Is peace on Earth possible?

Title

Creator

Strachey, John

Language

English

Source

Panorama Volume XIV (No.9) September 1962

Year

1962

Rights

In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted

Abstract

The Sunday Observer, London, December 24, 1961

Fulltext

■ “War is one of the most deeply rooted of all human institutions. Some people do not realize that in asking mankind to do away without war, they are making a wholly unprecedented deIS PEACE ON EARTH POSSIBLE? John Strachey Man in the Nuclear Age Twenty-five years ago the decisive issues were economic. Either our industrialised so cieties would surmount their economic problems or they would fall into decay. To day the threat of nuclear war is the decisive issue. A failure to surmount this new crisis would lead not to decay but to summary destruction. So much will perhaps be readily agreed. But the prevention of war, as distinct from its occasional avoidance or postponement, is a far more difficult matter than is even now realised. Many people, it is true, are tireless in reiterating that with the development of nu clear arms, peace has become * Secretary of State °for War in the last British Labour govern ment. indispensable. But those who best appreciate this truth are apt to overlook the fact that war is one of the most deep ly rooted of all human insti tutions They do not realise that in asking mankind to do without war, they are making a wholly unprecedented de mand. On the other hand those of a more realistic temperament — as they consider themselves — who have noted the histo rical record, are apt to ignore the new fact that to settle dis putes between nation-States by the time-honoured method of war has become impossibly destructive. No one can blame mankind for failing, initially at least, to face the dilemma upon the horns of which the progress of physical science has impaled us. But the fact is that for a world of fully sovereign States, war 36 Panorama remains inevitable but has be come intolerable. This dilemma of the nu clear age casts its shadow over every aspect of contemporary life. It will not be-resolved without diagnostic studies of the nature of war, sustained by many workers and over many years. To suppose any thing else would be as wish ful as to suppose that cancer could be overcome without achieving an ever-increasing comprehension of the morbid condition of the affected tis sue. The Role of Military Factors I do not take the view sometimes expressed by per sons of my political persua sion, that the military cha racteristics of the “delicate balance of terror” are unim portant. On the contrary, in the short run what is called “the stability of the balance,” which depends to a marked extent upon military factors, is of primary importance. Here I can only assert two conclusions. The stability of the nuclear balance, and so the proba bility of avoiding the early outbreak of nuclear war, is dependent, first, on both sides rendering their respective strategic nuclear forces as "in vulnerable” as possible to a surprise attack by the other. ThePe would be little hope of peace if both sides maintain ed strategic nuclear forces which could obliterate, or be obliterated by, the opposing force. For in that case the premium upon striking first would be overwhelmingly high. The second conclusion is that the stability of the ba lance, and so peace, will be gravely endangered if either side neglects its non-nuclear or “conventional" forces. For in that case the other side can seize some limited, but important, local advantage without the use of nuclear weapons, and so confront its opponent with the intolerable dilemma of submitting or of blowing up the world for the sake of what appears to be an issue of limited impor tance. Perhaps the side which has neglected its conventional forces will yield once or twice on such limited issues. But it is easy to see that a series of such issues could and would confront the neglectful September 1962 37 side with the stark choice of surrender or full-scale nuclear war. These military considera tions will be greeted by many readers with impatience. If, it will be said, the consequencies of nuclear war are as black as they are painted (and they are), ought we not to demand immediate and all-embracing measures to abolish this nightmare? Ei ther unilateral disarmament or the quick establishment of a world government is often demanded by those who have suddenly realised the peril in which they stand. It is true that no sugges tions for improving “the sta bility of the balance” can do more than procure us a stay of execution by nuclear war. But how much that is! The inhabitant of the condemned cell is ill-advised to despise a reprieve, even though only a full pardon will set him free again. In the same way it would be particularly rash for us to neglect “the stabi lity of the balance” on the grounds that it is undeniable that far more than this will be necessary to release us from that world-wide con demned cell which the human race to-day inhabits. Disarmament: (i) Unilateral We must conclude, then, that defense policy is a high ly important matter, but on ly in order to gain time for more fundamental measures. What are such measures? It is disarmament that has prin cipally attracted the enthu siasm of what may be called “the men of peace.” Disarmament, however, can be of two kinds. The kind that principally occupies pub lic attention to-day is unilate ral disarmament. It is pro posed that either this country, .or the alliance to which it be longs, should lay down its nu clear weapons without refe rence to what the other side may do. I have only one thing to say on this: if one is prepared to accept its consequences, name ly, compliance with the will, whatever it may be, of any State, or alliance of States, which does not lay down its nuclear arms, it is the obvious thing to do. For those men and women who have faced these conse quences, and accept them, I 38 Panorama have considerable respect. I cannot agree with them that this is either the right or the relevant approach to the mat ter. But it is certainly pos sible to argue that anything at all is better than to in cur even the risk of nuclear war, and that risk can be wholly avoided only by indu cing the alliance of which we are members unilaterally to disarm itself. Nevertheless I cannot find much interest in this propo sal. It is, no doubt, concep tually possible that the Cam paign for Nuclear Disarma ment might succeed not mere ly in disarming and neutrali sing Britain, which could not possibly eliminate the risk of nuclear war, but also in in ducing America, or even Rus sia, unilaterally to disarm herself. But the possibility of doing so appears too re mote to be relevant. More over, I am fortified in this view by discovering that it is fully, if unexpectedly, shared by the most eminent figure, by far, of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Ber trand Russell writes in his new book, “Has Man a Fu ture?”: — .. .there is a slogan invented by West German friends of peace: “Better Red than dead. * ’ One may guess that in some sections of Russian public opinion, there is an opposite slogan: “Better capitalists than corpses.’’ I do not think it is necessary to in quire into the theoretical validity of either sldgan since I think it out of the question that the one should be adopted by Western Governments or the other by the Governments of the East. Neither slogan presents justly the problem which East and West, alike, have to face. Given that military vic tory by either side is impossible, it follows logically that a nego tiated detente cannot be based on the complete subjection of either side to the other but must pre serve the existing balance while transforming it from a balance of terror to a balance of hope. Exactly. If “Better Red than dead” is a false issue, what is there left except to go back to the familiar, often frustrating, but indispensable path of disarmament and de tente by negotiation — of ne gotiations moreover which, as Russell writes specifically “cannot be based on the com plete subjection of either side to the other.” Disarmament: (ii) Multilateral We cannot, therefore, es cape by any sort of heroic September 1962 39 short cut from a considera tion of the whole complex and interlocked subjects of multilateral disarma m e n t, and with that, of the inter relations and intentions to wards each other of the Com munist and "Western” al liance respectively. I do not see how anyone can study the course of the disarmament negotiations since the nuclear age began without being forced to the conclusion that whenever these negotiations have been serious, they have raised the issue of the establishment of a world authority. True, they have not often been se rious, in the sense that both sides, or even either side, have actually contemplated the implementation of the mea sures under discussion. Usual ly they have been mere exer cises in "political warfare,” which may be defined as the gentle art of putting the other fellow in the wrong. On at least two occasions, however, disarmament nego tiations in the nuclear age have been serious, in the above sense that the negotia ting Governments did consi der the possibility of imple menting the proposals under discussion. The first of these occasions was in 1946 when America proposed the Baruch plan for establishing an In ternational Atomic Develop ment Authority which was to have a world-wide monopoly of the production of atomic energy. The second serious disarm ament negotiations of the nu clear age were the long-drawnout test ban negotiations at Geneva. The negotiators on both sides would agree, I think, that at various stages of these negotitaions the im plementation of the proposals under discussion was actually being considered. Here again this was because they, too, at least pointed in the direction of a world authority. A test ban treaty was at once a far more difficult thing to achieve, and would have been of far greater importance, than was widely realised. For its essence would have been that America and Russia should co-operate for the pur pose of preventing the acqui sition of a nuclear capacity by any other State — and con sequentially, I fancy, of the abandonment of their exist 40 Panorama ing, minor, nuclear capacities by Britain and France. Thus each of the disarma ment negotiations which have turned out to be serious have been those which pointed to wards the goal of a world authority. This is because the alternative goal, which may perhaps be defined as a world of “generally and completely” disarmed, but still fully so vereign, States, is close to be ing a contradiction in terms. The Goal of a World Authority There is, indeed, a growing consensus — at least in words — from the present Prime Minister, through Mr. Dun can Sandys and Lord Attlee to Bertrand Russell, that the creation of some sort of world authority, possessing a mono poly of nuclear capacity, is the sole salvation for the hu man race in the nuclear age. Russell, as usual, puts the issue with incomparable cla rity and force. He writes: — ... it seems indubitable that scientific man cannot long survive unless all the major weapons of war, and all the means of mass determination [destruction? J.S.] are in the hands of a single Authority, which, in consequence of its monopoly, would have ir resistible power, and if challenged . to war, could Wipe out any rebel lion within a few days without much damage except to the rebels. Thi9, it seems plain, is an abso lutely indispensable condition of the continued existence of a world possessed of scientific skill. Again the reader may be startled to find that Russell, and presumably the more ex treme wing of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, which he leads, are not agita ting for the abolition of nu clei “ weapons after all. They are on the contrary proposing the establishment of one cen tral arsenal of nuclear wea pons in the hands of “a sin gle Authority” which “could wipe out any rebellion with in a few days without much damage except to the rebels.” A Doctrine of Total Despair However, verbal tributes to the goal of world government do not take us very far. They may be — indeed they are — brushed off by the practical, able, overworked men who run the “establish ments” of the contemporary nation-States as the lucubra tions of elderly philosophers or the perorations of parlia mentarians. Nor do these September 1962 41 practical men lack able spokesmen for their scepti * cism. Their view was put by, for example, Mr. Hedley Bull in his recent work: “The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Con trol in the Missile Age.” He wrote: — We cannot expect that the es tablishment of a universal Govern ments by contract amongst the na tions rather than by conquest will be brought about by governments incapable of the most modest forms of co-operation. Accordingly he stigmatises any discussion, even, of the possibility of a world autho rity as "a fantasy” and “a confusion of thinking about international relations and a distraction from its proper concerns.” Again Sir William Hayter, writing in these co lumns on February 12, 1961, comes to the same emphatic conclusion: “Aiming at world government is now in my opi nion actually wrong. It dis tracts our attention from what we ought really to be doing, which is to search for ways of living safely in an inevi tably divided world.” These are not opinions that can be shrugged off: more especially as they are tacitly shared by, at a guess, 90 per cent of all well-informed men. Indeed, were it not for one consideration, we should be forced to accept them. That consideration is that they are a doctrine of total despair. The more closely we study the state of the nuclear ba lance, the course of the dis armament negotiations, the intentions of the principal nation-States of the presentday world, or indeed the in herent nature of sovereign nation-States, the more sure ly we shall be forced to the following conclusion: though the avoidance of this or that potential war is a by no means impossible task, yet the abo lition of war as a recurrent phenomenon in the relations of sovereign nation-States re mains, as it always has been, impossible. Therefore in the nuclear age to accept the con clusion that the world must remain indefinitely a world of sovereign States is, in very truth, “to shut the gates of baercy on mankind.” We can only conclude that the practi cal men have not even yet imaginatively assimilated the probable consequences of fullscale war in the nuclear age. — The Sunday Observer, Lon don, December 24, 1961. 42 Panorama

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