The Congo knot

Title

The Congo knot

Language

English

Source

Panorama XII (8) August 1960

Subject

United States -- Foreign relations -- Congo (Democratic Republic)

Rights

In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted

Fulltext

A piece of string The CONGO KNOT THE CONGO PROBLEM HAS become an entanglement of several distinct pro blems. It may help to unravel the strands and examine each individually. They are: the mutiny and the restoration of peace; the secession of Katan ga; the economic effect of Rhodesia and Nyasaland; the administrative breakdown and its repair; the Russia’s jubiliation; and the effect on race re lations, particularly in neigh bouring countries. Probably there are other strands stiff entwined. The restoration of peace has properly become a matter for the United Nations. It is a token of the progress made in Africa — and a rebuff to those who opposed it — that troops should be upholding the will of the United Nations from independent countries which five years ago did not exist. R is now proposed that European troops shall be used alongside African troops. African coun tries will regard the Congo as their affair, but the presence of Europeans will demonstrate that the United Nations is in tervening not against Belgians but against trouble-makers of whatever race. Belgium can be criticized on many grounds for her scandalous handling of the Congo’s independence, but she cannot to blamed for try ing to rescue people in danger. To this extent M. Lumumba’s complaints of aggression can be dismissed. He is on stronger ground in fearing Belgian de signs of Katanga. The Belgian Government’s statement that it had “noted” the province’s se cession might be interpreted as recognition. If secession might be interpreted as recognition. If secession were made absolute, it would mean that all hope of Belgian-Congolese economic co operation had been lost and that Belgium was prepared to write off the benefits to Africa of her 75 years there for the 28 Panorama sake of her copper interest. It would put the rest of the Con go in desperate economic straits, and African Govern ments and politicians through out the continent would not for give either Belgium or, vicar iously, the other colonial Po wers for an act of treachery to the State. |f atanga’s fortune cannot ■ * easily be separated from those of the Federation of Rho desia and Nyasaland. Last year the copper production in Ka tanga was 280,000 tons, which is more than the world surplus. If production stops entirely there will be a world shortage and Northern Rhodesia’s cop per prices will shoot up. A ceil ing price on copper would be hard to enforce. Apart from the short-term political dangers in herent in copper boom, in which Europeans will benefit indivi dually more than Africans, the way would open for copper sub stitutes to take a hold of the market and jeopardise North ern Rhodesia’s (and, if it is still there, the Federation’s) whole economy. Thus, even while the status of Katanga re mains in doubt, it is important that the Union Miniere should get its technicians back from their refuge across the border. They cannot be expected to go back without the firmest guar antees of security. As soon as the United Nations force has began to keep the peace M. Lu mumba should have a good night’s sleep and brace himself to negotiate with T. Tshombe a federal arrangement whereby Katanga (and possibly other regions) remains part of the Congo but enjoys that degree of provincial autonomy which he has been claiming since long be fore the Belgians left. If, as seems possible, the Central Government starts to break up the Congo will in any case be more than a collection of pro vinces. In the more favorable political climate which a CongoKatanga federation would bring about the administration pro blems could be tackled. The Congo will, for some years, have no energies to spare for quar rels with her neighbours. Her immediate purpose should be to restore the administrative ma chine to the conditions it was in when the Belgians left, and then to get new people to rut it. As soon as possible they should be Congolese, but in the meantime they should be grateful for any one with experience and a knowledge of French. Most of the former French colonies in Africa are now independent. They, too, suffer from a short age of experienced staff, but it is not as serious as the Congro’s It would entail great self-sacri fice to part with some of the men they have, but between August 1960 29 them they might muster the core of an efficient Congo Civil Service. In the last ten days, the So■ viet Union has had its first opportunity to meddle directly in an African situation. Mr. Khrushchev seems to have no other purpose than to excite emotions still further and cause as much havoc as he can. He must have little respect for the intelligence of Africans if he thinks that the Belgians rescue operation in the Congo can be represented as imperialist ag gression against Madagascar and Togo, which is how he des cribed the situation in his mes sage to M. Lumumba. It may that Russia which hitherto has been lukewarm in its support of an African nationalism based on intellectuals and the middle class rather than on the prole tariat, sees in the mutiny a working-class uprising which meets the Marxist specification. Whatever profit Mr. Krushchev eventually extracts from it, the Congo situation will not simpli fy the job of those in Rhodesia and Nyasaland who are working for a sensible solution of racial problems. It has emphasized the danger of creating an admi nistrative vacuum which has only lately been realized by the Government concerned. Afri can self-government is now the rule, and European Govern ments the exceptions. The ex ceptions cannot be expected to persist for many years. On the other hand, no responsible Afri can leader can take the risk of re-enacting the Congo debacle. Britain with her diminishing overseas responsibilities and her growing army of ex-colonial civil servants, is uniquely able to offer handsome terms: inde pendence with a unified Euro pean-African Civil Service and with a training scheme (on the lines of that at the Zaria Insti tute of Administration in Nige ria) to overlap independence. It would be worth trying to get Dr. Banda’s and Mr. Kaunda’s signatures to an agreement en titling Britain to ensure conti nuity in Civil Service when the date for self-government is fix ed. It invariably happens that the colonial civil servant doing the job is also the training of ficer for his subordinates, but we should not stop at this. Something like a crash prog ramme in administrative train ing here and overseas is need ed for the future security of the inhabitants, black and white, of Central and East Africa. — From Manchester Guardian Week ly 30 Panorama

pages

28-30

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