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DeWITT ON AMERICANS' STATUS

We are fortunate in being able to give our editorial space this month to publication of the brief which follows, work of Attorney Clyde A. DeWitt:

CITIZENSHIP OF AMERICANS RESIDING IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS AND THEIR FAMILIES

When, on the 36th anniversary of the Battle of Manila Bay, the Philippine Legislature accepted the Act of Congress providing for the establishment of a commonwealth government in these Islands and the recognition of their independence at a later date, the attention of not a few of the American residents here was drawn to the question of how their citizenship, and that of their families, is to be affected by the institution of the commonwealth government in this country and its complete severance from the United States at a future date. Some have felt apprehension that they might lose their American citizenship upon the institution of the coming political changes.

All fear in this regard is quite unfounded. The establishment of the government provided for in the Tydings-McDuffie Law would have no effect, one way or the other, upon the citizenship of Americans residing in these Islands. If one is an American citizen now he will remain an American citizen notwithstanding that Congressional piece of legislation—unless of course, he *voluntarily* renounces his citizenship and adopts another.

The question, therefore, is, Who are American citizens?

As a general proposition it may be stated that all persons born in the United States, including Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, and those who have been naturalized, are citizens of the United States, excepting, in the case of Porto Ricans, those who made a declaration under oath, within six months from March 2, 1917, of their decision not to be American citizens. (Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, sec. 1; U. S. C. title 8, secs. 1, 4, 5, 5b). A full discussion of the question of who are citizens of the United States would require a voluminous treatise, entirely beyond the scope of the present article; so for the present we shall consider only such points as may prove to be of practical interest to local Americans. In doing so, we shall deal with certain more or less familiar conditions found among Americans residing in this country.

1. *Americans who have no birth certificates or passports.*—These are, of course, American citizens. The fact that they have no birth certificates or passports does not, if we may use the word, un-Americanize them. Birth certificates and passports are mere evidences of citizenship. Such persons desiring passports should consult Malacañang as to the best means of remedying the situation. The Governor-General's office issues temporary passports, pending review by the State Department, if satisfied as to the question of citizenship.

2. *Americans legally married to Filipino women on or prior to Sept. 22, 1922.*—Americans who marry Filipino women, or women of any other nationality, do not lose their citizenship merely because of such marriage. But do their Filipino wives become American citizens by reason of the marriage?

Prior to September 22, 1922, an alien woman married to a citizen of the United States, "and who might herself be lawfully naturalized", became a citizen of the United States, irrespective of the time or place of the marriage or the residence of the parties. (Rev. St., sec. 1994; 14 Op. Atty.-Gen., U. S., 402.) Did a Filipino woman who was married to an American prior to that date acquire his citizenship? The answer to the question depends on whether she "might herself be lawfully naturalized".

It has been held that this clause does not require that the woman shall have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in the case of naturalization by judicial proceedings, but merely that she is of the class or race of persons who may be naturalized. (Kelly *v.* Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 498, 19 L. ed. 283.) So if Filipinos may be naturalized citizens of the United States, a Filipino woman marrying an American prior to September 22, 1922, became an American citizen.

Previous to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Toyota *v.* United States (1925), 268 U. S. 402, 69 L. ed. 1016, the authorities had not been in harmony on the question of the eligibility of Filipinos to American citizenship. Some courts held that they might be naturalized. (In *re* Bautista, 245 Fed. 765; In *re* Mallari, 239 Fed. 416; and see 27 Ops. Atty.-Gen. U. S. 12.) Other courts, however, denied to them the privilege of naturalization. (In *re* Alverto, 198 Fed. 688; In *re* Lampitoe, 232 Fed. 382; In *re* Rallos, 241 Fed. 686.)

The Toyota case settled all doubt on this question. It is there held that Filipinos are not eligible to citizenship, with the exception of—

"Any native-born Filipino of the age of twenty-one years and upward who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States *and* who has enlisted or may hereafter enlist in the United States Navy or Marine corps or the Naval Auxiliary Service, and who, after service of not less than three years, may be honorably discharged therefrom, or who may receive an ordinary discharge with recommendation for re-enlistment."

This exception to the naturalization laws of the United States was introduced by the Act of Congress of May 9, 1918, chap. 69. (40 Stat. at L. 542, 547, Fed. Stat. Anno. Supp. 1918, pp. 488, 495.)

