady that has afflicted it he-

cause "my duty has dictated to me, and it does not matter if I should die in its fulfillment." And he added that he was going "to finish my work and to confirm with my example what I have always preached. Man ought to die for his duty and his conviction."

Even when death was inevitable he did not waver. "I prefer to face death cheerfully and gladly give my life to free so many innocent persons from unjust persecution . . . I shall die happy, satisfied with the thought that all that I have suffered, my past, my present and my future, my life, my love, my joys,—everything I have sacrificed for my country. . . I shall die blessing her and wishing her the dawn of redemption."

Rizal undertook upon himself the task of the Filipino understanding his own people, their weaknesses and their sufferings and their hopes, in order to prepare them and to lead them to freedom and wholeness. He was the most enlightened revolutionary, one who sought a change achieved not through bloodshed but through ideals.

In conceiving the possibility of all Filipinos integrating themselves into a national community, he was, in effect, profounding a new way of life which by its very nature could not exist indefinitely within the framework of a colonial structure. In both of his novels, there is a failure on a common thing—change. In *Noli*, Ibarra failed in his attempts to solve the problems of Sisa and the schoolmaster. In *Fili Simoun* again failed in his attempt to cure the social ills by bloody revolution. Briefly, the social ills are not at all solved in his novels and no positive solutions are offered. Probably Rizal wanted to raise the question as to why and how these attempts failed. Perhaps he wanted the reader to see for himself which final method shall succeed.

Relating the problems of the novels with the aim of *La Liga Filipina* to weld the Filipinos into a national community, we can conclude that the existence of a national community alone could solve the ills presented in the novels. Rizal wanted to build a community where relations

were essentially moral in character, and where the people thought of the community before their personal desires. In *La Indolencia de los Filipinos*, Rizal pointed out that the lack of a national sentiment and the poor training of the people aggravated their own ills. Conversely, the ills of the country could be reduced by the development of a national sentiment and discipline, and most important—a better education, for it is through education that the formation of a national sentiment can be more easily facilitated. (Only when a national community has been formed can a people develop intellectual and moral virtues, where they were aware of their rights and had developed the character with which to defend these rights to the extent of dying for them. Indeed, in such a community exploitation and tyranny would disappear, for Rizal believed that tyrants existed only where there were slaves, a corrupt government only among a corrupt people.

Corrupt government, corrupt people! Can it be that we possess not the substance

but the shadow of a national community?

Possibly, Rizal was more interested in preparing the people for eventual independence in order not to perpetuate in the succeeding social order the very ills he exposed in the *Noli*. For if such ills would persist, what would have been accomplished is merely a succession of bad governments, nothing accomplished in matters of freedom and morality. Rizal probably did not believe that an immoral government of Filipinos was more desirable than a similar one by Spaniards.

As shown in his *Filipinas Dentro De Cien Años*, Rizal anticipated that the Philippines would some day be an independent nation. This foresight gave him the desire to prepare the people in their political transformation towards independence so that the social cancer would not be perpetuated. Again a well-integrated national community by Rizal's standards would be a prerequisite to a successful independence.

Time has shown to us that we are plagued with the very

same problems that faced our grandfathers. The nation is still sick with the same cancer. Eventually it will die for it can not go on forever sick. But still there is always the promise of an effective cure even if that cure is slow, painful and costly.

As Rizal said, we have to have a national community. For us to become all that we aspire to be we must stand united for the common good,

the common weal before our selfish well-being. When we have created a true nation, when we have become one in thought, in spirit, then at last we will know who we are; we will know our names; we will see our faces; we will imitate no more; will cultivate our own; we will be proud of our selves; we will declare to every man: "I have found myself. I know who I am. I am—a Filipino..."

SHE COULD BE RIGHT AT THAT!

Children — and for that matter, grown-ups — still continue to have trouble with the meanings of words in spite of special dictionaries.

A housewife reports that her six-year-old daughter was asked by a friend how many members she had in her family.

"Let's see," said the six-year-old. "We have two boys. And three girls. And one adult. And one adulteress."

- A visiting librarian finds some of the books we give our children to read in school are "almost treasonous."

THE NEED FOR LOCAL LITERATURE IS URGENT

It is time we took serious note of the deplorable state of the kind of literature children in the grades are exposed to. This problem, simple as it is, has become one to test our mettle as a people with pretensions to cultural maturity and a certain degree of political sophistication.

Consider the findings of a visiting Rockefeller consultant on libraries who is here to develop literature for children in the country. She is Miss D. Marie Grieco. She would like to see some beautiful books, the kind a book-lover can love — "books written for children by your (our) most talented writers, illustrated by your finest artists, printed and published by your most competent people."

We have the technical know-how and the training and the aptitude to do this. But, what actually do we we

find? Let Miss Grieco give you her observations, as culled from a talk she delivered before members of the Bibliographic Society of the Philippines:

"Let us look at some of the books your children have to read in your libraries. Have you seen them? Row upon row, shelf after shelf of discarded American readers. . . Have you seen your children learning to love 'literature' with worn out texts that were designed for quite different purposes and for quite different children?"

x x x

"You know that a majority of your children leave school after the first four years. During these few years, they have precious little contact with good books in any language. . . So how and when do we develop a reading public? . . . Have you seen some

of the books on Rizal that are used in schools? I have here a book published in 1957. . . . Let us investigate the caliber of some of the questions asked. After a sequence in which Jose does some tricks, we are told, 'Jose was a magician boy.' Could you do some magic?'

x x x

"I must submit to you that some of these books are almost treasonous. The sentimentality distorts the man. He has been disembodied, dissected and put back in isolated bits and pieces into lessons and exercises from which he emerges lifeless and unreal in a textbook teaching method which is a paragon of boredom.

x x x

"Even if the law did not tell you to develop ideals of nationalism, patriotism and freedom, you would want your children to be taught such values. You could have

books which depict the beauty of your country, the values of your own culture, the meanings of your own customs.

x x x

"Whatever your values are, if they are to be part of your educational program, you must attend to the literature used in the schools. Since your culture emphasizes different aspects and values in childhood, all American reading textbooks are not suitable for use here.

x x x

"The need for local literature is urgent. We need books to arouse intellectual curiosity, to stimulate aesthetic appreciation, to develop taste in good writing and art. to converse with the child as he copes with himself as an individual human being, as a member of a community and as member of a nation and a world."

Human liberty: liberty of thought, liberty of religion, liberty of residence, liberty of action. — Woodrow Wilson.

- New ways to achieve peace must be sought for the methods we still persist in pursuing are not going to save us from further catastrophes.

THE GREAT DOUBLE FALLACY: TO ARM OR DISARM

EMERY REVES

To the writer of this article, who closely followed the discussions in the 1920s which led to the great Disarmament Conference of 1932 in Geneva under the chairmanship of Arthur Henderson, the present excitement about disarmament appears unbearably repetitious. We express great surprise when Mr. Khrushchev proposes immediate and total disarmament, forgetting that this was exactly what Litvinov proposed in the name of the Stalin Government thirty years ago. And we follow with the utmost attention the American arguments that we must first establish controls before we disarm, forgetting that these were exactly the arguments of Briand, Herriot and Leon Blum. Not one single argument is being raised today by either of the par-

ties which was not discussed over and over again in the 1930s.

Trust and Treaties

Let us imagine that the American, Russian, British and French Governments agree on all the problems concerning nuclear disarmament and that in the near future a treaty is signed according to which all further atomic tests will be banned, all production of nuclear weapons stopped and all the existing plutonium and hydrogen bombs destroyed under a system of control as effective as any scientist and military expert can devise. Suppose that such a treaty is signed and ratified not only by the great Powers, but also by all the members of the United Nations and those outside, including China.

Is it imaginable that, given the existing political structure of this world American military leaders, responsible to their nation for the defence of the people and the territory of the United States of America will not suspect that, in spite of all the treaties and assurances, the Russians may hide in some underground cave in the Urals a few nuclear weapons, making it imperative for the U.S. to keep secretly some hydrogen bombs for self-defence in case of emergency? And is it possible to imagine that the General Staff of the Soviet Army, whose responsibility it is to defend the peoples and the territory of the Soviet Union would not have the same reaction towards the U.S.A.?

These are rhetorical questions; for if the political condition of the world made it possible for one sovereign great power to trust the present and future actions of another sovereign great power, there would be no need for disarmament, because there would be no need for armaments either.

But let us be credulous and accept the possibility that, if

our governments succeed in signing a treaty of complete nuclear disarmament, such a treaty would be honestly carried out and that there would be not one single nuclear weapon left anywhere nor the intention to produce one. Would such a most unlikely achievement bring us nearer to it?

In such an event we would be exactly where we were in 1939 and 1914

Technical Steps

During the 1930s our government thought that we could achieve peace by reducing the calibre of naval guns, by limiting certain heavy weapons, prohibiting the bombardment of civilian populations, etc. None of these negotiations led anywhere. But if a disarmament treaty had been signed in 1935, incorporating all the aims of the 1932 Geneva Disarmament Conference, it would certainly not have prevented a second world war. It would have merely reduced the technical conditions existing in warfare during the nineteenth century

Thus we can go backwards, century by century. No mat-

ter what weapons we abolish and what armaments we prohibit, under certain conditions there will still be wars, even without artillery, even without gunpowder, even without cavalry and without arrows.

It is strange to realize how we swing between two contradictory conceptions of peace. As long as we try to maintain peace between sovereign power groups, we have to apply the age-old diplomatic formula of the balance of power. The peculiarity of the balance-of-power principle is that it can maintain peace only during periods when power is *not* in balance. As soon as there is power balance, conflict invariably breaks out. During the phase of history when the power relationship is more or less in balance, we try to prevent war by disarmament. And during that phase when power is *not* in balance, we always try to maintain peace by superior armament, by what we call today the "deterrent."

Misleading Terms

This is a highly misunderstood and misused term, as

the superiority of power we like to call "deterrent" is actually an "incentive." Between 1945 and 1949 our Western statesmen said that peace was being safeguarded by the "deterrent" of the American atomic bomb. Unfortunately, to the Russians the American bomb did not appear as a "deterrent" but as an "incentive," which forced them to multiply their efforts to produce the same weapon and even to surpass their rival in the existing power relationship.

When the Russians produced their long-range rocket and shot satellites into space, they called it a "deterrent" to American aggression. But to the Americans the Russian rockets did not appear to be a "deterrent" but an "incentive," which stimulated them to double and redouble their efforts to produce bigger and longer-range rockets.

