9. Supreme Court Decisions, Delgado Brothers Inc. v. Court of Appeals et.al - Justice Bautista Angelo.pdf · Rare Periodicals

9. Supreme Court Decisions, Delgado Brothers Inc. v. Court of Appeals et.al - Justice Bautista Angelo.pdf

Media

Part of The Lawyers Journal

extracted text: !ormauce of an act which was specificnlly enjoined by law, and fo1 which there was no plain, speedy and adequate 1 'E.medy in the 01·<:inary course of law. The Answer of respondents which contaiJw1I ~he usual admission and denial, sustained the confrary view. The ("Fl rendered judgment, the dispositive J")Ortion of which reads: :" IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby decla·es the \)ustice of t he Peace Court of Malangas to be without jurisdictio11 to t ry the case for interpleader and hereby «et!' asid ~ its Order dated September 30, 1958, denying the motion to dismiss the interpleader case; and consiclering that Civil Cases 78 a nd 105 have long bce!1 pending, the respondent J ustice of the Peac~ of Malnngas is 11ereby ordered to proceed to try th> same, without pronouncemen~ as to costs." The only issue raised in the present appeal is whether or noi the Justice of the Peace Court has jul"isdiction to take cogniza1H'.f'" of the lnterpk ader case. The petitioners claimed the possession of the respective portior. cf the lands belonging to them <m which the l"<!spondents had erect.~ their house after the fire which destroyed petitioner-appellants' buildings. This being the ms~, the contention of petitiOncrs-app-"1 - :ant.s thut the complaint to i11ierpleo.J, lacked cause of action, is Section 1, Ruic 14 of the Rules of Court provides - .. lntetpleader when prc•/•er.- Whene,•er conflicting doims upon the ioame subject-matter a rr nr may be made against a p<:rson, who c!aims no intel"est whatever in the subject-matter, or nn interest which in whole or in p&.rt is not disputed by tho· :mts to C":.Jmpcl them to in~Erplcad ;md litigate their seve~·al cluims among themselves." The petitioners did not have conflicting C'laims a1;pmst the resr}ond(:nls. Their respective claim was separate and distinct from tilt: l>ther. De Camilo ~nly wanted the resp:-rndents to vacate that Jlf'I"· lion of her property which was el"!croachcd upon by them when th~~· l'rect-Jd their building. The same is true with Estrad2. and th" _Fr:li.Dcucns. _.They- claimed possession of two different parcels of land, of different a reas, adjoining each other. Furthermore ii iF r:ot true that respondents Ong Peng· Kef' and Adelia Ong dirt nf't have any interest, in the subject matte;r. Their interest was th" prolongation of their cccupancy or possession of 1}-,e portions e'lnoached upon by them. It is, therefore, evident that the requirements for a complaint of Interpleader <Iv not exist. Even in the supposition that the c('mplaint presented a cause of action for lnterplcader, stilt we hold that the JP had no jurisdiction lt. take ccgniZUTJCE: thereof. The t·omph1.int asking the petitiol'.<lrS to interplead, p1·actically took th!! case on: of the jurisdktiO!l of the JP court, because the action would then necessariiy ' '111volve the title to or possession of real p!'opcrty or any interest there· in" ove1 · which the C 1' ~ 1 has original jurisdiction (par. (b]. sec. 44, Judiciary Act, as amended). Then also, th<' subject-matter of the complaint (interpleader) would come under the original jurisdicticn of the CFI, because it would· not be capable of pecuniary estimation (Sec. 44, par.