10. Supreme Court Decisions, Fores v. Miranda - Justice J.B.L Reyes.pdf · Rare Periodicals

10. Supreme Court Decisions, Fores v. Miranda - Justice J.B.L Reyes.pdf

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extracted text: tht: frolit or hack thereof. Hespondcnt cannot elude its proviswns sinqi ~y because they prejudice him und t.akc advantage of those that arc beneficial. Secondly, the fact that respondent shipped his goods on boa1·d the s hip of petitioner and Jlaid the c~l'\'N;pondmg freight then:.on s hnws that he imp~iedly aC<!CpLcd the bill of Jading which was issued in connection wit.h the shipment in question, and so it may be sni,l tlmt the same is binding upon him as if it has been actually signed by him 01· by anY person in his behalf. This is more so where respondent i:; both the shi1iper :rnd the co11signee of the goods in question These circumstances take this case out of our ruling in the Mira.sol case (invoked by t he Court of Appeals) and place it within our doct.rine in the case of Mendoza v. Phi!iJJ1>ine A ir Lill<!S JnC"., L-3678, prnmulgated on 1'~ebrua1·y 2!J. l!l5i, x x x. .. With rega1·d to the contention th:H the Carri:1g:e of Goods by Sea Aet should also control this case tht' same i<: d !l'.) rn·1· •r:rmt. Articll' 17!'.i;; ( New Civil CP,!<') prov~<l<!s th~t th<' ·luw <,f th•J count1·y to which the g·oods arc to be t ra 11s11orte.-I shall govern 1h(' liability .:if the Cf'lllm011 ca1rier in cas(' of loss, <k~· nuction ror cleterioraticn. This means the law of thf'! P hi!ipµi11cs., or onr new Civil Code. Undl!t' Article ViHG, ' In all mal.ters 1Wt J'('gulated by this Code, thc r ights a nd obligations of commo~ carriers shall be r,ovcrned by the Code of Commerce and h\' s pecial laws.' and he1·e we have provisions that govern ·3a~<I ~ight.Q and obligations (A rticles 1736, 1737, :rnd 1738). Therdore, although Section 4(5) of t he Caniagc of Goods by Sea Act st.ates that the carrier shall not be liable in :rn amoun~ ·exceeding $500.00 per package unless lhe value of the good~ had been <leclared by the ship1ler a nd inserted in the bill o( larling,' said sectio11 .is men~l~, suppletory to the: pro\·isif'no;; .Jf the Civil Code. In this respect, we agree to the opinion of the Court of Appeals. ' -,Vhercfore, the decision appealed from is modified in the Sf>nSc that petitioner Delgado Brothers. l ne. shouid not be made lia:blc for the dru::age ca.u.£eJ to the ~cods in question, wi(l'.out 1u·o11ou:1cc· , G'engzt•11, C.J., Padilla. L"linulor, J.IJJ ,, P.r!JeS, !Jrn'1·eru, Gu~iern::: Da.ri,-i,/ our/ Pore./es. JJ., concurrcrl. V I p,1:: Furl'i<. f'etiti01u:r. 1·s. !rcneo M im111/a, Nesv1nulent, G.ll. .'"lo. £:12u.>:i, .~forch ·1, 1959, Rcyls, J .8.L., J. 1. P UBLIC S ERVICE- COMMISSION; APPROV.\L OF CONVJ:YANCE OR ENCUM BRANCE OF PROPER'l'JF.~ OF OPC".RATOR OF PUBLIC SERVICE. -- The p1·ov1~ions of S~ction 20 of the Public Sci-vier. Act IComn~onwcalth Act 14G) proh iJ,it lhc ~ale, alienation, lease, or cncumbrn.nce of t.hc property, ·1 franchise, certific~te, privileges or ri1rht;:., or any part thcrr-<·f . . of th.;: owner or operatni· of the public scn·ice without approval or autho1·ii;ation of the Public Service Commission. 2. TD.: ID.; PURPOSE OF T H E LAW. - The hw w:.is (lesi~11cd primarily for t he protcctior, of the public interest : and until t.he ripp1·oval of the .P ublic Service Commi~sion is obt:.im•d, tho; veh icl·~ i,,, in contemplation ('f law, .!'till under the service of the owner or ope1·ator starHling in the rccoids of the Commission, to which the public has right to 1·ely upon. ::!. :'.l!OHAL IJAMAG1' ~S ; CANNOT BE RECOGt'\lZED JN DAMAGE ACT ION BASED ON A BREACH OF CONTRACT OF TRA ~SPORTA'T'ION .