6. Supreme Court Decisions, Icasiano v. Icasiano.pdf

Media

Part of The Lawyers Journal

extracted text: medical certificate ot: a comp<?tcnt physician. Going now to the other circumstances, the mer its of the cau;:c of action of the plaintiff, lhe pleadings i;:how that the plaintiff has a certificate of title by reason of the grant of a free patent to l1im; that the land subject of the action is covcrl'd by the patent and the certificatp of t itle; and that the same land is in thP possession of the defendant. Not to allow plaintiff an opport unity to present his side of the case would certainly result in a clear in.iustice to plaintiff. As a matter of fact the decision in itself, which dii:misses the action of the plaintiff, causes him an injustice because by an error of the judge, plaintiff has been dep1·ivecl of the right to possess a certain portion of his titled property. The rourt reasons cut that a certain :·csolution of the Director of La~C.:> has cancell~d the certificat~ of title. That is a melter which shout! have been threshed out at the tl'ial or hea ring of the case. At this stage of the proceedings we must remind judge.; :i.nd counsel that the rules of preccdure are not to be applied in ?' very rigid, technical sense; rules c:>f. procedure are used only to help fCCUl"'C substantial justice. (nule I . Sec. 2) If a technical" and 1 igid l'.!nforcement of the rules is made, thf:ir aim would be defeated. In the case at bar, it appears that the r ules which are merely secondary ir importance are made to cvenide the ends 'Of justice; the technical mies had been misapplied to the prejudice of the substantial' right of a party. F or 1 he foregQing considerations, the decision and the pr01;;cedin£S in the ccurt below are hereby set aside and the case remanded to said court for further preceedings in acc.ordance herewith. No costs. Benaz<m, Padilla, Ba11tista .411.qcl<.>. Concepcion. J .IJ.1 .... Reues, P11re1lcs and n e Leon, JJ., concurre<L II Enriqite lca.~iano. PU1intiff-Appellcc vs. Felisa lCl1simw, Defen<lant-Appclla11t G·R. No. L-16592, Octoba 27, 1961, Concep<"ir;m, 'I. L COUN TERCLAIM; OI:.DER D!Sl\IISSING IT INTERLOCUTORY ; WHEN A PPEALABLE.- The orde1· granting plaintiff's motion to dismiss a counterclaim is inttrlocutory in 1111 turc and, hence, not appealable, until ufter j udgment shall have been rendered on plaintiff's complaint. 2. COMPENSATION; REQUISITES.- When all the requisites mentioned in Article 1279 of the Civil C'ode are present, compensation takes effect by operation of law, and exting'llishes both c!'l'bts to the conc~rrcnt amount, even though the creditors are not aware of the compensation. 3. COUNTERCLAIM; MAY BE SET UP TO REDUCE MONEY CLAIM BY P LAINTIFF.- Counterclaim may be set up, not so much to obtain , a money judgml!nt against plaintiff, as by w.:i.y :>f set-off, to reduce the sum colleclible by the latter, if successful, to the extent of the concunent amount ( M<'ore's Federal P ractice, Vol. I, pp. 695-6913) (See a lso Wisdom vs. Guess Drycleaning Co., 5 Fed. Sup!., 762-767). Ji1i111.e R. Nuevas for the plaintiff-eppellee. Jose W. Diokno for the defendant-appellant. DE C I S ION Appeal from an order o-f t.he Court of First Instance of Manila granting plaintiff's motion to dismii<'I defcncla1~t's fir'lt counterclaim ;ind dh,missinC" the laltt:r. 1'he facts :i.re simple enough. In his complaint, dated July 31, 1959, plaintiff Enrique lcasiano sought to l't!Cover P20,000, plus interest and attorney's fees, from th<? defendant, Felisa Icasiano. Within the reglementai-y pei·iod, or vn NovembC'r 9, 1959, the latter filed 11n 11nswer admitting some allegat ions of the complaint denying othe:- allegations thereof and setting up special defenses'. :>s well us two (2) counhrclaims - one for the sum of Pl 50.00 allcgc:dly borrowed by plaintiff from the dofendant, and another fo1· moral and exemplary danw.i'Cs, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, allegedly suffered and incurred by the defendant in