[a], Judiciary Act), there having been no shCowing that rentals were asked by the petitioners from respondents. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FORE GOING, We find that the decision appealed from is in conformity with the law, and the same should be, as it is hereby affirmed, wi th costs agolinst 1·espondentsappellants Ong Peng Kee and Adelia Ong. Betigz(m, C.J., Padilla, Lubrador, Concc1>cio1i , J.8.L. Reyes , and De Leon, JJ., concurred. llautista AngPfo, Barre1·a rrnd Dizon, JJ., took no pa rt. v Delgado Brothers, lnc., Petitioner vs. Th~ Courl of Appe"ls, et al., Respvndffi. ts, G.R. No. L-15651,, December 29, 1960 , Ba1disU1 Angelo, J. L COMMON CA RRI ER; EXEMPTION FROM RESPONSIBILl· TY ARISING FROM N EGLIGENCE MUST BE SO CLEARLY S.TATED I N A CONTRACT.- It should be noted that the clause in Exhibit 1 determinative of the responsibility for the use of the crane contains t wo pa1·ts, namely: one whe~in the shipping company assumes full responsibility for the uso of the crane, and the other where said company agreed not to hold tl"te Delgado Brothers, Inc. liable in any w ay. While it may be admitted that under the first part the carrier may shift responsibility to petitioner when the da~age caused arises from tho negligence of the crane operator because exemption from responsibility for negligence must be stated in explicit terms, how. ever, it cannot do so under the second pal't where it expressly agreed to exempt petitione1· from liability in an y way it may arise, which is a clear case of assumption of responsibility on the part or the carrier contrary to the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals. Jn other words, the contract in question as embodied in Exhibit 1 fully satisfiect the doctrine stressed by said court that in order that exemption from liability arising from negligence may be granted, the contract "must be so rlcar as to leave no room, for the oper:ition of the ordinary l"Uies of liability consecrated by experi<mce and sanctioned by the express provisions of law." 2. ID.; BILL OF LADING ; SHIPPER SHALL BE BOUND BY THE CONDITIONS AND TERMS OF BILL OF LADING UPON ACCEPTANCE THEREOF.- 'I N ACCEPTING THIS BILL OF LADI NG the shipper, consignee and owner of the goods agree to be bound by all its stipulations, exceptions, and conditions whether wr itten, printed, or stamped on the front or back thei·eof, any local customs or privileges to the contrary notwithstanding.' This clause says that a shipper or consignee ' who accepts the bill of !acting becomes bound by all stipulations contained therein whether on the front or back thereof. ResPOJ•dent cannot elude its provisions simply because they prejudic~ him and take advantage of those that arc b<oneficial. Secondly, the fact that rcs11ondent shipped his goods on board the ship of petitioner and paid the corresponding freight hereon shows that he impliedly accepted the bill of lading which wa3 issued in connection with th<' shipment in question, and so it may be said that the same is binding upon him as if it has b«:·n actually signed by him or by any person in his beh~li. This is more so where resp(lI1dent is both the ~hipper and ~h<.' cunsignee of the goods in question. ,,. ID.; LAW GOVERN ING LIABILITY JN CASE OF LOS£, DESTRUCTION OR DETERIORATION OF GOODS TRANSPORTED.- Article 1753 . 