

# Troop Information And Education In The AFP

By Lt. Col. Apolinar G. Fajardo



**C**ONSERVATIVE and operations-conscious officers have been asking why the AFP has to embark on the task of providing information education to its men, thereby distracting its own attention and efforts from its main mission — military training and operations. To this question we find one of the answers from an editorial of a prominent cosmopolitan daily which says: "If there is any group of men in the country today which

needs to be soaked in culture, which needs the humanizing influence of art and letter and music, it is the soldiery — it is our class of officers and men. For it has become evident that these people are beginning to act and think like that Nazi soldier who remarked, 'Every time I hear the word culture, I want to draw my gun!' The situation could not be so bad if it were not for the fact that army men are being called upon to perform



functions which can hardly be classified as military. More and more, they are being given civilian assignments which they can discharge properly only if they think and act like civilians."

Without accepting or rejecting the truth of the observation, we at once have an inkling of the impression the army makes on the outsiders. It accentuates the need for the tempering influence of culture on our men if they will command the respect, admi-

ration, and cooperation of the people instead of creating suspicion, antagonism, and fear.

Incidentally, culture may be defined as a development of that faculty which will enable the soldier, as well as any student, to think, to understand ideas, and to exercise judgment. It should equip him, in our civilization, to understand and appreciate democracy. It should make him a soldier or a civilian who is a stronger and better citizen.

We find another answer on the pages of the history of World War II. If we are to learn some of the lessons from the last World War, we must consider the most outstanding of them the role information and education played in the struggle for supremacy of two major European powers. It is claimed that a certain deep significance lies in the fact that the only two major European armies capable of facing each other are the products, not only of intensive military training, but of studied information and educational programs. Armies too numerous to mention have boasted of their prowess and morale, but mechanized warfare has eliminated them and they are no longer in existence. Yet because neither the German nor Russian Armies relied on mechanization alone, they survived to face each other in the final decision. These two powers employed well-studied information and educational programs to supplement military training. A

brief review of the informational and educational programs of these major powers should prove an eye-opener for our planners of the armed forces training program.

In Nazi Germany, the boy, from the age of six, was closely observed in school, in the Hitler Youth Camp, Storm Troops, Black Corps or Labor Front. Army psychologists unknown at the outset of the last war, administered aptitude tests and other forms of examination, and long before the German youth entered the Army, his career, professional and cultural, was clearly chartered. Except when engaged in combat, all German units devoted one hour of each day's schedule to information and education. This was in part a compulsory lecture, in part a period of discussion in which officers of fighting experience — men of 1914-18 if possible — related stories of war and battle. The object of course was neither cultural nor vocational training but a thorough indoctrination in the myth of Nazi superiority.

This thoroughness in the indoctrination and education of the German soldier is matched only in the Red Army. The Red Army is something more than a mere military instrument. It is at the same time a school and a political machine. There is no other army in the world which pays greater attention to education. It has innumerable schools and over 2,000 libra-

ries, and every soldier has to have some general knowledge of both modern and classical literature. The male adult who must serve two years in the Army, receives, in addition to his military training, a certain amount of general education. Many of the soldiers, when they join the army, are illiterates, of bad habits, and generally backward. It is necessary in the first place to teach them reading, writing, and hygiene. They must attend classes in political subjects, structure of the State, and the functions of the Red Army. The teachers are the Commanders who are especially trained for the purpose, the programs and methods of working being planned by educational experts. (Every company has its small room or "Lenin Corner" where work among backward soldiers takes place, and each corner is supervised by the battalion club. Each "Lenin Club" has its circles in dramatics, singing, music, and movie show. All the clubs and corners possess libraries with books of general culture, including Russian and foreign classics).

It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of army training to Soviet Russia. It means that when the men go back to their villages they cannot only read and write but have also a grasp of political affairs, and can take an active part in the organization of village life. Connected with the Army is a

Correspondence School from which the men, who have left the army, can get educational help and advice.