consequence of this suit, in such sum as the court may find just and reasonable. On November 17, 1959, 1 1laintiff moved (a ) to dismiss tl~e first counterclaim; (b) to strike out paragraph (2) of defendant's answer; ::.nd (c) to set the case fot· hearingi on the merits. Despite defendant's objection thereto, on December 7, 1959, the !ower ~ourt grantca the first prnyer, deni-:!1 the second prayer and set Lhc c&se for hearing on u stated date. Notice of the order to this effect was served on the defendant on December 17, 1959, who, three (3) days later, filed her notice 0-f appeal and appeal bone!.. Plaintiff cvtrnte1·ed with a motion to strike out defendant's appcat "in so far 33 said notice refers to the H etting for hearing of the abevc cntitlcC case on \January 7, 19GO, at 8:30 a.m., for the simple l"(;ason that snid order, in so far as it sets a ctate for the hearin; CJf the above t:ntitled case is intcrloeut('ry and, therefore, not nppealal>le, and for the further reason that the intended appe-al from r.aid setting order is plainly frivolous and interposed only for the purpose of delay". This motion was denied in an order dated Deci.'ml>er 19. 195it, which a llowed defendant's appeal "from the order of D<.-cember 7, 1959, ins~far us it 01·ders the dismissal of defendant's first counterclaim, and !:letting the hearing. of this case on January 7, 1960, at 8:30 a.m."' Upon denial by the lower court uf pla'.atiff's motior. for re,.,.onsidcrati.:m of its last order , defcndtmt fi!c:I h~r record on appeal, which after its amendme11t, wa~ o.pprovcd "there being 110 opposition thereto." Sometimes after the transmittal' of the amended rec.ord on appeal to this Court, or on Febniary 4, Hl60, plnintiff file:t a motkn to dismiss the appeal upon the g·nmnd that defendant's ."\pJ;eal· '•from the order of the trial court dated D*".cember 7, 1959, dismissing her fiJ'St counterc!uim is manifestly and palpably frivolous" 2-nd that her ap!)cal from said order insofar :i.s it set the case for hearing i'l" "ostensibly dila~ry, asidfl from the fact that such setting order is intc1 locutory and, therefore, not immediP.tely appealable". This motion was denied by a · resolution of this Court dated Februa1y 17, 1960. We, likr-w:s:e, denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of said resolution. The main issue in this appeal is whether er. not the lower court erred in holding itself without jurisdiction to enteJ"tain defend· 1rnt's f1 r~t counterolaim. Before passing upon the merits of such question, ;t should be noted, however, that t.he order granting pl::i.intiff's motion to dismiss said counterclaim is interlocutOl'y in nature, and, hence, not appealable, until after judgment shall have hren rendered on plaintiff's comptaint (Cuano, et a!. vs. Monteblanco, ct al., L-14871, Apr il 29, 1961; Villasin vs. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of the Philippines, L-13501, April :!8, 1960; Caldera, et al. vs. Balcueha, et al., 84 Phil". 304) . However, plaintiff did not object to defendant's appeal from said order, except insof ar r.ml11 11s ie set the case for h.roring. Jr, other words, it acquiesced to said appeal as reg-ind the dismissal of the aforementioned" counterclaim In fact, plaintiff interposed no objection to defendant's amei:ided record on appeal. Hence, even if the lower court should have disupproved it, for the reason that !<ni(I r.rdcr of dismissal is int.erkcutnl"y in c haract~r, its order approvinqthc amended rcrord on appeal eutailed, at moi:t, ~n error of judgment that does not affect our jurisdidion k C'ntertain the appeal (Gat111uitan v,;. Medina, L-14400, August 5, 1960; Salazar vs. Salazar, L·U823, April 29, 1953). It may not he amiss to add that the a llegation in die motion, filed by plaintiff with this Court to dismiss the appeal, to the effect that the same is frivolous insofar as it ~eeks a review of the order dismissing defendant's first counterclaim, has no merit, not only bEcause a party can not be barrefl upon