-lt has been held in Cachero n. MMil:I Yellow Taxic11b Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-8721, May 23, 1957; Necesilo, et a l vs. Paras, G.R. No. L-10605-10606, June 30, 1958, that mora l damag-es ai·e not 1·(·coverable in damage nc~ ions predicated on a h1·each of the contract of transporb~ion, ,in view of A rtieles 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code. 4. ID.; REQUISITE TO JUSTIFY AN AWAJW. - In ca"'<'·' of brc:1eh of contwct, including one of transportation, prvof of bad faith 01' fraud (doius). i.e., wanton or deliberately inj ui·icus conduct, is esser~tial to just.if y an award of morat damiiges. 5. ID.; l3 l~EACH OF CONTRACT NOT I NCLUDED I N TJH: TERJ\I "ANALOGOUS CASES" USED IN ARTICLE 2219', CI VIL CODE. - A breach of contract can not be considered in the descriptive term ''analogous cases" used in A1·t. 2219; not only because A r t. 2220 !<peeirically provides fo1· the danrng•es that are caused by· the c~ntractual breach, but bccau~c the definition of <1uasi-delict in A!·t. 2176 c.f the Code cx!H·cssly excludes the cases where there is a ''preexisting cont rnctu;il relation l>etwecn the pa ~·l~es." G. JD.; MERE CARELESSN ESS OF CARRIER'S DRIVER DOES NOT PER S E CONSTIT UT E AN INFERENCE OF RA D l~A I T!-1 0 1·' CA l~RI ER.-Th•! mei·e carelessness of t he caniBr's d1·iv<'t' does not pet se constitltte 01· .iustif~, an inference of malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier. 7. ID.; AWARD O F MORAL DAl\I AGES FOR BREACH 0 1~ CONTRACT W ITHOl' T P HOOF' OF BAD FAlTH WOUI D BF: A VIOLATION OF LAW. - To award moral damagC:i for breach of contrn<'1, withvut proof of bad fait h or rr,aJi~C' would be to violate th,• cka1· pr"Jvlsions of the law, and constitute unwarrant<!d juUicial legislation. S. ID.: PRESUMPTION OF LIA BILITY OF CARRIER; lllJHDEN OF PROOF. - The action Cor breach of contract imposes on the defendant cal'l'ier a pr<!sumption of liability upon mne proof of mjury to the p9.Ss<!nger; the latter i.; relieved from tht- duty to esta blish t he fault of the ea: ricr, or r;! his employees, and thC' burde~ is pince<! on the carl'ier to prove tht1t it was due to an unforeseen event or to force 11mj(•w·e (C:1ngco vs. Manila Rai lroad Co., 38 Phil. 768, 777) . DE C I S ION Defendant-petitioner Paz F'ores bring's tr.is petition for review of the decisivn of the Court of Appeals (C. A. Case No. 1437-R) awnrclinJ.( t(I the pla ir.tiff-rcspu1dent l '.eneo Miranda the S U!Tl3' nf t>:i,000.00 by way of :i.rtual dam;,c:es and counsel fees, anct 1'10,000.00 as mornl damages, with costs. Respondet1l was one of the passengers on a jeepney d1 ·iven by ~uge11io Luga. While the vehicle wus desrentling the Sla. M">'!I bl'idgc at a n excessive rate of speed, the driver Jost control thereof, <..ausing it to swerve and to hit t he bridg-e wn!I. The accident ocr~ir· red on the morning of i\la;·eh 22, 1953. F'lve of the passengers w.:>J"e injt1red, including t he respondent who suffe red a fracture of the 11p·' }.-N high humo..uz. Ile was taken tc the N'ationa! Orthopedic Hos!'lital for treatment and later wn~ subjected to a sel'i<!S of operations: the first on ~lay 23, 1953, when wire loops werl.'