1f the new Ci,1 il Co<l1.. pr::vides tlw.t the law of the country to which the g0ods a rt: to be tran~ ported ~hr.ll i;overn the "liabiLty of the common carrier in c~.::c. of loss, destruction or deterioration. This means the law of the Phi;ippines, or our new Civil Code. 4. ID.; ID.: LAWS GOVERNING RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS O f< ~ COi\!MON CARRIERS; CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SF.A ACT SU PPLETOHY TO CIV IL CODE.-Article 1766 of t he new Ci"il Code providcs that "In all matter~ not regulate:! by thi:; C<Jde, the rights and obligations of ccmnwn ca n;·~r!I shall ~ governed by the Code of Commerce and by sp<'Cial laws,' and said rights and obligations are governed by Artie!<'~ 173G, 1737, and 1738 of the new Civil Code. Therefore, although Section 4(5) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act stat<'s that the carrier shall not be liable in an amount exceeding P500.00 per packag·e or.less the value crf the goods had O c-cn decla red by the shippei- and inserted in the hill of lading, Nov~mber 30, 1961 LA WYERS !JOURNAL Page 33'} snid seclion is merely suppletot·y to the p1 ·ovisions of t•ic Civil Corte. DEC I S I ON Richard A. Klcp1>er broug-ht thi.s action befo1~ the Court of F'irst Iustance of Manila tc recover the sum of 1 '6,729.50 as damages allegedly sustained hy his goods conta ined in a lift \ Hn which fell to the ground while being u11l(ladcd from a "hip owned and operated by t.hc American President Lines, Ltd. to the i>icr. plus the sum of P2,000.00 as sentimental value of the dan1aged goods and at.lorney's fees. It appea1·s that. on Februa ry 17, 1955, Klc.ppe1· shippc~• on board the S. S. President Cleveland at Yokohama, J apan one lift van unde1· bill of lading No. 82, cont:lining personal and househol11 effects. The ship arrived in the port of Manila on Fe).irnary 22, 1955 ant.I while the lift van was beiug u11loadcd hy the gant1·y crnne operated by Delgado B rothers, Jnc., it fell on the pier and its contents weie spilled and scaUe\"ed. A survey was made and t he result was. that Klepper suffei·cd damages totalling PG,729.50 arising out of the breakage, dent ing nnd ~mashir.g of the good.'i. The trial court, on November 5, 195i , rendered decision order· ing the ~hipping comp:rny to pay plaintiff the smn of 1'6,729.!>0, value of th<: goods dama~ed, plus t>500.00 as theii- sentime ntal vnlue, ·with legal interest from the fili1,g of the complaint, a nd the sur.i of ~I ,0(10.UO 3S attorney's fees. The coul"i orderer! that, 9ncc 1h" judgment. is satisfied, co-d<:fcndant. Delgado Brothers, Inc. should pay tho ship1)ing compauy the i;:ame amo~rnt by way of 1eimbursemc11t. Both defendants a 1 >pealed l\l t he Court of A:,pcals which affirmed in tolo the decision of the t rial cou 1t. Dell~ado Brothers, I nc. inter11oscd the pr<.:f>Cllt petition for review. The main is.sue which thi.; Cou rt 11~-eds t<:' d<:h'rminc is wJp•t hcr petitione1 may b;>i held liable fo1· the damag1,; done to the goods of respondent Richard A. Klepper subs idiarily to the liability attached to its co-defenda nt American President Lines, qd. as held by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner disclaims Uability upon the g round H•at it has beP.n C'x1>ressly :·elieved 1heref1om by its co-dcfc:ic!ant shippin~ Nmpany ui·der a <'Ontnict cntc1·ed ir:to "etween t lu:m relati,·e to t he ~a:it r;. crnne ' belonging to l)etitioner which was used by said sh i1 >PinJ.:" compa'ly ;n t:11loading the goods in que5tit1n. Pc_.titioner 1>lants its case on Exhibit I (Delgado) which reads: "Please furnish us ONE gantry lo be used on hatch #2 <if the S/ S PRES. CLJ~:VELA.N D Reg. from 1300 hri;:. to FINISH hi·s. on 22 Feb1·ua1·y 1955. "We he reby assume full 1·espc1;sibility ant: liability for dnm:we:. ro i..an~oo;.,s , ship ur (llh ~ ovise a 1 ising from u.