with private domestic banks and 30 per cent with PNB

-The net increment of P50 million in deposits with the commercial banking system resulted from additions to time and savings deposits of P115 million and deposits with the government of P39 million, after reductions in demand deposits and de-posits of banks by P71 million and P33 million,

respectively.

Deposits with private domestic banks dropped by a net amount of P63 million; those with PNB and foreign banks rose by P69 million and P44 mil

ion, respectively.

—This quarter, PNB reduced its bills payable and "other liabilities by a substantial P170 million.

—Private domestic banks continued to liquidate their bills payable (by P45 :nillion this quarter). Net additions to this group of account arose mainly from the incur-rence of additional "other liabilities" of P50 million and additions to marginal deposits on letters of credit of P33 million.

An increase of P20 million during the first quarter of 1970 brought the total net worth of domestic commercial banks to about P1.2 million as of March 1970.

-Unused letters of credit rose by a substantial P1,484 million this quarter, with PNB accounting for P929 million of the increase. The increment

DOMESTIC CREDITS OUTSTANDING OF THE COMMERCIAL BANKING SYSTEM ¹ 1949-1970 1949-1970 (Amount in million pasos)												
		TOTAL			CLASSIFOR BY SECTOR				CLASSIFIED BY TYPE OF CREDIT			
Bad of period	Amequat (4 + 4 ± 5 to 11)	demarke credits of the Book-ne System (E)	Fer cont change over prayings beed (3)	Annul	Per cent of food (a)	Anizonii (4)	Per cent of rotal (1)	Domination securities	Louis & discounts	Overdentse*	Contomore Unbliffy acceptances (11)	
1949	659.6	81.7		91.2	13 8	368 4	86 2	110	280 9	222 B	111.9	
1950		75 5	+ 2.0	108.7	16.1	584.4	83 9	721	292 (261.1	47.6	
1951		76.1	+25.0	89 I	10 6 13 2	752 6 753 4	89 4 86 8	63.1	320 9	324 7	132 8	
1952		76 6 78 8	+11.5	114.4	13 7	635.6	863	79 7 90 9	365 4 196 9	313 8	108 0	
1953		78.7	+ 7.8	121 9	11.7	921 7	88.3	1011	396 9 427 0	342 6 365 2	137 4	
		75.6	+ 25.7	228.7	17.4	1.082 7	82.6	223 4	111.0	363 Z 421 3	150.3	
		76.8	+194	343.9	22.0	1,221 8	780	332 4	545.4	421.3 596.3	222 7 181 6	
1956		65.8	+ 34	161 8	100	1.457.6	90 0	121.2	683.5	592 G	222.1	
1950		61.4	+ 31	184.2	9.8	1,505 1	90 2	111.5	179.2	605.5	173 1	
1959		60 0	+122	175.8	9.4	1.696 6	90.6	113.6	889 0	703.2	1664	
1960		62.7	+ 9.6	187.2	9.1	1.865.2	90.9	133 1	953 5	744.2	2216	
1961		68.0	+47.3	520 4	17.2	2.503 8	82 8	435.9	1,259.3	939 5	389 5	
1962		69 2	+13.3	120.1	12 3	3.007 1	87.7	370 6	1.564.2	1.023 5	168 9	
1963		74.5	+32.9	609.5	13.4	3.944 7	86.6	468 7	2,122.7	1,334.3	628 5	
1964		76.3	+149	711.7	13.6	4.520 7	86.4	479.7	2.452.0	1,515.4	794.3	
1965		78.6	+11.5	1.101.8	18.9	4.731.6	81 1	620 0	2,727 0	1.592.8	893.6	
1966	6,499.5	78 1	+14.4	1,1350	17.5	5,364.5	82.5	795.4	3,231 4	1,555.1	917.6	
1967	7.921.9	78 5	+21.9	1.652 8	20 9	6.269.1	79 1	1.065 6	1,175 1	1,683.7	997.5	
1968		78 9	+11.2	1.872 8	21.3	6.933 7	78.7	1.217.5	4.791 2	1,833 7	964.0	
1969		768	+10.9	2.496.3	25 6	7.267 T	74.4	1.626.7	5.530.7	1,722.5	884.1	
1970, January	9.674.1	76 8	+ 8.7	2,514.8	260	7,159.3	74.0	1.662.9	5.468.3	1,673 4	869.5	

SOURCES OF BASIC DATA: Statements of Condition of the Commercial Banking System, I Consisting of all commercial banks and rural banks accepting demand deposits Including unused overfart lines

million is about

174 per cent of the addi-

tions to PNB's unused let-ters of credit for 1969.

dit of private domestic banks rose by P326 mil-

-The significant in-

crease in unused letters of

-Unused letters of cre-

of P929

THE CORNER BANK

During the recent wave lion. Last year, unused letters of credit of these banks dropped by P68 mil-lion from the previous of student demonstrations against the "establish-ment" — the government, the capitalists, the privi-leged elite, etc., it is re-freshing to note that one bank continued to identify credit may be attributed mainly to the floating exchange rate adopted on Feb. 21, 1970 and the simultaneous lifting of the itself with the masses without any cry of dissent from the protestors.

