Benita S. Balinon, Petitioner, vs. Celestino M. de Leon et al., Respondents, ADM. Case No. 104, Jan. 20, 1954 [Supreme Court Decisions]

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Title: Benita S. Balinon, Petitioner, vs. Celestino M. de Leon et al., Respondents, ADM. Case No. 104, Jan. 20, 1954 [Supreme Court Decisions]
Language: English
Source: The Lawyers Journal Volume XIX (Issue No.6) June 30, 1954
Year: 1954
Subject: Lawyers -- Philippines; Legal ethics; Lawyers -- Dismissal of
Rights
Abstract: [The Solicitor General has filed a complaint against the respondents Celestino M. De Leon and Justo T. Velayo, duly qualified members of the bar in active practice, alleging that, since December, 1949, respondent De Leon, still legally married to Vertudes Marquez lived as husband and wife with Regina S. Balinon.]
Fulltext: SUPREME COURT DECISIONS Alejandro Srm1son, Petitioner, V3. Andrea B. Andat de Agui. h, ct al., Respondent:>, G.R. Nt). L-5932, Feb. 25, 1954, Pnrns, C.J.: OBLIGATION PAYABLE DURING THE JAPANESE OC.. CUPATION; PAYMENT AFTER LIBERATION MUST BE ADJUSTED WITH THE BALLANTYNE SCHEDULE.The Supreme Court has heretofore sustained the yroposition that, when an obligation is payable within a certain period of time, and the whole or part thereof coincides with the JapaneSe occupation, payment after the liberation must be adjusted in accordance with the Ballantyne schcdul'E!, because the debtor could have paid said obligation in Ja}Jd:i.ese war notes during the occupation. <Asis vs. Agdamag, G.R. No. L-3709, October 25, 1951; Ang Lam vs. Peregrino., G.R. No. L-4871, Ja:lUary 26, 1953) ; Jales vs. Gamara, G. R. No. L-4460, Oct. 31, 1053.) The debto1·'s mere failu.re to accomplish p<ayment during the Japanese occupation did not make him liable to pay, as dam:ige or penalty, the ':liffr-renc<• between th{' value of tl,e Japanese war notes at the time the obligation became payable and of the Philippine currency at the time of r,ayment. <G0n1ez vs. Tnhia, 47 O.G. 641.) It is true that the creditors herein could not demand payment prior to October 25, 194f;, but this did not prcdudE' the debtor, herein petitioner, from paying l'>is obligation at any time within one year from October 25, 1944, if he had wanted tQ du so. llbid.) Se11.<;1n S. Ceniza for petiifoncr. Sison, Sevilla, Aqitino & Paras and Pedro P. Colina for res;JOndents. DECISION PARAS, C.J.: On March 4, 1947, Alejanrlro Samson filed aga.inst Agapito B. Anda! and Valentina Berana de Andal in the Court of First Instance of Manila a complaint for declaratory l'clief, praying that judgment be rendered fixing tht! amount which A!PjaT?drn Samson should pay to Agapito JJ. Andal and Valentina Bcrana de Anda! under a deed of mortgage executed by the former in favor of the latter, and that the defendantF be ordered to co.reel the mortgage upon pa.yment of said amount. On August 26, 1949, the court rendered a dedsion, declaring that the amount du~ from the plaintiff to the defendants is P150.00, Philippine currency, plus annual interest a.t the r::ite of 7% from October 25, 1!:144, and O!'dering the defendants to execute t he proper deed of cancellation upon payment by the plaintiff of said amount. The coui-t applied the Ballantyne scale of values. Agapito B. Andai and Valentina Berana de Anda! appealed to the Court of Apr~'als which, on J une 9, 1952, rendered a decision hclding that the plaintiff should pay to the defendants f'6,000.00 (the full amllunt of the loan obtained by the pl~nt!ff from the defendants on October 25, 1044), in actual Philippine currency, plus the stipulated intert:st, but subject to the mor!ltorium law. Fi·cm this decision Alejandro Samson has appealed to this Court by way of certiorari. By resolution cf October 17, 1952, Agapito B. Andal and Valentir.a Berana de Andcl 'who had <lier!) wel"C ordercci substituted as parties respondents by their heirs, Andrea B. Andal de Aguila '1nd others. The Court ;f Appeals found that Alejandro Sams1m, hnreir. petitionE"r, obtained from Agapito B. Andal and Valentina B. de Anda! on October 25, 1944, a. lo::i.n of f'6,000.00, with intr.rest at ':% per :innum and, to secure its payment, the former execut~d in favor of the latter a real estate m:n·tgage. 