If we want to discuss seriously the problem of peace in this magnificent and highly dangerous age of nuclear fission and fusion, we must first realize that our thinking and our action are threatened by two fallacies.

The first fallacy is that we

can secure peace by armament.

And the second fallacy is that we can secure peace by disarmament.

Political Problem

Endless historical evidence proves the incontrovertible fact that peace is not a technical problem, not a military problem, but an essentially political and social problem.

Within a certain political structure, no weapon not even the hydrogen bomb or the long-range rocket, represents any danger. The people of the State of New York are not afraid of the nuclear weapons manufactured in the State of New Mexico or the rockets launched in Florida. But the people of the Ukraine are frightened of them. The people of the Ukraine are not afraid of the hydrogen bombs and rockets manufactured and launched in Central Siberia, but the people of New York and Chicago are.

Peace between conflicting groups of men was never possible and wars succeeded one another until some sovereign power and source of law was set over and above the clash-

ing social units integrating them into a higher sovereignty.

If human society were organised according to present-day scientific, technical and industrial realities, so that relations between groups and units in contact were regulated by democratically-controlled law and legal institutions, then modern technology could go ahead in devising and producing the most devastating weapons, yet there would be no war. But if we allow sovereign rights to reside in the separate units and groups without regulating their relations by law, then we can prohibit every weapon, even penknives, and people will beat out each other's brains with clubs.

Most practical politicians will smile and say that any integration of the sovereign nation-states in a higher legal order is Utopia. This is a debatable assertion. But there can be no question that the ideal of disarmament between the highly industrialised sovereign nation-states of the twentieth century, with or without controls, is the Utopia of Utopias.

A Sick World

Our world is prodigiously healthy and vigorous and at the same time terribly sick. The extraordinary economic expansion of the past fifteen years, the upsurge of almost every segment of the human race, give hope of unprecedented progress. The malady that may destroy everybody and everything is caused exclusively by our outdated political institutions, in flagrant contradiction to the economic and technological realities of our time. This malady resembles more a nervous than an organic illness.

During the past years, our leaders have tried to cure this neurosis by shock treatment: violent changes of mood and policies, constant travelling, innumerable visits to each other, conferences and more conferences. One never knows who is where and who is visiting-whom next. But all this globe-trotting diplomacy, this interminable chain of meetings before the eyes and ears of thousands of journalists, microphones and cameras, can produce no other result than personal publicity and the reinforcement of the

antagonistic national positions.

The shock treatment having failed, perhaps we would try to treat the world neurosis by a rest cure. Let us try to organise a few months of quiet: no conferences, no meetings between the members of the different national governments, no speeches on international affairs. Just for a few months. During these few months, with not travelling, no broadcasting, no propaganda, our ministers and the leaders of public opinion may find a little time to reflect in privacy, to get down to the fundamentals of the problem and to discuss the possible solution with their advisers.

In a democracy based on popular elections, politicians are apt to think first of the effect their actions and words might have on their electors. So they turn down *a priori* any suggestions which they feel would not be immediately accepted or even understood by the majority of their electors. This is a travesty of the principle of leadership. With such an approach in any field, progress would be

impossible. How could we have arrived at nuclear fission if Einstein, Planck, Bohr and the other giants of abstract science had been guided by the consideration whether the masses would immediately understand and appreciate their theoretical conclusions?

Leadership's Task

The solution of a vital problem always goes through two stages. The first stage is to find the correct theoretical solution of the problem. During that stage it is absurd and futile to take into consideration whether the solution would be acceptable to the masses. Once the solution is found, then begins the second stage, which is a totally different process, the spreading of the solution and its acceptance by the large body of mankind.

It is perfectly possible that the correct solution to the problem of peace will not be understood by the peoples and will be rejected by generations to come. But even such a gloomy outlook does not justify advocating superficial and oversimplified measures which appeal to the credulity of the masses, when

we know that even a hundred-per-cent acceptance of such measures by the majority or even the totality of the nations would not solve the problem.

If we want to make some progress, the first step is to organise a meeting or a series of meetings between statesmen and political thinkers to analyse the problem of peace as it presents itself in the middle of the twentieth century. Should they succeed in finding a solution, then begins the task of the politicians, that of persuading the peoples to accept the solution, if it is peace they want.

New Thinking

Whether statesmanship will be powerful enough to organise humanity in a social order that will save us from a nuclear war is impossible to foretell. But it is certain that the measures which have been put forward since the second world war by Left and Right, by East and West, and which we still persist in pursuing, are not going to save us from further major catastrophes.

Mankind has always yearned for peace. The fact that since the establishment of the

sovereign nation-states we have never achieved it does not prove that peace is an unapproachable ideal. But it certainly makes it clear that the methods we have hitherto applied for reaching it have been inadequate.

The fear of a sudden nuclear war should induce us to re-read history and to see

how, in the past, wars have been stopped between families, tribes, feudal barons, municipalities, principalities, and other units when they were endowed with sovereign power. If we are capable of learning from history, the outlook is immensely bright.
—*The London Times.*

WHAT IS FILIPINISM?

However we may differ in our definition of what Filipinism is, we know that it is a hope, a promise, a dream. The hope of a nation where men and women are judged not by their nationality or their religion, but by their worth as individuals, as neighbors. The promise of a land, rich in the fruits of the earth, where none willing to work need fear want. The dream of a society in which citizens may try new social and political paths free from inquisitions. Filipinism is a hope which can be fulfilled — and only we, Filipinos, can bring about this fulfillment.

A GENTLEMAN AND A SCHOLAR

Can one be a gentleman and a scholar? The phrase is peculiarly American, a piece of old-fashioned, ortund, rustic blarney, a cliché of insincere praise. Was it meant to suggest the felicitous combination of two admirable accomplishments or did the flattery intend to go further and suggest that the recipient combined in himself virtues elsewhere irreconcilable?

Probably the first. Gentlemen and scholars were alike alien to the experience of most who employed the phrase and there is little likelihood that they even guessed at their fundamental opposition.

For if *gentleman* be interpreted in the American sense, as designating a man endowed with natural kindness, marked by delicate consideration for others and graced

with polished manners, nothing could be more opposed to it than *scholar*. A scholar is interested in the pursuit and publication of facts. Nothing is more ruthless, less considerate, more devoid of kindness. And few occupations have been marked by manners as consistently bad as those shown by scholars. They are not interested in making a good impression. They shouldn't be.

Of course if *gentlemen* is interpreted in the English sense, as designating one of a good family, with some education, and not in trade, the combination is possible. Indeed, it has been made many times. Newton was a gentleman and a scholar. So was Darwin. So were Lecky, Buckle, and a dozen others. But the English sense of *gentleman* won't do; the phrase is used only in America.—Bergen Evans.

One of the great truths we have to learn is that there are no national lines if you are a decent person.

- A noted expert on Soviet diplomacy takes a fresh look at the changing face of the Kremlin monolith and makes a plea for more tolerance and understanding.

KEEPING A WORLD INTACT

GEORGE F. KENNAN

International life normally has in it strong competitive elements. It did not take the challenge of Communism to produce this situation. Just as there is no uncomplicated personal relationship between individuals, so, I think, there is international relationship between Sovereign States which is without its elements of antagonism, its competitive aspects. Many of the present relationships of international life are only the eroded remnants of ones which, at one time, were relationships of most uncompromising hostility. Every government is in some respects a problem for every other government, and it will always be this way so long as the sovereign State, with its supremely self-centered rationale, remains the basis of international life. The variety of historical experi-

ence and geographic situation, would assure the prevalence of this situation, even if such things as human error and ambition did not.

The result is that the relationship we have with the Soviet Union has to be compared, if we are to determine its real value, not with some non-existent state of total harmony of interests but with what we might call the normal level of recalcitrance, of sheer orneriness and unreasonableness, and which I am sure we often manifest in our own. This again is largely the product of the long-term factors affecting a nation's life. Russian governments have always been difficult governments to do business with. This is nothing new in kind—if anything is new, about it,

it is only a matter of degree.

Russia would have been a great military and industrial power by mid-century, whatever regime she might have had. This greater strength would certainly, in any circumstances, have whetted her ambitions and stiffened her diplomacy. Traditional, deeply ingrained traits of reaction and of diplomatic methods would have made her, under any government, a country difficult to deal with in the present mid-century. It is against this reality, not against a state of blissful conflictlessness, that Soviet recalcitrance and hostility have to be measured. The result does not justify us in the conclusion that we are facing a wholly new and unprecedented situation.

Dangerous dreams

Not only are these differences ones of degree but they reflect factors which have been, are, and will continue to be, in a state of constant flux and change. Soviet statesmanship represents a mixture of some elements which are ones of abnormal hostility towards us and do indeed embody dangerous dreams of

world hegemony, and of other elements which are indistinguishable from the normal motivations of governments in a competitive world. The relationship between these elements is not a stable one. It is constantly changing; and if it is true that these changes have been erratic, that they have been in the nature of zigzags with downs as well as ups, the general trend of them, especially in recent years, has been in the direction of normalcy—towards a preoccupation with internal and defensive interests in the Soviet State, away from the world revolutionary dreams of the early aftermath of the Revolution.

Significant changes

Let us not be put off by the angularities of Mr. Krushchev's personality. Individuals are not so important here: they come and they go, sometimes faster than we expect. I am inclined to ascribe deep and encouraging significance to some of the changes in the character and structure of the Soviet regime that have taken place since Stalin's death. The drastic alteration in the role of the police has consti-

tuted a basic change in the nature and spirit of Soviet society. It has also altered somewhat the character of the political process, particularly in the senior echelons of the party, away from the horror of unadulterated police intrigue, and in the direction of a rudimentary parliamentarianism, at least within the Central Committee. This is true despite the fact that it is a reform which could, theoretically, be reversed again at any time. The longer things go on this way, without a reversal, the harder any such reversal will be, in my opinion. The relaxation of the Iron Curtain has, to date, remained within modest limits. It obviously encounters deep inhibitions in the neo-Stalinist echelons of the regime. But I think it has gone so far that it would not be easy to bottle up again the intellectual and cultural life of this talented people as it was bottled up under Stalin.

Ally and rival

Finally, the position of the Soviet regime has been fundamentally altered by the fact that for the last ten years it has not been alone within its

own Communist community but has had, alongside it, one great associate to whom its relationship is partly that of ally and partly that of rival, and a number of other associates in eastern Europe whose interests it cannot treat quite as cavalierly as many people in America seem to fancy. This means that it has passed from the relative simplicity of a bipolar world, in which the only issue was "we" and "they"—who-whom, *ktokogo*, as Lenin put it—and has come into an international setting marked by real complications and contradictions. People who have only enemies don't know what complications are; for that, you have to have friends; and these, the Soviet Government, thank God, now has.

