11. Supreme Court Decisions, San Diego v. Sayson - Justice Labrador.pdf · Rare Periodicals

11. Supreme Court Decisions, San Diego v. Sayson - Justice Labrador.pdf

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extracted text: (b) That a breaoh of cont1·nct can not be considered included i11 the descriptive term, "analag:>ull cases'! u~ed in .j\rt. 2219, not only because Art. 2220 specifically provides for the damages that arP. causgq by contractqal breach, llltt because the definition of qiwsi d!l/1ci in Art. 2Jl76 of Code c.'l:pres&lY exclµdes the cases whe1c ··hmc !!'.' :\ "JJrc-exislmg co'1trnckal 1elation between the parties." "Art. ~176. Whoever by act or omission causes damages tu anQthl.'r, there being fault '"'r ne~ligcncc, is obliged to pay for the \'.l.amagc done. ~uch fault or negligence, i! there is no pre-existing contractual rei:J.tion Qclween the pa11ies, is cal)(',\ a qµasi-c!e~ict and is gove"rnecf by the provisions of this Chapter." T he ll)!Ception to the basic rule of uamages now under cons1J·e1 ation is a mishap resulting- in the dr.nlh of a pas:;tnger, in which case A1ticle 1i64 makes the common carrier ex)>ressly subject to t h'! rule of Art. 2~0G, that entitles the sriouse, descendants and ascer - dants o! the deceased passeur,er to "demand moral dan~ages for mental anguish by reason Qf the dcnth r;{ the deceased" (N:ecesito vs. P aras, G. R. No. L-IOG05, Resolution on Motion to reconsider,' SeptC'mh.:1 11, I96t<). But the e..c:ceptic11al rule cf Art. 1764 mak~s it all the more evidenr tha.L where the injurC'd passenge1· does not die, moral damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that t~e c~rrie:- was guilty of malice 01· bad faith. W e think jt is clear that the men .. c.:irolessncss of the carri<'r's <lrivC'r does not per ,,t roristitute or justify an ipferenrc of malice or bnd faith on th ~ part of the UJ.rl'iur; and in the case at ba1· there is no other evidence of such malice to support t he award of moral damages· by th~ Court of Appeals. To award moral damages for breach of co11• tract, therefore, without proof of bad foith or malice on the pr.it d the 1le!cndant, as required by A1·t. 2220, would be to vioh1tc the clear provi!'lions (If the law, and constitute unwananted judicial legislation. The cArt of Appeals has invoked our rulings in Castro vs. Aero Taxicah Co. R. G. No. 4815, December 14, 1948 and Layd!l vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. L-4487, January 29, 1952; but these doctrines were predicated upon our former law of dam:lges, before judicial discretion in fixing them bee3m(:: limited by the ('xpress provisions 0of the new Civil Code (pi·eviously quotec!L Hence, the aforesaid rulings are now 111appti('ablc. Upon tht· other hand, the advantageous position of a pai ty suing a carrier for breach of the contract of tl"anspoi·tation explains, to some extent, the limitations imposeci by the new Code on the amoun~ 9f the recovery. The action for breach of contract im~ poses on the defendant carrier a rresumption o"f liability upon Tit#ll'fl proof of inj 4ry to the passen~et·; the latter is reiieved from 1 he dyty to cst.abli.;iti the fault of the carrie1·, or of his employees, <ind tP,e burden is placed on the carrier to prove that it was due to an unfor.>een event or to force majeure (Cangco vs. Manila Railn)ad C,o., 38 Phil. 768 1 777). i\foreovel", thl' canicr unlike in suits for qursi-delict, may ~10t escape liability by proving that it has exe!"cised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its em11!oyces (Art. 1759, new Civil Code; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co .. supra; Prado V'l. M~nila Electric Co., 51 Phil. 900). The difference in co,nditions, defense3 anri proof, as well as the codal concept of quai;i-delicl as essentially ea:tra-contractual 11cg!i1,,"C11cf, compel us to differentiate L~tween acuons ex con1 .1·<'c:· t11. atid actions qwl!li ex delirto, and prevent us ln'm viewing the nction (or breach fJf contract as simultaneously embodying an action on tort. Neither can this action be takE'n ns one to enfoJ":."c <m emp!oye1's liability under Art. 1o:i of the Revised· Penal Co·!e, since the respopsibility is not alleged to be subsid'iary, nor is then~ on record any averment or proof that the d1·iver of appellant was i!'.~olvcnt. Jn fact, h~ is not e\·en ma<lf' ~ party to the suit. It is alSo suggested that a c:nl'ier's violation of its engagement to safely transport the passenger involves a breaoh of the pa>1sengcr's confirlencc, and thf'refoi·e should be regarded as a breach of eont1·act in bad fait11, justifying recovery of moral den1agcs under Art. 2220. This theo1·y is untenable, for under it the carttier would alwnys be deemed in had faith, in every case its C1blignt..ion t<> the passenger is infringed, and it woul'd he never accountable for simple negligence; while under the law (Art. 1756), the presumption is that common carrien acted negligently (and not maliciously), and art 1762 :1peaks of negligeno~ of tr.e rvmmon carrier. "Art. 17fi6. In case of deatl1 of 01· injuries to passen~'!rs, common can-ie1 !.