! wound a romul I.he broken bones and screwed into place ; a second, effe~tcd to insci·t a ;nelal splint, anrl a t hird OW! tn 1·em<we such SJJ\int.. At the time of the trial, it appears that responctent had not yet recovered the use of his 1 ·ight arm. T:1c drivi!r was cha rg<'d with sc,-ious physical :njuries thr':!ugh reckless imprudence, and U'pon interposing a pica of guilty was ~entenced accordingly. The contention that the C\'idence did not s ufficie11t.ly Psbblish t.he identity of t.he vehicl<! as t ha1 b<'longi11g to t.he !)~tition<>1· was rejected by the appellate court which foun'.l, among cthrr 1hings, that it carriE'd plat(' Ne. TPU-!Hi3, series of l!Jfi2, QuP.:!.cn City, 1·egistered in the name n[ Paz F,1rcs, (appellant herein} am! that the vehicle even had t he name of "Doiia Paz" painted below its windshield. No evidence tiJ the confr;.ry was introduced by the petitioner, who relied on :i.n attack upon the nedibilit y of the lw<' A point to be fllrther rcnnrked is . pctitio•1cr's contentio:1 nrnt V!l l\brch 2 1, 1953, 01· one day IY.!fore the accident happenl'd, she allegedly sold the passenge1· jeep that was involved therein policemen who went to th(), scene of the ir.cidont. to a certain Cai·men Sackcrman. Novcmbe!' :10, l!lGl LAWYERS \JOURNAL 'Page 337 The initial problC'm raised by the petitioner in this a)l!ll'al may be forreulated thus - " Is the appr•wai of lhc Public Servir,r Commii:sion nc·:!cssary for th(' .5alc of a pnblic scrv:'tr vehicle cY.:r:. without conveying therewith t.hc autbrity to operate the sam'!!~" Assuminl::t' the d11bio1i.s stil<> to be a fa:.:t, the Cour t of Appeals si.nswcre<l the query in the affinnativ~. Thi'.' rnling should be upheld. Section 20 of the Public ~crvicc Act (Commonwealth Act No. 146) prov:dzs: ' Sec 20. Subject to cstablishf::d i:mitatic.ns and e."<ceptions and saving provision:; to the "ontrary, it shall be unlawful for any public service or for the owner. lessee or operato1 thereof, without the 1 u·evious approval and authority of the Commission previously ha•j _ x x (g) To i:cil, ali~nat'!!. mortgage, encumber er lease it~ pro1 i1::rty, franchises, certificates, privileges, or rights, or any part thereof; or merge or coMolidate it.:; 1>roperty, franchises, privileµ-es Cir rights, or any pnrt thereof, with tho~c of any other public se1·vict.. Thi: approval herein requin•rt shall be given, after 11otiC'e to th<! public and af!Rr hearing, if it be shown that there are jus~ and reasonabl.~ grou:1ds for making the mMtg-.i~c or encumbrance ·for liabilities of more than one year mat urity, or the sale, alienation le&.s:e mcri;cr, or con::;olidation to be approved, and that th; same are not detrimental to the pubilc interest and in cnsC' of S.'tle, the date on wllich the sa•ne is to be cons~mmated s!mll be fixed in the order or approval; Proville<l, however, Th11t nothing herein contained sh::i\J be cons~ ruC'd ICI prevent th~ transaction from being negotiated or completed before ita ap. pro\•al or to preY!'nt t he sale, alienation, or lease by any pnblic service of any of its property in the ordinary course of its business.·• Interpreting the effects of this pa1ticula r provision of law, we h~va held in tht• recent cast!S of Montoya vs. lgnaciC1, SO Off. Gaz. No. I. p. 108; Timbol vs. Osias, ct a: al, G.R. Nc. L·7547, April :SO, 1955, and Mediiia vs. Crest:ncia, G. R. No. L-8193, 52 Off. Gaz. No. 10, 4606, that a transfer contemplated by the law, if made without the 1C'quisit<J approval of the Public Service Cc.mmission, is not effective and binding in so far as the re!!ponsibilit}' <'f th1~ !?1" 8ntcC under the franchise in 1 ·dation to thr public is COil· u·rned. Petitioner assails, however, tht• a pplicability of thC'sc 1 ut:ngs to the instant case, contE;nding that in those caseJ, tl:e operator