If this is now a complicated world for the Soviet Government, so it is for us. This, too, places limitations on our ability to treat Soviet hostility in the *simpliste* way that some of our people would like to see us treat it. When we have only *one* enemy, we can at least have some hope of doing this successfully. When we have more than one, and when they are too strong to

be taken on all together, we cannot afford this luxury. In connection with the events of the thirties, when we were in this position, when we had two quite separate and unrelated adversaries: Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia—and when we were so weak that we could hope to cope with one of these adversaries only by collaboration with the other—then we could no longer cultivate the luxury of high moral attitudes. This, I fear, is our position again today, in the face of Russian and Chinese power, not to mention some of the other complexities of our international position.

Complicated world

In saying this I am not entertaining dreams of setting the Russians at war with the Chinese. I do not want to see any great nation at war with any other great nation in this day of the atom. I think it naive to suppose that Russian-Chinese relations could in any case be very different from what they are to-day, so long as the present world situation prevails. I am merely saying that it is incumbent on us, too, to re-

cognise the existence of a complicated world, not a simple one; and that in the light of the duality which now marks the Communist orbit, we would be very foolish to overlook the differences in the nature of the challenge offered to us by these two great forces and to insist on having merely one adversary where we could, to our own benefit, have two.

American public opinion has often been something like a decade behind the times, in devising these responses. Not until the late twenties, a decade after the event, did it begin to be generally recognised in America that a revolution had taken place in Russia of such strength and depth that it was destined to enter permanently into the fabric of our time. When F.D.R. recognised the Soviet Government in 1933, he was acting largely on an image drawn from the Russia of Lenin's day; nothing was further from his powers of imagination than the Russia of the purges that was already then in the making. Even in the Second World War, Roosevelt's view of Russia, and that of many other Americans, was

one that took little account of the purges, little account of the degree of commitment Stalin had incurred by virtue of his own crimes and excesses—a commitment which would have made it impossible for him to be a comfortable associate for the likes of ourselves, no matter how we had treated him.

Progress marker

And when in the late forties, numbers of worthy people in America suddenly and belatedly discovered the rather normal phenomenon of foreign penetration and espionage, and set out frantically trying to persuade us that *we* ought to lose faith in *ourselves* because they had made this discovery, the evil of Communist subversion over which they were so excited was one which had actually reached its highest point several years earlier and was by that time definitely on the wane. Today, there are many equally worthy people, who appear to be discovering for the first time that there was such a thing as the Stalin era, and who evidently have much difficulty in distinguishing it from what we have known

since 1953. I could even name professional "sovietologists," private and governmental, who seem afraid to admit to themselves or to others that Stalin is really dead.

Let us not repeat these mistakes. Let us permit the image of Stalin's Russia to stand for us as a marker of the distance we have come, a reminder of how much worse things could be, and were—not as a spectre whose vision blinds us to the Russia we have before us to-day.

Moral dilemma

I also wish to stress the necessity of an American outlook which accepts the obligations of maturity and consents to operate in a world of relative and unstable values. If we are to regard ourselves as a grown-up nation—and anything else will henceforth be mortally dangerous—then ~~we~~ must, as the Biblical phrase goes, put away childish things; and among these childish things the first to go in my opinion, should be self-idealism and the search for absolutes in world affairs. For absolute security, absolute

amity, absolute harmony. We are a strong nation, wielding great power. We cannot help wielding this power. It comes to us by virtue of our sheer size and strength whether we wish it or not. But to wield power is always at best an ambivalent thing—a sharing in the guilt taken upon themselves by all those men who, over the course of the ages, have sought or consented to tell others what to do.

There is no greater American error than the belief that liberal institutions and the rule of law relieve a nation of the moral dilemma involved in the exercise of power. Power, like sex, may be concealed and outwardly ignored, and in our society it often is; but neither in the one case nor in the other does this concealment save us from the destruction of our innocence or from the confrontation with the dilemmas these necessities imply. When the ambivalence of one's virtue is recognized, the total iniquity of one's opponent is also irreparably impaired.

Worth living in

The picture, then, which I hope I have presented is

that of an international life in which not only is there nothing final in point of time, nothing not vulnerable to the law of change, but also nothing absolute in itself: a life in which there is no friendship without some element of antagonism; no enmity without some rudimentary community of interest; no benevolent intervention which is not also in part an injury; no act of recalcitrance, no seeming evil, from which—as Shakespeare put it—some “soul of goodness” may not be distilled.

A world in which these things are true is, of course, not the best of all conceivable worlds; but *it is* a tolerable one, and *it is* worth living in. I think our foremost aim to-day should be to keep it physically intact in an age when men have acquired, for the first time, the technical means of destroying it. To do this we shall have, above all, to avoid petulance and self-indulgence in our view of history, in our view of ourselves, in our decisions, and in our behavior as a nation. If this physical intactness of our environment can be preserved, I am not too worried

about our ability or inability to find answers to the more traditional problems of international life. I am content to add: "Let us leave a few problems for our children to

solve; otherwise they might be so bored." — From the book, *Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin*, as excerpted by *The London Observer*.

HOW FREE ARE WE?

It is often said, with reason, that a person is really free and independent only up to the time he is nine years old. After this, he is subjected to all sorts of prejudices — racial, religious, social, ideological, or what have you. What he claims are his views or opinions are no more than the views and opinions of people who have influence over him — his parents, his teachers, his other mentors, religious, political or intellectual, and others. Unless he is able to free himself from these influences, and he can do so only through study and learning, he will remain fettered. One authority says, if somewhat flippantly, that the best teacher is the teacher that teaches the least. Certainly, there are many things one has to unlearn. And freeing himself from his prejudices is the surest way to his discovery of himself. Only then can he consider himself really free.

- It will be necessary for each and all of us not only to disarm our armies of dreadful weapons, but to disarm our minds of dreadful fears.

A WAY IN WHICH TO SAVE MAN

ADLAI STEVENSON

With all the disadvantages, with all its disorderly debates and cross-purposes, is democracy becoming a luxury we cannot afford any more? Is it possibly true, as the communist leaders love to say, that history really is on their side?

Even if you ask the question in those terms—which are the terms the Communists themselves prefer—I think history since 1945 has already begun to give the answer; and the answer is No.

Communism has yet to be the popular choice of one single nation anywhere on the face of the globe. In the few places where it has extended its control, whether in Czechoslovakia, North Vietnam, or Cuba, it has been in the same classic role—as the scavenger of war and of ruined revolutions.

And we have seen, too, that the high tide can recede: Yugoslavia ceased to be a satellite; Poland achieved a certain measure of internal autonomy; and in more than one country of Africa and Asia, Communist ambassadors have been requested to go home and take their agents with them.

The score isn't one-sided. The promised victory of Communism keeps on receding into the future. The juggernaut just does not jug. Either democracy is less bumbling than we fear, or Communism is less efficient than it claims.

War Machine

It is small wonder that dictatorships look efficient at waging war—whether cold or hot—because a totalitarian government is in its very essence a kind of war machine. Power is the ultimate

justification for all its acts, and the extension of power is the chief article of its foreign policy.

The aims of democracy are altogether different. "As I would not be a slave, so I would not be a master" — was Lincoln's idea of democracy.

We positively do not want power and domination over others. The greatest triumph of the Marshall Plan was not, as Mosow then said, to enslave Europe, but to put it back on its feet and restore its independence. Our aim in the emerging nations is basically the same.

The tides of history, in this particular time, have brought the world to a fortunate conjunction of circumstances. The colonial system throughout the tropical regions of the world is coming rapidly to an end. Almost the first object for which the emerging nations wish to use their new independence is to overcome the age-old curse of poverty and ignorance, which are the most elementary obstacles to personal freedom.

In this same period the northern Atlantic region is emerging into a post-colonial era of unprecedented growth,

starting from the most advanced industrial and technical base known to history, and spurred on by increasing regional unity, provides the very resources of capital and technical and scientific accomplishment on which the new and emerging nations must draw.

Atlantic Community

The stake of the United States in the success of the Atlantic Community is very great. This is one of the historic creative developments of the postwar generation. We are determined that the Atlantic Community, far from being opposed to the general interest, shall move in directions that will serve and invigorate the economic and political freedom of the whole world, and especially the interest of the developing nations.

The United States, therefore, proposes both to support a growing Atlantic Community and to use it as a creative force for unity in the world at large. We shall experiment freely within it on the institutions and policies of free association; and thus we may perhaps provide mo-

dels for other continents and even for the association of continents which ultimately has to come. We shall make use of all the worldwide agencies — the U.N. programs of technical cooperation, the World Bank, the International Development Association, UNESCO, F.O.A. and other important members of the United Nations family.

In short, we shall seek, in season and out of season, to demonstrate that the fortunate and advanced nations of the world are forming our association not to withdraw from our common human responsibilities, but to explore them more deeply and more effectively, not to look inward on our affluence, but outward on our common human tasks.

Principles

We believe the principles of an open society in the world order survive and flourish in the competitions of peace. We believe that freedom and diversity are the best climate for human creativity and social progress. We reject all fatalistic philosophies of history and all theories of political and social predestina-

tion. We doubt whether any nation has so absolute a grin on absolute truth that it is entitled to impose its idea of what is right on others. And we know that a world community of independent nations accepting a common frame of international order offers the best safeguard for the safety of our shores and the security of our people. Our commitment to the world of the United Nations Charter expresses both our deepest philosophical traditions and the most realistic interpretation of our national interest.

Sometimes it seems to me, working at the United Nations, that the name of that organization is almost right, but that the adjective is wrong. It should be, if we are precise, the Uniting Nations. It was founded to maintain a peace which has never been made. It is not something established and achieved, by means of which we casually attend to little quarrels and difficulties as they arise. It is rather a center of aspiration; a continuous process of wrestling with the seemingly irreconcilable; and a constant straining to break out of those temptingly clear

but hopelessly narrow logical systems which drive us apart, into a less clear but far wider and deeper logic of tolerance that can save mankind.

Moving Humanity.

How excruciatingly slow that process seems, and how distant that aspiration! But "man's reach must exceed his grasp, else what's a heaven for?" It is not just the dread of war but the yearning for peace, and the intuition of brotherhood, that can exert the necessary force to move humanity, against all the obstacles of outworn institutions toward a peace based on tolerance.

