8. Supreme Court Decisions, Carpio Vda. de Camilo et. al. v. Hon. Arcamo et al. - Justice Paredes.pdf · Rare Periodicals

8. Supreme Court Decisions, Carpio Vda. de Camilo et. al. v. Hon. Arcamo et al. - Justice Paredes.pdf

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extracted text: "It is ob\'10us to us that such inference is unwarranted. To · begin with, there is absolutely nothing in Act No, 27ri' to indicate the aforementioned intent. Secondly, r.'.lpea1 or amendments by implication are neither presumed nor favored. On the contrary, every statute should be harmonized with them. Thirdly, the jurisdiction of courts o! first instance to hear anrl determine crimina l· actions within the original jurisdiction thereof !s far from inconsistent with tho authority of justices of the peace to make preliminary investigations in such actions. What is more, this authority has beC\n vested to relieve courts of first instance of the duty to hear cases which are devcir! of' probablo cause, thereby paving the way for the effective exel"cise of the original jurisdiction ol' said courts and expc:!itious disposal by the S!l.me of criminal cases which a1·e prima facie meritorious. x x x." ''Jt is apparent, from a 1 >erusal of the t hree (3) provisions aforementioned, that the !rnmers of Article 360 of the R~vised Penal Code intended "to introduce no substantial ch!lng<> in the existing Jaw, except as regards venue, and that, in all other respech, they meant to preserve and continue the status quo under sections 2 and 11 of Aot No. 2117. ~heh. was, n!i:io the purpose of Congress in passing House Bill No. 2695, whir.h eventually became Republic Act No. 1289." The Bohon .iustice of th~ peace has thus al'led within hie Samuel A. Arcamo, J ustice of the Peace of Malangas, Zamboanga q"el Sul", Ong Peng Kee and Ad£:lia Ong. Petitif•llCr Petru Carpio Vdu. De Camilo, had been by herself and predecessors-in-interest in peaceful, open and adverse post-t:ssion of a parcel of public foreshore !and situated in Mnlangas, Zamboanga de! Sur, containing an a rea of about 400 square meters. A commercial building was erected on the property which was declared under Tax Dec. No. 5286 and assessed at P7,400.00. Rrropondent Ong Peng Kee was a !£:ssee, of one of the apartments of ~aid commercial building since June 1, 1957. On August 1 1957, Arthur Evert Bannister filed an unlawful Uctuincr case against both De Camilo and Ong Peng Kee (Ch-ii Case No. 64) wit!-1 the JP of Malangas. For failure of Bannister and/ or counsel to appear at the trial they were declared in default nnd Pl00.00 was awarded to De Camilo on her counterclaim. The motion for reconsideration presented by Bannister was denied. T~e other petitior:crs, Severino Estrada, F elisa, Susana , Antonio and the minors Isabelo, Rene and Ruben, all surnamed Francisco, the said minors represented by their mother Susana, had also been in possession (in common). peaceful, open and adverse, sinrc 1937, of a parcel of public fore.~hore land about 185 square metei·s which is ~1djoining that lali.d occupied by de Camilo. On this parcel, o commercial building assessed at Pl,000.00 was ne~ted by th~ Francisco's, and had the same declared under Tax Dec. No. ·1911. On Septemher 1, 1957, the two commercial buildings were hurnpowers, and this pelition will have to be dismissed. Petitioner here maint.:i.in3 that (.\'en if \he justice of thc €d <lown. Two weeks thereafter, l"espondents Onq Peng Kee anr! Adelia Ong, conslJ"Ucted a building of their own, vccupying abo11t 120 squa1<' meters. T he buildmg, howevel", was so built that portions of the lands previously xcupied by petitioners (De Ca'lli l~ and the Frimciscos) wcrC' encroached npon. pence cou.rls have jurisdiction to conduct prelimir.ary investigations, the vcm1e was impr?pei·ly laid In Bobon, bt>cause neither th: t·vmplainant nor the defendant resided ther<'. The statute(2) prnvides th:i.t whe1·e the libel is published or ci1 cuJated in a province or city wherein