Said the Supreme Court in the Toyota case:

"When the Act of 1918 was passed, it was doubtful whether sec. 30 of the Act of 1906 extended the privilege of naturalization to all citizens of the Philippine Islands. They were held eligible for naturalization in *Re* Bautista, 245 Fed. 765, and in *Re* Mallari, 239 Fed. 416. And see 27 Ops. Att. Gen. 12. They were held not eligible in *Re* Alverto, supra, in *Re* Lampitoe, 232 Fed. 382, and in *Re* Rallos, 241 Fed. 686. But *we hold that until the passage of that act, Filipinos not being 'free white persons' or 'of African nativity' were not eligible, and that the effect of the Act of 1918 was to make eligible, and to authorize the naturalization of, native-born Filipinos of whatever color or race having the qualifications specified in the seventh subdivision of sec. 4.*

"Under the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, December 10, 1898, 30 Stat. at L. 1754, Congress was authorized to determine the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands. And by the Act of July 1, 1902, sec. 4, chap. 1369, 32 Stat. at L. 691, 692, 7 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2nd ed., p. 1139, it was declared that all inhabitants continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899, and then resided in the Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, 'shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain', according to the treaty. The citizens of the Philippine Islands are not aliens. See Gonzales *v.* Williams, 192 U. S. 1, 13, 48 L. ed. 317, 321, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 177. They owe no allegiance to any foreign government. They were not eligible for naturalization under sec. 2169 because not aliens, and so not within its terms. By sec. 30 of the Act of 1906, it is provided: 'That all the applicable provisions of the naturalization laws of the United States shall apply to and be held to authorize the admission to citizenship of all persons not citizens who owe permanent allegiance to the United States, and who may become residents of any state or organized territory of the United States, with the following modifications: The applicant shall not be required to renounce allegiance to any foreign sovereignty; he shall make his declaration of intention to become a citizen of the United States at least two years prior to his admission; and residence within the jurisdiction of the United States, owing such permanent allegiance, shall be regarded as residence within the United States within the meaning of the five years' residence clause of the existing law.' 34 Stat. at L. 606, chap. 3592, Comp. Stat. sec. 4366, 6 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed., p. 1001.

"Section 26 of that act repeals certain sections of title xxx. of the Revised Statutes, but leaves sec. 2169 in force. It is to be applied as if it were included in the Act of 1906. Plainly, the element of alienage included in sec. 2169 did not apply to the class made eligible by sec. 30 of the Act of 1906. The element of color and race included in that section is not specifically dealt with by sec. 30, and, as it has long been the national policy to maintain the distinction of color and race, radical change is not lightly to be deemed to have been intended. 'Persons not citizens who owe permanent allegiance to the United States, and who may become residents of any state', may include Malays, Japanese, and Chinese, and others not eligible under the distinction as to color and race. As under sec. 30 all the applicable provisions of the naturalization laws apply, the limitations based on color and race remain: and the class made eligible by sec. 30 must be limited to those of the color and race included by sec. 2169. As Filipinos are not aliens, and owe allegiance to the United States, there are strong reasons for relaxing as to them the restrictions which do not exist in favor of aliens who are barred because of their color and race. And in view of the policy of Congress to limit the naturalization of aliens to white persons and to those of African nativity or descent, the implied enlargement of sec. 2169 should be taken at the minimum. The legislative history of the act indicates that the intention of Congress was not to enlarge sec. 2169, except in respect of Filipinos qualified by the specified service. Senate Report No. 388, pp. 2, 3, 8. House Report No. 502, pp. 1, 4, Sixty-fifth Congress, Second Session. See also Congressional Record, vol. 56, pt. 6, pp. 6002-6003. And we hold that the words 'any alien' in the seventh subdivision are limited by sec. 2169 to aliens of the color and race there specified. We also hold that the phrase 'any person of foreign birth' in the Act of 1919 is not more comprehensive than the words 'any alien' in the Act of 1918. It follows that the questions certified must be answered in the negative."

Inasmuch as a Filipino woman, married to an American citizen prior to September 22, 1922, "might not herself be lawfully naturalized", it follows that she did not become a citizen of the United States by reason of such marriage.