And surely, at some point along the way, it will be ne-

cessary for each and all of us — Russians, Americans, Europeans and Latin Americans, Asians and Africans — not only to disarm our armies of dreadful weapons, but to disarm our minds of dreadful fears; to open our frontiers, our schools and our homes to the clean winds of fact and of free and friendly dialogues; and to have done with those exclusive fanatical dogmas which can make whole peoples live in terror of imaginary foes.

Not in order to save oneself, we must act on the truth which our experience makes inescapable: that the road to peace in this fearful generation is the road to an open world.

ON ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM

What is our attitude toward brains — the intellectual? What do the young learn, at home, in the newspapers, over the radio, on television and wherever they turn, about the intellectual? They learn that intellectuals are not really to be trusted because they have a fatal tendency to indulge in subversion. They learn that intellectuals are trouble makers. They learn that college professors are absent-minded and woolly and silly; that "brain trust" is a term of contempt; that "eggheads" are not to be entrusted with political power. — Henry Steele Commager.

- It is an open question whether extreme measures such as the death penalty can effectively deter others from following the paths of those who have faced the firing squads.

SOVIET LAW AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

Theories of capital punishment in the more progressive countries are based on the retributory and corrective function of the death penalty in the scheme of penalties. Occupying the highest level in this system, the death sentence has been subject to various criticisms most of which are based on humanitarian motives. In those countries which impose the death sentence however, capital punishment has been confined only to the more heinous crimes generally regarded as particularly shocking. Only occasionally does the state impose the penalty for offenses committed against its very existence such, for instance, as rebellion, espionage, and treason. Even then, the offense is graduated into various degrees with correspondingly serious penalties imposed and with the death penalty reserved for offenders whose crimes fall

under the highest category.

In the Philippines, the death penalty is imposed in case of political crimes only where several aggravating circumstances are present. Otherwise, the offender may get a jail sentence ranging from 10 years to life imprisonment. Rebellion, or acts committed by citizens to overthrow the lawfully constituted government, is not penalized with the capital punishment. On the contrary, the maximum jail term a convicted rebel can receive is 12 years. Only when the rebel does not only seek to replace the duly established government with another set up by him and his cohorts but also tries to literally hand over his country to another sovereign power is the capital penalty usually imposed. For then, he commits treason which cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be justified. On

the other hand, rebellion, so the penologists say, becomes a patriotic act when it is successful and is able to re-establish order in the society.

With a few local variations of no substantial importance, this system prevails in most democratic countries at present. In comparison, at least one state established and run along Marxist-Leninist lines extends the capital punishment to various other offenses, some of which merit only a protracted stay inside a prison cell. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, by a very recent series of legislation passed by its highest governing body, the Presidium, has imposed the highest penalty on a class of offenses previously punished by less extreme penalties. Significantly, most of these new capital offenses are primarily sins against the economic structure of Soviet society. Thus, embezzlement of state property, counterfeiting, illegal currency transactions, and bribe-taking can earn for those involved either the hangman's rope or the firing squad's bullets.

In comparison, these offenses are punished, at least

in the Philippines, with jail terms ranging from six months to 12 years depending on the value of the property embezzled, the number of persons prejudiced, and several other factors most of which have little to do with the state's political and economic policies. Of course, offenses against the government are classed either as crimes against public policy or the public order. But these labels are more for convenience and orderly classification than for anything more substantial. Suffice it to say, Philippine laws, at least, would probably never reach a point in their progressive development when the death penalty would have to be imposed for the commission of any of these crimes.

It is significant to note that the trend in the Soviet laws on capital punishment has been towards "humanization". But probably more significant is the successive abolition and re-appearance of capital punishment in the 50-old year history of the Soviet regime. Thus, the death penalty was abolished by the new Soviet government way back in 1917 and later rein-

roduced the next year, abolished early in 1920, and re-introduced some years later. After the Second World War, in 1947, the capital penalty was again abolished in acknowledgement of "the exceptional devotion of the entire population of the Soviet Union to the Soviet homeland and the Soviet government" and of "the wishes" of various workers' unions all over the country. The Soviet Union went as far as to advocate among delegates to the United Nations in 1948 for the universal abolition of the penalty.

Philippine penal law has been consistent, at least on this point. The only offenses to which the death penalty has been further imposed right after the war are rape committed on a child below 12 years and kidnapping where ransom is demanded by the offenders.

Quite apart from the observation by experts on the Soviet legal system that capital punishment is imposed on a wider class of offenses in Russia than anywhere else, these experts note the phrase "temporary and exceptional measure" which invariably qua-

lifies any Soviet edict imposing capital punishment on more and more offenses. This clearly implies that Soviet policy-makers, and perhaps including Soviet penal theorists, do not consider the death penalty as a logical and essential part of Soviet penal law. They have consistently justified this subterfuge or legal fiction by maintaining that an enlightened Soviet legal system has no place for such a capitalist contraption as the death sentence. And when it is found necessary to impose the extreme penalty, it is because certain capitalist vestiges producing crimes shocking to the Soviet people need to be firmly and unequivocally weeded out.

This line of reasoning has been most apparent in those laws, most of which were passed only last year and early this year, penalizing so-called economic sins. Thus, recent statements from official Soviet sources maintain that certain "rotten elements" in society are the targets of these new edicts, that these elements are carriers of "capitalist infection" and that "objectively," therefore, are agents of imperialism. Specifically, pecu-

tion, bribe-taking, and illegal trading are regarded as "survivals of capitalism in the consciousness of the people," as forms of "parasitism" without roots in the soil of Soviet society.

Without judging at this point the validity of these reasons, one is tempted to laud the Soviet regime for being firm against such "parasites" of society. But for unfortunate prejudices entertained by most of us which preclude intelligent appraisal of such stringent measures, one might well convince this country's top administrators and policy-makers to give these recent Soviet laws a second thought.

It is of course an open question whether extreme measures such as those recently passed by the Soviet Presidium can effectively deter others from following the paths of those who have gone to the execution grounds. Even those who seek to justify

the penal systems after which ours is substantially patterned by saying that the prospect of having oneself roasted should sufficiently discourage wrongdoers cannot stand up against bare statistics. Publicity complete with lurid details of the convict's death throes does not seem to help bring down the number of crimes all over the country. Indeed, if one has to justify the death penalty, the only valid, though rather brutal, way is to say that electrocuting, shooting, or hanging an offender is society's way of avenging its shocked and trampled feelings. Whether more offenses are brought under capital punishment or only "special" ones is immaterial. One might even be said to be only a more "civilized" version of the other though both are essentially only refinements of the ancient concept of "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth."

A guest on the speakers' stand was unexpectedly called upon to make a speech. He stammered for a moment, apologized for coming unprepared, then looked at the toastmaster and quoted Jonah's admonition to the whale:

"If you had kept your big mouth closed I wouldn't be in this hole now."

- When the interests of a super-power so demand, can meddling in the internal affairs of other nations ever be justified sufficiently?

AMERICA'S SPIES: THE CASEBOOK OF THE CIA

Only more than a year from the order of American President Kennedy to institute a blockade against Cuba, the United States had launched an invasion against Cuban Premier Fidel Castro—and had failed miserably, thus earning world-wide condemnation from both its allies and antagonists alike because of its having taken a hand in engineering an uprising against what was after all a legitimate government—and because of its having failed.

Behind the invasion was the Central Intelligence Agency, a coordinating agency whose functions, because of the Cuban failure, underwent a reappraisal by the new American President who discovered that the CIA, in going about the Cuban affair, had made several miscalculations, and, what was more alarming, had taken upon itself certain powers which did not belong to it.

The London *Sunday Times*, in examining the CIA's role in American policy, recently published excerpts from a new book, "CIA—The Inside Story," by Andrew Tully, which attempts to set down both the CIA's successes and its failures and the subsequent steps taken to make sure that its failures as in the Cuban fiasco, would never happen again.

The CIA has been credited as one of the most successful organizations for espionage so far devised. It was formed by then President Harry S. Truman in 1946 to "make sense" out of the numerous and at times conflicting intelligence reports which crossed his desk and which only served to confuse him and leave him as uninformed as ever. However, the subsequent years saw the CIA assuming another form: that of its, at times, assum-

ing the role of a policy-making body. It was during the Cuban fiasco that steps were taken to correct this.

The Agency, actually, can be held responsible for some of the biggest blunders which have been dangerous enough to threaten the peace of the world and for some of the less publicised successes of the United States in gaining valuable information—and at times in manipulating governments to suit the purposes of the nation it serves.

The famous tunnel into East Berlin was one of the CIA's notable successes. Through its agents the CIA was able to determine the location of a terminal of telephone cables serving East German military and government officials. The telephone terminus was six hundred yards from the American sector of Berlin. "Somehow" says Tully in his book, "those lines had to be tapped because by doing so the CIA would be privy not only to Communist military conversations but also to messages to and from Moscow. By late 1954, prodded by Allen Dulles [head of the CIA later relieved by President Ken-

edy because of the Cuban fiasco], America's German organization had gone into the business of tunnel building."

The tunnel finally built to tap the telephone terminus, in the words of Tully, was "a burrow with overtones of elegance." So elegantly indeed was the wire-tapping carried out that for almost a year the tunnel was undetected as it listened to thousands of conversations within, to and from East Berlin, recording and transcribing millions of words for analysis.

When it was detected by Soviet troops, the Soviet Union immediately sent a note to the United States protesting the operation, demanding punishment for those persons who were involved in it. But strangely enough, Tully notes, both Soviet and East German newspapers heaped praise upon the tunnel as a masterpiece of daring and skill and even opened it to the public as a tourist attraction, with guides to explain the apparatus.

There were no grave international repercussions that time, as there were no grave international repercussions

from the CIA's "coathanger case," when it was able to discover the kind of alloy the Soviet Union was using to make new airplane wing. From a litter basket from a Russia airline, a CIA agent was able to obtain a bent coathanger, which had been made from the shavings of a new kind of metal for plane wings. With all the facilities at its command the CIA was able to know what kind of metal the coathanger and the plane wing—were made of.

It was entirely different, however, when the CIA was accused of having backed the French general's mutiny in Algiers against President Charles de Gaulle of France, only a few days after the Cuban fiasco.

For it meant, if true, that the US had virtually conspired against France's de Gaulle and was plotting to replace his government with that of the generals whose disagreement with de Gaulle had been over his Algerian policy. President Kennedy's Press Secretary, Pierre Salinger, managed to convince the French that the CIA had no

hand in the mutiny, and matters ended at that.

