The fall of Malolos

Title

The fall of Malolos

Creator

Gagelonia, Pedro

Language

English

Source

Panorama Volume XVIII (No. 4) April 1966

Year

1966

Rights

In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted

Fulltext

■ The war fought by the Filipinos against the U.S.A, would have lesulted in American defeat if the Fili pinos had received guns anil better weapons, as now shown in the difficulties Americans now en counter in Vietnam. THE FALL OF MALOLOS One of the first acts of Genera? Wesley Merritt after the capitulation of Manila on August 13, 1898, was to order General Anderson to rid the city of armed Fili pino revolutionists. General Aguinaldo received a tele gram from the American general to forbid any of his troops to enter the city. General Aguinaldo instead sent a commission to discuss the matter with General An derson but the American officer instructed the Fili pino commissioners to deal with General Merritt. The commissioners told Merritt that the withdrawal of Fili pino troops from the city should be done provided that the American authorities agreed to put in writing cer tain conditions, namely, joint occupation of Manila, pro tection of the Filipino ship ping by Admiral Dewey and “the restitution to the revo lutionists of the areas to be evacuated in the event that the United States recognized by the treaty Spain’s domi nion in the Philippines.” Merritt stuck to his de mand for the immediate withdrawal of the Filipino troops without conditions. A week after General Elwell S. Otis assumed command of the American forces succeed ing General Merritt he was ordered by the U.S. War De partment to use force if ne cessary in effecting the re moval of the Filipino forces from the confines of the city. General Otis sent a letter to General Aguinaldo not only to reiterate the stand taken by General Wesley Merritt but even to threaten General Aguinaldo “with the use of force if the American de mand is not complied with within one week.” The revolutionary leaders who were with General Agui naldo, particularly Generals Artemio Ricarte, Pio del Pilar and Mariano Noriel, became angry upon receipt April 1966 11 of Otis’ letter. They realiz ed that the Americans were here but not for humanita rian reasons after all. Gen eral Aguinaldo realizing the gravity of the threat and the state of his forces’ unpre paredness managed to advise prudence and moderation to his subordinates. He manag ed however to convince Otis to change the tone of his de mand from an ultimatum to that of a request which the latter did. On September 14, the Fili pino forces moved and eva cuated “some of the suburbs" beyond the area specified by the Americans. Meanwhile the seat of the Revolutionary Government was transferred to the town of Malolos. But General Otis at this stage was not satisfied by the eva cuation > of the Filipino troops. He demanded that Paco, Pandacan and other areas be freed from Filipino forces. General Aguinaldo, however, insisted on the right of his troops to stay put in Pandacan, although he or dered his men under pain of being court-martialed "not to interfere with the affairs in the city of Manila and its suburbs." Filipino-American relations up to the outbreak of armed conflict was not altogether smooth. Numerous clashes between them occurred in side and outside the city. Filipino troops getting in side the city were insulted to the extent of being disarmed. The Americans, on the other hand, complained of the an noyance they suffered from the Filipinos when they left the city. In February 1899 the Fili pino-American relations grew from bad to worse. The Filipino forces were deployed around the city "in a semi circle with a radius of about three miles having the mouth of the Pasig river as cehter. About this time the strength of the Filipino forces was es timated to be as follows: 3,000 men in Caloocan; 400 in Pasig; 1,200 in Malate; around 500 each in Sta. Ana, Paco, Pasay, and Pandacan. Opposite the Filipino lines the American troops were also deployed in same semi circle pattern. North of Pa sig River was a division un der Major-General Arthur MacArthur. Major General Thomas Anderson was in 12 Panorama charge of another division south of the Pasig River. On February 4, 1899 at 8:30 in the evening the ten sion which characterized the Filipino-American relations exploded. Private William N. Grayson who was recon noitering the surrounding areas of their outpost in San Juan fired at a group of four Filipino soldiers who failed to stop when challenged to halt. The Filipinos were caught by surprise. It was Saturday night and most of the troops were on week-end pass to visit their relatives and fa milies. At the critical mo ment only General Pantaleon Garcia was at his post at Maypajo, while Generals Paciano Rizal, Noriel, and Ricarte and Colonels Cailles, San Miguel and several others were absent. The following morning the Americans started their offensive against the Filipi nos. The brigade of General Otis under General Mac Arthur’s division made a blitzkrieg attack against the Filipino defenses in La Loma. General Hale’s bri gade did the same to the Filipino defenses in San Juan del Monte. Heavy fighting took place near the waterworks. Finding diffi culty, General Hale secured the support of the gunboat “Laguna de Bay” which shelled the Filipino positions by the Pasig River. With the destruction of Filipino defense lines the capture of waterworks and reservoir was made easy. At this stage Col. Stotsenberg with his brigade also cut across