3. *Americans legally married to Filipino women after September 22, 1922.*—A similar answer should be given with regard to Filipino women marrying American citizens after September 22, 1922; for the Act of Congress approved on that date provides that—

"Any woman who marries a citizen of the United States after September 22, 1922, or any woman whose husband is naturalized after that date, shall not become a citizen of the United States by reason of such marriage or naturalization; but, *if eligible to citizenship*, she may be naturalized upon full and complete compliance with all requirements of the naturalization laws, with the following exceptions:

(a) No declaration of intention shall be required;

(b) In lieu of the five-year period of residence within the United States and the one-year period of residence within the State or Territory where the naturalization court is held, she shall have resided continuously in the United States, Hawaii, Alaska, or Porto Rico for at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the Petition." (U. S. C., title 8, sec. 368.)

4. *Children of American father and Filipino mother.*—Although, as we have seen, a Filipino woman, the wife of an American citizen, does not follow the citizenship of her husband, nor does she become eligible to naturalization by reason of such marriage, nevertheless the children born of such union are citizens of the United States, except those children "whose fathers never resided in the United States". Section 6, title 8, of the United States Code provides as follows:

"Sec. 6. CHILDREN OF CITIZENS BORN OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES. All children born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, whose *fathers* may be at the time of their birth citizens of the United States, are declared to be citizens of the United States; but the right of citizenship shall not descend to children whose fathers never resided in the United States. All such children who continue to reside outside the United States shall, in order to receive the protection of this Government, be required upon reaching the age of eighteen years to record at an American consulate their intention to become residents and remain citizens of the United States and shall be further required to take the oath of allegiance to the United States upon attaining their majority. Duplicates of any evidence, registration, or other acts required by this section shall be filed with the Department of State for record. (R. S. sec. 1993; Mar. 2, 1907, c. 2534, secs. 6, 7, 34 Stat. 1229)."

It will be noted that the law used the word "fathers" and not "parents".

Section 7 provides, among other things, that—

"the children of persons who now are, or have been, citizens of the United States, shall, though born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, be considered as citizens thereof."

It has been held that in the application of this rule it is wholly immaterial whether the parents are citizens by birth or naturalized citizens. (11 C. J. 779-780.)

A most pertinent inquiry in this connection is as to the meaning of the phrase "whose fathers never resided in the United States" found in that part of section 6, above quoted, which provides:

"but the right of citizenship shall not descend to children whose fathers never resided in the United States."

Does that phrase mean that the father's residence in the United States *at any time*, whether before or after the birth of the child, constitutes a sufficient compliance with the statute? The question was answered in the affirmative by the lower Federal courts before it was passed upon by the United States Supreme Court. (Weedin *v.* Chin Bow (1925), 7 F. (2d) 369; Johnson *v.* Sullivan (1925), 8 F. 2d, 988; Ex Parte Wong Suey Sem (1927), 20 Fed. (2d) 148.)

But the Supreme Court held in the Chin Bow case that the father's residence in the United States must have occurred prior to the birth of the child in order that the latter may have the status of an American citizen—that residence after the birth of the child does not satisfy the statute. The Court said:

"Only two constructions seem to us possible and we must adopt one or the other. The one is that the descent of citizenship shall be regarded as taking place at the birth of the person to whom it is to be transmitted, and that the words 'have never been resident in the United States' refer in point of time to the birth of the person to whom the citizenship is to descend. This is the adoption of the rule of *jus sanguinis* in respect to citizenship and that emphasizes the fact and time of birth as the basis of it. We think the words, 'the right of citizenship shall not descend to persons whose fathers have never been resident in the United States', are equivalent to saying that fathers may not have the power of transmitting by descent the right of citizenship until they shall become residents in the United States. The other view is that the words, 'have never been resident in the United States', have reference to the whole life of the father until his death, and therefore that grandchildren of native-born citizens even after they, having been born abroad, have lived abroad to middle age and without residing at all in the United States, will become citizens, if their fathers born abroad and living until old age abroad shall adopt a residence in the United States just before death. We are thus to have two generations of citizens who have been born abroad, lived abroad, the first coming to old age and the second to maturity and bringing up of a family without any relation to the United States at all until the father shall in his last days adopt a new residence. We do not think that such a construction accords with the probable attitude of Congress at the time of the adoption of this proviso into the statute. Its construction extends citizenship to a generation whose birth, minority and majority, whose education and whose family life have all been out of the United States and naturally within the civilization and environment of an alien country. The beneficiaries would have evaded the duties and responsibilities of American citizenship. They might be persons likely to become public charges or afflicted with disease, yet they would be entitled to enter as citizens of the United States. Van Dyne, Citizenship of the United States, p. 34.