But, says Tully, "Obviously... CIA made whatever contacts it could in the controversy; and there is every reason to believe that there were CIA operatives who let their own politics show, and led Challe and the other rebels to think that the United States looked with favour on their adventure."

There are those who will look even with less favour on the CIA's having engineered a *coup* against Premier Mohammed Mussadiq of Iran, which Tully calls a *coup* "hailed as a blow for democracy, which it was, but whose results have not been all that democracy might wish."

Mussadiq was appointed by the Shah of Iran to satisfy the growing nationalism in the country. Once appointed, however, Mussadiq refused to be a mere figurehead: he "shoved the youthful king of kings in the background while he expropriated the properties of the British owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company..."

Mussadiq naturally earned the anger of the large international bankers; Iranian oil

was virtually boycotted, and when he attempted to negotiate with smaller independent companies, the American State Department stepped in to warn these companies to keep away from any negotiations with the Premier. Iran began to feel the consequences, and Mussadiq, finally desperate, wrote then American President Eisenhower and warned him that unless the United States sent more aid, Iran would seek aid elsewhere—meaning with the Soviet Union.

"The danger to the West was clear," says Tully. "With Iran's oil assets in its pockets, the Russians would have little trouble eventually in achieving a prime object of Russian foreign policy since the days of the Tsars—access to a warm water outlet on the Persian gulf, the free world's life line to the Far East." And, even if Soviet Russia managed only to get Iran's oil from the West, the West would be weakened throughout the Middle East and Soviet prestige would rise in that area. "It was clear too, of course, that Anglo-Iranian Oil represented a stake of millions, and when

private enterprise of that magnitude is involved, State Departments and Foreign Officers are apt to react most sensitively."

The CIA therefore reacted. It found out that the Shah of Iran still retained some hold on his people, and that if something were done to enable him to take the reins of government more firmly, perhaps a way could be found to ease Mussadiq out of the government and thus end the threat to the West.

Through various manipulations, the hesitating Shah was persuaded to oust Mussadiq as Premier and to name someone else in his place. Mussadiq, however, arrested the officer entrusted with the message and declared that a revolt against the rightful government of Iran had been crushed. The Shah with his queen, flew to Rome, while Brig. Gen. H. Norman Schwartzkopf, the man assigned to the Mussadiq gamble, took over "as unofficial paymaster for the Mussadiq-Must-Go movement. In a period of a few days Schwartzkopf supervised the careful spending of more than ten millions of CIA's dollars.

Mussadiq suddenly lost a great many supporters." And the CIA was able to put down Mussadiq. "It is senseless," says Tully further, "to say that the Iranians overthrew Mussadiq all by themselves. It was an American operation from beginning to end, a *coup* necessary to the security of the United States and probably to that of the Western world. But after that the CIA — and the American government — stood by while a succession of pro-Western and anti-communist administrations, uninterested in the smallest social reforms, brought Iran again to the edge of bankruptcy." And because of this, Mussadiq, under house arrest, continued to gain supporters. As Tully puts it, the CIA learned from all its manipulations in Iran that "in the struggle with Communism the United States cannot be content with short-term results. It is proper to try to help pro-Western groups to gain power in the strategic countries of the world, but if their only qualification is that they are pro-Western perhaps CIA should shop around a little more. For too often these Western-

oriented leaders are not oriented to the needs of their own peoples."

The U-2 blunder and the Cuban fiasco remain the biggest mistakes the CIA has ever committed. From one point of view the U-2 operations may be called a success: it obtained for the United States invaluable information. From another, however, it was an almost unforgivable error, for it broke up a projected summit meeting between the East and West to thresh out certain points of friction and precipitated a crisis in East-West relations.

With the shooting down of airman Gary Powers over Russian air space in 1960, "the Eisenhower Administration reacted with extraordinary naivete . . . First a cover story was patently put out that was amateurishly false. Then . . . President Eisenhower not only broke the first rule of espionage, which is to admit nothing, but he insisted that the United States had a right to do such things and implied that the flights would continue." This led to the breaking up of the 1960 summit conference and spread war fears all over the world with

the resulting increase in tension between the Soviet Union and the United States.

In the case of the Cuban fiasco, Tully notes that the CIA "remains first in line for censure, chiefly for its apparently traditional unwillingness to do business with any but the forces of the extreme Right." Tully maintains that the planned invasion of Cuba, as ludicrous as it may sound now, would have had a better chance if the CIA had attempted to contact at least moderately liberal anti-Castro underground organizations instead of consorting only with the extreme Right forces, who were themselves discredited in Cuba, since most of them were identified with the dictator Batista.

Here is where American interests come in, for in the effort to coordinate the underground factions which had sprung up in the United States against Castro, the CIA had relied too heavily on the Right. The two most prominent factions were the Movement for Revolutionary Recovery, a Right-wing group composed of military officers, Cuban business and professional men, and Manolo An-

tonio Ray's People's Revolutionary Movement. Ray, however, did not meet the CIA's specifications, for his program included the adoption of most of Castro's program for the Revolution, but without Castro. That meant difficulties for American business. CIA did manage to coordinate these factions, but the MRR was given the highest attention, although it did not enjoy the popular appeal the MRP enjoyed. The rest is too recent to recall in detail. The result was that the anti-Castro uprising failed because it did not get the popular support the CIA was banking on and because at the last minute the United States decided to withdraw full support.

Strangely enough, the lessons the United States government learned from the Cuban fiasco were limited: President Kennedy merely restored all responsibility for the making of policy to the State Department "because in certain countries, the CIA had either made policy or had given the *impression* that its activities were identical with policy." Largely forgotten is one fact in today's high tension world:

that the CIA had at times aggravated the risk of war, and had even acted directly in ousting governments which it considered inimical to the interests of the United States. It may be true that Mus-sadiq and Castro had seriously flirted with Soviet Russia, but can a *coup* against, or an attempt to oust a legitimate government be justified sufficiently? For in spite of whatever "justifications," in spite of our hatred for communism, the fact remained that both Mussadiq and Castro at one time or another enjoyed the people's mandate (by the CIA's own admission), and were therefore in control of their respective governments for better or for worse. When American interests so demand, can actual meddling in

the internal affairs of other nations ever be justified sufficiently? We need only remember that the CIA continues to be an undoubtedly efficient and well-financed agency capable of toppling any government which may pursue policies inimical to American interests. Where does national sovereignty end — or does it end at all? Like the suppression of freedom, which usually begins with the suppression of the minor ones, this too can start with minor, seemingly harmless meddling in the internal affairs of a nation, justified in one way or the other — and can end up in actual, undisguised manipulation of a nation's government as a pawn in the Cold War.

The Pinoy abroad expresses his patriotism by an intolerable yearning for a mound of white rice.. As he sits down to a meal, no matter how sumptuous, his heart sinks. His stomach juices, he discovers, are much less cosmopolitan than the rest of him and they have remained in that dear barrio in Bulacan or in that little town in Iloços with the adobo and the pinakbet. He aches for a plateful of crisp pinipig, and he would give his right arm for a dish of sinigang and patis. — Carmen G. Nakpil.

- 'I shall not be surprised if my last years are spent in a lunatic asylum—where I shall enjoy the company of all who are capable of feeling of humanity.'

CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

(A plea for sanity in an insane world)

BERTRAND RUSSELL

There are two different kinds of conscientious civil disobedience. There is disobedience to a law specifically commanding an action which some people profoundly believe to be wicked. The most important example of this case in our time is conscientious objection. This, however, is not the kind of civil disobedience which is now in question.

The second kind of civil disobedience, which is the one that I wish to consider, is its employment with a view to causing a change in the law or in public policy. In this aspect, it is a means of propaganda, and there are those who consider that it is an undesirable kind.



Many, however, of whom I am one, think it to be now necessary.

Many people hold that law-breaking can never be justified in a democracy, though they concede that under any other form of government it may be a duty. The victorious governments, after the Second World War, reprobated, and even punished, Germans for not breaking the law when the law commanded atrocious actions. I do not see any logic which will prove either that a democratic government cannot command atrocious actions or that, if it does, it is wrong to disobey its commands.

Democratic citizens are for the most part busy with their own affairs and cannot study difficult questions with any thoroughness. Their opinions are formed upon such information as is easily accessible, and the Authorities can, and too often do, see to it that such information is misleading. When I speak of the Authorities, I do not think only of the politicians, whether in office or in opposition, but equally their technical advisers, the popular press, broadcasting and television

and, in the resort, the police. These forces are, at present, being used to prevent the democracies of western countries from knowing the truth about nuclear weapons. The examples are so numerous that a small selection must suffice.

I should advise optimists to study the report of the committee of experts appointed by the Ohio State University to consider the likelihood of accidental war, and also the papers by distinguished scientists in the proceedings of Pugwash Conferences. Mr. Oskar Morgenstern, a politically orthodox American defence expert, in an article reprinted in *Survival*, Volume II, Number Four, says: 'The probability of thermonuclear war's occurring appears to be significantly larger than the probability of its not occurring.' Sir Charles Snow says: 'Speaking as responsibly as I can, within, at the most, ten years from now, some of those bombs are going off. That is the certainty.' (*The Times*, 28 December 1960.) The last two include intended as well as accidental wars.

The causes of unintended war are numerous and have already on several occasions very nearly resulted in disaster. The moon, at least once, and flights of geese, repeatedly, have been mistaken for Russian missiles. Nevertheless, not long ago, the Prime Minister, with pontifical dogmatism, announced that there will be no war by accident. Whether he believed what he said, I do not know. If he did, he is ignorant of things which it is his duty to know. If he did not believe what he said, he was guilty of the abominable crime of luring mankind to its extinction by promoting groundless hopes.

Consider the question of American bases in Britain. Who knows that within each of them there is a hard kernel consisting of the airmen who can respond to an alert and are so highly trained that they can be in the air within a minute or two? This kernel is kept entirely isolated from the rest of the camp, which is not admitted to it. It has its own mess, dormitories, libraries, cinemas, etc., and there are armed guards to prevent other Am-

ericans in the base camp from having access to it. Every month or two, everybody in it, including the Commander, is flown back to America and replaced by a new group. The men in this inner kernel are allowed almost no contact with the other Americans in the base camp and no contact whatever with any of the inhabitants of the neighbourhood.

It seems clear that the whole purpose is to keep the British ignorant and to preserve, among the personnel of the kernel, that purely mechanical response to orders and propaganda for which the whole of their training is designed. Moreover, orders to this group do not come from the commandant, but direct from Washington. To suppose that a crisis the British government can have any control over the orders sent from Washington is pure fantasy. It is obvious that at any moment orders might be sent from Washington which would lead to reprisals by the Soviet forces and to the extermination of the population of Britain within an hour.