neither the offended party nor t he offender r esides, the action may be brougt.t therein; and the complaint herein questioned, alleges that the libel had ht>t:n published and ci-rculated in Bobon and other municipalities of Sam(lT. Bohon and Samat, therefore, constituted a prope::- venue. Petitioner's last contention that the complaint stated no eau~e flf action, may not be considered now. It. is unimportant in a Cl"I'tiorari proceeding, specially because petitioner has the remedy of diScussin~ the issue before the court of first instance, and then if a fter hearinK he is conYicted, to appeal in due time. Petition dismissed. ~o costs. Padilla, Bautista .4 pqelo1 Lrf>ra•/or, Cuncepcioi,, J.B.l... Reyes, Earrera, Paredes and Diz{)1?, ./J., concurred. IV Petra Carpio V!la. d6 Ca1nllo 6t al., Pf,ltitioner•-wppelle.e•. VB. The Hon. Justice of the Peace Sa?f1,1tel A. Arcp.1no1 Ong reng Kee <rnd Adeli.p. Onf11 Re~p~nc.ients-uppellants, G.R. No. L-15653, Sep· tembe.-r !!9, 1961, Pwedes, J. INTERPJ-iEADER; WH~N JU:-iTICE OF THE PEACF. COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION.- The complaint asking the petitioners to iriterplead, practically took the case out of the jurisdiction of the I.JP court, becaus~ the action would then necessarily "involve the title to or POSS<!Ssion of real property qr aqy interest the1·~in" O\'er which thl' CFJ has original jurisdiction (par. [b], S<'C. 44, Judicia:·y Act, as amended). Then also, ttie subject-matter of the complaint (interpleader) would come under thl! original jurisdiction of the OFI, because it would n<Jt be capable of pecunia r:y estimation (Sec. 44, par. (a], t.Tudiciary Act), there having bcftll no showing that rentals were asked by the petitioners from respondents. DE C r SJON This appeal stemmed from a petition for Certiorari and Manclamus .filed by Petra Carpio Vda. de Camilo and others, agai?lst (2) Quoted in the margin, s1wn1. Under date of December 3, 19C.7, De Camilo filed a Civil Cao;I' No. 78 for Forcible Entry against Ong Peng Kee nnd Adelia Or:gwith the JP of Malangas with respect to the portion belonging to her wherein the building of Ong Peng Kee was erected. On A1:gust 8, 1958, Severino Estrnda and the Fn!.nciscos filerl a similar case (No. 105). Jn answer to the complaints, the defendants (Ong Peng Keo and Adelia Ong), claimed that th(' land whe-re they constructed their building was leased to them by the Municipality of Malangas. Pending trial of the two Ct.SC!J, thfl rcsppn4cnt Ong Peng Ke::: .1r.d A1clia Ong filed a complaint for l11terpieader :-:gninst De Camilo. SeyerinQ Estrada, thti franciscos 1 Arthur Evert Bannister, the Mayor and Treasurer of ?ofalangas (Civ. Case No. 108), alleg-;ng tl)p.t the filing of the three cases of forcible entry (Civ. Cases No.<>. f.41 7a and JOG). indicated that the defendants, (in the Inte?·pleader) had conflicting interests since they a!l claimed to be er.titled to thl" possession of the lot in question and they (Pfng Ke~ and Ad~lia). rould not determine without hazard to themselves who of the defendants wa3 entitled to the 1mssessiM1. lnterpleader plaintiff'! fut·ther a!!cged that they had no interest in thl" property other than as mere lessees. A motion to dismiss .lhe Complaint for Interplcader was presented )ly the defcndan:s ti1erein (now petitioners), con.tending tha.t (1) the JP tia4 no ju1·isd!ction to try and to hear the case: (2) There were pending other actions bei')\tC'En the parties for the same cause; and ( 3) The complaint for Interpleader did not state a cause of action. Peng Kee and Adelia registered their opposition to the motion and on Septembc1· 30, 1957, respondent Justice of the I'£:ace denied the motion to dismiss and O!'