The third answer is derived from the experiences in World Wars I and II of the British and the U.S. Armies which utilized information and education not so much to obtain training efficiency but to promote and maintain a high state of morale. It is to be noted in passing that in spite of the fact that these two democracies are among those which have the best and most extensive educational systems in the world, and, consequently the best educated citizens, they have to resort to information and education in keeping a high state of morale in their armies. A glimpse into the programs of information and education in the British and the U.S. Armies should provide us with the necessary information on their organization, operation, extent, and content.

In the British army, the men under arms during the two world wars had comparatively little opportunity for land action. The maintenance of the morale of these forces was a problem. Inactivity and mental stagnation can undermine an army as effectively as a disease. The British recognized this danger as early as 1920 when their Army Education Corps was first organized. Each army unit had its educational officer who ad-

vised and guided the student-soldiers. An inspector-general, attached to the adjutant general's staff, supervised the program. The British plan for adult education in the army consisted of frequent lectures, correspondence courses, library facilities and personally supervised study under the direction of trained civilian educators.

The U.S. Army has one of the most complete, extensive, best organized, equipped, manned, and supplied army informational and educational system in the world. Its I & E operations followed the men to their foxholes in all theaters of wars, including the isolated isles in the South Pacific. Its I & E program is geared to both peace and war time conditions, planned and operated by a special staff known as the Information and Education Division. The education program of the U.S. Armed Forces is being carried out by the United States Armed Forces Institute (USAFI). Since World War II, the USAFI with headquarters in Madison, Wisconsin, has grown into one of the biggest correspondence schools in the world. For a \$2.00 fee, USAFI will give any serviceman anywhere correspondence and self-teaching courses in any of the 334 grade, vocational, and college subjects. It also offers extension courses from 47 cooperating universities. Every isolated detachment, from a weather station in the Arctic to an air-



*Troops in, or back from, combat need soothing effects of information and education. In Korea, AFP troopers were indoctrinated during program.*

strip in Africa, has at least the part-time services of a man from the I & E Division. Large military bases have a complete school system. At some there is an actual branch of an American university. Men who cannot read and write are given time off and required to attend school two hours every day until they have received fifth-grade certificates. For other men, attendance in any of the USAFI courses or colleges and universities is voluntary and in off-duty time. Students receive full credits and the government pays three-fourths of their college expenses.

In our country the need for information and education in the

army has been recognized by both educators and military leaders as early as the first organization of the Philippine Army. The first attempt to extend education to the army was made by the Office of Adult Education in 1937 when, through its initiative, 10,843 illiterate trainees in army cadres were taught how to read and write in their own dialects and afforded training in agriculture and vocations by the cadre commanders and their assistants. The war interrupted the program of training, but after the liberation the post-war PA planners, recognizing more than before the value of information and education in the armed services, incorporated into the Philippine


Army organization the Information and Education Division.

It is noteworthy to mention here that the former PC officer assumed the duties of father, mother, teacher, big brother, and leader of his men all at once. The PC officer settled intramural bickerings and petty quarrels. His word was virtually the law, and very seldom would anyone contest, or ask clarification of his decisions. But the old PC officer was as just as he was stern. He conducted company schools at day time or at night and taught his men the three R's, because he was required by reg-

ulations and tradition to give his men an education and make them literates. This phase of work was so emphasized that the ordinary PC non-com before the war could conduct an investigation, effect an arrest, prepare the information, and argue the case before a Justice of the Peace Court.

A comparative study of the process of indoctrination of the US Army Serviceman and the machinery that makes him a good soldier with those of our own system and facilities, will help us understand better the underlying causes of the present prob-

*In the TIE Division, materials for discussion and audition are available and distributed regularly. Troops are required to have one hour of discussion each week.*



## DO YOUR JOB

KEEP RIFLES IN ARMCRACK

DON'T HERSEY JUDGE GEORGE... CHECK UP

KNOW YOUR MEN... THEIR BACKGROUND THEIR ATTITUDES THEIR MOODS

ACT UP ANY SIGNS OF OLD BEHAVIOR

INDOCTRINATE YOUR MEN IN THE ARTICLES OF WAR

BE SURE YOU ARE UNDERSTOOD

LOOK INTO YOUR SOLDIERS' PROBLEMS AND HELP RESOLVE THEM



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lems of morale and discipline in the AFP.