The situation of these ker-

nel camps seems analogous to that of the Polaris submarines. It will be remembered that the Prime Minister said that there would be consultation between the US and the UK government before a Polaris missile is fired, and that the truth of his statement was denied by the US government. All this, however, is unknown to the non-political public.

To make known the facts which show that the life of every inhabitant of Britain, old and young, man, woman and child, is at every moment in imminent danger and that this danger is caused by what is mis-named defence and immensely aggravated by every measure which governments pretend will diminish it — to make this known has seemed to some of us an imperative duty which we must pursue with whatever means are at our command. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament has done and is doing valuable and very successful work in this direction, but the press is becoming used to its doings and beginning to doubt their news value. It has therefore

seemed to some of us necessary to supplement its campaign by such actions as the press is sure to report.

There is another, and perhaps even more important reason, for the practice of civil disobedience in this time of utmost peril. There is a very widespread feeling that the individual is impotent against governments, and that, however bad their policies may be, there is nothing effective that private people can do about it. This is a complete mistake. If all those who disapprove of government policy were to join in massive demonstrations of civil disobedience, they could render governmental folly impossible and compel the so-called statesmen to acquiesce in measures that would make human survival possible. Such a vast movement, inspired by outraged public opinion, is possible; perhaps it is possible; perhaps it is imminent. If you join it, you will be doing something important to preserve your family, friends, compatriots, and the world.

An extraordinarily interesting case which illustrates the power of the Establishment,

at any rate in America, is that of Claude Eatherly, who dropped the bomb on Hiroshima. His case also illustrates that in the modern world it often happens that only by breaking the law can a man escape from committing atrocious crimes. He was not told what the bomb would do and was utterly horrified when he discovered the consequences of his act. He has devoted himself throughout many years to various kinds of civil disobedience with a view to calling attention to the atrocity of nuclear weapons and to expiating the sense of guilt which, if he did not act, would weigh him down. The Authorities have decided that he is to be considered mad, and a board of remarkably conformist psychiatrists have endorsed that official view. Eatherly is repentant and certified; Truman is unrepentant and uncertified.

I have seen a number of Eatherly's statements explaining his motives. These statements are entirely sane. But such is the power of mendacious publicity that almost everyone, including myself, believed that he had become a lunatic.

In our topsy-turvy world those who have power of life and death over the whole human species are able to persuade almost the whole population of the countries which nominally enjoy freedom of the press and of publicity that any man who considers the preservation of human life a thing of value must be mad. I shall not be surprised if my last years are spent in a lunatic asylum — where I shall enjoy the company of all who are capable of feelings of humanity — *The New Statesman*, London, February 17, 1961.

Bertrand Arthur Russell, the 3rd Earl Russell, philosopher, mathematician, 1950 winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature. First published in 1896. Iconoclast, passionate sceptic, centre of controversy, he now concludes: 'love is wise, hatred is foolish'.

■ A British psychologist explains how easily we can be deceived by what is apparent to our eyes.

HOW THE EYES DECEIVE

RICHARD GREGORY

Our brains receive information from our sense organs in the form of electrical pulse, but how they use this information to give us knowledge of the world around us is almost entirely mysterious. In our efforts to find out how the brain works, we can at present only snatch at straws. Optical illusions are obvious straws, and they have been seized upon ever since psychology began. For by studying the conditions under which our senses mislead us we may come to understand how our perceptual system works.

It is useful to separate illusions into two basic classes. In the first kind, the perceptual system is disturbed in some way so that it cannot function properly, and we experience distortions, or even complete hallucinations; while in the second kind the perceptual system is normal but it is presented with a


problem it cannot solve correctly. Both these kinds of illusions are interesting, and they can be important in causing errors and accidents.

The first kind may be caused by drugs, brain damage, prolonged stimuli, or fatigue. The second kind affects us all, when we look at certain objects or particular patterns drawn on paper. These are the common optical illusions. They have been studied for a hundred years, but we are only just beginning to understand them. They may take many forms: repeated patterns of parallel lines; concentric circles, or multiple rays which can all produce weird shimmering effects, general mental disturbance, and even nausea.

But there are so many simple patterns which produce distortions of visual space—things look the wrong size or shape. Many theories have

been proposed to account for these effects, but all of them are in my view unsatisfactory.

Two famous examples of optical illusions are reproduced here. They are extremely simple figures and the illusions, are compelling. The left-hand picture is known as the Pönzo figure, and consists of just four straight lines. Two lines converge slightly towards the top of the page, and look like railway lines receding into the distance.



The other two lines are horizontal and shorter, and one is above the other. They lie between the two 'railway lines' like a couple of sleepers, but not touching. They are exactly the same length, but the illusion is that the upper 'sleeper' looks longer than the lower.

The other illusion is called the Muller-Lyer figure, and it consists of two arrows with shafts of equal length.

The first has ordinary arrow heads at each end. The second, which may be drawn parallel to the first, has arrow heads at each end pointing inwards; the fins stretch outwards, extending beyond the ends of the shaft. If you now compare these arrow figures, you will see that the one with the fins extending beyond the ends of the shaft looks longer than the one with normal arrow heads. Evidently there is something special about ingoing and outgoing arrow heads, and about non-parallel lines, which can distort visual space and make things look the wrong size. Why should this be?

If you look at the two figures you may notice something rather important. The first one, the Pönzo figure, has two lines like railway lines. In the real 3-D world, they would actually be receding into the distance. And the Muller-Lyer figures are drawings of ingoing and outgoing corners. If you look at the corner of your room you will see that the line the walls make with the ceiling and floor form the same pattern as the outward-going Muller-Lyer arrow. The flat image

on the retinas of your eyes of the 3-D corner of your room is just like this figure, except indeed that the angle the fins make with the shaft of the arrow is more acute for a figure which gives the maximum illusion. Similarly, the ingoing fins of the other arrow form the same pattern as the corner of a box which is pointing towards you. In fact a common property of all optical illusions is that they have features which we generally associate with depth.

An important fact about perception is that if you look at objects which are the same size, but placed at different distances from you, they will appear to you to be very nearly the same size, although the further ones form much smaller images on the retinas of your eyes. This effect is called size constancy. The images on the retinas of your eyes grow larger and larger as you approach an object, but in spite of this the object as you see it will keep almost the same size. It is true that very distant objects look smaller than near objects, but size constancy works over a wide range of distance.

There is a simple and dramatic experiment you can do

to show your own constancy scaling at work: all you need is an unshaded light bulb. Look at the bulb for several seconds and then look at the furthest wall of your room. You will see a ghostly light hovering on the wall. It has the shape of the bulb filament. This is an after-image of the lamp impressed like a photograph on your retina, and it will fade within half a minute. You will find that if you project your after-image on to a nearer wall it will look smaller. Although it now looks a different size, the effective retina image must remain the same. The perceived size depends on the distance at which the after-image seems to lie in space. The effect is essentially the same as the 'harvest moon' illusion. When the moon is low on the horizon, it looks larger than when it rides high in the sky. The actual size of the moon is the same, but when it seems to be further away—behind the horizon—it looks larger, just as the apparently more distant after-image looks larger.

If your brain is to correct the size of images, to allow for distance, it must be able to deduce how far away things

are. We know that it uses many different sources of information. The most important are the differences, between the views of the two eyes, the angle of convergence of the eyes, and a host of perceptual features which are associated with distance and which can be picked up by a single eye. These single-eye features of distance are used by painters to indicate depth; they are such things as changes in apparent texture, and convergence of lines by perspective. They are essential for objects further than about twenty feet: we are effectively one-eyed for distant objects. Psychologists have found that size constancy for one-eyed vision becomes more and more perfect as the richness of these one-eyed features is increased, while constancy can be entirely absent for dim patches of light viewed in darkness. As you add depth information, constancy increases, but the increase is not precisely related to the accuracy of judging the distance of objects. This is important, for it gives us a clue as to how the perceptual system is organized: it indicates that constancy scaling is not

mediated directly by apparent distance.

Disagreement Which Leads To Illusions

Perception itself cannot be understood without thinking in terms of a number of parallel systems, each one providing information which may or may not agree with the output of the other systems. Disagreement can lead to illusions, and especially disagreement over the appropriate amount of constancy scaling to adopt for a given distance. Disagreement can also give us perceptual paradoxes.

Consider any drawing or painting or photograph. The objects depicted seem to lie at different distances, and yet at the same time you can see that they lie on the plane of the paper. They are seen in depth and yet at the same time as flat. Real objects cannot lie both in two and three dimensions at the same time, yet this is how they appear in a photograph or drawing. It seems that we can have a perceptual paradox when the parallel systems provide incompatible information to the brain, and in

the case of drawings or photographs we have perspective information indicating that the objects represented are lying in depth, while at the same time the texture of the paper tells us that they are lying in one plane.

But to return to the illusions. We have seen that there is a mechanism—constancy scaling—which could produce distortion of visual space if it were misplaced, and that all the known illusions have features which commonly indicate depth by perspective. It is also clear in every case that the illusions go the right way: those parts of the figures which would normally be further away in 3-D space appear too large in the illusion figures.

Any information about the brain could be useful, and generally has a fascination in its own right. Illusions can be serious in flying or driving, and they affect the appearance of buildings and clothes, and should be taken

into account by architects and artists. The fact that realistic depth is easily obtained from flat, luminous figures viewed in the dark suggests a new art form: in the near future we may walk round picture galleries in the dark, viewing luminous pictures with one eye!

More seriously, it is a real question as to whether our earth-bound perceptual system will work efficiently in space. In outer space there is none of the texture information which we associate with distance on earth, and so the conditions will be similar to our self-luminous figures viewed in darkness. Under these conditions, near and distant objects are readily confused: and we have found that when you move round these self-luminous objects they can appear to follow you. This could be most disconcerting if you were assembling the parts of a satellite in space or on the moon. — *The Listener*.

Traffic is the lifestream of the twentieth century. It is the sign of success and prosperity. After all, what is a pedestrian? He is a man with two cars: one driven by his wife, the other by his children.

- We should remember sometimes our collective debt to those who give as well as get and put necessities and luxury within our reach.

ANONYMOUS ARTISANS OF HISTORY

History is a fable agreed upon. At best, it is only a part-told tale. The conquerors tell their own story. The stagehands never get the spotlight. The janitor and the night-watchman remain in darkness. The dustman and the doctor are both important to our health, but who ever remembers the former unless to complain? The names of the kings and caudillos monopolize attention.