'fhat court, i.n holding that the pelitirmer ahould pay f'6,000.00 in p:P.sent Philippine r.'un·ency, argued that while t he loan was made during the: Japan<:se occupation, it became due and pnyable Q nly afte1· said period. We ha'"e heretofore sustained the pruposition that, when :lll r>bligUtion is payable within a certain 1ieriod of time, and the whole or part thereof coincides with the Japanese uccup:;.tion, payment after the liberation must be adjusted in accordance with the Ballantyne schedule, because the debtor could have paid said obligation in Japanese war notes during the occupation. (Asis vs. Agdamag, G.R. No. L-3709, . 0 ctober 25, 1951; Ang Lam vs. Pcregrina, G.R. No. L-4871, January 26, 1953.) As Mr. Justice Feria indicated in his crmcurring opinion in the case of Gomez vs. Tabia, 47 0 .G. G41, the debtor's mere failure to accomplish 1ia~·mrnt during the Japanese occupation did nvt make him li&b\c to pay, as damage or penalty, the difference between the value of the Japanese war notes at the time the obligatbn became paynble and of the Philippine cuncncy at the time of payment. It is true th:lt the creditors herein could not demand payment prior to October 25, 1945, but this did not preclude the debtor, herein petitioner, from paying his obligation at any time within one year from October 25, 1944, if had wanted to do so. Wherefore, the decision of t.he Court of Appeals is hereby reversed, and it is declared that the amount which the petitioner should pay to cancel his mortgage is only the sum of !'150.00, the c -quivlllent in actual Philippine currency of PG,000.00 in Japanese war notes on October 25, 1944, phis ar,nual interf!st at the rate of 7% on the said sum of !'150.00 from October 25, 1944. So 01·dered without costs. 8 e11g::on, Reyes, Ju90, Ba.utista A.ngdo and Labrador, J.J., concur. Justice Padilla concurred in tlie rf' . .!<Ult. Just·ice Montemaycn- a.nd Justice Pablo took no part. II Benita S. Balinon, Petitioner, vs. Celestino 111. de Leon et al., Respondents, ADM. Ca:Je No. 104, Ja,n. 20, 1954, P<Nras, C.J.: ATTORNEY AT LAW; SUSPENSION; CASE AT DAR. - This Court had heretofore imposed the penalty of suspension upon an atforney who prepared a document stipulating, among other, that the contracting parties, who al"e husband and wife, authorized ce.ch other to marry again and that each renounced whatever right of action one might have against the party so marrying (/11 Te Roque S:intiago, 40 Off Gaz. [5th Supp.] p. 208>. In effect the affid-ivit prepared and dgned by respondent De Leon has similar implicaticn, in that althoni?h it does not bluntly authorize said respondent to marry another during his subsisting wedlock with Vertudes Marquez, he made it appear th::i.t he could take in :lnother woman as a lifetime partner to whom he would remain loyal and faithful ss a lawful and devoted loving husband and whom he could take and respect as his true and lawful wife ; thereby virtually permitting himself to commit the crime of concubinage. It is true, as respondent De Leon argues, that the consent or pardon of either spouse constitutes a bar to a criminal prusecutivn for adultery and concubinage, but, as the Solicitor General observes, said crimes are not thereby lega.lized, the result bdnz merely that prosecution is such cases would not lie. The contention th:lt the affidavit is only a unilateral declaration nf facts is of no moment, since it uudoubtedly enabled respondent De Leon to attain his purpose of winning over Regina S. Balinon with some degree of permanence. F'irst A ssistant S(·Ucircn- General Ruperto Kapv;nan, Jr. and S olicitor Juan T. Alano for petitioner. Jose W. Viokno, Justo '/'. V r!ltlyo &lld Celestino de Leon for respondent . DE C I SION PARAS, C. J.: The Solicitor General has filed a. complaint against the resJ une 30, 1054 THE LA WYERS JOURNAL 271 pondents Celestino M. De Leon and J usto T. Velayo, duly qualified members of the bar in active practice, alleging that, since Dec~in bE:r, 1949, respondent De Leon, still legally married to Vertudes Marquez lived as husband and wife with Regina S. Bali non; that Faid rt-spondent prepared and subscribed on Febrm>..ry 4, 1949, before respondent Ve>layo, a notary public, an affidavit which i·eads as follows: "KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: "I, CELESTINO DE LEON, of legal age, married, filipino citizen, after being duly sworn to according to law depose and say: "That there exists a contract of separation executed a nd perfected between my wife, Vertudr.s Marquez and myself; "That said contract states among other things that each of us is at liberty and free to take for himself and herself a lifetime partner