5. Supreme Court Decisions, McEntce v. Manotok - Justice Labrador.pdf · Rare Periodicals

5. Supreme Court Decisions, McEntce v. Manotok - Justice Labrador.pdf

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extracted text: SUPREME COURT DECISION George McE1itce, PlltintifJ-uppellonL, Perpetnu Mmwtol.-, f)eje11rl.11tl-<1/)1,{/lcc, C.R. No. L -14968, October 27, 19Gl, Labrador, J. 1. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; l\IOTIONS FOR POSTPON E].JENT OF THIAL AND N E:W T RIALS; CIRCUMSTANCES TO BE CONSIDERED I N CHANTI NG OR DENYING THE SAME. - Jn the consideration cf motions for po'>timncm:!nt of trids, i;.s well 35 in those fot· new tria~, two circumstances f,}10u t<l be tnkcn into :lccount by th~ court, n'\mcly, first the me rits of t he cuse of the movant. and ~econd, the rcnsonabl<'ncss of the postponement, the 1 ules pointing out. to nccidcnt, su1·prise Qr excusable neg!t"Ct a s !'casons thcrdo/'c. So, with 1·espect to the first circumstnnce the rules require an a ffidavit of merits, with respect to the second, a !1 n.ffidn.vit showing the acciGent, surp1·isc or ~Xcl;sablc :•eglcct. T here may bn an accid~nt, surprise or excusable r.eglect justifyini postponement {l l' reconsideration, but. if movant does not present a meritorious cbim or defer.gc, dcninl of his :notion for postponement may not be considered as ~n abuse of the discretion of th:! court. Note that discretivn is lodged in the p!'esiding judge, and this discretion should be used in considering th(' circumstances abov-.- mentioned. ~. ID.; ID.; S UDDEN ILLNESS OF COUNSEL; ABSENC E OF MEDICAL CERTIFICATE. - In the .·as(' at ba r. th(• ncci•J:::mt that had prevented appea nrnce of counsel for p!;,1intiff on the dr.y set for trii:.1 w!ls sudd1m illness. There l~Hty hhve bet•n 110 ce1 tificate •Jf illnes;i, but this ci1·('um.;tancc is explained by the •;udden appearance or aggrnvation of 'the illnei;s, rer.dering it inconvc.nient if not difficult. for counsel to secure the reQ.uired t·ertificate A illness. Accidents 01· illness, if sudden and unexpected, can not always be subject to n ce~ tificate; the ci r~umsh.nces ma~' render it imµOs!!ibt·e t(. !'ecurc in time the medical certiiicate i hat is needed, or tlw person making the affidavit may not be evailable at the time to prepnre opportunely the dfi<lavit cxplainins- the excusable neglect. 3. ID.; ID.; WHEN COURT RHOULD NOT BE TOO STRICT IN DEMANDING THAT ILLN ESS 01' ~ COUNSEL BE ATTESTED BY MEDICAL CERTlfo~JCATE. - Where plaintiff had askcri for postpom·ment of trial for the first time beca•1se counsel w:u ill, and inasmuch as his sickness is an accident that l·ould not ha~e been foreseen at the time of the trial, the court should not have been too strict ih demanding that illnt"i<S be attested b:v a medical certificate of a competrnt physician. -I. ID.; RliLES OF PAOCEDURE; TECH NICAL, AND RIGID E~FORCE MENT SHOULD NO'I' BE MADI;;, - Ru\.:s of 1 1rocc•iurc arr used only H• ht!lp .<:ecure substantial justirc. (Rulfl l , Sec. 2) If a technical and r igid enf•Jfeement of thjj rule:J is made, their aim would be defeated. In the case at bar, it ap1 iears that the rules which a rc merely secondary in import'.rnce are made to OV(.JTidc the ends of justice ; the technical n•les had bei.!n misapplie1! to the prejudice of the substa:1tial right of a party. l'edro J\Jugsalin, for the plaintiff-appellant. A ntonio Gonzflles, for the defcndnnt-appetlee. DEC I S I ON Appeal from a decision dismissing plaintiff's complaint and on orrier denying his motion for reconsideration and new triul in Civil Case No. 9742 of the Court of First Im~tance of La1;, '1ma. The appeal was originally take~ to the Court. of Appeals but was o .