When they dig up the funeral bark of Pharaoh, they never ask, who built it? Who first flaked a flint to a cutting edge? Who first made fire and tamed it for man's use? Who pulled on the ropes to make the Stonehenge pillars stand erect? Who carried the stones for the Pyramids? Who built the Chinese Wall? Who cleans the windows in the United Nations building?

When Jerusalem fell, who wielded the hammer and trowel to raise its walls again?

Who actually watered the Hanging Gardens of Babylon? Were there no cooks and foot-soldiers and ditchdiggers and roadmakers in the conquering armies of the Caesars? Who fed and hostlered the horses of Alexander as he advanced to overwhelm the then known world? Who taught Shakespeare the alphabet? Who thinks of the unknown heroes who created the alphabet itself and gave signs to sounds and made possible the memory of mankind in our libraries? Who recalls the names of the bat-boy and the groundsman, who will not get a line in the record book full of the home-run heroes and the pitchers' performances? The Presidents we know; the peasants are anonymous.

In our fables of history the warriors who burned the wheatfield get their meed of praise, but the sower and the reaper who labored there are forgotten men. The captain who destroyed the city wears

his laurels, but the identity of the stonemason who built it is an anonymous grain upon the sands of time. Behind the ancient civilization of China were the little people who kept the ditches deep. The great armadas had their cabin boys. Columbus did not sail alone. The cathedrals, spiring upwards, express the loving care and pride of untold craftsmen.

Farmers in New England, as well as the oft-named famous Founding Fathers, had their share in the Revolution—and their disappointments, too, if the too-often ignored Shay's Rebellion is recalled. The colonels strut in their brightly decorated uniforms, but it is the *campesinos* who feed them. The engine driver and the ship's crew never get publicly, but without them the kings and captains, the statemen and the much-decorated chiefs would not depart. The plane must crash before the pilot and the stewardess get their names listed in the press report. The pre-dawn milk delivery man, the letter-carrier, and salesman ply their indispensable roles. They are the cogs without

which our community life would grind to a halt.

It was the worker's bones which bleached upon the prairies and the mountains before the golden spike was driven to unite the Atlantic and the Pacific with bonds of iron rails. The bloody infantry in war and peace sweat out the blood and tears. The miner in the darkness, the man at the loom, and the girl on the assembly line are "newsworthy" only when they strike. The janitor in the basement of the tall skyscraper, the cook and dishwasher in back of the banquet hall, the man at the switch, and the girl at the phone exchange play their role without the limelight's glare. The prima donna's costume gets the plaudits; the seamstress who made it is ignored. Those who wired the synchroton and patiently worked out the computations to wrest the atom's secrets are anonymous. Thousands of unnoticed workers faced unknown dangers in pioneer atomic-energy plants.

The well-dressed guests at the opening ceremony seldom spare a thought to the workers' hands that poured

the steel, rolled the girders, and riveted them to reach for the sky. The building craftsmen are too many to list upon the dedication plate. Behind the radio's rolling eloquence, the pancaked television orator, and the publicity release stand the stenographer, the stencil cutter, the mimeo man. Who would hear their wisdom without the electrician and the man at the controls? The modest typo sets it up on the page just as part of the day's work. The literary genius could not make his ideas available but for the chores of the bookbinder.

The locomotive engineer and the bus-driver do their job to get us where we want to go—all unknown soldiers unless accident and death break the journey. Who ever thinks of the man in the front

cab of the subway train unless a sudden jerk reminds us that he is human too.

Someone washed the diapers, sewed the coat, rolled the cigar and cut the hair of the allegedly self-made tycoon. Can we spell out in detail the unpayable debt we owe to those who give as well as get and put necessities and luxury within our reach? At least we should remember sometimes our collective debt to those who work in obscurity.

The slave, fellaheen, farmer, serf, peasant, laborer, craftsman, and mechanic are almost as forgotten as the men who captured the first fire spark, made the first lever and the wheel.—Mark Starr, in *The Saturday Review*.

THE LAST STRAW

In the Bowery's most notorious bistro, a bouncer threw a drink-cadger out on his ear four times running, but the undaunted victim came staggering back for more. An enthralled bystander finally tapped the bouncer on the shoulder.

"You're putting too much backspin on him!" he observed.

- Hitherto unpublished, this remarkable document gives us an insight into the early beginnings of Filipino journalism from one who was a newspaperman in his youth.

FILIPINO JOURNALISM OF YESTERYEAR

I was a newspaperman during my law-student days, from 1909 to 1914. I began working as a cub reporter of *El Ideal*, the organ of Nacionalista Party. That was my first opportunity to come in contact with the Nacionalistas, who, since then, have been, with brief interludes, wallowing in power. From there I transferred to *La Vanguardia*, the worthy successor of *El Renacimiento*. I quit active journalism in 1914 when I finished law and for the first time entered the government service as secretary to Don Vicente Ilustre, who was a member of the Philippine Commission in the Harrison Administration. Then I became a law clerk of the first Philippine Senate in 1916, and from 1919 to the present successively congressman and senator, without any interruption save for my brief stay in the Sup-

reme Court and the three years of Japanese occupation, maintaining contact throughout with newspapermen through personal association and periodic contributions to dailies and magazines. This forms the basis of my humble knowledge of the evolution of Filipino journalism from the early days of the American occupation to this day.

I shall touch first on the kind of public relations the two foremost political leaders of our country, Quezon and Osmeña, maintained for a period spanning almost half a century. My closeness to the press, which brought me also close to these top public figures, and my having been myself an actor on the political stage, have given me unusual opportunities for studying and observing not only the character of Filipino journal-

ism but also the relationship between them during that period, the most eventful, I believe, in the life of the nation.

It is a trite saying that all men in public life are keenly aware of the importance of public opinion. There is no exception to this rule, only differences in degrees of sensitiveness, which is a matter of temperament. Lincoln himself, who had a hostile press, said that in a democracy "public sentiment is everything," and "consequently, he who moulds public sentiment goes deeper than he who enacts statutes or pronounces decisions."

President Quezon had a good press when he was Resident Commissioner in Washington before the approval of the Jones Act, and during the Commonwealth, there being in his last-mentioned era no opposition parties worthy of the name, and when even the mouthpiece of the American community was the majority floor-leader in the first Philippine Assembly and during his years as Senate President from the middle of 1916 to late 1935. This was due to the fact that opposition organs (*La Democracia*

for the *Federales* and their successor the *Progresistas*, and later *Consolidacion Nacional* for the *Democratas*) joined hands with the American papers to make war on him. Quezon's impulsiveness and self-assurance bordering at times on cockiness, made him the favorite target of their attacks. Few remember now the unfortunate incident he had with Don Hugo Salazar, a venerable defenseless old man, then editor of *La Democracia*, whom Quezon, accompanied by bodyguards, personally assaulted in the very premises of that paper. For such unbecoming behavior he was publicly condemned and Quezon himself, after years and sickness had mellowed his character, spoke about it with genuine regret, in intimate conversations. On another occasion, while president of the Senate, he met, some time in 1922, reporter Benito Sakdalan in a corridor of the old Ayuntamiento and threatened to throw the pint-sized reporter out the window because of some news item about him by-lined by Sakdalan in one of the local dailies. His conduct met again with public censure. On still an-

other occasion, Federico Calero, writer and realtor, wrote in *Libertas*, the organ of the Dominican Fathers, something that displeased Quezon very deeply. Quezon gave another display of bad temper on the floor of the Senate by literally tearing to pieces that particular issue of *Libertas* and trampling it under foot to the consternation of the gallery and his fellow senators.

American papers — *Cable-news American*, *Manila Daily Bulletin*, and *Manila Times* — not only were after his scalp but were harassing the national campaign for independence, so Quezon thought of publishing his own paper. The *Philippines Herald* came, with Vicente Madrigal, Ramon Fernandez, and the Earnshaw brothers as financial backers. But as happens with political organs, this one led a languishing life, in spite of having had for editors, one after another, such distinguished writers as Conrado Benitez and Arsenio Luz.

Quezon's public relations went from bad to worse when the Roces publications came to the scene. It was not long after *The Tribune* appeared

that this paper turned its guns on the Senate President. Quezon took up the Roces paper's challenge, and one day, seething with indignation, he took the floor of the Senate in his usual spectacular fashion to castigate the said papers and their publisher, Don Alejandro Roces. Quezon's friends approached the advertisers of *The Tribune*, who were mostly Americans, to secure the withdrawal of their patronage. But the paper's circulation was increasing daily by leaps and bounds, and the advertisers preferred to ignore Quezon's request. Failing in this, and realizing the error of his tactics, he enticed Carlos P. Romulo, who was the editor of *The Tribune* and the writer of the Roces-dictated and rabidly anti-Quezon editorials, to transfer to the *Philippines Herald* under terms and conditions which Romulo found acceptable. This scheme did not work either, but Quezon, ever the smart and practical politician, found a way to ingratiate himself with the powerful Don Alejandro, the sole proprietor of the Roces papers. "The Kaiser," as Don

Alejandro was intimately known, was fond of fishing so Quezon made it a point to have him as a regular guest on the presidential yacht "*Castana*", the counterpart of President Garcia's "*Santa Maria*" and *The Tribune* gradually turned out, for all practical purposes, to be the personal organ of Manuel L. Quezon and supporter of his policies.

Don Sergio Osmeña did not have a bad press; I dare say it was even good because he so managed to wrap himself in a cloud of enigmatic respectability that, aside from *La Democracia*, and later, *Consolidacion Nacional*, whose fiery editor was Gregorio Perfecto, and Vicente Sotto's *The Independent*, which went a little too far in its personal attacks on the Cebuano statesman,—the rest of the local dailies, Filipino and American, looked up to Don Sergio in awe and reverence and on the slightest provocation would shower him with praises.

Don Sergio was unlike Quezon in public relations. While Quezon enjoyed a lively interchange of blows, whether on the Senate floor

or in any other forum, Don Sergio would prefer to sit stoically and take everything you could throw at him. No other Filipino in public life would have taken or would take the beatings that Don Sergio took the way he did, from his political and personal enemies and the opposition press. On this score he was no different from Washington and Lincoln. All he did was to let his attackers wear themselves down through sheer exhaustion. It was, I believe, the oriental trait in him; like the Arab of the story, he would sit calmly in his tent and watch day by day for the funeral corteges of his enemies to pass by.