< are nresumcd to have been at fault or to hav-:: acted negligently, unlcst" ·they J>ron~ that they observed e.xtrn.ordinarily diligcncc as prE:f:cribed in ai·ticles 1733 anJ 1755." "Art. 1762. Th(' contributory negligence <,f the passcng~r cloes 11ot b;ar recovery of damage::; for his death or injuries, if the proximate cauSf! thcrr.of is the negligence o! the common carl'ier, but the amount of dr.mages shall be eguitably re<l\\Cf!I/,'' The distinction between fraud, bad faith or malice (in t he sense of deliberate or wa11ton wrongdoing) and negligence (as mere carelessness) is too fundamental in our Jaw to be ignored (Art. 11701172): then· c<insequenccs being clearly differentiated by ~he Cu<!-:-. "Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, ti"je damages for which the obligor who a : ted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the .natural and proQable consequences of the br1>nch of the obligation, ancl which the parties have foreseen or could hnve rCflSOnabiy foreseen at the time the obligation w~s co111:t:tutec!. In case of frnud, bad faith, malice ot· written attitude, the obligor i;hall be respoT\sible for all damages which may bcreason&bly attributed to the non-performcnce of the obligation." It is to be presumed, in th1J absence of statutory provision to the contn11·y, that this diffei·cncc was in the mind of the lawmaker~ when in A rt. 2220 they limited recovety of moral qamages to l•1cachcs of contrnct in ha~ faith. I ~ is tnrn that negligence m.ay be occas:onally so gross as to amount to malice; but that fact must be shown in evidence, and a carrier's bad faith is not to he lightly infe1Tcd from a mc.-e fimling that the contract was breached th!·ough negligence of the carrier's employees. In view of the foregoing considerations, the decision of the Coui·t of A1>pcals is modified by eliminating the award of P5.000.00 by way of moral damag<!s (Court of Appeals &solution of May 5, 1957). Jn all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. No costs ip tP,is instance. So Ordered. Paraa, C.J., JJeny;:rm., Pculilla, Montenwyor, A, Reyes, Bcmtist1i A n9efo, r.abra<lor, Concepcion, a1ul E ndrncia, JJ., concurred. VII Bartolom.e San Die!Jo, Petitioner, vs. Eligio Sa.yson., Respondent, G.R. No. L-16258, A ugiut 31, 1961 , U tbraclor, J. L CIVIL CODE; ART. 1724 OF T H E NEW CIVIL CODE AN D ART. 1593, OLD CODE COMPARED. - Article 1724 of the new Civil Code is a modified form of Article 1593 of the Spanish Ci\'il Code. It. will be noted that under Article 1593 of the old Civil Code recovery ·for additional costs in a construction contract can be had it authorization to make such additions can be proved, while article 1724 of the new Civil Code requires that instead of merely proving authorization, such a uthorization by the proprietor must be made in writing. 2. JD. ; AUTHORIZATION FOR RECOVERY OF ADDITIONAL COSTS BY REASONS OF CHANGES I N P LAN IN CONSTRUOTION CONTRACT BE IN WRITING; P.URPOSE OF THE AMENDMENT.- The evident purpose of the amendment is to p1·evcnt litigation for additional costs incurred by reason of additions or changl!s in the original plans. That the requirement for a written authorization is not .merely to prohibit ad· mission of oral testimony against the objection of the adverse party, can be inferred from the fact that the provision is not included among those specified in t he Stat\ltf! o! F rauds, Article November 30, \~61 LAW\'ElQS 'JOURNAL Page 3;3Q 1403 of the Civil Code. As it does not appear to have been intended as an extension of the Statute of Frauds, it must have been adopted as a substantive provision or a condition precedent to reeovery. The new provision was evidently adopted to prevent mjsun,:lcrstandings and litigations bt:twcen contractors and owners. Clearly it was the intention of the legislature in making the amendment to require authorization in writing before costs of ad"ditional labor in a contract for the construction of a bu\iding may be demanded. DECISION This is a petition for certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming a judgment of the Court Of First Instance of Manila which sentenced petitioner Bartolome San Diego to pay respondent Eligio Sayson the sum of P5,541.75 with legal interest thereon from Sept<'mber 10, 1956, plus P500 as attorney's fees and costs. Jn the action brought by respondent Eligio Sayson in the Cou'rt of First Instance of Manila, he alleg~d that in November, 1954, he and San Diego entered into an agreement. whereby Sayson would furnish labor for the construction of a building at 1200 Arlegui, Farnecio, Quiapo, Manila, in accordance with the plans approved by the city