did not convey, by lease 0r by sale, the vehicle independently of his rigihts under the franchise. This !inc of reasoning docs w :it find suppor t iu th'! Jnw. The pL"cvi!iions sf the statute are clear and p1 ohibit the sale, alienation, lease or encumbrance of the property. franchise, certific.ate, privileges or rights, or any part ther~f of the owner or operator of the public service without approval of the Public Sci vice Commission. The law was designed J · rlma ~ily fo1· the protection of the puhEc interest, an:] until th1' approval of the Public Se1vice Commission is obtained, the vehiclu is, in contemplation of law, still under the se1vice of the owner or operator standing in the records of Commission, to which th,... public has a right to rely u11on. The proviso contained· in th3 afo1equotcd law, to the e fe('I ~h at 11otlung lherei•1 shall be constrn~<l .. to prevent t!ie trnnsactlon from being negotiated or completed before its ..ipproval" menu~ oniy that the sale without the rcquir1.d approval is still 11a!id and binding between the parties (M onto~·a ''s. Ignacio, supr.i). The phrase " 111 the ordinary course of its business" found in thC' other provisu "01· to prevent iht• ~ale, alienation, 0 1 :ease by any public service of any of its pl"Opel'ty'', :-:..:; conectly observed by the lower court, could not have been intended to include the sale o~ the vehicle itself, but at most may refer only to such prope1-ty that may be conceivably disposed of by the carrier in the ordimu·y course of its business, like junked equipment or share parts. The case of Indalccio de Torres vs. Vicente Ona (63 Ph;I 594, 597) is enlightening; and there, il was held: "Under the law, the Public Service Commission has not only gcrieral supervision and regulation of, but also full jurisdiction and contrOI over all public utilities including the p l"Operty, equi pment and facilities used, and the p1 ·C1perty rights :inJ franchises enjoyed by t'very individual and company en gaged in the performance of a public service in the sense this phra~c is used in the Puhlic Eer11icc Act or Ace No. 3108 ( ,:e~ 1308) . By virtue of the p_rovisions of said Act, motor veh.icles 141'.?rl in the perforniancc of I! scrvict', as the , ·runsportalion of freight Crom one point t.-0 nnoth(>r, have to this date been c~n sidercd - and they cannot but be so considerc:d - public "'"rvice 11ropeJ·ty; and by 1casons of its own nature, a TH truck, which means that the operator thereof places it at th, dii:posat of anybody who is willing to pay a rental for its use, when lie c!csires to transfel' or carry his effects, merchandise or any other cargo Il'Om On\! placE' to another , is necessarily a pub!ic service property." (Empha:<:is supplied) Of course, this Court hus held in the case of Bachrach Moto;Co. vs. Zamboanga T ransportation Co., 52 Phil. 244. that the:e may be 1. 11u.nc vro t11111· autriol"izatinn which has the effect of having the approval retroact to the date of the transfer, but such oul.cume cannot prejudice rights intervening in the meantime. It :lppcars that no llUC'h approval was giv<>n by the Commission b~ fore the accident occurred. The Pl0,000.00 actual damages awarded by the Court of F irst Instance of Manila were reduced by the Court or Appeals to on!~· PZ,000.00, on th ground that a 1eview of the recorci!> fai~..!d to ~i::; close a sufficient basis for the trial court's appraisal, since the :rnly ev1 Jencc presented or. this pdnt Mni<ist;:>d of rcspondC'nt's hn:c statement that his expenses and loss uf income amounted to P.!O, 000.00. On tt:e other hand, " i~ cannot be denied," the lower COllrt said, "that appcllcc (respondent) did inc.ur expenses." It is w,...11 to note further that respondent wa:; a painter by p rofession ar.