The policies on indoctrination in the US Army do not differ widely from those adopted in the AFP. As a matter of fact we have adopted from the US Army what we believe are the most effective techniques in spreading the concept of troop information and education, and also in eliciting interest from military personnel for this important phase of military activity. Circular No. 62, GHQ AFP, series 1953, contains a clear and concise procedure of disseminating troop information materials. This circular imposes upon all unit commanders in the AFP the responsibility of conducting a troop information hour among their troops for one undivided hour of duty time per week. In the TI & E Division, materials for discussion and audition are available and being distributed regularly.

Unfortunately, for lack of a thorough understanding of the value of TI & E in relation to the training, morale and combat effectiveness of the troops, a considerable segment of our Officer Corps has not given attention and support to the TI & E program of the AFP. To say the least, the attitude of many of our commanders toward our TI & E program is indifference. Some commanders and ranking officers for that matter, have come out with the statement that the TI & E

program of the AFP is useless to the individual soldier. To this type of officers, operations are all that matter. They have overlooked a truism born out of experience from fighting in costly wars that it is the best informed and best educated soldier who wins battles. *It is for this reason that the per capita expenditure of the US Army, the British Commonwealth Armies and practically all the modern armies in educating and informing their personnel amounts to over \$100 per year. Our per capita expenditure per year for similar purpose is only about P1.00, and yet we decry the expense in undertaking a real-to-goodness TI & E program.*

The reasons advanced by most commanders in the field is lack of time for assembly and discussion. Moreover, they believe that troop information is secondary in importance to the operations effort. Most commanders are so engrossed in catching Hugs and bandits, without realizing that men, exposed to the elements and hazards of the jungle, become emotionally unbalanced, and in some cases, develop various degrees of insanity. These troops need the soothing balm of advices and reorientation in the ways of the more convivial life in the lowlands, through no other more effective means than troop information. It is the negative attitude among unit commanders, therefore, that constitutes the main drawback of our troop in-



*With inadequate funds, Troop Information and Education Division does its best. It operates, aside from schools for enlisted men, a library (photo above).*

formation and education program.

Whereas the US Army officer exhausts every means at his command to inform his soldiers on the things that are necessary in making him an effective fighter, we have to admit with remorse that the ordinary unit commander in the AFP devotes very little time, if at all, to the work of giving his men the necessary mental orientations that should be given normally to give him a better appraisal of his relations to his unit and the whole nation.

Facilities available in the US Army and the AFP are hardly worth comparing. Suffice it to say that judging from the enormity and quality of the troop in-

formation and education materials turned out by the US Army, it is safe to conclude that the American soldier receives about a hundred dollars worth of TI & E materials per capita yearly. This figure will likely be increased because the United States is engaged in an ideological battle with the Communists everywhere, and we know only too well that the US will not fight this battle sitting down.

As early as November 1943, when the US Army was impressing millions of young men for service in the battlefronts of Europe and the Far East, the need for mental training of the soldier was recognized by its top planners. The US War Depart-





*Demonstrations are held often in the AFP schools for EM and dependents. Vocational demonstrations are among those given by army and civilian teachers.*

ment in TM 28-210 said:

"All armies now recognized the need for training the soldier's mind in order to maintain his zeal and for work and combat. The United States holds the belief that the soldier's mind should be free, informed, judicious, able to protect itself for sophistry and falsehood, alert and understanding of the larger problems of command and of his nation.

"Such qualities of mind can grow only in the presence of a free press and freedom of speech; and they can only serve the individual and his democratic society adequately if he has opportunity to nourish such qualities through information and education."

Accordingly the Information and Education Division was established in the War Department as a functional staff division. It was charged with "the supervision and policy control of those activities which are concerned with the mental training and the attitudes of the soldier." . . . .

\* The mission of the Director, Information and Education Division US Army was defined as follows "... the planning, production, dissemination, and supervision of materials and programs for the information, orientation, and nonmilitary education of troops and with research on troop attitudes, in order to assist commanders in maintaining a high state of morale."

