The great powers facing nationalism

Title

Creator

Schlesinger, Arthur Jr.

Language

English

Source

Panorama Volume XXI (No. 4) April 1969

Year

1969

Rights

In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted

Abstract

The present rise of nationalism has presented a significant challenge to the great powers today — Russia and the United States

Fulltext

■ The present rise of nationalism has presented a significant challenge to the great powers today — Russia and the United States. THE GREAT POWERS FACING NATIONALISM Nationalism means, first of all, the determination to assert national identity, na tional dignity, and national freedom of action. It can also mean, as the memory of prewar Germany, Italy, and Japan reminds us, the determination to assert these things at the expense of other nations; and in this sense nationalism has been and will be a source of tre mendous danger to the world. But the nationalism which arose after the second world war, in the main, not the aggressive and hysterical nationalism which had led nations before the war to try and dominate other na tions. It was rather the na tionalism generated by the desire to create or restore a sense of nationhood. In the years since 1945 na tionalism has redrawn lines of force around the planet. Take Europe, which Chur chill described twenty years ago as “a rubble heap, a charnel house, a breeding ground for pestilence and hate.” Economically shat-’ tered, politically demoral ized, militarily defenseless, Western Europe in the For ties was absolutely depen dent on America for social reconstruction and military protection. Then the Mar shall Plan set in motion the process of economic recovery. Economic recovery led to the revival of political self confidence, and political self confidence to a determina tion to assert European auto nomy. No doubt the turn given this mood in recent years by General de Gaulle is exaggerated and extrava gant. But it would be a great error, I believe, to sup pose that Gaulism does not spring from a profoundly real impulse in contemporary Europe: a deep pride in 16 Panorama European traditions and ca pacities, a growing will to reaffirm European indepen dence against the twin co lossi. And even those who reject the narrow nationalism of de Gaulle do so in the name of the large national ism of Europe. The contagion of nation alism runs everywhere. To day nationalism is seeking home rule in Scotland and Wales; it is dividing the country of Belgium; it is threatening Canada with the secession of French Quebec; in our own country it finds expression in the mystique of Black Power. And it has wrought even more spectacu lar changes within the em pire which Stalin once ruled so calmly and implacably. The Yugoslav heresy of 1948 represented the first serious rebellion of national Com munism against Russian pri macy. In another decade China burst forth as inde pendent Communist state, increasingly determined to challenge Russia for the do mination of Asia and for the leadership of the interna tional Communist movement. With the clash between China and Russia, the uni fied Communist empire be gan to break up. Moscow long ago had to accept the Yugoslav heresy, and on Yu goslav terms. It has con ceded a measure of national initiative to the once cowed and complaint satellites of Eastern Europe. Albania and Romania are going their own way. In a desperate ef fort to preserve the domi nant Russian position, the Soviet Union had to resort to military intervention in order to discipline Commu nist Czechoslovakia. Even Poland, even East Germany may some day insist on na tional freedom. “Everyone chooses the truths he likes. In this way faith disinte grates.” This was said by Pope Paul VI, but it might as well have been said by Brezhnev. The unity of Communist discipline, the unity of Com munist dogma — all are va nishing as international phe nomena, crumbling away under the pressure of na tionalism. In the contem porary age of polycentrism there is no longer any such thing as “world Commu nism.” A Communist take over no longer means the April 1969 17 automatic extension of Rus sian, or even of Chinese po wer. Every Communist gov ernment, every Communist party, has been set free to begin to respond to its own national concerns and to pursue its own national poli cies. One Communist state, Cuba, has even performed the ingenious feat of being simultaneously at odds with both Moscow and Peking. The reason for the failure of Communism in the dev eloping world is the same as the reason for the expulsion of colonialism from that world what the new nations want more than anything else is the assurance of thennational freedom of decision. And this very fact too, while it has endowed the new na tions with spirit and auda city, ' has’ prevented them from forming, as some once feared they might do, a uni fied block against the West. My guess is that the most realistic evolution in the fu ture would be along the lines of the proposal made by Churchill in 1943 — a development o f regional groupings within the United Nations, thereby merging universalist and sphere-of-inlluence conceptions, strength ening the “middle powers” and discharging the great powers from the supposed obligation to rush about put ting down every presumed" threat to world peace. This would be a policy neither of universalism nor of isolationism but of dis crimination. It would imply the existence of what Pres ident Kennedy called the “world of diversity” — “a robust and vital world com munity, founded on nations secure in their own indepen dence, and united by alle giance to .world peace." By Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. "Viet nam and the End of the Age of Superpowers,” from Harper’s Magazine, March 1969. 18 Panora ma

pages

16+

Media