Mandaluyong, and occupied Cainta and Taytay four days after the outbreak of hostilities. General Antonio Luna on being aware of the tense si tuation, issued an order on February 7, 1899, designed to arouse the sentiments of his countrymen with an ins truction "to liquidate the enemy” saying: “To the field officers of the territorial militia: “By virtue of the barba rous attack made upon our army on the 4th day of February without this be ing preceded by any strain of relations whatsoever be tween the two armies, it is necessary for the Fili pinos to show that they know how to avenge themselve of treachery and de ceit of those who, working April 1966 13 upon their friendship, now seek to enslave us. "In order to carry out the complete destruction of that accursed army of drunkards and thieves, it is indispensable that we all work in unison, and that orders issued from this war office be faith fully carried out. On February 10, the Filipino defenses at Caloocan were softened by naval guns and General MacArthur’s ar tillery. General Antonio Luna with his 4,000 poorly armed men had to retreat toward Polo to avoid being murdered. By the fall of March the American force had 950 of ficers and 23,000 men. Gen eral MacArthur was in com mand of the 2nd Division consisting of the 1st Brigade, composed' of the Kansas and Montana Volunteers and two batteries of the 3rd Artillery under General Harrison; the 2nd Brigade composed of the Colorado, Nebraska, South Dakota, and six companies of Pennsylvania Volunteers under General Hale; and the 3rd Brigade composed of the 7th U.S. Inf., 17th U.S. In fantry, the Minnesota and Wyoming volunteers and the Utah Artillery under General Hall. General Antonio Luna at this stage, was the military o p e r ations’ Commander-in Chief. The Filipino Army now had a total of 30,000 men but only 16,000 were ac tually armed. Its artillery consisted of obsolete cannons. General Otis knew then that General Aguinaldo had established his headquarters at Malolos which was the capital of the Revolutionary Government. To terminate the war, Aguinaldo and Ma lolos must be captured at the earliest time possible. He knew too that the bulk of the Filipino forces was in the north. On March 25, the Ameri cans began their northward offensive against the Filipi nos. Hale’s Brigade made a lightning attack at the Fili pino defenses north of .the city but was repulsed by the Filipino troops who engaged them in hand-to-hand com bat at San Francisco del Monte. The superiority of their arms forced the native troops to be routed, however, the brigade encountered hea vy losses at Cabataan, Tali14 Panorama napa, and Tuliahan river along the Novaliches road. General MacArthur’s artille ry saved them from suffering more losses. Meanwhile the Otis bri gade managed to push north ward via the railroad tracks. Contact with the Filipino troops was made at Marilao on March 27. Fierce fight ing took place in the after noon when the Filipinos after retreating in the morn ing made a surprise counter attack on the same day, kill ing fifteen and wounding seventy Americans. On the 29th, at about 10:00 a.m. Bocaue was taken. The Fili pino defenders at Bigaa were routed at noon of the same day. At Malinta and Polo the Americans suffered heavy casualties. After a spirited fight General Luna directed his troops to retreat to Meycauayan. Gen. Irving Hall, in an attempt to out-smart the defenders, got himself wounded. On the 30th of March the American Army cautiously moved to Malolos expecting a fierce encounter “to take place owing to the political significance of the capital.” General Mac Arthur stopped his forces within two miles of the town. His scheme was to unlease a thirty minute artillery barrage to the town proper before encircling it the following day. Colonel Frederick Funston of the Kansas Volunteers des cription of the American en try into Malolos reads: We were now less than a mile from the nipa houses in the suburbs of Malolos. I was in the rail road track with the divi sion commander (MacAr thur), when he asked me if I would like to take a few men and feel my way into the town. I said I would be glad to, and took Lieutenant Ball and about a dozen men from Com pany E, leaving the regi ment in command of Lieu tenant-Colonel Little for the time being. Moving rapidly over to the left of the regiment, our detach ment found a narrow road leading into the capital, and we went up it on the jump, now and then halt ing for a few seconds, to peer around the corners. The road soon became a street and here we were April 1966 15 joined by the ubiquitous Mr. Creelman, quite out of breath from his exer tions in overtaking us, he having "smelled a rat” when he saw us leave. We were fired upon by about a dozen men behind a street barricade of stones, gave them a couple of vol leys, and then rushed them. A minute later we were in the plaza or public square, and exchanged shots with a few men who were run ning through the streets starting fires. The build ings occupied by Aguinal do as a residence and as offices and the Hall of Congress were burning. We gave such cheers as a few men could and I sent back word to General MacArthur that the town was ours. In a few moments troops from all the regi ments of the brigade, as well as the brigade com mander himself, joined us. — By Pedro Gagelonia in Variety of March, 1966. LEARNING'S PILLARS Seeing much, suffering much, and studying much, are the three pillars of learning. — Disraeli. 16 Panorama

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