~e of said C !'ane :rnd we will not hold t he Oc:gado Brothers, Inc. li;•hlc or 1csponsibl1· in ariy way thPreof. "We hereby ::gree to pay the co1Tt'SJJ011ding charges foi· ahovc-i-equestl.'d services." The Com t of Appeals, in holding that 1~titio11er cannot (li ?c·laim liabilit;.· under the term3 of the abovf' contl'act because it Cilnnot elude 1es pCJnsibility for the ncglig1:nce of its ployc.~. ma•le the following comment: "Thi:; aypdlant asserts thal negligence l'f its f"'mplO;.•f!C, the crane o perator, is within the coveni.~e 11£ th·~ foregoi11;,r d o~umcnt. Exhibit I-Delgado call'i for onC' gantry 'to be 11io.ed' (.JJ hatch No. 2 of t he vessel. The American Pi·esident Lin':!s, Ltd., only answered 'for use of said crane.' The phraseology thu.~ (·mployed would 11nt imluce a conclus io11 that the American Presidc11t Lines, Ltd. assumed 1·csponsibility for the n(..gli~•·1 1<:e cf the crane ..>perator who was employed by the othe1· app<·llant, Dclirncb lfrothcrs, Inc. Responsibility was not shift<!:! to the stc:.1mshi1 > company. " Exhibit I-Delgado was prepared in mimeographed form by Delgado Brothers, Inc. At best, the stipulation therein arc obscu1e. Th2t is u count against Dclgad() Brothers, Inc. And again, it must answer for the damages. 0 .B. Ferry Service Co. vs. l\ M.P. Navigation C., 50. O.G . No. 5, pp. 2 109, 2113. "A familiar legal precept is that which states that. a person is liable for the negligence c-f his employees. That is a duty owing hy him to others. '[(J exculpate him frcm lia bility for s uch ll(;giigence. the cont1·:.wt must say so in express term';. The contract conferr ing such exemption 'must be so clear as to leave no 1oom for the operation of the ordinary rules of Jiabilit~, consecrnted by exjJt.rien~e and sanctioned by t.he. cxJH·css provisions of law.' The Manil\t Hailroad Co. vs. Let Campana Trnsatlantica and the Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., 38 Ph:l., 1-175, 886. The ti•nc honored rule .;;till is Rcniinti"tia 1w11 11me1•11mitfr. Strictly construed and giving every reasonab:e intcndment ag-ainst the 1mrty claimi11it e xemption, we ,hold that Exhibit I-Delgado affol'ds no p1·otcction for Delgado Bi·others, Inc.'' We cannot agree with t he find"ing that the ph1·aiwology employed in Exhibit I would not ""induce a conclu-sion t hat the American Pr~sident... Lines Ltd. assumed iesponsibiiity for t he negligence cf the crane operntoi· who was employed by the other appellant, Delgado Brothe1 ·s, Inc." and that fo1· that t·eason the latte1· s hould he blamed fqr the consec1uence o( t he negligent act of :t5 opc1 ulo1·. because in ou1· opinion rhe phra<>eology thus employed coiovcys p1ecisely that conc!usion. It ,;hould be 1.oted that U:~ clause determinative of lhe responsibility for the use of the c ra!le ..;<Jnt;;ins tw:i pai·l:>, namely: on<: wherein the shipping compan~· assumes rull responsibility for the use or the crane, a nd the othl'r wh.:rc said company agi·ced n<it la J wld the Delg{ld'.) Brothers, Jnr. liable 111 llny way. While it nay be admitted that under the f ir:-;I 1 1art the carrier may shift 1 ·el\pOnsibili1y to 1>ctitiu11er \•, hen 1h~ Jamage c.:aused arises frnm the