with the full consent and authorization of ea.ch other; "That by the same contract our conjugal p::.rtnership was dissolve and our existing property, rights and int~rf'st were divided and apportioned; "That in the said contract my wife shall have the full control, care and custody of the children, and as such all of . our conjugal property rights and interests were apportioned to her with the exception of my private personal belongings and things pertaining to my law profession; "That, besides the said dissolution and apportionment, Gaid contract further states about my wife's and also my children's share to my current income by way of alimony and support; "NOW, therefore, by virtue of the said contract of separation, I now by these presents take my new found life-partner REGINA S. BALINON, as my true and lawful wife; "That, in order to protect her i·ights a11d interests with regards to her personality and future property rights, I, hereby voluntarily and of my own free will solemnly swear under oath; "That I will uphold and defend her honor and dignity and prestige as a woman of the weaker sex as well as any and all members of )ler family arising by reasons of said relationship; "That I will maintain and preserve the new existing companionship, the love, respect and goodwill prevailing among the members of her family of which I am now a Member ::s well as equally mine; "That I will not do any act that may tend to degrade or dishonor her or any member of her family unbecoming the dignity of said relationship but would rather take and resflect her as my true and lawful wife; "That in case of intentional desertion on my part thereby frustrating the true and honest intent of my affirmations, the same may be sufficient ground for my perpetual disbarment upon her in11tance or any third lJal'ty in interest; "That except for such minur dues and allt'wances by way of alimony and support mentioned above, any and all such future properties, rights and interests that we shall acquire during said relationship shall exclusively appertain and belong to her as her due share and shall bear her name in all such titles and documents thereto, subject to her legal heirs as such; "That any offspring that we shall bear by reason of said companionship and relationship shall be acknowledge by me as my true and legal child with all the i·ights and privileges accorded by law pertaining to that of a legitimate child; "That this contract of companionship is done of my own accord, freely and voluntarily without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, So HELP ME GOD. "IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my signature this 4th day of February 1949. "SGD.) CELESTINO M. DE LEON CELESTINO DE LEON .. SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF: "REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ) CITY OF BACOLOD ) S.S. ''Pc!'Sonally appeared before this 4th du.y of February 1!)49, CELESTINO DF. LEON with Residence Certificate No. issued at on 1949, who executed the foregoing affidavit with contract of companionship consisting of two pages, and acknowledge by me that the same is his own free and voluntary act and deerl. "I N WITNF.SS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal on the place and date first wrtiten above. "Doc. No. 484 "Page No. 97 "Rook No. XVJ "Series of 1949," "(SGD.l JUSTO V. VELAYO" NOTARY PUBLIC Until D~c. 31, 1948 The complaint. also alleges that, nc>twith:itanrling the unlawful and immoral purposes of the for~going affidavit, iespondent Velayo knowingly signed the same in vioh:tion of his oath of office '.l.S attorney and notary publil'. Respondent De Leon admits his continuous cohabitation with Regina S. Balinon during his subsisting marl'iage with Vertudes Marquez and the fact that he prepared and subscribed the affidavit above quoted, hut contE'nds that he has not yet been finally convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude ; that while the affidnvit ma~ be ilicit, it is nc;t an agreement but a m('re innocent unilateral declaration of facts; and that while the execution of said affidavit may hP. illegal and void ab i11itio, no 1<pecific law has been violated so as to give rise to an action. Respondent Velayo alleges, on the other hand, that his participation was limitNI to the task of notorizing the affidavit, as a matte1· of courtesy to a brothe1· lawyer and wit.11011t. knowing its contents, and thi£ allegation is corroborated