14. Supreme Court Decisions, Cagalawan v. Customs Canteen et. al. - Justice Paredes.pdf · Rare Periodicals

14. Supreme Court Decisions, Cagalawan v. Customs Canteen et. al. - Justice Paredes.pdf

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extracted text: au~ in imminent danger of being lost or removed unless a Receiver is appointed to take charge of and preserve the same, GERUNDIO DIASNES, of Dumangas, lloilo, is hereby aP1>ointed as RECEIVER of the property in litigation as well as the products thereof, and upon putting up a bond of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (PG,000.00), approved by this Court, the sa id RECEIVER may qualify and assume his duties as such." Defendants moved for the reoonsideration of the above Ol'der , claiming that the kt in question is in rnstodia lcgis in S1>ecial Proceedings No. 8tfi and can not, therefore, be the subject o!' a receiver~hip in this cas:e; that while it is tru(' that said lot had be<>1• assii.rncd to plaintiff in the pl"o.ject of partition in said praeeedings, the probate court, in approving m id partition, withlwld th<' ordei· or distribution and the closing of the estate " pending the sub:nission by the administration and the heirs of the written conformity of the creditors, namely, th<' RFC and the PNB to such <list ribution and e,·entual assumplion by the heirs of the liabilitiC's of the estate" ; and final!)', that it does not aP1lear fr.:im the com - pla int th:lt plaintiff has such interest in th~ p1 ·oper:y in liti :ation and its produce, and that such property is in dange1· of being lost, removed, or materially injur~, as to justify the appointment of a !'eceiver. This motion having been denied, defendants fil~ the .present petition for certiorari reiterating substantially their arguments in their motion for reconsideration in the court below, and urging that the order appointing a 1-eceiver was issued in grave al-iuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction by the court a quo. Upon JlC'titioners' filing of a bond in the amount of ;-z,000.00, we !ssuol! ~ writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the lower court f1·on• en forcing the order complained of. We see no sufficient cause or 1ea:>on in thfl instant case \(I justify placing the land in question in receivership. While it d'()('S appear from the pleadings in the cou1·l below that title or owne1·ship over said land is with plaintiff by virtue of :.he order of pr.rtition in Special Proceedings No. SIS adjudicating ;:aid prope!-ty ·to him, it li~ewise appears, howercr, that petitioners are in the m'.lte>:ial possession ther(oof, hot under any claim of title or ownership, but pursuant to a lease contract signect with them by plaintiff'<; daughter, Rvsario Evangelista, the fonncr administrator er aq~nt of plaintiff ovel" said property. In fact, plaintiff admitted in his answer to the present petition that h<' did " let his daughtf"r "'!'Ianage the said property" (par. 1 of Affirmative and Special Defenses, Answer , p. 2) . Until, therefore, the lease aJn'(!ement sign<.'rl b t>tween Rosario Evangelista, a!; agent of plaintiff, :u1d defendant~ is judicially declared Yoid for want of authority of the agent to c..xecute the ,;ame, defendants are entitlerl to continue in the posS"."S!>ion of the premises in que.~tirm, unle!!s powerful re'.ls:ons exi3t for the lower court t.o deprive them of such possession and appoint a re<:eiver. o'·er said property. These pow~rful reasons are wanting in this case. Indeed, there ifl even no showing here that the property in question and its pending harvest are in danger of hein.1t lost, or that defondants are committing acts of waste thereon or that def1md2nts are insolvent and cannot 1 ·epair any damagri they cause to plaintiff's rights. In fruth, the complaint alk ges no intr-rest on the part of the plaintiff in the .crops subjected to receiv'.'