-l a professor of F ine Arts, so that the amount (If P--2,000'.00 awarded caunot be said to be excessive (see Art. 2224 and 2225, Civii CoCc .1! til'~ P hili ppi11cs) . The attonwy's foes in the siim l')f P3,000.(}0 •~:so awarded to the re.ipendeni arc assailed on the g!'ound that th<:Com t of Firf'I ln~tance did not pr~vide for the :c.am~. nnd since no appeal was interposed by ;:aid respondent it was allc.gct.!!~, enor fo1· thC' Court of Appeals to awa1d them nwtu propr fo. Po:;titioner fails to note that attorney's fees are included in the concept cf actual damages under the Civil CodC' and may be awarded whenC.\"er the court dC'ems it just and E'QuitahlE' (Art. 2208, Civil Code of 1hc Philip!>ines) . We sec no 1·ea!>rm to alter these awards. Anent the moral dama.g~s ordered to be paid to t.he responcten!, the same mu& t be <fo;carded. We have repeatedly ruled (C:lr.hero vs. Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. Inc., G.R. No. L-8721, May 23, 1957, Ncccsito, et al vs. Pa1·as, G.R. No. 10605-10606, J u.ne 30, 1958, that moral damages arc not !·ce0HrabJ·p in damage azfrn1s 1•redic'.ltcd on a hreach of the <'ontmd 0f transportation, in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the new Civil Code, which provid~ a<; follows: Art. 2219. Moral damages m~y be recovered in the following and analogous casl!s: (1) A cl'iminal offense re.1u:ting in physical injuri ... s : (2) Quasi-delicts caming physical injuries; " Art. 2220. Willful injuiy to properly may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if th<: court should find that under the circumtancC's, suC'h damug;;s arc j ustly due. The same n1lc a ppli<!S to bn::al•hes of contract where :he defcnda:it. acted fr'lt;tiu!ently or in bad faith." By contr~sting the provisions of tht·S<: two :irticlcs it 1mRh'o..!iately becomes apparent that: (a) In cases of breach of contrad (including one of transporiation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus) . r e., w-.nton or deliberate])· injurious canduct, LS essential to justify an award of mo,.;.; damages: and Page 338 LAWYERS \JOU RNA L November 30. 1961 (b) That a breaoh of cont1·nct can not be considered included i11 the descriptive term, "analag:>ull cases'! u~ed in .j\rt. 2219, not only because Art. 2220 specifically provides for the damages that arP. causgq by contractqal breach, llltt because the definition of qiwsi d!l/1ci in Art. 2Jl76 of Code c.'l:pres&lY exclµdes the cases whe1c ··hmc !!'.' :\ "JJrc-exislmg co'1trnckal 1elation between the parties." "Art. ~176. Whoever by act or omission causes damages tu anQthl.'r, there being fault '"'r ne~ligcncc, is obliged to pay for the \'.l.amagc done. ~uch fault or negligence, i! there is no pre-existing contractual rei:J.tion Qclween the pa11ies, is cal)(',\ a qµasi-c!e~ict and is gove"rnecf by the provisions of this Chapter." T he ll)!Ception to the basic rule of uamages now under cons1J·e1 ation is a mishap resulting- in the dr.nlh of a pas:;tnger, in which case A1ticle 1i64 makes the common carrier ex)>ressly subject to t h'! rule of Art. 2~0G, that entitles the sriouse, descendants and ascer - dants o! the deceased passeur,er to "demand moral dan~ages for mental anguish by reason Qf the dcnth r;{ the deceased" (N:ecesito vs. P aras, G. R. No. L-IOG05, Resolution on Motion to reconsider,' SeptC'mh.:1 11, I96t<). But the e..c:ceptic11al