The task of indoctrinating the American soldier into the ways of the military, apart and distinct from the training he received in the profession of arms, was given to a selected group of officers specialized in this work. "Information and education staffs were set up in all higher commands, I & E personnel were authorized in all units and installations down to and including the regimental and post level provision was made for the appointment of additional duty personnel in lower echelons; and the stipulation was restated that all military personnel will be given training in orientation; and that in regiments, groups and separate battalions, squadrons, companies, and detachments, or equivalent organizations, not less than one undivided hour per week will be devoted to this training during duty hours." Throughout the army, in short, orientation became a continuing training program; the information and education program became an established responsibility of commanders; and information-education personnel, primary and additional duty, became members of the staff or command team in every headquarters and organization." To carry out these functions and objectives, the Information and Education Section, Special Staff of the U.S. Army at Theatre level was set up as follows:

Personnel — (Officers only)  
 Theater I & E Officer ..... 1  
 Field Service Supervisor .... 1

Education Officer ..... 1  
 Radio Officer ..... 1  
 Research Officer ..... 1  
 Detachment Commander ... 1  
 Radio Section ..... 1  
 USAFI Section (USAFI Br) 1  
 Each section has a complement of at least one (1) additional duty officer and seven enlisted men who are specialized along their respective lines.

The US Army I&E organization at theater level was presented because it corresponds to the level at which the TI & E Div, GHQ AFP, operates. \* As a matter of fact, the mission of this Division is the very same mission that its US Army counterpart is implementing. Added to these missions and objectives, the TI & ED Chief of the AFP, as special Staff Officer of GHQ, performs the following functions:

1. Advises the Chief of Staff on all matters pertinent to troop information, non-military education and historical matters of military importance;
2. Plans, coordinates and supervises all troop information and education and activities covering military history of the AFP;
3. Procures, allocates, prepares and distributes materials and equipment for the above mentioned activities;
4. Recommends and trains personnel to conduct these activities;
5. Conducts researches and staff studies intended to enhance the morale of the troops in the

field and improves public relations in general.

Compared with the US Army the AFP Troop Information and Education Division personnel are as follows:

TI & E DIVISION, GHQ, AFP	
C, TI & ED .....	1 officer
Executive .....	1 officer
TI Branch .....	1 officer
	2 EM
	3 Civ
Non-Military	
Education Branch—	1 Off
	2 EM
	2 Civ
Publications Branch—	1 Off
	1 EM
	2 Civ
Military History	
Branch .....	1 Off
	1 EM
	4 Civ
Library & Museum	
Branch .....	1 Off
	1 EM
	4 Civ
Administrative	
Branch .....	1 Off
	3 EM
	4 Civ

In the field, we find the most incongruous TI & E set-ups. There are no officers assigned to engage primarily in troop information work. At best an unqualified officer who has shown little fitness for combat is detailed for this highly specialized job. The officer so assigned develops a disgust for the unit and even for himself, and ultimately for his job due to sly passes and

jokes he has to put up with which usually runs in this wise: "The most unfit for combat comes in handy for odd jobs." In some units, however, qualified officers are overloaded with work. The man who exhibits aptitude for troop information work is given additional duties that call for super human brawn and brains. In one Military Area headquarters for instance, there is an officer who is called upon to do the jobs of PRO, SGS, PIO, and TI & E officer all at once. Obviously these responsibilities and function with the desired efficiency and effectiveness will have to be given no additional work. All told, our TI & E machinery is very inadequate.

The subject matter of indoctrination given in the AFP differs slightly from that adopted in the US Army in that we have imposed upon troop information officers the additional duty of training our men in the ways of good citizenship.

Of course the educational level, nay the cultural level of the average American soldier is admittedly higher than that of the AFP soldier. The American GI only needs the materials from which he could learn the things necessary in orienting his mind in the military life and thus place himself in the correct perspective for good soldiery and good citizenship. The AFP soldier, on the other hand, not only needs the materials but also a conscientious leader who can help him



*AFP soldiers need information materials as well as information leaders to help them imbibe doctrines of good citizenship and interpret events.*

assimilate the doctrines of good soldiery and good citizenship, or who would help him interpret the news developments around him and the whole nation in their true light.

If inspite of the high level of the education and culture of the typical American soldier, the US Army spends huge sums for his information and education, it stands to reason that the AFP whose rank and file consists of men who have barely an elementary education should devote more funds and personnel for troop information.