!'ship. 1)11011 the other hand, defendants occupied and planted the land in questio11 in good faith ~l!; less(es, and it is only j ust and equitable that they be allowed to cuntinue in their possession and harvest the fruits of their labor (subject to their obligation to pay their lessor his due share in the harvest) until the respl'ICtive rights <-•f the parties in this case lo the po!s·~i:sion of the land in question a !'e fin:i.llr resolved and adju<licatecl. This Court has repeated\~~ ruled that where the effect of the appointment of a receiver is to take rral estate out of the possei:sion r,f the d-efendants before the final adjudication of the rights of the parties, the appoint· ment should be made only in extreme cases and on a clear showing of ncce~i~y therefoi-e in order to save the plaintiU from grave and irreme<!iable loss of d'amage (Mendoza v. Arellano, 36 Phil. 59; De la Cruz v. Guinto, G.R. No. L-1315, Sept. 2D, 1947; Calo and San J ose v. Roldan, 76 Phil'. 455; Municipality of Camiling v. De Aquino, G.R. No. L-11476, Feb. 28, 1958; Delos Reyes v. Bayona, G.R. No. L-13832, March 29, 1960) . Moreover, the trial court seems to have overlooked that as has cften been held, "the power to appoint a receiver is a delicate- one: that said power should be exercised with extreme caution and only when the ci1·cumstances so demand, either because there is imminent danger that the pro1 >ert y SC'ugl1t to Oc placed in the hands of a receiver be lost or because they nm the r isk of being impaired, endeavoring to avoid that the injury thereby caused be greater than tl,e one sought to be averted. For this reason, l:efore tho 1 ·emcdy' is g r:i.ntert, the consequences or effects thereof shouJd be considered or, at least, estimated in ot·der to avoid causing irreparable injustice or injury to others who are entitled to as much consideration as those seeking it", (Velasco & Co. v. Gochico & Co., 28 Phil. 39; Claudio, et al. vs. Zandueta, 64 Phil. 812; Calo v. Roldan, 76 Phil. 454) . WHEREF'ORE, the orders of November 14, 1959 and December 10, 1959 are set aside, a11d the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Ccurt on February 3, 1960 is made pennanent. Costs againts respondent Daniel' Evangelista. Bengzon, Padillo., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, llarrern, (;utie1..,·ez Du vid, Paredes, aml Dizon, JJ., concurred. x Concordia Cagalaw•rn, Plaintijf-oppellant, i•s. Custom8 Canti>en. el n/., Dcfe71dwnttJ-a7>pellee8, G N. No /,-/f;Ofll , October .':/, 191;1, P,ircde1J, :.J. 1 COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; JURISDICTION; WHEN IT HAS NO J URISDIC"fION OVER MONF:Y CLAIMS.- Under th<! law and jurisprudence the Court d Ind:1strial Relations' j urisdiction extends only le. cases in•1oh·ing (a) labor dispute3 affecting an industry which is incfo- · pcnsable to thf' n:itional· interest nmt is so certified by the Prei:ident to the Court (Sec. 10, Rep . . <\ct No. 87C); (b) controversy .'.lbout the minimum wage, under the Minimum W-:>.!"'e Law, Rep. Act No. 602; (c) hours of employment, under the Eight-Hour Labor Law, Comm. Act No. 444 and (d) unfai!· labor practice (Se<.'. 5 [a), Rep. Act No. 875). And such c.lisputes, to fall under the jurisdiction of the CIR, must ar i"W while the employer-employee rel'ationship betw(>en the parties nxists or the employee seeks reinstatement. When such relation· ship is over and the employee doc!' not seek reinstatement, R!l claims become money claims that fall un<lei- the jurisdiction of the regular courts (Sy H uan vs. ,Judge Bautista, et al., G.R. No. L-16115, Aug. 29, 1961; and cases cited t herein). 2. ID.; ID.; WHE N IT HAS NO POWER TO GRANT REM?<-;DY UNDER ITS POWER OF l\IEDIAT ION AND CONCILIA T ION.- In th'-' absencf"! of unfair lRbor practice. the CIR ha'! no power to grant reme..ly under its genera! p(lwers cf ma<!i~ tion and conciliatir:n, such as 1 ·einstatemcnt or back wages. 3. ID. ; ID.; NO JURISDICT ION ON VIOLATION OF SEPARATION PAY LAW ; OHDINARY COURT, JURISDICTION Of<~.- A violation of the law on separation pay (Rep. Act No. \OU2, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1787), involvt>s, at most. :i breach of an obligation of the employer to his employ&> or vice versa, to be prose;::uted like an ordina!·y contract or ohligati(ln - a breach of a pl'ivatc l'h~ht which may be redres..