neglige11ce of the crane operator because exem1Jtio11 from res po,1sibility for ncglib"C'nce must be stnted 111 (:Xplicit terms, however it. cannot do so under t he second part whrre it cxp1·essly agreed to exempt petitioner from liability i11 W!J/ wuy it may arise, which is a clear case of assumption of responsibility on the part of the carrier con~rnry to the conclnio.;on 1eached by the Court of Appeals. In other words, the con£1:act in que~tinn as embodied in Exhibit l fully satisfies the dO<'.trine stressed by said court that in order that exemption from liability al"ising from negligence may be grnnted, the contract. " must bC so. clea1· as to !cave no room fc1· the operation of the 01 ·dinary rule's 0f liability co11secn~teJ by expe1·ic·nce a:vl sanctioned by th<· cx1m.·ss 1 irovisions of law. ~ The case of The Manila Railroad Co. v. l..;a Campaiiia Tras~tlantica ct al., 38 Phil., 8i 5, i11vok.?d i11 l hc nppc:1lcd cl'ecision, is" uot, thel'eforc, in poinl. In t he 1 11tte1" case, the evidf'nce adr1uced is not clear as to t he exemption of t'esponsibiiity. Here the ~Con tnlry appea rs. He11ce, t he doctTinc therein laid down is not contrnlling. With n •gnrd to the enors assig"oe,J 1'elative 10 the disrei~ard mude by the Cou1·t of Appeals of clause 17 of the bill of l.adi:ijt which limits ~t.c amount of li1~bility of the carrie1·, as w<-li as -the non-application of t he Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, particularly Section ·I (3) thereof, we don't de-cm uccessary IC' discuss ~hem ht:re. 1'he same have already been disposed of in the appeal taken by the shipping company from t he same decision, docketed as G.R. No. L-l ii671 (pl'Omulgated November 29, 1960), wherein we hck~ the following: "\Ve a rc inclinl'tl to ag 1 ee t" this tontenl iun. Firstly, w~ can!mt bur take note of the following: clause Jninte<l in r",I ink ti.at ap1iears on the vel'V face of the bill of lading : ' I N ACCEPTING THIS BILL 01~ LADING the !;hipper, consi!,rr.·e n;' d f"IWl'<:r of the goods a.l:("~·ee to !>r !>o\rnd by all its 'itipulatfons, exceptions, and conditions whethe1· written, p1·inted, or st.ampt'(i on tt:e f1 011t or bat k t hei·cof, any l{leal customs 0 1· privileJ!'eS lo the contrary notwithstan,!ing. This clause is very 1evealint!. J: says that a shippe1· or ecnsignee who acCe11ts the bill of fadi P~ Le::,,1111i.'t bl'und by all stipulations co111.ai11ed thctein wheth<'r on Page "336 LAWYERS \JOURNAL November 30,_ 1961 tht: frolit or hack thereof. Hespondcnt cannot elude its proviswns sinqi ~y because they prejudice him und t.akc advantage of those that arc beneficial. Secondly, the fact that respondent shipped his goods on boa1·d the s hip of petitioner and Jlaid the c~l'\'N;pondmg freight then:.on s hnws that he imp~iedly aC<!CpLcd the bill of Jading which was issued in connection wit.h the shipment in question, and so it may be sni,l tlmt the same is binding upon him as if it has been actually signed by him 01· by anY person in his behalf. This is more so where respondent i:; both the shi1iper :rnd the co11signee of the goods in question These circumstances take this case out of our ruling in the Mira.sol case (invoked by t he Court of Appeals) and place it within our doct.rine in the case of Mendoza v. Phi!iJJ1>ine A ir Lill<!S JnC"., L-3678, prnmulgated on 1'~ebrua1·y 2!J. l!l5i, x x x. .. With rega1·d to the contention th:H the Carri:1g:e of Goods by Sea Aet should also control this case tht' same i<: d !l'.) rn·1· •r:rmt. Articll' 17!'