-.ndoi·scd to this Court for decision because the issuo raised therein is pu1·cly one of law. George McEntce filed the instant action against Perpetu& Manotok to recove1· the possession of a parcel of lan<t situated i11 Bunio Bangba ng, Los Bailos, Lagurrn. In his am~nded complaint dated Februa ry 2G, 1954, plaintiff substantially allegos that he is the registered owner of that parcel of Jund covered by Original Cel'tificatC! of Title NCl. P -5G with an a1·ea of 7 ,273 sq. meters, mon! or iess, which is located in the above-mentioned place ; that he acquired his title over the said land' by means (}( a free paten t grant from the Government in 1952; that he, personally and through his predecessor in interest, had been in actual, continuous and peaceful 1 >ossession over the same since 1926 until somet.ime in the month of November, 1952 whcm the defendant unlawfully entered and occupied the. northern portion of said land of approximately 1,000 sq. meters which is covered within the above-stated certificate of title; thtit the defendant also gathered and took the h:nvest of the improvements which he had introduced therein consisting of fruit-bearing trees and plants, and appropriated them for her own use and benefit- and that by reason or these allege<t illegal acts of defendant, plaintiff also claims to have suf. fered damages in the itmount of 1 >1,000 plus a similar sum for attorney's fees. On March 18, 1954 t he defenda11t answered the complaint setting up, among other things, the defense that plaintiff's free patent title was obtained' from the Bureau of Lands through fraud , .and misrepresentation ; that the plaintiff, either personally or thn1 his p1·edecesso1 · in interest, had never occupied and cultivated the land in question so as to entitle him to a free patent thereto; that he has not posted the conesponding notice of his application l.i.S required ~Y law; that he has not caused the same to be investigated by a land ins)lector, :ind if there ifl any investigation, he gave false testimony and caused the report to contain false findings; that the land in question is embrace1\ and' included in her (defendant's) prior and subsistinl{ Miscellaneous Lease Application No. V-194 of the Hure~u of Lands; and consequently, plaintiff arquired no free patent title or l'igiht over the same. By way of countEl'claim, dcfendant reproduced the above-material allegations as integral parts of said counterclaims, and prays that plaintiff's title be annulled a nd that damages amounting to P3,000 be .'.lward&d to her. Attached to the answer with counterclaim are the original a!ld sup;>lomental petitions to inval:date and annul plaintiff's title which the defendant filed with the Bureau of Lands :\!lei the or<ler of the DirecU:ir of said Bu 1 ·eau causing the investigation of <lefendant's chargcs which consist mostly of t hose dC'fenses embodied in the answer. [ 11 answer to defendant':; counterclaim, plaint iff specifically Cenicd its material allegations, and averred that his titl'e was secured by him through k:;·al proceeJings and afV .:r hn hnd complied with all requirements of the bw for its issuance. He also alleged that his tit!e over th'J land was acquirei:I for more thnr. one year already, hence it can no lon1=,"er be revoked or cancelled. Thereafter, defendant presented a moti'on for leave to fi)f' a supplement~) :!ns\vcr which wa~ granted by the trial court. This supplemcntai answer attaches the on!;?r cf .the D:1 ·ecto1· of Lan<l:<1 finding the charges of defendnnt. adverted to in the orig;nal nnLAWYERS (JOU RNAL Ncvembe1· 30, 1961 swer well f'lundcd. Plaintiff ir. turn submitted 1 1is reply contenciing that the order of the Direclor is not yet final and s!ill subject to a motion for rcconsidC!ratic.n, and the lame is also ar>pealab:e to the Secretary of Agricul!'ure and Natural Resom·i:cs. He further a lleges that said order was issued w ithout jurisdiction and, is, thcrefo1·e null and void. In t he mea11time dcfe11dant pruyetl for the issuance of a prelin1inary injunction to restrain the pla intiff from disturbing ht;r posscs11ion. After a preliminary hearil!g or. May 19, Hl55, the irial court g ranted the injunction. The trial court set the ca,,e for hearing on J uly 1, 1955 but the hearing was postponed as requested by d'efendant who claimPd that sho was goiug to take the bar examinations to be giv~n on August :if that year. The hearing was reset for September 8, 1955 but on