-e•l oy a r<'cr,111·se to the ordinary <'our!. DEC I S I ON · On December 2-i, 1957, Concordia Cagalawan, filed a claim againsl the Manager, Customs Canteen (Ral"fl<>lla Pastorat). befor<' the Reg<onal Office No. S, Department of Labor, Davao City for November 30, 1961 LAWYERS ~JOURNAL Page ::!'3 8<>par.ition Pay, Ove11:ime Pay and underpayment (Case No. LSV · 23). iThe henring officer held that the claim fer overtime pay nr:d undcrpay:ncnt did not lie and C:ismiSS4:d the same for lack of merit , btit ordered llw pr:.yment of separation pay in the sum of Pl04.00, ii she would not be rcinst:"\ted:, and recommended the filing of an <lCtion 'fc.r a violation of se.:=tion ll(h) and 4(c) of the Wom~n :-ind Child L:i.hor Law. No appeal was taken from this ruling to the Labor St:md:u·d Commission. On January 16, 1958, tho same Concordia Cagalawan filed a complaint against the Customs Canteen, Francisco Yu and Ramona Pastoral, before the CFI of Davao (Civil Case No. 2554). She alleged in her complaint that on February 20, 1957, defendants contracted her to work on the Customs Canteen, a s a waitress; that she was receiving a monthly salary of P30.00, mud. below the minimum required by the Minimum Wage Law (Rep. Act No. 602); that she had rendered overtimo work for which she was not paid compensation (Com. Act No. 444); that in June, 1957, she complained with the Pol'ice Department of Davao ' City regarding a quarrel she had with one of the boys in the canteen. which act displeased the manager, defendant Yu who, without cause, compelled her to leave her employment; that she was not formally and actually notified by defendants at least one. month in advance that her services was to be tenninated, "in gross violation of Republic Act No. 1052, as amended and as such, she is entitled to reinstatement, including back salaries until she is returnee to her w;,rk"; and that due to the refusal of defendants to pay 11~r c;aim, despite demands, she was compelled to hire a lawyer to !Jrn' tect her intei-est for P200.00 and that she suffered moral damage!' in the sum of Pl,000.00. Plaintiff prayed that defendants be or · 1lered: (1) to pay her the amount corresponding tr. her overtilT'.:> pay and and the differential pay between her actual salary and the minimum provided for by Act No. 602; (2) to pay "her one month separation pay or in the alternative, back salaries and WllgP:> until her reinstatement"; and (3) to pay her the sum of P200.00 and ~1,000.00 for attorney's fees and moral damages, respectivc>fy. Defendants mov,ed to dismiss the complaint r.n the grour.-Js that (1) the value of the subject matter sought to he recovered is less than the minimum requirement: and (2) even assuming th" value is more than P-2,000.00, the Cou rt has no jurisdiction over the action (amended petitio11 to dismiss). It is contended that the subject matter of tht> complaint being mc>ney claim, such as 5eparation pay, overtime pay and unde!"payment , the regular courts or justice have no original jurisdiction and that the> Regional Office No. 8 of Davao City should try and determi:lc such claims, as such office alone has the original and exclusive jurisdiction on all money cases. The court dismissed the case, without costs, holding that "th(• c\a.im of the plaintiff here does not fall under the original ju~is dietion of the Court Of First Instance because the claim is Jess than P2,000.00" and suggesting that what the plaintiff should hav-: C:one "was to elevate the case to the Lnbor Standard Commission and after the final decision in accordance with the Rules a nd Rc~· ulations I, an appeal can be interposed to the Coilrt of First l n~tance". The appeal taken from said j udgml'nt by the illaint.iff to the Court of Appeals, was elevated up to Us, as the same involves th-: question of ju riMiction. We recently held: - "x x x . So that it was not the intention of Congress, in enacting Rep. Act No. 997, to authorize the transfer of p<1wcrs and jurisdiction :;ranted to conrts of justice from thc>se, to the officials to be appointed or offices to l>e created by th'! Reorganization Plan. x x x. The Legislature cculd not have intended to grant such powers to the Reorganization Commis1ion, an executive body, as the Legislatore may not and cannot delegate its powers to legislate or ereate eourts of justice 10 any other agency of the Governmc:ont. x x x tht. provision "' R.iorganization Pfiln No. !?0-A, J)al'ticulorly S ec. 25, '11Jh ch grants t.o