such gTound: from appealing by wJ"it of error, but, also, because W(! find that the lower court had erred in issuing the order ~omplained of. Indeed, regardless of whethe!' the court ·of first instance may entertain counterclaims for less than PS,000, it must be noted that Page ~82 LAWYERS ITOURNAL Ncvember 39, 1961 Articles 1278, 1279, and 1286 and 1290 of our Civil Code read: "ART. 1278. Compcm,ation shall take place when two persons, in their own right, arc creditors a nd debtors of each vt.her.'' "ART. 1279. In order that compensation ma y ~ proper, it is necessary: ( l ) That each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at the same time a principal creditor of the other; (2) T hat both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due arc consumable, they be of the same kind, and also of the same quality if the latter has been stated; (3) That the two debts be <Inc: (i) That they he liquicl:ltcd .:tnd dcmandablc; (6) That over neither of them th•·rt' be any retention or controversy, commenced by third persons and conununicated in due time to the debtor." "ART. 1286. Compensation takes place by operation of 2. ID. ; VF.NUE OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINT WHERE LIBEL JS CIRCULATED JN PROVI NCE OR CITY WHERE NEITHER OFFENDED PARTY NOR OFFENDER RESIDES.- Petitior.er here maintains that even if t he justice of the peace com·ts have jurisdiction to conduct prelimin:uy invl:!stigations, the Hnue was improperly laid in Bohon, because neither the complainant nor the defendant. resided there. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republie Ad 1289 provides that where the libel is published or circulated in a province or city wherein neither the offended pa~i:y nor the offender resides, the action may be brought therf'i;i; and the complaint herein questioned, a!kges that the libel h!l.d been pubfishctl and circu/a'tetl in B obm1 and other ttmnicipalilies of Samar. Bohon and Sama1·, therefore, constituted propct· venue. DEC J SION On April 20, 1959, Amancio Balite, filed with the justice of the peace court of Bohon, Samar, a criminal complaint for libel law, even though the debts may be payable at different places, against Delfin Mcrcader. After making the preliminary examinbut there shall be an indemnity for expenses of ru.:changc or transportation to the place of payment." "ART. 1290. When ail thf' requisites mentioned in arti,.le 1279 are present, compensation takes effect by operation of law, and ru.:tinguishes both debt:;; to the concurrent amount, even though the Cl'editors and debtoi·s are not aware of. the compensation." Pursuant to these provisions, defendant would have been entitled to deduct from plaintiff's claims of P20,000 - if the latter were established - the sum of Pl5G involved in her first counterclaim, if the al.ego.lion thereof were ti·ue, evc11 if no srtch co1rnterclaim had be~m set up iJ1 he1· answer, for "when all the requisites mentioned in Article 1279 a1·c present, compensation takes effect by operation of law, and extinguishes both debts to the concurrent amount, even though the creditors and debtors are not aware of'" - and, hence, did not plead - "the compensation''. Moreover, it ls dear f1om the reco'rd before us that said eounterdaim was set 1111, not so much to obtain a money judgment against plaintiff, as by way of set-off, to reduce the sum collectible by the latter, if successful to the extent of the ::oncurrent nmC'ur.t (Moore'!! FedNal Practice, Vol. l, pp. 69&-696) (See, also, Wisdom vs. Guess Drycleaning Co., 5 Fed. Sup!., 762-767). WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby reversed, insofar as it dismisses defendant's first counterclaim, and the case, is, accordingly, remanded t<i the lower court for f url.her pr<>c:eedings, not inconsi!