engineer, at the price of PHi,000; t hat in the course of the construct ion t he plans a pproved by the city engineer were modified and changes were made not called for in the approved plans, for which plaintiff had to perform and/ or furnish labor valued at P6,840:31; and that San Diego has refused to pny this addilional sum. Jn a spe•cial defense, San Diego alleged that even granting that additiona l work had been performed, he may not held liable for the same in view of the provisions Of Article 1724 of the Civil Code. At the trial the Court of First Instance of Manila found the following extra or additional work pel"fonncd by Sayson: ··x x x he testified that the width of the building was increased from 13.80 meters in the plan as approved to 14.30 meters; the party wall of hollow blocks as appearing in the plan was changed to· reinforced concrete; that although the mezzanine was ordered eliminated in the plan and therefore not included in the contract, defendant had it constructed; that aft.c~ the stairs were constructed, it was ordered removed (Exhibit A-1-a); that the partitions were enlarged (Exhibit A-1-b); that the partitions on the second floor was raised, the transom was removed and the partition elevated to the ceiling (Exh. A-1-c); that all the partit ions which were single in the plan were ordered made into double wall ; the wooden flooring in Section 22 in th~ plan wa;; changed lo reinforc~I concrete (Exhibit A-3-u): that the eaves facing Farnecio SLreet although crossed out by the City Engineer were ordered made (Exh. A-1-d); that the walls had "costura'' only under the plan but were ordered plastered and ceilings were ordered although not included in the plan (Exh. A-1-e). These changes which were ordered by rte· fondant and h is engineer are summarized on page 8 of Exhibit B as follows: For additional work performl!d P6,840.31." (Record 0:1 A 1 )peal, pp. 18, 19-20.) Judgment for Sayson having been rendered for this amount the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals. In said cou.rt petitioner herein again raised as his defense the provision of Article 1724 of the Civil Code, but this court held: ''We do not see any plausible reason why <lefendant shoul<l not compensate plaintiff for the alterations done by the latter at the instance of the foimer who was benefited thereby. Bid for such alterntions were not included i.n the amount of 1'15,000. which amount was computed and submitted in the light of the approved plans. And since those alterations undoubtedly entailed expenses, time and efforts on the part of the contractor, then he should be in justice and equity to him paid for by defendant as owner of the building where they were done. It is true that there was no written agreement for such alterations but the absence thereof should not be allowed to make the contractor poorer and the owner of the building richer. Defendant in trying to justify his refusal to pay plaintiff for the latter's claim cites the following article of the Civil Code." "Art. 1724. The contractor who undertakes to build a structure or any other work for a stipulated price, in conformity with plans and sp·ecifications agreed upon with the landowners can neither withdraw from the contract no1· demand increase in t he price on account of the higher cost of labor or materials, save when there has been a change in the plans and specifications, provided: (I) Such change has been authorized by the pro{>riCtor in writing; and (2) The additional price to be paid lo the contractor has been determined in writing by both parties. "Obviously, the a forcquoted provision of law is not applicable on the claim of defendant." The decision was affirmed. Hence the case was brought here 01, an appeal by certioral'i. Article 1724 of the Civil Civil Code is a modified form of Article 1593 of the Spanish Civil Code, which provides as follows: "No ar(jhitect or contractor who, for a lump sum, undertakes the construction of a building, or any other work to be done in accordance with a plan agr(!(!d upon with the owner of the ground, may demand an increase of the price, even if the cost of the materials or labor has increased; but he may do so when any change increasing the work is made in the plans, provided the owner has given his consent thereto." I n his commentaries on this Article, Manresa said : •'El articulo 1.793 <let Co<ligo frances es mas provisor quc al quc comentamos, pues exigo para que el aumento de precio pueda 1>edirsc, que 105 cambios o ampliaciones dcl plan se hayan autorizado por escrito y que se haya convcnido et precio con el proprietario." (X Manresa, Fifth ed., p. 926.) Obviously influenced by the above criticism of the article, the Code Commission recommended and the legislature approved tbe pro-' vision as it now stands. It will be noted that whereas under the <Id art icle recovery for additional costs in a