this date, plaintiff's counsel, Atty. Bernardo Q. Aldana, failed to appear. Instead he filed an urgent petition for tra11sfor of sai1l hearing on the ground that he is seriously ill and it is physically impossible fol' him to travel on account of sa ici' illneis. This 1 ietitio11 was however, not verified nor was there a medical ce'rtificate attached. On defendant's ob'jection, the trial court denied' the motion for continuance and allowed the defendant to present her evidence ez vart.e. Said counsel, upon learning of this incident, move(\ but failed to have this order reconsidered. Several day$ later t he trial court rendered its decision dismissing plaintiff's complaint for failure to prosecute, i.e., absence of counsel, and making• the injunction previously issued permanent. Upon receipt of the decision, said counsel for plaintiff a~ked for its reconsideration and new trial on the ground that his iailmc• to appcs:- on the day of trial· was due to sicknesis which constitutes an accident or excusable uegligcnce to warrant the roopeninr: c.f the casc. Furthermore, he asserted the inddeasibility of hi:; !'rc:oe parent title which can no longer be cancelled by the Director d Lands, im•oking th(' case of Sumail vs:. Judge of Court of Firs1 Iustan('e of Cotabato, G .. R. No. L-827b'., April 30, 1955. The trial court d~nil.'<l this motion, so plm11tiff prosecuted this appeal to th~ Court of Appeals. Before th>? said appellaU> court, plainti!f-a'pJlf'llanl presented a new motion for new trial based on the s"me grounds p1eviously ;aised in the cou1·t below but this time he attached thcretc. t he fo\lo·wing a s annexes : fa) affidavit of the physician, Dr. Etigenio S. De Leon, who attended to the alleged illness of plaintiff's counsel ; (b) a photostatic copy of the permit from tl1e U nited States Anny for plaintiff's predecessor in interest to occupy the land in question; (c) a copy of the decree tor the iss:us11ce of a free patent by the Director of Lands: a nd (d) a copy of plaintiff's original certif icate of title issued by 1 he Register of Deeds of Laguna. In his brief, plaintiff-appellant contends that the trial eoul't N rcd or committed at least a gra\•e t:buse of discretion in denyin:i his urgent petition for transfer of hearing on September 8, 1!)5,-, and in not giving him an opportumty to present his evidence to support the complaint.. He claims that the failure of his former counsel (the lat.e Atty. Bernardo Q. Aldana) to attend said hnaring on that date on account of illness is an accident which coni;itutcs a valid ground that would entitle him to a favorable continuance of said hearing; and that this fact had been satisfaclorily explained by said coui1sel in his motion for recons:deration and new tria:. Thus, the late Atty. Aldana explained that although he had been skk for about a month he did not present. the urgent petition for transfer earlier because he hoped and believed that he will recover and get well before s:a id date, but unfortunately his ill!less, became more serious and ~m·h illnc:>i;, according to his att('nc\ing physician, would endanger his life, if he traveled by any means of transportation; that mid mot ion was not accompanied by a medical certificate because he was not able to contact his attending physician at the time he prepared it, and at any rate this defect has been cured or supplied by the affidavit of Dr. De Leon attached to the motion for new trial filed in the Cou!'t of Appeals ; that although said petition was not verified, the faet that it is the counsel himself who asks for the continuance due to his own iltness should have been given mel'it by the trial cou1 t and that said court should have taken and believed his word because it was made by the lawyer himself who is deemed to be an officer of the court. And to demonstrate the sedou~11ess of forme1· counsel's illness, thC' present counsei for plaintiff has manifested that. Atty. Aldana's illcess beeamc worse from September to November, 1955 nnd he was operated on the stomach for cancer of the intestines which f.ventual!y c.aused his death on May, 19Gfi. Furthern1ore, plai:itiff contends lhat he has a valid and meritorious C'ausc cf action aga.inst th(' defendant, the land in question' being covered: by a Torrens tit.le which has already become iJ\defcasiblc, and thnt he she-uld: have been respected in his possession. Hencc, he concludes that he wa.'