rule cf Art. 1764 mak~s it all the more evidenr tha.L where the injurC'd passenge1· does not die, moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that t~e c~rrie:- was guilty of malice 01· bad faith. W e think jt is clear that the men .. c.:irolessncss of the carri<'r's <lrivC'r does not per ,,t roristitute or justify an ipferenrc of malice or bnd faith on th ~ part of the UJ.rl'iur; and in the case at ba1· there is no other evidence of such malice to support t he award of moral damages· by th~ Court of Appeals. To award moral damages for breach of co11• tract, therefore, without proof of bad foith or malice on the pr.it d the 1le!cndant, as required by A1·t. 2220, would be to vioh1tc the clear provi!'lions (If the law, and constitute unwananted judicial legislation. The cArt of Appeals has invoked our rulings in Castro vs. Aero Taxicah Co. R. G. No. 4815, December 14, 1948 and Layd!l vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. L-4487, January 29, 1952; but these doctrines were predicated upon our former law of dam:lges, before judicial discretion in fixing them bee3m(:: limited by the ('xpress provisions 0of the new Civil Code (pi·eviously quotec!L Hence, the aforesaid rulings are now 111appti('ablc. Upon tht· other hand, the advantageous position of a pai ty suing a carrier for breach of the contract of tl"anspoi·tation explains, to some extent, the limitations imposeci by the new Code on the amoun~ 9f the recovery. The action for breach of contract im~ poses on the defendant carrier a rresumption o"f liability upon Tit#ll'fl proof of inj 4ry to the passen~et·; the latter is reiieved from 1 he dyty to cst.abli.;iti the fault of the carrie1·, or of his employees, <ind tP,e burden is placed on the carrier to prove that it was due to an unfor.>een event or to force majeure (Cangco vs. Manila Railn)ad C,o., 38 Phil. 768 1 777). i\foreovel", thl' canicr unlike in suits for qursi-delict, may ~10t escape liability by proving that it has exe!"cised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its em11!oyces (Art. 1759, new Civil Code; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co .. supra; Prado V'l. M~nila Electric Co., 51 Phil. 900). The difference in co,nditions, defense3 anri proof, as well as the codal concept of quai;i-delicl as essentially ea:tra-contractual 11cg!i1,,"C11cf, compel us to differentiate L~tween acuons ex con1 .1·<'c:· t11. atid actions qwl!li ex delirto, and prevent us ln'm viewing the nction (or breach fJf contract as simultaneously embodying an action on tort. Neither can this action be takE'n ns one to enfoJ":."c <m emp!oye1's liability under Art. 1o:i of the Revised· Penal Co·!e, since the respopsibility is not alleged to be subsid'iary, nor is then~ on record any averment or proof that the d1·iver of appellant was i!'.~olvcnt. Jn fact, h~ is not e\·en ma<lf' ~ party to the suit. It is alSo suggested that a c:nl'ier's violation of its engagement to safely transport the passenger involves a breaoh of the pa>1sengcr's confirlencc, and thf'refoi·e should be regarded as a breach of eont1·act in bad fait11, justifying recovery of moral den1agcs under Art. 2220. This theo1·y is untenable, for under it the carttier would alwnys be deemed in had faith, in every case its C1blignt..ion t<> the passenger is infringed, and it woul'd he never accountable for simple negligence; while under the law (Art. 1756), the presumption is that common carrien acted negligently (and not maliciously), and art 1762 :1peaks of negligeno~ of tr.e rvmmon carrier. "Art. 17fi6. In case of deatl1 of 01· injuries to passen~'!rs, common can-ie1 !.