<lered the defendants ~here in to interplead (Annex D). The two forcible entry casc-s were disnlissed. The defendants (now petitioners) instituted th<' present proceedings, for ccrtforari ltn<l manda11ms before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, claiming that re<;pondent JP in denying tl-c motion to dismiss acted without jurisdir:tion, and for having given <lue course to the complaint for Jnterpleader, the respondent JP gravely abused his discretion, and unlawfully neglected the perPage 234 LAWYERS \JOURNAL Novo~r 3(!, 1961 !ormauce of an act which was specificnlly enjoined by law, and fo1 which there was no plain, speedy and adequate 1 'E.medy in the 01·<:inary course of law. The Answer of respondents which contaiJw1I ~he usual admission and denial, sustained the confrary view. The ("Fl rendered judgment, the dispositive J")Ortion of which reads: :" IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby decla·es the \)ustice of t he Peace Court of Malangas to be without jurisdictio11 to t ry the case for interpleader and hereby «et!' asid ~ its Order dated September 30, 1958, denying the motion to dismiss the interpleader case; and consiclering that Civil Cases 78 a nd 105 have long bce!1 pending, the respondent J ustice of the Peac~ of Malnngas is 11ereby ordered to proceed to try th> same, without pronouncemen~ as to costs." The only issue raised in the present appeal is whether or noi the Justice of the Peace Court has jul"isdiction to take cogniza1H'.f'" of the lnterpk ader case. The petitioners claimed the possession of the respective portior. cf the lands belonging to them <m which the l"<!spondents had erect.~ their house after the fire which destroyed petitioner-appellants' buildings. This being the ms~, the contention of petitiOncrs-app-"1 - :ant.s thut the complaint to i11ierpleo.J, lacked cause of action, is Section 1, Ruic 14 of the Rules of Court provides - .. lntetpleader when prc•/•er.- Whene,•er conflicting doims upon the ioame subject-matter a rr nr may be made against a p<:rson, who c!aims no intel"est whatever in the subject-matter, or nn interest which in whole or in p&.rt is not disputed by tho· :mts to C":.Jmpcl them to in~Erplcad ;md litigate their seve~·al cluims among themselves." The petitioners did not have conflicting C'laims a1;pmst the resr}ond(:nls. Their respective claim was separate and distinct from tilt: l>ther. De Camilo ~nly wanted the resp:-rndents to vacate that Jlf'I"· lion of her property which was el"!croachcd upon by them when th~~· l'rect-Jd their building. The same is true with Estrad2. and th" _Fr:li.Dcucns. _.They- claimed possession of two different parcels of land, of different a reas, adjoining each other. Furthermore ii iF r:ot true that respondents Ong Peng· Kef' and Adelia Ong dirt nf't have any interest, in the subject matte;r. Their interest was th" prolongation of their cccupancy or possession of 1}-,e portions e'lnoached upon by them. It is, therefore, evident that the requirements for a complaint of Interpleader <Iv not exist. Even in the supposition that the c('mplaint presented a cause of action for lnterplcader, stilt we hold that the JP had no jurisdiction lt. take ccgniZUTJCE: thereof. The t·omph1.int asking the petitiol'.<lrS to interplead, p1·actically took th!! case on: of the jurisdktiO!l of the JP court, because the action would then necessariiy ' '111volve the title to or possession of real p!'opcrty or any interest there· in" ove1 · which the C 1' ~ 1 has original jurisdiction (par. (b]. sec. 44, Judiciary Act, as amended). Then also, th<' subject-matter of the complaint (interpleader) would come under the original jurisdicticn of the CFI, because it would· not be capable of pecuniary estimation (Sec. 44, par.[a], Judiciary Act), there having been no shCowing that rentals were asked by the petitioners from respondents. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FORE GOING, We find that the decision appealed from is in conformity with the law, and the same should be, as it is hereby affirmed, wi th costs agolinst 1·espondentsappellants Ong Peng Kee and Adelia Ong. Betigz(m, C.J., Padilla, Lubrador, Concc1>cio1i , J.8.L. Reyes , and De Leon, JJ., concurred. llautista AngPfo, Barre1·a rrnd Dizon, JJ., took no pa rt. v Delgado Brothers, lnc., Petitioner vs. Th~ Courl of Appe"ls, et al., Respvndffi. ts, G.R. No. L-15651,, December 29, 1960 , Ba1disU1 Angelo, J. L COMMON CA RRI ER; EXEMPTION FROM RESPONSIBILl· TY ARISING FROM N EGLIGENCE MUST BE SO CLEARLY S.TATED I N A CONTRACT.