> deprived of his day in court and should have been granted a new tl'ial because there is a great probability that the j udgment will he altei·e:I shouid he be al!c•wed to adduce evidcn<·e in his favor. On the other hand, t.he defend·ant-appel!ee contends that the trial cout't correctly dismissed the complaint for failure to prosecute on the part of the plaintiff, because the absence of plaintiff's counsel during the hearing is not excusable; that t he petition for transfer was presented only during the day of hearing w hen he could have done it earlier because he received notice thereof as early as July 25, Hl55; that said pdit ion was defect ive becauso it was not verified a11d was una·c~ompanied by a medica! certificate. He further maintains that the free patent title issued' in plaintiff's favor is no longer effective bccouse the Director of Lands has al, reaciy recomm<:nded its cancellutlon and the same was later a ffi1 ·med by th~ Secreta1·y of Agriculture and Naturnl Resources . The principal issue to be H:solvcd in this case is whether the denial of plaintiff's motion for continuance constitute an abuse cf C.:iscl'elior. which will entitle p!aiutiff to u grant. of new trial. In the considcrntion of motions for postponem-mt of t rials, as well as in those for new t rial, two circumstances should be tak:-u into account by the oourt, namely, first the merits of the case of the movant and second, the reasonableness of the postponement, t he rules pointing out to accident, surprise or excusable neglect as rea- , sons therefor. So, with respect to the firs:t circumstance the n;les require an affida vit of merits; with respect to the second, an affidavit showing ~he accident, sm·p:·ise or excu~r.Llc neglect. There may he ar. accident, i;urprise r..r excusable neg!P.<:t justifying postponement or reconsidet·ation, but if the movant <toe~ not present a meritor ious daim or defense, denial of his motion for post1>onement may not be considered as an a buse o'f the discretion of the court. Note that disc1·etion is lodged in the presiding judge, and this discretion should be used in consideri11g the circumstances above mentioned. Going no'" to the case at Lar, wr find that there was an accident that had prevented appearanC\3 of couns:el for plaintiff on the day set for trial, and that is, sudden illness. There may have been no c'-!rtificate of illness, but this circumstances is explained' by the sudden appearance or aggravation of the illness, rendering it inconvenient if not difficult, fo1· counsel ro ~ecure the requi1 ·ed ct'rtificut? of ill'l<'SS. Accidents O)' illness, if sudden and unexperted, ca11 not always be subject tO a certificate; the circumstances may render it impcssible to secure in time the medical certificate ihet is neede<l, or the person making· th~ affidavit may not be available at t he time to prepare opp(lrtuncly the affidavit exJJlaining the excusnble nC'gl•!cL In the case al bar, we a ls..1 find that while the defendant had been asking for postponement, because he was waiting a certain 1·esolution of the Lands Depaitmcnt, it does not appear that postponement has been granted at any time upon motion of the plaintiff. This fact is apparent frcm the record on appeal as well as from the decision of the trial judge. Since this was the first time that plaintiff had asked for postponement because counsel was ill, and inasmuch as his sickness is an accident that could not have been foreseen at the time of the trial; the court should not have been too s:trict in demanding that illness be attested b)· a November 30, 1961 LAWYERS \JOURNAL 3.11 medical certificate ot: a comp<?tcnt physician. Going now to the other circumstances, the mer its of the cau;:c of action of the plaintiff, lhe