.i;; ( New Civil CP,!<') prov~<l<!s th~t th<' ·luw <,f th•J count1·y to which the g·oods arc to be t ra 11s11orte.-I shall govern 1h(' liability .:if the Cf'lllm011 ca1rier in cas(' of loss, <k~· nuction ror cleterioraticn. This means the law of thf'! P hi!ipµi11cs., or onr new Civil Code. Undl!t' Article ViHG, ' In all mal.ters 1Wt J'('gulated by this Code, thc r ights a nd obligations of commo~ carriers shall be r,ovcrned by the Code of Commerce and h\' s pecial laws.' and he1·e we have provisions that govern ·3a~<I ~ight.Q and obligations (A rticles 1736, 1737, :rnd 1738). Therdore, although Section 4(5) of t he Caniagc of Goods by Sea Act st.ates that the carrier shall not be liable in :rn amoun~ ·exceeding $500.00 per package unless lhe value of the good~ had been <leclared by the ship1ler a nd inserted in the bill o( larling,' said sectio11 .is men~l~, suppletory to the: pro\·isif'no;; .Jf the Civil Code. In this respect, we agree to the opinion of the Court of Appeals. ' -,Vhercfore, the decision appealed from is modified in the Sf>nSc that petitioner Delgado Brothers. l ne. shouid not be made lia:blc for the dru::age ca.u.£eJ to the ~cods in question, wi(l'.out 1u·o11ou:1cc· , G'engzt•11, C.J., Padilla. L"linulor, J.IJJ ,, P.r!JeS, !Jrn'1·eru, Gu~iern::: Da.ri,-i,/ our/ Pore./es. JJ., concurrcrl. V I p,1:: Furl'i<. f'etiti01u:r. 1·s. !rcneo M im111/a, Nesv1nulent, G.ll. .'"lo. £:12u.>:i, .~forch ·1, 1959, Rcyls, J .8.L., J. 1. P UBLIC S ERVICE- COMMISSION; APPROV.\L OF CONVJ:YANCE OR ENCUM BRANCE OF PROPER'l'JF.~ OF OPC".RATOR OF PUBLIC SERVICE. -- The p1·ov1~ions of S~ction 20 of the Public Sci-vier. Act IComn~onwcalth Act 14G) proh iJ,it lhc ~ale, alienation, lease, or cncumbrn.nce of t.hc property, ·1 franchise, certific~te, privileges or ri1rht;:., or any part thcrr-<·f . . of th.;: owner or operatni· of the public scn·ice without approval or autho1·ii;ation of the Public Service Commission. 2. TD.: ID.; PURPOSE OF T H E LAW. - The hw w:.is (lesi~11cd primarily for t he protcctior, of the public interest : and until t.he ripp1·oval of the .P ublic Service Commi~sion is obt:.im•d, tho; veh icl·~ i,,, in contemplation ('f law, .!'till under the service of the owner or ope1·ator starHling in the rccoids of the Commission, to which the public has right to 1·ely upon. ::!. :'.l!OHAL IJAMAG1' ~S ; CANNOT BE RECOGt'\lZED JN DAMAGE ACT ION BASED ON A BREACH OF CONTRACT OF TRA ~SPORTA'T'ION .-lt has been held in Cachero n. MMil:I Yellow Taxic11b Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-8721, May 23, 1957; Necesilo, et a l vs. Paras, G.R. No. L-10605-10606, June 30, 1958, that mora l damag-es ai·e not 1·(·coverable in damage nc~ ions predicated on a h1·each of the contract of transporb~ion, ,in view of A rtieles 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code. 4. ID.; REQUISITE TO JUSTIFY AN AWAJW. - In ca"'<'·' of brc:1eh of contwct, including one of transportation, prvof of bad faith 01' fraud (doius). i.e., wanton or deliberately inj ui·icus conduct, is esser~tial to just.if y an award of morat damiiges. 5. ID.; l3 l~EACH OF CONTRACT NOT I NCLUDED I N TJH: TERJ\I "ANALOGOUS CASES" USED IN ARTICLE 2219', CI VIL CODE. - A breach of contract can not be considered in the descriptive term ''analogous cases" used in A1·t. 2219; not only because A r t. 2220 !<peeirically provides fo1· the danrng•es that are caused by· the c~ntractual breach, but bccau~c the definition of <1uasi-delict in A!