th.: rcnional offices ori9innl and e.i:clusiv~ jurisdfr· tion over money claims· of laborers, is null and void, said gr::nit having been made witho1it authority by Rep. Act No. 997" (Corominas, Jr., et al. vs. Labor St,unda.rd Commission, ct Ill.., L-14837 ; MCli, vs. Calupitan, et al., L-15483, Wong vs. Carlim, ct. a ?., L-1;1940; Bnlrodgan Co. et al., vs. Fuentes, ct al. L· 5105, Junt: 30, 1961.) (8ee also Pitt,go v;:;. Lee Bee Trading Go., et al., G.R. No. L-15693, Ouly 3, Hl61). A£ the p1ovision of Reorgarnzatiol1 Plan No. 20-A whil'h grants to the regional offices (in this cas~ Regionat Office No. 8, Deparlmcnt of Labor, Davao City), original nnd c>xclu:>ive jurisdiction over money claims of laborers, is null and void, what court, should entertain the present claim? Under the law and jurisprudence the Court of Industrial Relations' j urisdiction extends only to cases involving (a) labor disJ'utes affecting an industry which is indis1iensable to the natirmal interest and is so certified by the Presid('nt to the Court (Sec. 10, Rep. Act Ne>. 875) ; (h) controvnsy .'lbout the minimum wage, ur.der the Minimum Wage Law, Rep. Act No. 602; (c) hours of employment, under the Eight~Hour Labor Law, Comm. Act No. '144 ~ind (d) unfair labor prac~ice (See 5[a], Rep. Act No. 875). And such disputes, to fall under the jurisdiciion of the CIR, must arise whi:c the employer-employee r!!lationship between the parties exi;:;ts or the employee seeks reim:tatement. When such relationShip is over and the employee does not. seek reinstatement, :\II claims become money claims that fall under the jurisdiction of the regular courts (Sy Hunn vs. Judge Flautista, et al., G.R. No. L-1611; nnd (ases cited therein). In the {'ase at bar, acbnittedly there is no labor dispute: 110 unfair labor practice is denounced by any of the pa11:ies; the c:a11se Of the dismissal of the petitioner was the displeasure caused upon the 1-es9'.;ndent manager, by the act of the pt'titioner for having h-ought a quarrel between her and another employ~•:, to the attention of police authorities; and when the claim was filed, there WM no Jonget· any employ«r-employee relationship hetwe{'n the partic>!\. While it may he true that the complaint, aUeged that s~e was no~ notified by dc!E:.ndants, at least one month in advance, that her senices were to be terminated ''in gros;:; violation of Republic Act No. 1052, as ameuded, and as such she is entitled to reinstatement, in · eluding back salaries until he is returned to her work" and that, in hei· prayc.- she asked for the gr::rntini; of such relief, it ill cqunll~ true that it is not within the authority of the Court of ln<hlstrial Re!ations, to reinstate her and pay her back wage.;;, in the event that she had a right to a &eparation pay, there being no allegation nor proof that defendant had committed unfair labor practice. ln the rocent case of National Labor Union vs. lnsular-Yebana Tobacco Corporation, L-15363, July 31, 1961, it was ruled that in the absence of unfair labor practice, the CIR has no 110wer to grant remedy under its general power of m.fldiation and conciliation, such a-. rcinstai.emE>nt or back wage:;;. MoreOV(>r, a violation of the Jaw en sepuation pay (Rep. Act No. 1052, as amended by Rep. Art No. 1787), involves, at most, a breach of an obligation of the employer to his employee or vice versa, to be p rosecuted like an ordinary contract or obligation - a breech of a privat.e right which may ~ redressed by a recourse to the ordinary comts. Hence, t \.ircase at bar is cognizable by an ordinary court, the Court of Fin•t Instance of Davao, in this particular cnse, it appearing that t.he amount involved hel'cin is within the jurisdiction of said court. a:> per fin<!ings of the Co'.lrt vf Appeals. IN VIEW HEREOF, the crder ap;')ealed from, dismissing th .. case for lack of jurisdiction, i!'l reversed, and the same is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, without pronouncement a~ to costs. Bi!ng:on, C.J., Pndif/n. , Bmiti11ta .411gelo, Labrador, c~mccpcion, J.RL. Reyes, Dizwi wnd De Leon, JJ., e.>'11C1irt:t.d. Barrera,, ·'· took no part. Page 344 LA WYERS I.JOURNAL November 30, "19151
Date: 1961
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