construction contrar.i: can be had if authorization to make such additionl'I can be proved, the amendml!'nt evidently requires that instead of merely provinf"." authorization, such author ization by the proprietor must be m:id1 • in writing. The evident purpose of the amendment is to prevent litigation for additional costs incurred by reason· (;f additions (lr r hanges in the original plans. Is this additional requirement of a written authorization to be considered ai; a mere extension of the Statule of Frauds, or is it a substantive provision. That the re'!Uirement for a writl<'n authorization is not me:-ely to prohibit admission of oral testimony ag-.i.inst the objection of the adverse party, can Ix> inferred from. the fact thnt the provision is not includ('j among those specified in the Statute of Frauds, Article H 03 of the Civil Code. As it does not appear to have been intended :ui un , extension of the Statute of Frnuds, it must have been adopted as a substantive provision or a condition precedent to recovery. Our duty in this respect is not to dispute the wisdom of the provision; we should only limit ourselves to inquiring into the legislative intent, and once this is determined to make said intent effective. The new provision was evidently adopted to prevent misunderstandings and litigations between contractors and owners. Clearly it was the intention of the legislature in making the amendment to require authorization in writing before costs of· additional labor in a contract for the construction of a building may be demanded. We find that the provision is applicable to the circumstances surrounding the case at bar, and we' are in duty bound to enforce the same. The trial court should have denied the demand for Page 340 LAWYERS O"OURNAL November 30, 1961 additional costs as directed by the provisions of Article 1724 of the Civil Code. WHEREFORE, the writ is hereby granted, the decision of the Court of Appeals reversed, and the action of respondent dismissed. Without eosts. Beng.:001, C.J., Padilla, J.13.l. Reyes, Pa1·cdes, Dizon 1.,11ul De LCQI!, JJ., concurrctl. Barrera, Natividad u11d C001cepcion, JJ., took no part. VIII la Mallorca Bu.s Co., et al., Petitioners-appellees, vs. Nica1101· R-0.mos, et al., Respondents; Fuentes a.nd Plomantes, Respondents<1vpellants0 G.R. No. L-15476, September 19, 1961 . Natividad, J. l. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; REORGANIZATlON PLAN NO. 20-A; JUDICIAL POWER CONFERRED TO REGIONAL OFFICES ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE IJURISDICTION OVER MONEY CLAIMS OF LABORERS IS NULL AND VOID.- The p1·ovisions of Reorganization Plan No. 20;-A, nndertaken under the provisions of Republic Act No. 997, as a mended, insofar as they confer judicial power upon the R.:!gi!lnal Offices thereby created and give said offices origin3l and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims of laborers other th1l!l those falling unde~· the Workmen's Compensatfon Law, . '"trc null and void and of no effect. Corominas, el a\'. vs. L"hor Stundar•I Commission, G.R. NO. L-14837, and companion ~a~e,;, June 30, 1961; Miller vs: J\lardo, G.R. No. L-15138, and. companion ca~es, July 31, 1961; Caltex (Phil.) Inr.. ''S. Villanue·ca. f't al., August 21, 1961. 2. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW; APPLICABILITY TO. CLAIM FOR COMPENSATJ0::-1 FOR DISABILITY DUE TO T UBERCULOSIS. - The claim fo1· disability due to tuberculosis, a!legedly to have been caused and aggravated by the 11ature of plaintiff'~ employment in the petitioners' servic~, falls squarely under Section 2 of the Workmen's Compensat ion Law (Act No. 3423, as amc:nded hy Act No. 3812, Commor,"ealth Act i>Jo. 210 and Re))Ublic Act Nos. 772 and' 889). 3. WORKMEN'S . COMPENSATION COMMISSION ; \JURISDICTION WHICH IS NOT REPEALED BY REP. ACT 992; REGIONAL OFFICES; JURISDICTION OVER CLAIMS F01~ COMPENSATION FALLING UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW.- As the juris.diction vested by Act No. 3428, as amended, on the Workmen's Compensation Commission to hear and decide claims for compensation coming under its pre.visions has not heen ri:vok::d, f'ither expressly or by necessa ry implication, by Republic Act No. 992, as amended, or by any olher subsequent staitite, :rnd t he regional offices created under Rcl·r~nization Plan No. 20-A in the Depa1·tment o~ Labor partake of the nature of referees which the Workmen'~ . Compensation Corrmission had the right to appoint and clot!'!e with juri.!'diction to hear and decide such cl:iims (Sec. 48, .Act No. 3428, as amended), the provisions of said wganizat1011 plan, insobr a!'I they confer or: said regional offices j1:nsdiction 1.v11r daims for compen.-sation falling under the Worl:m~n's Compensation Law, is perfeetly legal, and their d;xi· . sions on such claims are valid' and binding. . DECI S IO N Thi!