·t. 2176 c.f the Code cx!H·cssly excludes the cases where there is a ''preexisting cont rnctu;il relation l>etwecn the pa ~·l~es." G. JD.; MERE CARELESSN ESS OF CARRIER'S DRIVER DOES NOT PER S E CONSTIT UT E AN INFERENCE OF RA D l~A I T!-1 0 1·' CA l~RI ER.-Th•! mei·e carelessness of t he caniBr's d1·iv<'t' does not pet se constitltte 01· .iustif~, an inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier. 7. ID.; AWARD O F MORAL DAl\I AGES FOR BREACH 0 1~ CONTRACT W ITHOl' T P HOOF' OF BAD FAlTH WOUI D BF: A VIOLATION OF LAW. - To award moral damagC:i for breach of contrn<'1, withvut proof of bad fait h or rr,aJi~C' would be to violate th,• cka1· pr"Jvlsions of the law, and constitute unwarrant<!d juUicial legislation. S. ID.: PRESUMPTION OF LIA BILITY OF CARRIER; lllJHDEN OF PROOF. - The action Cor breach of contract imposes on the defendant cal'l'ier a pr<!sumption of liability upon mne proof of mjury to the p9.Ss<!nger; the latter i.; relieved from tht- duty to esta blish t he fault of the ea: ricr, or r;! his employees, and thC' burde~ is pince<! on the carl'ier to prove tht1t it was due to an unforeseen event or to force 11mj(•w·e (C:1ngco vs. Manila Rai lroad Co., 38 Phil. 768, 777) . DE C I S ION Defendant-petitioner Paz F'ores bring's tr.is petition for review of the decisivn of the Court of Appeals (C. A. Case No. 1437-R) awnrclinJ.( t(I the pla ir.tiff-rcspu1dent l '.eneo Miranda the S U!Tl3' nf t>:i,000.00 by way of :i.rtual dam;,c:es and counsel fees, anct 1'10,000.00 as mornl damages, with costs. Respondet1l was one of the passengers on a jeepney d1 ·iven by ~uge11io Luga. While the vehicle wus desrentling the Sla. M">'!I bl'idgc at a n excessive rate of speed, the driver Jost control thereof, <..ausing it to swerve and to hit t he bridg-e wn!I. The accident ocr~ir· red on the morning of i\la;·eh 22, 1953. F'lve of the passengers w.:>J"e injt1red, including t he respondent who suffe red a fracture of the 11p·' }.-N high humo..uz. Ile was taken tc the N'ationa! Orthopedic Hos!'lital for treatment and later wn~ subjected to a sel'i<!S of operations: the first on ~lay 23, 1953, when wire loops werl.'! wound a romul I.he broken bones and screwed into place ; a second, effe~tcd to insci·t a ;nelal splint, anrl a t hird OW! tn 1·em<we such SJJ\int.. At the time of the trial, it appears that responctent had not yet recovered the use of his 1 ·ight arm. T:1c drivi!r was cha rg<'d with sc,-ious physical :njuries thr':!ugh reckless imprudence, and U'pon interposing a pica of guilty was ~entenced accordingly. The contention that the C\'idence did not s ufficie11t.ly Psbblish t.he identity of t.he vehicl<! as t ha1 b<'longi11g to t.he !)~tition<>1· was rejected by the appellate court which foun'.l, among cthrr 1hings, that it carriE'd plat(' Ne. TPU-!Hi3, series of l!Jfi2, QuP.:!.cn City, 1·egistered in the name n[ Paz F,1rcs, (appellant herein} am! that the vehicle even had t he name of "Doiia Paz" painted below its windshield. No evidence tiJ the confr;.ry was introduced by the petitioner, who relied on :i.n attack upon the nedibilit y of the lw<' A point to be fllrther rcnnrked is . pctitio•1cr's contentio:1 nrnt V!l l\brch 2 1, 1953, 01· one day IY.!fore the accident happenl'd, she allegedly sold the passenge1· jeep that was involved therein policemen who went to th(), scene of the ir.cidont. to a certain Cai·men Sackcrman. Novcmbe!' :10, l!lGl LAWYERS \JOURNAL 'Page 337
Date: 1961
Rights