"As between the two interpretations, we feel confident that the first one was more in accord with the views of the First Congress. We think that the proviso has been so construed by a subsequent Act of Congress of March 2, 1907, chap. 2534, sec. 6, 34 Stat. at L. 1229, U. S. C. title 8, sec. 6, which provides:

"'That all children born outside the limits of the United States who are citizens thereof in accordance with the provisions of sec. 1993 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, and who continue to reside outside the United States shall, in order to receive the protection of this government, be required upon reaching the age of eighteen years to record at an American consulate their intention to become residents and remain citizens of the United States, and shall be further required to take the oath of allegiance to the United States upon attaining their majority.'

"Now if this Congress had construed sec. 1993 to permit the residence prescribed to occur after the birth of such children, we think that it would have employed appropriate words to express such meaning; as, for example, 'all children born who are or may become citizens.' The present tense is used, however, indicating that citizenship is determined at the time of birth. Moreover, such foreign-born citizens are required upon reaching the age of eighteen years to record their intention to become residents and remain citizens of the United States and take the oath of allegiance to the United States upon attaining their majority. If the residence prescribed for the parent may occur after the birth of the children, the father may remain abroad and not reside in the United States until long after such children attain their majority. Thus, they could not register or take the oath of allegiance because the rights of citizenship could not descend to them until their fathers had resided in the United States. This class of foreign-born children of American citizens could not, then, possibly comply with the provisions of the Act of 1907. Nor could such children 'remain citizens' since they are expressly denied the rights of citizenship. We may treat the Act of 1907 as being in *pari materia* with the original act, and as a legislative declaration of what Congress in 1907 thought was its meaning in 1790. United States *v.* Freeman, 3 How. 556, 564, et seq., 11 L. ed. 724, 727; Cope *v.* Cope, 137 U. S. 682, 688, 34 L. ed. 832, 834, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 222.

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"The expression 'the rights of citizenship shall descend' can not refer to the time of the death of the father, because that it hardly the time when they do descend. The phrase is borrowed from the law of property. The descent of property comes only after the death of the ancestor. The transmission of right of citizenship is not at the death of the ancestor but at the birth of the child, and it seems to us more natural to infer that the conditions of descent contained in the limiting proviso, so far as the father is concerned, must be perfected and have been performed at that time.

"This leads to a reversal of the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals and a remanding of the respondent."

Weedin *v.* Chin Bow (1927), 274 U. S. 657, 71 L. ed. 1284, 1288-1289, 1291.)

Of course, if a child of an American father and a Filipino mother is born in the United States, the child is an American citizen, for, as we have seen, all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power are citizens of the United States, irrespective of race or color. (Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, sec. 1; U. S. C., tit. 8, sec. 1; U. S. *v.* Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 42 L. ed. 890.)

An interesting question that arises in this connection is with regard to *illegitimate* children, that is, children born out of wedlock of American fathers and Filipino mothers. Are such children citizens of the United States?

No authoritative pronouncement upon this question has as yet been given by the highest court of the land. It will be noted that the law does not qualify the word "children"; that is to say, it makes no distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children. Nevertheless, in a very old case (1864), the Maryland Supreme Court, construing the provision that—

"the children of persons who are or have been citizens of the United States shall, though born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, be considered as citizens of the United States",

held that a child of an American father, born out of lawful wedlock in a foreign country, did not come under said provision, for the reason that *under the law of that State*, such a child was *nullius filii*. (Guyer *v.* Smith, 22 Md. 239, 85 Am. Dec. 650, 653.) The doctrine of this case was followed in Mason ex. rel. Chin Suey *v.* Tillinghast (1928), 26 Fed. (2d) 588, wherein the Circuit Court of Appeals of Massachusetts said:

"Revised Statutes, sec. 1993, Comp. St. 1916, sec. 3947, reads as follows:

"'All children heretofore born or hereafter born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, whose fathers were or may be at the time of their birth citizens thereof, are declared to be citizens of the United States; but the rights of citizenship shall not descend to children whose fathers never resided in the United States.' 8 U. S. C. A. sec. 6.