by ·l'eSp<illdent De Leon wh'> fm•ther stat.. ed that no consideration whatsoever passed to the fo1·mcr. This Court had herctofol'e imposed the penalty of suspension upon an nttorney who prepared a document stipulating, among otJier, that the contracting parti('S, who are husband and wife, authorized e::i.ch other to marry again and that each renounced what.. ever right of action one might have against the party so marry·ing (ht re Roque Santiago, 40 Off. Gaz. 5th Supp. p. 208). In effect the affidavit prepared and signed by respondent De Leon has similar implication, in that although it does not bluntly authorize said respondent to marry another during his subsisting wedlock with Vertudes Marquez, he made it appi!ar that he could take in another woman as a lifetime partner to whom he would remain loyal and faithful as a lawful and devoted loving husband and whom he could take and respect as his tru(' and 0 lawful wife; thereby virtually permitting himself to commit the crime of concubinage. 272 THE LAWYERS JOURNAL June 30, 1954 It is true, as respondent De Leon ugues, that the consent or pardon of either spouse constitutes a bar to a criminal prosecution for adultery and concubinage, but, as the Solicitor General observes, said crimes are not thereby legalizeci, the result being merely that prosecution in such cases would not lie. The contention that the affidavit is only a unilateral declaration of facts is of no momf'nt, since it undoubtedly enabled respondPnt De Leon to nttain his purpose of winning over Regina S. Balinon with some 1!cgr~e of perIt is likewise insisted that the acts imputed to respondent D1:i Leon had no relation with his prMessional duties and therdore cannot Eerve as a basis for suspc11sion or disbarment under seetion 25 of Rule 127. It should be remembered, however, that a member of the bal' may be removed or suspended from office as a lawyer on irround other than those enumerated by said provision Un re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 5ti7). l\forcover, we can even stute that !'espondent DP. Leon was able to prepare the affidavit in questiou bf'cause he is a l::wyer, and has rendered professional serv\cp to himself as a client. Ile smely employed his knowledge of the law a.nd skill as an attorne~· tn his advantage. fManalo v. Gan, Adm. Case No. 72, May lS, lfl53. l With reforence to respcndent Velayo, there is no question that he did nothing except to affix his signature to the affidavit in question as a notary public. While, as contended by his counsel, the duty of n notary public is p!·incip2.lly to ascerl::iin the identity of the affiant and the voluntariness of the deela.ration, it is nevertheless incumbent upon him at least to guard against having any_ thlng to do with illqrnl or immoral arrangement. In the pre>sent case respondent Velayo was somewhat negligent in just affixing his signature to the 2.ffidavit, although his fault is mitigated by the fact that he had relied on the good faith of his co.rt.>spondent. Wherefore, we he>reby decree the suspension from the practice of law of respondent Celestino T\L De Leon for three year11 from the date of the promnlg:ition rif this decision. Respondent Justri T. Velnyo is hereby merely reprimanded. So ordered. Pablo, Ben9:1ni, Padilla, Mu·11lcmayor, Reyes, Jugo, BuuliBta A n9elo and Labrador, J.J., concur. III King Mau Wn, Plaintiff-Appe/lee vs. Francisco Sycip, Defend. cr.t-A ppellant, G. R. No. L-5897, April 23, 1954, P•JJilla, J.: PLEADING AND PHACTICE; ACTION BY A NON-RESIDENT PLAINTIFF AGAINST A RESIDENT DEFENDANT. - Where in a contract uf agency it is contended that ir.!\Smuch as the contract was executed in New York, the Court of First Instance of Manila ha.s no jurisdiction over the case, the contention is without merit bec.'.luse a non-resident may sue a resident in the co~rts of this cr.untry where Jefendant may b..: summoned and his property leviahle upon '!xecution in case of a favornble, final and e:xecutory judgmer.t. <MarshallWells Co. vs. Henry W. Elser & Co., 46 Phil. 70; Western Equipment and Supply Co. vs. Reyes, 51 Phil. 115.) I. C. Jlfonsod for appellant. J. A. lVolfsun and P. P. Gallardo for appellee. DECISION PADILLA, J .: This is an actier. to collect P59,082.92, togeth:!r with lawful interests frem 14 October 1947, the date of the written demand for payment, and costs. The claim mises out of a shipment of 1,000 ions of coconut oil emulsion gc,Jd by the plaintiff, M agent of