This is not at all surprising since Provident Savings Bank — "The Corner Bank," has been closely identified with the masses from the time it first formally opened its doors to the public six years ago. Indeed, it was established primarily to serve the banking needs of and help the "common tao." And the "common tao." And it earned its name, "The Corner Bank," because it has chosen to establish its main office and later its branches where it is convenient and accessible to them - at the corner of the busiest streets.

With the sustained support and continued pa-tronage of the so-called "bakya crowd," Provident has been able to greatly expand its resources and now ranks among the

country's bigger and more solid savings banks.

From a modest start of P3 million, Provident's total resources soared, in a short span of six years, to its present total of P60 million. Within this same span of years, it was able to establish six extension offices to better serve its growing clientele. These branches are all conveniently located in Legarda,
Market. Ylaya, Central Market, Ylaya, Evangelista, Baclaran and Rizal Avenue and collec-

(Continued on Page 16)



other equally mandatory instruments of credit control. the CB can still attain the desired goal by means of moral suasion.

This tool may take the form of published an inceeding of outcrences, in e t in g s with the Bankers Association of the Philippines (BAP) and the like wherein plans and courses of action are proposed and discussed. The object is to seek the cooperation of the objectives of the Central Bank to stabilize the currency and promote overall economic progress.

That this approach has proven successful in many cases in the past, in that the banking community has heeded the call of

support by the Central Bank, is due largely to the fact that appeals of this sort have instilled in the banks a sense of belonging and of being enthusiastic partners with the CB in the praiseworthy task of bringing about monetary stability and material welfare.

Open Market

Another important measure of credit control which is beginning to take roots in developing countries atthough still in its inlancy in the Philippines is the traditional tool of open market operations. This instrument can very well serve as a brake to unwarranted expansion of credit in times of inflation and as an accelerator in

granting more credit in periods of deflation.

The first situation can be effected when the Central Bank shall not make purchases of securities in the open market or at best minimize such purchases uch purchases uch purchases look purchases. On the other hand, the second situation, i.e. in case of declining money supply and big does are needed to be injected into the economy, its realized when the CB undertakes more purchases, withholds sales of its security holdings or reprutations its boundaries.

In this country open market operations has been resorted to not only to control credit but also to make more people bank conscious since commercial banks serve as agents in the encashment of bonds, to encourage forced savings habits and, most importantly, to finance economic development of the country.

In addition, when open market operations expand or restrict credit, bank reserves are either increased or decreased. When the Central Bank purchases securities in the open market the proceeds of the securities in the open market the proceeds of the securities in the open market the proceeds of the pro

Conversely, when the CB sells securities in the OB sells securities in the open market, the deposit accounts of the member bank will be debited, resulting in the shrinkage of money supply and thereby in the bank reserves. The bank reserves are provide more credit to the public and if bank reserves are reduced less credit is available.

Other Reasons

Besides the fact that open market operations as a cevoce in controlling credit is comparatively of recent vintage in the Philippines, there are other reasons why it cannot be used extensively as yet in this country. For one thing, the market for securities is small and the country is still largely agricultural where it is difficult to develop among the people the consciouses of investing their money in bonds and securities.

For another thing, the people are not accussomed to buying and selling them and it is believed it would take some time to reorient. Heir minds toward investment in securities. Nevertheless, education and moral suasion can be very useful measures that can bring about changes in this direction.

There are still other instruments that can control credit and which are better known as selective credit control measures such as the placing of ceilings on rediscounts of commercial banks and the requirement that commercial banks should maintain a one-to-one ratio between their actual foreign exchange assets and foreign exchange liabilities.

There are authorities, however, such as Dr. Gregorio S. Miranda, who claim that the formersure did not entirely curb lendings made by commercial banks and therefore not very effective in controlling credit. But the one-to-one ratio which was designed to check unnecessary imports has been more effec-

tive in regulating credit with the added advantage of reducing the amount of the foreign exchange liabilities of commercial banks with the corresponding increase in their foregre exchange assets.

Other Measures

Still in certain instances these traditional instruments of credit control may not be effective enough to cope with the situation, say a rapid skyrocketting in money sup-ply or an unchecked decrease in the quantity of money in circulation, bringing about a serious case of deflation. To be sure, many central banks in the world, including ours, have invariably employed other measures, singly or collectively conjunction with the traditional instruments.

These measures are the rationing of credit (i.e., placing a limit on discounts), prescribing minimum cash margins for opening letters of credit and the imposition of minimum ratios which capital and surplus of banks must bear to the volume of thei, assets.

By and large, however, all these credit control measures, despite their initiations imposed by circumstances, lack of fiscal restraint, the law and the usual unitra m me lied spending on developmental projects and public works, have contributed in one form or another toward the expansion of credit and the curbing of unwarranted expansion and consequently that too of the money supply.

His work on this mat-

ter, Business and tioter, Business and tiovernment, has been used as reference for this article.

The Corner Bank

(Continue non Page 5) tively account for 53 per cent of Provident's total number of depositors and 42 per cent of its total deposits

To keep pace with the bank's growth, Provident has expanded its lending operations. At present, its total outstanding loans amount to ever \$41 million. A majority of these loans were granted for real estate development and housing construction as a response to the present need for housing facilities. Provident today enjoys

Provident today enjoys the trust and confidence of over 110,000 depositors who avail of the 12-hour service of the bank from Monday to Saturday. Such trust it has continuously nurtured through improved and better services and relentless efforts in looking for means to bring higher returns for the funds entrusted to it by these depositors.

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