"*The statute applies to legitimate children only, and no provision is made in it in regard to the citizenship of illegitimate children who may be thereafter legitimated by marriage.* It determines the status of the child *as of the time of his birth*, and declares him to be a citizen of the United States, provided his father is a citizen thereof and shall have resided therein. See Guyer *v.* Smith, 22 Md. 239, 85 Am. Dec. 650.

"The Circuit Court of Appeals in the Ninth Circuit reached the same conclusion in Ng Suey Hi *v.* Weedin, 21 F. (2d) 801, although it went further and decided that, if it were conceded that illegitimate children would become citizens by subsequent legitimation by their parents, there was no evidence of such legitimation in that case."

And so in Louie Wah You *v.* Nagle (1928), 27 F. (2d) 573, in which the Circuit Court of Appeals of California said:

"This is an appeal from an order quashing a writ of habeas corpus and remanding the appellant to the custody of the immigration authorities. The appellant made application for admission to the United States, claiming citizenship through his father, under section 1993 of the Revised Statutes (8 U. S. C. A. sec. 6). At birth, the appellant was the illegitimate offspring of a citizen of the United States of the Chinese race, who was born in California and maintained his domicile in that state. Counsel concedes that, unless the status of the appellant has been changed since birth, he is not a citizen, and is not entitled to admission. Ng Suey Hi *v.* Weedin (C. C. A.) 21 F. (2d) 801. But he earnestly insists that the appellant has been legitimated under the laws of California and is therefore a citizen.

"The circumstances attending the birth of appellant are as follows: His father married a woman of the Chinese race in San Francisco in 1903, and lived with her as his wife for about two months. In the following year the father visited China, returning to the United States in 1905. During this visit he married a second woman of the Chinese race, whom he has since recognised and maintained as his wife in China. At the time of the second marriage his former wife was still living and undivorced. The father made a second visit to China in 1913, returning in 1914, and a third visit in 1924, returning in 1926. As a result of each of these visits a child was born to the second wife in China; the appellant being the second son, born in 1915.

"Section 230 of the Civil Code of California provides: 'The father of an illegitimate child, by publicly acknowledging it as his own, receiving it as such, with the consent of his wife, if he is married, into his family, and otherwise treating it as if it were a legitimate child, thereby adopts it as such; and such child is thereupon deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of its birth.' The construction of this statute is for the California courts, and the construction there adopted is controlling on this court. The rule established by the later decisions of the Supreme Court of that state, while apparently out of harmony with some earlier decisions, is that:

"'The court below seems to have acted upon the theory that where the father of an illegitimate child has no family the provision of the code in question in that respect may be dispensed with. This cannot be done. The Legislature adopting section 230 evidently went as far as public policy would justify in this respect, and the language is too plain to be misunderstood. The father of an illegitimate child in order to adopt him as legitimate must not only publicly acknowledge him as his own, but must receive him into his family, and if he have a wife, with her consent. It does not say that he must receive him into his family if he has a family, and if not, in that case can receive him or send him elsewhere; but having a family, or at least a home, in which he can receive him is one of the cardinal conditions prescribed for such adoption.' Estate of De Laveaga, 142 Cal. 158, 169, 75 P. 790, 794.

"In Estate of Gird, 157 Cal. 534, 545, 108 P. 499, 504 (137 Am. St. Rep. 131) the court again said:

"'In Estate of De Laveaga, 142 Cal. 160, (75 P. 790), this court was careful to limit its language as to the necessity of the existence of a family into which the child can be received as one of the cardinal conditions prescribed for an adoption under section 230 of the Civil Code, by saying "having a family, OR AT LEAST A HOME IN WHICH HE CAN RECEIVE HIM" is such a condition. The words of section 230, "receiving it * * * into his family", imply a receiving into a place of which he is the head, of which he has control. As used in this section, the word "family", in our opinion, means no more at most than that the father must have a "home", a settled place

of habitation of which he is the head, into which he must receive the child, such receiving to be with the consent of his wife, if he be married. The brothers and sisters of deceased, who never lived with him in California, constituted no part of his "family" within the meaning of that section.'

"The testimony in this case was sufficient to prove a public acknowledgment by the father, but insufficient to prove that the father received the illegitimate child into his home, or settled place of habitation of which he was the head. The domicile of the father is in the State of California and his home and settled place of habitation of which he is the head must also be in that state, and not in China, because, if his home and settled place of habitation was in China, his domicile would likewise be there, and the statutes of California could have no application. It seems to us that it would be going too far to say that the home and settled habitation of the father was in China, a country he has visited but twice in nearly 25 years, and but once since the birth of the appellant some 13 years ago.