>tent with t his decision, with costs ag:.i.iust plaintifi-appellee, Enrique Icasiano. IT SO ORDERED. Bengwn., C. J., Pridil!a, l1•rntistr1 Aliyrlo. f_,rtbnulor, J.IJ.l. Reyes, P4redc8 mul De l-1'011, JJ., concuri°1!d. Bar-rtra tin<l Di::ou, JJ., to::ik no part. Ill Delffo Mercader, Petitioner, v11. Hon. Frrrncillc.J Valila of the J1111tice of the Peace C'ou:rt of Bobon, Samar and Amancio /Jnlitt;, Respondents, G.R. No. L-16118, February 16, 1961, BengZ<Yn, J . 1. LIBEL; VENUE FOR CRIMINAL ACTION A ND Cl\°!L ACTIO N FOR DA!>.IAGES.- The riimina\ and civil act!ol" for damages in cases of written defamations shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the Court of First Instance of tho province or city where any of the accused or any of the offended parties resides at the time of the commission of the offense. Where the libel is pt:iblished, circulated, displayed or PXhibited in a province or city wherein neither lhe offender nor the offended party resides the civil and criminal actions may be brought in the Court of First Instance thereof. (Art. 360, Rev. Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act 1289). ation, the judge issued the corresponding warrant of a rrest. The accused moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and cause nf action. Upon denial thei:eof, the accused filed in September 1959, this petition for certiorari, based mainly on the alleg-ed want of jurisdiction of the aforesaid inferior court. In ordinary l'ircumstanccs, the petition would have been Cif;· missed, witho1.:t prejudice to its presentation before the local eom-t o! first instance. But at that time then• were pending before this Tribunal some cases involving the jurisdiction, or lack of jurisdi"~ 1 ion, of justic<:f; of the peace over e;·iminal libel, in the light of llepublic Act 1289, ap1>roved .lune 15, 1955.(1) So, we gave due course to this petition. In his answer, the respondent judg(' <!Xrlained that he had taken cognizance of the case for purposes of preliminary investigation. I n fact, he stated, as the accused h~1d failed to attend the hearing, and there was prima facie evidence, he fonvardcd the exvediente to the •_·e>urt of first instance for the · trial on the merits. The controversy is thus reduced to the question whether the infet'ior coul't!: may, after the passage o! Republic Act 1289, ent:::rt11in cnminal eompl<lints for written defamation, not for trial on the merits, but for purposes of preliminary investigation. It is cnntcnded by those who would deny such authority, that Republic A rt. 1289 had the effect of depriving justice of the peace court'! of their power even to conduct preliminary investigations b the m:;i.tter of libel or written defamation. 'fhe question has been decifled in the affirmative in People v. Olarte, L-13027, June 30, 196fl. Tllrough Mr. Justice Concepcion, this Court said: "Can we justly hold that by fixing for said offense' a penalty falling under the original jurisdiction of courts of fir!lt instance, the framel'S of section 2 of Act No. 277 had cYince:t the intent,, either to establish an exception to the proviskn= of Ad No. 194, authori2.ing i:very ju~tice of the peace, to mo.lie pn~limina1·y investigation ~if any crime ali"eia-ed to have het:n committed within his municipality, jurisdiction to hear and determine which is by Jaw x x x vested in the judges of Cou!·ts of First Instance,' or to divest justice of th<! peace Of such authority, as regards the crime of libet?" (') Amt>nding Art. 361} of the Revised Pen:il Code to read :i~ follows: "x x x The criminal ar.d ci~·il action for dan~nges in cnee;:: of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be <ile<I !.;imultaneously or Sf'parate\y with the Court of First Instanc~ of the province or city where any of 1 he ro.ccl!.;;eJ or :my of the "ffcndect pai·ties resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Prnvidecl, however. that whertJ the libel is published, circulated. <lisplayed or f'xhibited in a province or city wherein neither the offender nor the offendc>d party resides the civil and criminal adions may ~ brought in the Court of F irst Instnnct! the!'eof. x x x." November 30. 1961 LA WYERS \JOURNAL Page 33f.s
Date: 1961
Rights