- It should be noted that the clause in Exhibit 1 determinative of the responsibility for the use of the crane contains t wo pa1·ts, namely: one whe~in the shipping company assumes full responsibility for the uso of the crane, and the other where said company agreed not to hold tl"te Delgado Brothers, Inc. liable in any w ay. While it may be admitted that under the first part the carrier may shift responsibility to petitioner when the da~age caused arises from tho negligence of the crane operator because exemption from responsibility for negligence must be stated in explicit terms, how. ever, it cannot do so under the second pal't where it expressly agreed to exempt petitione1· from liability in an y way it may arise, which is a clear case of assumption of responsibility on the part or the carrier contrary to the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals. Jn other words, the contract in question as embodied in Exhibit 1 fully satisfiect the doctrine stressed by said court that in order that exemption from liability arising from negligence may be granted, the contract "must be so rlcar as to leave no room, for the oper:ition of the ordinary l"Uies of liability consecrated by experi<mce and sanctioned by the express provisions of law." 2. ID.; BILL OF LADING ; SHIPPER SHALL BE BOUND BY THE CONDITIONS AND TERMS OF BILL OF LADING UPON ACCEPTANCE THEREOF.- 'I N ACCEPTING THIS BILL OF LADI NG the shipper, consignee and owner of the goods agree to be bound by all its stipulations, exceptions, and conditions whether wr itten, printed, or stamped on the front or back thei·eof, any local customs or privileges to the contrary notwithstanding.' This clause says that a shipper or consignee ' who accepts the bill of !acting becomes bound by all stipulations contained therein whether on the front or back thereof. ResPOJ•dent cannot elude its provisions simply because they prejudic~ him and take advantage of those that arc b<oneficial. Secondly, the fact that rcs11ondent shipped his goods on board the ship of petitioner and paid the corresponding freight hereon shows that he impliedly accepted the bill of lading which wa3 issued in connection with th<' shipment in question, and so it may be said that the same is binding upon him as if it has b«:·n actually signed by him or by any person in his beh~li. This is more so where resp(lI1dent is both the ~hipper and ~h<.' cunsignee of the goods in question. ,,. ID.; LAW GOVERN ING LIABILITY JN CASE OF LOS£, DESTRUCTION OR DETERIORATION OF GOODS TRANSPORTED.- Article 1753 . 1f the new Ci,1 il Co<l1.. pr::vides tlw.t the law of the country to which the g0ods a rt: to be tran~ ported ~hr.ll i;overn the "liabiLty of the common carrier in c~.::c. of loss, destruction or deterioration. This means the law of the Phi;ippines, or our new Civil Code. 4. ID.; ID.: LAWS GOVERNING RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS O f< ~ COi\!MON CARRIERS; CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SF.A ACT SU PPLETOHY TO CIV IL CODE.-Article 1766 of t he new Ci"il Code providcs that "In all matter~ not regulate:! by thi:; C<Jde, the rights and obligations of ccmnwn ca n;·~r!I shall ~ governed by the Code of Commerce and by sp<'Cial laws,' and said rights and obligations are governed by Artie!<'~ 173G, 1737, and 1738 of the new Civil Code. Therefore, although Section 4(5) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act stat<'s that the carrier shall not be liable in an amount exceeding P500.00 per packag·e or.less the value crf the goods had O c-cn decla red by the shippei- and inserted in the hill of lading, Nov~mber 30, 1961 LA WYERS !JOURNAL Page 33'}
Date: 1961
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