Vicente Sotto, Gregorio Perfecto, Don Juan Sumulong, Dominador Gomez and even Manuel Quezon, whose term of office as President of the Philippines was illegally extended by the American Congress in 1942, to the detriment of Don Sergio's personal and constitutional rights to the Presidency, and Manuel Roxas, who defeated him in the 1946 Presidential elections, are no more. They have all crossed the Great Divide. But Don Ser-

gio is still with us (*He died in August, 1961—Ed.*) seated happily on soft cushions in his tent, smoking his narghile so to speak (Don Sergio does not smoke), and on occasion gracing with his venerable presence the meetings of the Council of State, and distributing juicy patronage among those of his choice, as he used to do in his good old days when he was the fair-haired boy of the American Governors-General.

Don Sergio Osmeña was not insensitive to the attitude of the press towards him. Nothing of the sort. From the start of his national political career, that is, since he was chosen Speaker of the first Philippine Assembly in 1907, and became *ipso facto*, according to the phrase he himself coined, "the leader of the Filipino participation in the Government", he gave evidence that he was not unaware of the importance of the press in the shaping of public opinion, and, consequently, in the success of government policies and of the men behind them. In effect, shortly after he assumed that high office, he established his own paper, *El Ideal*, which

performed the double function of mouthpiece for the Nacionalista Party and defender of the Forbes Administration with which the Nacionalista Party was completely identified. Governor Forbes allowed Don Sergio to exercise the privilege of patronage and to deliver innocuous radical speeches demanding immediate independence, and, in turn, Don Sergio supported Forbes' policies to the extent of causing the enactment of a law legalizing Forbes' order to deport without due process undesirable Chinese.

El Ideal folded up after several years, but Don Sergio continued to be the favorite of the American and the Roces papers, particularly on those occasions when internecine fights for party leadership in the Nacionalista Party pitted him against Quezon, as in the historic quarrel between the two leaders in 1922, ostensibly on whether leadership should be Collective or Unipersonal,—this was the cause of the split of the Nacionalista into "*Colectivistas*" and "*Unipersonalistas*" — but actually a fight for personal supremacy; and again in

1934, on whether the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act should be accepted or rejected, which split the Nacionalistas a second time into *Antis* (Quezonistas) and *Pros* (Osmeñistas). Even during his brief term in the presidency, when his administration was charged with inaction and grave irregularities in the disposition and distribution of UNRRA goods, the press showed a benign attitude towards him.

As for Roxas, Quirino, and Magsaysay, their cases belong to contemporary history. I cannot pretend to know more than you (newspaperman) do about their relations with the press. But this much I will say in the case of Magsaysay. His press relations in life and after his death, in this country and abroad, have been the best in our history, even since his incumbency as Quirino's Secretary of National Defense when he conducted a costly campaign for "peace amelioration." How he managed to do it is a secret he carried with him to his grave. And yet he was the one great figure in Philippine politics who most feared press and radio attacks to the point of

panic. He went to extreme lengths in appeasing and befriending the proper parties to insure himself against said attacks. Even the *Catonian Free Press* could not find fault with him. As for the newspaper publishers, they were all for him: they were made to feel they were his consultants and advisors.

A word more, and this is about Filipino journalism of my time. Those were the years when the editorial policies of the newspapers were still those of the people who wrote them and nobody else's. Of course, fly-by-night papers and political organs, like *La Democracia*, *El Ideal* and *Consolidacion Nacional*, with fixed partisan policies to pursue and defend should be excluded. There remained only the truly independent papers: the legendary *El Renacimiento* and its sister publication *Muling Pagsilang*, which the courts padlocked as a result of a libel suit brought by a prominent American official, leaving *La Vanguardia* and *Taliba*, which were founded, edited and written by the same staff of *El Renacimiento* and *Muling Pagsilang*. The publisher of

these papers was Don Martin Ocampo, a great self-sacrificing patriot, who not only avoided interfering with the way Fernando Guerrero, or Teodoro Kalaw, or Fidel Reyes, or Pedro Aunario, or Lope K. Santos, or Fautino Aguilar, or Carlos Ronquillo, formulated and implemented the editorial policies of the two papers, but was himself in accord with those editors. As a matter of fact *El Renacimiento* and *Muling Pagsilang* and their worthy successors *La Vanguardia* and *Taliba*, were the opposition press par excellence at the time, because, in contrast with party organs *La Democracia* and *Consolidacion Nacional*, they fiscalized not the party in power but the American colonial regime. Our campaign for independence would not have met with success without the support of those herculean pillars of the national sentiment: *El Renacimiento* and *Muling Pagsilang*, and *La Vanguardia* and *Taliba*; and later *El Debate* of Ramon Torres and Francisco Varona, and *La Opinion* of Don Ramon Fernandez. There was also *Los Obreros*, founded and edited around

the years 1907-1909 by Jose Ernesto del Rosario, and devoted to the cause of labor and national independence; it was also a short-lived "periodico de periodistas." A few of us realize the enormous contribution they gave to the national cause. Of them it could be repeated with Churchill: "Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few."

By the middle of the last 20's press empires began to appear: first, the Roces empire, then the Madrigal empire—the *Philippine Herald* appeared ahead of *The Tribune*, but although millionaires Madrigal, the Earnshaw brothers and Ramon Fernandez, all Quezon's personal friends, were the ones who, with Quezon as the moving spirit, founded that paper, the same began and remained for some time a humble affair.

The romantic era of the "newspapermen's newspaper," began at the dawn of the century with *El Renacimiento* and *Muling Pagsilang*, and after their glorious death, continued with *La Vanguardia* and *Taliba*. That era was interrupted when *La Vanguardia*

dia was acquired by Don Alejandro Roces. After a brief interval the era was revived in its full glory by *El Debate* of Torres and Varona, later reinforced by Don Ramon Fernandez, *La Opinion*, but it ended definitely when *El Debate* passed into the hands of Don Vicente Madrigal who completed his own press empire with the formation of the DMHM (*Debate, Mabuhay, Herald, Monday Mail*) Syndicate, and *La Opinion's* publication was suspended. When Ernesto del Rosario, I. P. Soliongco, and Associates founded the *Manila Chronicle* it was thought for a while that there would be a revival of the "periodico de periodistas" era; but it was just a flicker of hope, because soon the paper came to be owned by the founders of a new press empire: the Lopez brothers. A fourth empire, that of Hans Menzi, came recently into being when he purchased from Carson Taylor the *Manila Daily Bulletin*.

Thus ended without hopes for a revival in any foreseeable future the era of the "newspapermen's newspaper". In this community of press empires, whatever policies are to

be defended or attacked editorially, what news are to be suppressed or released are the exclusive concern and privilege of the proprietors; only the columnists can give vent and expression to their own personal thoughts and ideas in their respective corners. Thanks to them, a great tradition in journalism is still being preserved. In those old days the advertiser, no matter how powerful he was, could not be heard in protest against what should or should not appear in the paper; editors then would have preferred to cancel a profitable advertising contract rather than withhold publication of an article or information affected with public interest. I do not mean to imply that things are now quite the contrary, but I know from personal observation that suppression of news and withholding of editorial criticisms of top public officials and powerful organizations are becoming a not uncommon practice.

During the first decade of the century, freedom of the press was only true in the sense that there was no previous censorship, and the li-

bel laws were so strictly enforced by the courts, that to criticize a high government official, for instance, a member of the cabinet, meant a stiff prison term and a sizeable fine not to mention crippling civil damages. Teodoro Kalaw was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment and ₱3,000.00 fine, and business manager Don Martin Ocampo to six months and ₱2,000.00, for the publication of the editorial "Aves de Rapiña" in *El Renacimiento* written by Fidel A. Reyes, upon complaint of Secretary of the Interior Worcester. The latter was not mentioned in the article, either by name, or by the title of his office, but was allowed to prove, by testimonial evidence, that it was he who was alluded to in the words "vampire", "vulture", and "owl", used in the allegedly offensive article. Worcester also succeeded in obtaining judgement from the Supreme Court against such persons as Galo Lichauco, Angel Jose, Mariano Cansipit, Felipe Barretto, and Manuel Palma, who for purely patriotic motives contributed some funds to the foundation of the newspaper, for the

payment of ₱25,000.00 as indemnity. Even the names *El Renacimiento* and *Muling Pagsilang* went under the hammer and were awarded to Worcester. No prosecutor would file such information with our courts today; nor would a court hand down a verdict of conviction in a similar case.

If we contrast Worcester's sullen and vindictive attitude with the humility and forbearance of two of the greatest American Presidents, Washington and Lincoln, particularly of the first, in the face of scurrilous attacks of opposition press and writers, without resorting to court for redress of their grievances, and without even attempting to defend themselves in public, it is difficult to find justification either for the morbid sensitiveness of Secretary Worcester or the severity of the courts at the time.

Yet in those days when the colonial regime was a crude affair in the Philippines, McKinley's famous instructions notwithstanding, there was a firm determination on the part of the Filipino newspapermen, such as has not been seen thereafter, to speak their

minds courageously against the illegitimacy of the regime and the behavior of its highest officials. Long imprisonment and heavy fines did not deter the forward march of their noble crusade. Freedom of the press is now complete and absolute. The libel law has not been deleted from the statute books, but the day remains to be seen when the editor of a newspaper is sent to prison or made to pay crippling judgements for damages, for castigating a high public official for malfeasance or misfeasance in the discharge of his duties. Yet despite this safeguard, the privilege is rarely exercised, if at all. I have not seen so much benevolence or tolerance on the part of the press towards top public officials in the face of so much incompetence and malfeasance. Editorial freedom to criticize condemnable policies and practices of the government or of powerful organizations, has fallen into disuse in spite of constitutional guaranties. At the most it is aired once a year at grid-

iron dinners, when it becomes license.

Let us build up a dedicated Filipino press, inspired and directed, in the words of poet J. G. Holland, by

**Strong minds, great hearts,
true faith, and willing
hands;**

**Men whom the lust of office
does not kill;**

**Men whom the spoils of of-
fice cannot buy;**

**Men who possess opinions
and a will;**

**Men who have honor; men
who will not lie.**

**Men who can stand before
a demagogue**

**And damn his treacherous
flatteries without winking:**

**Tall men, sun-crowned, who
live above the fog**

**In public duty and in private
thinking!**

"Every nation or group of nations has its own tale to tell". Whether the Filipino nation, one century hence, shall tell a story of constant frustrations and defeat, or of great and noble achievements, will depend in a very large measure on how Filipino journalism conducts itself in the years to come.—(From a speech on September 30, 1958.)

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