"There was, therefore, no competent evidence of legitimation, and the judgment must be affirmed. It is so ordered."

On the question whether or not the requirement that children born without the United States who continue to reside abroad upon reaching the age of 18 years, must record at an American Consulate their intention to become residents and remain citizens of the United States, and must take the oath of allegiance to the United States upon attaining their majority, is applicable to children born of an American father in the Philippine Islands, we are advised by Malacañang that no machinery has been set up here for such recording, and that Malacañang does not require evidence of such recording in order to establish the American citizenship of such children who have passed their eighteenth year.

As has been noted, however, American citizenship does not descend to children whose fathers never resided in the United States. This means that if a son of an American father and a Filipino mother born in wedlock in the Philippine Islands never resides in the United States, his children, being grandchildren of the American, do not enjoy American citizenship. The result is that many old timers in these Islands have grandchildren who are not American citizens, and cannot become American citizens unless prior to their birth their fathers resided in the United States.

The reader will understand that questions arising affecting Americans and their families in the Philippines that concern the state department are subject to interpretations and rulings by that department; nothing more than the general law can be stated until the state department rules.—*Ed.*

Philippine Economic Conditions—March, 1934

Summary of official radiograms forwarded to the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C. Prepared by E. D. Hester, American Trade Commissioner, 410 Heacock Building, Manila, with assistance of Government and trade entities. S. R. 34/76.

Philippine economic and business conditions continued in the same general character as February, i.e. low prices for principal export materials causing further declines in provincial purchasing power. The copra, coconut oil and sugar markets were practically demoralized due to uncertainty pending final decision by Congress on the Jones-Costigan Sugar Bill and the Coconut Oil Excise Tax. Banking and finance were particularly disturbed and new sugar crop advances were denied or reduced in many districts.

Provincial movement of textiles was considered especially good due to the Easter holy days and fair peasant income realized from the rice harvest. Foodstuffs turned weaker. Tinned fish has long suffered the effects of excellent native catches of fresh fish and improved inland transportation. Automotive lines reported very good sales.

Construction activity was unsatisfactory with Manila Building permits valued at ₱250,000 compared with ₱947,000 for March 1933.

Power consumption during March totaled 10,300,000 K.W.H. compared to 9,400,000 for March 1933.

Internal revenue collections in Manila during the month showed an increase of over 20 per cent compared with the same period last year.

Transportation

Cargoes: All highseas berths, excellent; Orient interport and interisland, both good. Passengers: outward, very good; inward, fair.

Manila Railroad average daily metric freight tonnage, 13,400 for March compared 14,000 February and 13,200 a year ago.

Overseas Trade, February

The value of exports in February (exclusive of gold) was ₱31,061,586 as compared with ₱19,715,019 in February, 1933. Imports were ₱18,225,131 as against ₱8,608,505 a year ago. The resulting visible balance was + ₱12,836,455 as compared with + ₱11,106,514.

Trade with the *principal countries* was:

	1934	1933
United States: (a)		
Exports to	₱28,196,737	₱17,666,021
Imports from	13,343,850	4,435,956
Balance	+ ₱14,852,887	+ ₱13,230,065
Japan:		
Exports to	₱ 435,422	₱ 451,721
Imports from	2,168,625	1,231,841
Balance	— ₱ 1,733,203	— ₱ 780,120
China:		
Exports to	₱ 184,292	₱ 88,265
Imports from	617,834	734,637
Balance	— ₱ 433,542	— ₱ 646,372
Great Britain:		
Exports to	₱ 352,217	₱ 282,090
Imports from	297,014	260,128
Balance	+ ₱ 55,203	+ ₱ 21,962

The substantial gains in trade with the United States continued to wipe off the losses from Oriental markets, especially with Japan and China, and left a reserve in favor of the Philippine Islands.