pleadings i;:how that the plaintiff has a certificate of title by reason of the grant of a free patent to l1im; that the land subject of the action is covcrl'd by the patent and the certificatp of t itle; and that the same land is in thP possession of the defendant. Not to allow plaintiff an opport unity to present his side of the case would certainly result in a clear in.iustice to plaintiff. As a matter of fact the decision in itself, which dii:misses the action of the plaintiff, causes him an injustice because by an error of the judge, plaintiff has been dep1·ivecl of the right to possess a certain portion of his titled property. The rourt reasons cut that a certain :·csolution of the Director of La~C.:> has cancell~d the certificat~ of title. That is a melter which shout! have been threshed out at the tl'ial or hea ring of the case. At this stage of the proceedings we must remind judge.; :i.nd counsel that the rules of preccdure are not to be applied in ?' very rigid, technical sense; rules c:>f. procedure are used only to help fCCUl"'C substantial justice. (nule I . Sec. 2) If a technical" and 1 igid l'.!nforcement of the rules is made, thf:ir aim would be defeated. In the case at bar, it appears that the r ules which are merely secondary ir importance are made to cvenide the ends 'Of justice; the technical mies had been misapplied to the prejudice of the substantial' right of a party. F or 1 he foregQing considerations, the decision and the pr01;;cedin£S in the ccurt below are hereby set aside and the case remanded to said court for further preceedings in acc.ordance herewith. No costs. Benaz<m, Padilla, Ba11tista .411.qcl<.>. Concepcion. J .IJ.1 .... Reues, P11re1lcs and n e Leon, JJ., concurre<L II Enriqite lca.~iano. PU1intiff-Appellcc vs. Felisa lCl1simw, Defen<lant-Appclla11t G·R. No. L-16592, Octoba 27, 1961, Concep<"ir;m, 'I. L COUN TERCLAIM; OI:.DER D!Sl\IISSING IT INTERLOCUTORY ; WHEN A PPEALABLE.- The orde1· granting plaintiff's motion to dismiss a counterclaim is inttrlocutory in 1111 turc and, hence, not appealable, until ufter j udgment shall have been rendered on plaintiff's complaint. 2. COMPENSATION; REQUISITES.- When all the requisites mentioned in Article 1279 of the Civil C'ode are present, compensation takes effect by operation of law, and exting'llishes both c!'l'bts to the conc~rrcnt amount, even though the creditors are not aware of the compensation. 3. COUNTERCLAIM; MAY BE SET UP TO REDUCE MONEY CLAIM BY P LAINTIFF.- Counterclaim may be set up, not so much to obtain , a money judgml!nt against plaintiff, as by w.:i.y :>f set-off, to reduce the sum colleclible by the latter, if successful, to the extent of the concunent amount ( M<'ore's Federal P ractice, Vol. I, pp. 695-6913) (See a lso Wisdom vs. Guess Drycleaning Co., 5 Fed. Sup!., 762-767). Ji1i111.e R. Nuevas for the plaintiff-eppellee. Jose W. Diokno for the defendant-appellant. DE C I S ION Appeal from an order o-f t.he Court of First Instance of Manila granting plaintiff's motion to dismii<'I defcncla1~t's fir'lt counterclaim ;ind dh,missinC" the laltt:r. 1'he facts :i.re simple enough. In his complaint, dated July 31, 1959, plaintiff Enrique lcasiano sought to l't!Cover P20,000, plus interest and attorney's fees, from th<? defendant, Felisa Icasiano. Within the reglementai-y pei·iod, or vn NovembC'r 9, 1959, the latter filed 11n 11nswer admitting some allegat ions of the complaint denying othe:- allegations thereof and setting up special defenses'. :>s well us two (2) counhrclaims - one for the sum of Pl 50.00 allcgc:dly borrowed by plaintiff from the dofendant, and another fo1· moral and exemplary danw.i'Cs, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, allegedly suffered and incurred by the defendant in consequence of this suit, in such sum as the court may find just and reasonable. On November 17, 1959, 1 1laintiff moved (a ) to dismiss tl~e first counterclaim; (b) to strike out paragraph (2) of defendant's answer; ::.nd (c) to set the case fot· hearingi on the merits. Despite defendant's objection thereto, on