< are nresumcd to have been at fault or to hav-:: acted negligently, unlcst" ·they J>ron~ that they observed e.xtrn.ordinarily diligcncc as prE:f:cribed in ai·ticles 1733 anJ 1755." "Art. 1762. Th(' contributory negligence <,f the passcng~r cloes 11ot b;ar recovery of damage::; for his death or injuries, if the proximate cauSf! thcrr.of is the negligence o! the common carl'ier, but the amount of dr.mages shall be eguitably re<l\\Cf!I/,'' The distinction between fraud, bad faith or malice (in t he sense of deliberate or wa11ton wrongdoing) and negligence (as mere carelessness) is too fundamental in our Jaw to be ignored (Art. 11701172): then· c<insequenccs being clearly differentiated by ~he Cu<!-:-. "Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, ti"je damages for which the obligor who a : ted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the .natural and proQable consequences of the br1>nch of the obligation, ancl which the parties have foreseen or could hnve rCflSOnabiy foreseen at the time the obligation w~s co111:t:tutec!. In case of frnud, bad faith, malice ot· written attitude, the obligor i;hall be respoT\sible for all damages which may bcreason&bly attributed to the non-performcnce of the obligation." It is to be presumed, in th1J absence of statutory provision to the contn11·y, that this diffei·cncc was in the mind of the lawmaker~ when in A rt. 2220 they limited recovety of moral qamages to l•1cachcs of contrnct in ha~ faith. I ~ is tnrn that negligence m.ay be occas:onally so gross as to amount to malice; but that fact must be shown in evidence, and a carrier's bad faith is not to he lightly infe1Tcd from a mc.-e fimling that the contract was breached th!·ough negligence of the carrier's employees. In view of the foregoing considerations, the decision of the Coui·t of A1>pcals is modified by eliminating the award of P5.000.00 by way of moral damag<!s (Court of Appeals &solution of May 5, 1957). Jn all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. No costs ip tP,is instance. So Ordered. Paraa, C.J., JJeny;:rm., Pculilla, Montenwyor, A, Reyes, Bcmtist1i A n9efo, r.abra<lor, Concepcion, a1ul E ndrncia, JJ., concurred. VII Bartolom.e San Die!Jo, Petitioner, vs. Eligio Sa.yson., Respondent, G.R. No. L-16258, A ugiut 31, 1961 , U tbraclor, J. L CIVIL CODE; ART. 1724 OF T H E NEW CIVIL CODE AN D ART. 1593, OLD CODE COMPARED. - Article 1724 of the new Civil Code is a modified form of Article 1593 of the Spanish Ci\'il Code. It. will be noted that under Article 1593 of the old Civil Code recovery ·for additional costs in a construction contract can be had it authorization to make such additions can be proved, while article 1724 of the new Civil Code requires that instead of merely proving authorization, such a uthorization by the proprietor must be made in writing. 2. JD. ; AUTHORIZATION FOR RECOVERY OF ADDITIONAL COSTS BY REASONS OF CHANGES I N P LAN IN CONSTRUOTION CONTRACT BE IN WRITING; P.URPOSE OF THE AMENDMENT.- The evident purpose of the amendment is to p1·evcnt litigation for additional costs incurred by reason of additions or changl!s in the original plans. That the requirement for a written authorization is not .merely to prohibit ad· mission of oral testimony against the objection of the adverse party, can be inferred from the fact that the provision is not included among those specified in t he Stat\ltf! o! F rauds, Article November 30, \~61 LAW\'ElQS 'JOURNAL Page 3;3Q
Date: 1961
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