Time has come for us to travel with the wheels of progress. Our present crop of soldiers in the AFP are also hungry for wis-

dom, inquisitive, and anxious to know the reasons behind the orders and actions of their officers. There is a definite need for satisfying their curiosity at least, and telling them the wisdom behind their officers' moves, without breaching of course, security regulations. All these can be done by a thorough process of troop information and education. It is only through this medium whereby the demands for knowledge of the highly technical and highly democratized enlisted man can be met. There is still time to answer the growing inquisitiveness of our soldiers by supplying them with all the correct and truthful information about themselves as soldiers and as ci-

tizens, and their true relations with their officers and their organization. The mild wave of discontent, arising purely from lack of correct indoctrination and information, can still be easily corrected by giving the Troop Information and Education Division facilities and means to engage in an expanded troop information program.


We have barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in this gigantic job, but if we are to solve the problems of morale and discipline of our new type of soldiers, we should engage in a troop information and education campaign with sufficient force and intensity so that our effort could be felt not only by the


highest ranking officer but also by the private.

The TI & ED has delved into ways and means of providing the necessary impetus to make our soldiers well informed and educated so that they may be able to gauge for themselves the good and the evil, especially in our present world of conflicting ideologies. We have taken tremendous strides toward that end, but the effort certainly is not commensurate with the demands. The educational level of our soldiers is far from the ideal, and only through the expansion of our TI & E program can this ideal be attained.

It is a worthy commentary that since the establishment of the

*Enlisted personnel of the AFP hardly need any motivation to subscribe to information and education program. They realize value of activities undertaken by the I & E Division.*





*AFP schools for enlisted men lack adequate facilities. Authorities do best with what they possess and hope for better support from the government.*

AFP School for Enlisted Men (high school level) under the supervision of the TI & ED, said schools have had a total enrolment of 7,520. These schools have graduated 1,035. To some degree, therefore, the educational program undertaken by the Armed Forces, through the TI & ED, has helped increase literacy in our organization.

The TI & ED has been entrusted with the publication of informational materials with the end in view of guiding our soldiers on the path to becoming not only better soldiers but better citizens. And further, the TI & ED has been given the mission of publishing a professional magazine, and to research

on and write the different unit histories of the pre-war and wartime Philippine Army as well to chronicle the all-continuing activities of the AFP.

A more realistic and complete program of troop information and education that we propose, one that will add power and force to military training probably not possessed by the present Army program, is premised on the following ideas:

1. The changed method and dimension of warfare which utilizes the results of technological progress in this atomic age require soldiery of higher intellectual and educational level capable of tackling the more complicated weapons and material. They require men who can exercise con-

structive leadership in positions of responsibility and intelligent followership in the ranks.

2. Our country can ill-afford a big army, so it must have the highest possible quality of men in its ranks that will make up for its size. It should be able to attract the more responsible, progressive, and desirable types of men and encourage them to remain in the service during the most productive years of their lives. The high rate of pay and specially privileges alone will not accomplish this. An assurance of growth and future advancement can be sufficient guarantee. To attract men imbued with the spirit of service.

3. If the army expects to play the role of leadership and gain the respect, admiration and cooperation of the people, instead of their suspicion, fear, and antagonism, it should have in its folds men of cultural and intellectual quality above the general level of the masses. Power capable of repelling ideological bullets. Only a thorough information and education will properly equip the fighting man in such a warfare. The role of troop information and education in such a warfare is undisputed.

Let us meet therefore the progressive minds of our soldiers with progressive methods of information and education. If we neglect this important phase of military



*Progressive minds of our soldiers must be met with progressive methods of information and education. Photo above shows chief of Troop Information Branch, TI & ED, speaking during one of office's troop information drives in field.*

activity, there could be reason to fear that in the not-too-distant future, the AFP would disintegrate, due to forces not from without but from within. Note that lack of sufficient information could render our men more susceptible to the dangerous and wily communist propaganda. The activities of the communists here are far too apparent to discard as an idle thought. Our leaders and policy makers therefore, should not negate the much needed support these important activities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines deserve.