December 7, 1959, the !ower ~ourt grantca the first prnyer, deni-:!1 the second prayer and set Lhc c&se for hearing on u stated date. Notice of the order to this effect was served on the defendant on December 17, 1959, who, three (3) days later, filed her notice 0-f appeal and appeal bone!.. Plaintiff cvtrnte1·ed with a motion to strike out defendant's appcat "in so far 33 said notice refers to the H etting for hearing of the abevc cntitlcC case on \January 7, 19GO, at 8:30 a.m., for the simple l"(;ason that snid order, in so far as it sets a ctate for the hearin; CJf the above t:ntitled case is intcrloeut('ry and, therefore, not nppealal>le, and for the further reason that the intended appe-al from r.aid setting order is plainly frivolous and interposed only for the purpose of delay". This motion was denied in an order dated Deci.'ml>er 19. 195it, which a llowed defendant's appeal "from the order of D<.-cember 7, 1959, ins~far us it 01·ders the dismissal of defendant's first counterclaim, and !:letting the hearing. of this case on January 7, 1960, at 8:30 a.m."' Upon denial by the lower court uf pla'.atiff's motior. for re,.,.onsidcrati.:m of its last order , defcndtmt fi!c:I h~r record on appeal, which after its amendme11t, wa~ o.pprovcd "there being 110 opposition thereto." Sometimes after the transmittal' of the amended rec.ord on appeal to this Court, or on Febniary 4, Hl60, plnintiff file:t a motkn to dismiss the appeal upon the g·nmnd that defendant's ."\pJ;eal· '•from the order of the trial court dated D*".cember 7, 1959, dismissing her fiJ'St counterc!uim is manifestly and palpably frivolous" 2-nd that her ap!)cal from said order insofar :i.s it set the case for hearing i'l" "ostensibly dila~ry, asidfl from the fact that such setting order is intc1 locutory and, therefore, not immediP.tely appealable". This motion was denied by a · resolution of this Court dated Februa1y 17, 1960. We, likr-w:s:e, denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of said resolution. The main issue in this appeal is whether er. not the lower court erred in holding itself without jurisdiction to enteJ"tain defend· 1rnt's f1 r~t counterolaim. Before passing upon the merits of such question, ;t should be noted, however, that t.he order granting pl::i.intiff's motion to dismiss said counterclaim is interlocutOl'y in nature, and, hence, not appealable, until after judgment shall have hren rendered on plaintiff's comptaint (Cuano, et a!. vs. Monteblanco, ct al., L-14871, Apr il 29, 1961; Villasin vs. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of the Philippines, L-13501, April :!8, 1960; Caldera, et al. vs. Balcueha, et al., 84 Phil". 304) . However, plaintiff did not object to defendant's appeal from said order, except insof ar r.ml11 11s ie set the case for h.roring. Jr, other words, it acquiesced to said appeal as reg-ind the dismissal of the aforementioned" counterclaim In fact, plaintiff interposed no objection to defendant's amei:ided record on appeal. Hence, even if the lower court should have disupproved it, for the reason that !<ni(I r.rdcr of dismissal is int.erkcutnl"y in c haract~r, its order approvinqthc amended rcrord on appeal eutailed, at moi:t, ~n error of judgment that does not affect our jurisdidion k C'ntertain the appeal (Gat111uitan v,;. Medina, L-14400, August 5, 1960; Salazar vs. Salazar, L·U823, April 29, 1953). It may not he amiss to add that the a llegation in die motion, filed by plaintiff with this Court to dismiss the appeal, to the effect that the same is frivolous insofar as it ~eeks a review of the order dismissing defendant's first counterclaim, has no merit, not only bEcause a party can not be barrefl upon such gTound: from appealing by wJ"it of error, but, also, because W(! find that the lower court had erred in issuing the order ~omplained of. Indeed, regardless of whethe!' the court ·of first instance may entertain counterclaims for less than PS,000, it must be noted that Page ~82 LAWYERS ITOURNAL Ncvember 39, 1961
Date: 1961
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