the defendant. to Jas. Maxwell Fassett, who in turn assigned it to Fortrade Corporation. Under an agency agreement set forth in a letter dated 7 November 1946 in New York addressed to the defendant and accepted by the latter on the 22nd day of the same month, the plaintiff was made the exclusive agent of the defendant in the sale ?f Philippine coconut oil and its derivatives outside the Philippines anci was to he paid 2-1/2% on the total actual sale price of sales obtained through hii:; 1:ifforts anQ. in addition thereto 50% of the difference between the authorized sale price and the act.ual sale price. After trial where the depositions of the plaintiff and of Jas. l\faxwell Fassett and several" letters in connection therewith were introduced and the testimony of the defendant wa:. heard, the Court rendered judgment as prayed for in the complaint. A motion for reconsideration wa.s denied. A motion for n1:iw trial was filed, supported by the defendant's affidavit, based on newly disc.overed evidence which consists of a duplicate original of a letter dated 16 October 1946 covering the sale of 1,000 tons of coconut oil soap emulsion signed by Jas. Maxwell Fassett to the defendant; the Jetter of credit No. 20122 of the Chemical Bank & Trust Company in favor of Jas. Maxwell Fassett assign~d by the latter to the defendant; and Jetter dated 16 December 1946 by the Fortrade Corporatic.r. to Jas. Maxwell Fassett whereby the corporativn placed a firm order of 1,000 metric tons of coconut oil soap emulsion and Jas. Maxwell Fassett accepted it on 24 December 1946, all of which documents, according to the defendant, could not be produced at the trial, despite the use of reasonable diligence, and if produced they would alter the 1·esult of the controversy. The motion for new trial was denied. The defendant is appealing from said judgment. Both parties arc agreed that the only transaction or sale n•ade by the plaintiff, as agent of the defendant, wa& that of 1,000 metric tons of coconut oil emulsion f .o. b. in Manila, Philippines, to J as. Maxwell Fassett, in whose favor letter of eredit No. 20122 of the Chemical Dank & Trust Company for a sum not to exceed $400,000 was established and who assigned to Fortrade Corporation his right to the 1,000 metric tons of coconut oil emulsion an<:l to the defendant the letter of credit referred to for a sum not to , exceed $400,000. The plaintiff claims that for that sale he is entitled under the agency contract dated 7 November 1946 and accepted by the defendant on 22 November of the same year to a commission of 2-1/2% on the total actual sale price of 1,000 tons of coconut oil emulsion, part of which has already been paid by the defendant, there being only a balance of $3,794.!14 for commission due a~d unpaid on the last shipment of 379.494 tons and W% of the difference be>tween the authorized sale price of $350 per ton and the actual selling price of $400 per ton, which a.mounts to $25,000 due and unpaid. and $746. 52 for interest from 14 October 1947, the date of the written demand. The defendant on the other hand, contends that the transaction for the si.i.le of 1,0oo metric tons of coconut oil emulsion was n~t covered by the agency contract of 22 November 1946 because it was agreed upon on 16 October 1946; that it was en independent and sepa.rate transaction for which the plaintiff has bee~ duly cc mpensated. The contention is not borne out by the evidence. 'I'he plaintiff and his witness depose that there were several drafts of documents or letters prepared by Jas. l\faxwell Fassett preparatory or kading to the exeeution of the agency agreement of 7 November 1946, which was accepted by the defendant on 22 Nove1~ ber 1946, and that the letter, on which the defendz..nt bases his contention that the transaction on the 1,000 metric tons of coconut oil e>mulsion was not covered by the agency agreement, was one of those letters. That is believable. The letter upon which defendant relies for his defense does not stipulate on the commission to bC' paid to thl' plaintiff as agent, and yet. if he paid the pla!ntiff a 2-1/2% commission on the first three coconut oil emulsion shipments, there is no reaoon why he should not pay him the saml' commisi;ion on the last shipment am,ounting to $3,794.94. There can be no doubt that the sale of 1,000 metric tons of coconut oil emulsion was not a separate and independent contract June 30, 1954 THE LA WYERS JOURNAL 273
pages: 271-273