The value, in pesos, of the *principal imports* for February and the cumulative comparison for two months:

	Feb. 1934	Feb. 1933	Total for two months 1934	1933
Iron and steel and mftrs.	2,814,035	785,099	4,834,704	2,638,152
Cotton cloth	2,490,129	1,199,710	4,504,043	2,368,883
Cotton mftrs., except cloth	1,017,677	747,819	1,899,102	1,583,395
Meat and dairy products	992,758	422,759	1,730,924	840,461
Automobiles and parts	866,937	208,539	1,521,628	813,603
Wheat flour	587,340	228,112	870,880	605,203
Paper and products	816,228	159,207	1,155,031	493,814
Leather and mftrs.	384,426	119,341	606,031	279,880
Others	8,255,601	4,737,919	15,463,292	11,278,720
Total	18,225,131	8,608,505	32,585,635	20,902,111

(a) Includes Hawaii, Guam and Puerto Rico.

The value, in pesos, of the *principal exports* for February and the cumulative comparison for two months:

	Feb. 1934	Feb. 1933	Total for two months 1934	1933
Abaca	1,262,163	805,980	2,644,642	1,677,326
Sugar	23,602,690	13,887,108	40,592,276	25,227,832
Coconut oil	1,516,633	1,588,828	2,553,013	2,526,751
Copra	1,080,211	778,331	2,037,972	1,766,722
Copra cake	155,558	207,672	348,178	274,981
Cigars	671,243	408,310	1,308,321	697,543
Leaf tobacco	532,101	455,685	693,660	943,014
Others	2,240,987	1,583,105	3,972,749	2,803,867
Total	31,061,586	19,715,019	54,150,811	35,918,036

Detailed imports of *automotive goods* for February, 1934:

	Number	Pesos
Passenger cars:		
United States	370	378,594
Great Britain	1	1,600
Germany	4	3,597
Japan	1	1,225
Total	376	385,016
Trucks:		
United States and total	257	242,051
Motorcycles:		
United States	1	798
Japan	1	698
Total	2	1,496
Parts:		
United States		225,373
Great Britain		7,483
France		35
Germany		1,916
Italy		11
China		2,760
Japan		2,292
Total		239,870
Tires:		
United States		294,140
France		498
China		33
Japan		3,203
Canada		1,759
Total		299,633

Detailed imports of *cloth* for February, 1934:

	Unbleached cotton Sq. meters	Pesos	Bleached cotton Sq. meters	Pesos
United States	1,810,338	316,694	1,734,620	416,726
Great Britain	6,331	4,571	68,697	21,238
Spain	—	—	5	2
Switzerland	—	—	124,658	31,224
China	664	188	100	260
Japan	161,839	29,284	1,104,362	211,195
Denmark	—	—	435	435
Total	1,979,172	350,737	3,032,877	681,080

	Dyed Sq. meters	Pesos	Printed Sq. meters	Pesos
United States	2,101,890	595,122	1,418,798	366,975
Great Britain	94,688	47,357	1,427	274
Belgium	1,114	564	—	—
Germany	1,042	809	—	—
Switzerland	41,162	8,561	14,851	3,368
China	67,048	13,675	8,125	1,053
Japan	1,039,714	241,985	762,792	178,569
Total	3,346,658	908,073	2,205,993	550,239

	Silk Sq. meters	Pesos	Rayon Sq. meters	Pesos
United States	36,073	44,423	85,842	58,225
Germany	15	123	40	19
Spain	34	129	—	—
Switzerland	—	—	2,452	513
China	8,317	8,754	2,740	1,110
Japan	30,351	16,742	708,519	250,992
France	—	—	20,865	9,468
Siam	—	—	914	82
Singapore	6	5	—	—
British East Indies	6	5	—	—
Dutch East Indies	8	5	—	—
Total	74,810	70,186	821,372	320,409

Detailed imports of *pipes and fittings*, February 1934:

	Cast iron Kilos	Pesos	Wrought iron Kilos	Pesos	Steel Kilos	Pesos
United States	422,456	61,615	557,966	100,462	30,059	6,023
Great Britain	20	29	25	2	—	—
Belgium	—	—	—	—	24,633	2,873
Germany	34	17	11,389	1,669	50	4
Hongkong	544	475	—	—	—	—
Japan	—	—	30	1	—	—
Total	423,054	62,136	569,410	102,134	54,742	8,900

Detailed imports of *petroleum products*, February 1934:

	Crude oil Liters	Pesos	Gasoline Liters	Pesos
United States	11,683,871	182,229	4,934,520	312,964
Dutch East Indies	4,571,108	29,656	—	—
Total	16,254,979	211,885	4,934,520	312,964