> action fo1· prohibition with preliminary injunction, initiated in the Court of First Instance of Manila to enjoin the respondents from enforcing a decision of the Regional Office No. 3 ('.f the Department of Labor which ordned the petitioners to IJ:t~ to respondent NicP.nor Ramos t.he sum vf Pl,862.00 as compe!1sation for disability due to tuberculosis, plus Pl9.00 as fees, is n'lw before this Court on the appeal interposed by the respondents from the judgment therein entered by t hat Court grantii1g the w1·it therein prayed for, on the ground that said regional offire was wilhout jurisdiction to hear and determine the claim therein involyed. It appear:. that respondent Nicanor Ramos was a driver of the petitioners La Mallorca and Pampan.ga Bw; Co., Jn::. Sometime prior to November 19, 1968, said respondent filed against the \:it· ter with the Regional Office No. 3 o! the Department of Labor a complaint asking for payment of compensation for disability due lo tuberculosis allegedly contracted by him as a resuJt of his employment in said concerns. The petitioners resisted the action. After hearing, the Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor, on November 19, 1958, i·endered a decision ordering the petitioners to pay to said respondeht the sum of Pl,862.00 as disability compensation, and to said office the amount of Pl9.00 as fees. Notified of this decision the petitioners, on cranunry 23, 1959, filed in thf' Court of F irst lnswnce of Manib the instant action, whe1·ein they asked that the enforcement of said decision of the Reg ional Office No. 3 be restrained, alleging that it is null and vcid ab inili-0 as said region:il office lia<l no j uriscl'iction to hear :ind rleci<lt. t'1c claim which was the subjl:'Ct·matter t hereof. ResrionclP.nis fil::d ~n answer to the petition. When the case was called for hearing on February 13, 1959, the parties submitted the same for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court took the cnse under advisement, and on March 12, 1959, rendered judgment on the pleadings, vacating and 'setting aside the decision of the Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor complained of, on the gt·ound that said regional offic.e was without jurisdiction to hear and decide the claim therein involved, and granting the writ of prohibition applied for. l''rom this judgment, t he responJrnb appealed to this Court. They contend in this instance that the trial court committed error in granting, on the ground invoked, the writ of prohibition applied for by the petitioners. It is claimed that the decision of the Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor complained of is legal and binding, for the Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, undertaken pw·suant to Republic Act No. 997, as amended, gives said regional office j urisdiction to hear claims for compensation under, the Workmen's Compensation Act . The issues raised has ah·eady been the subject of previous pronouncements made by this Court. In three recent decisions u11 the ~ubject, thi~ Court held that thc provisions of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, undet·tak.:!n under the provisions of Republic J\ct No. 097, as amendocl, insofar as the>y confor judicial power l!{10n the Regional Offices thereby created and give said officEs origi!'la\ <111J exclusive jurisdiction over money claim!! of laborers otht>r than those falling under the Workmen's Compens~tion Law, art> null and void and of no effect. Corominas, et at. vs. Labor Standard Commission, C.R. No. L-14837, and companion cases, J une 30, 1961; Miller vs. Mardo, G.R. No. L-15138, :ind c-::mpanion C.'\.~.s. July 31, 1961; Caltex (Phil.) Inc. vs. Villanueva, E:t al., Augu"'t 21, 1961. In the Corominas case, 81t;prn, this Court said: "The provision of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, particularly Section 23, which grants t n the regional· offices origina l and exclusive j urisdiction over money claims of laborers, is null nnd void, said grant having been made without authority by Republic Act No. 097." In that of Mill!!r vs. Mardo, snwa, this Court held : "On the basis of the foregoing conskteratbu, wc hold ~,nd declare that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, in!>ofar as it c1ir.fers judicial power to the Regional Offices ove1· cases other th:m those falling under the Workmen's Compensation Law, i!' invalid and of no effect." And in the C2.ltex case su pra,, this Court said: "From t he foregoing provision of la'" and Jules, it may be gathered that a r egional office of the Department of Lal:c·r has original j urisdiction to hear and detenr.ine claims for ccmpenrntion under the Workmen's Compeni ation Act. If :l elaim is controverted it shall' be hear d 11nd d'ecided t>nly by a r'?!lNove"!l:tfr 30, 1961 LAWYERS \JOVR>NA.L Page 341
Date: 1961
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