The Vietnam War in relation to the Philippines

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Part of Panorama

Title: The Vietnam War in relation to the Philippines
Language: English
Year: 1966
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Abstract: This was a speech delivered by Senator Sergio Osmeña Jr. in the Philippine Senate session, March 14, 1966. It represents the views of only one sector of the Filipinos.
Fulltext: ■ This was a speech delivered by Senator Sergio Osmena Jr. in the Philippine Senate session, March 14, 1966. It represents the views of only one sector of the Filipinos. THE VIETNAM WAR IN RELATION TO THE PHILIPPINES The Filipino people today are deeply engrossed in tile vital issue of whether or not to send a Filipino engineer ing battalion with adequate security to South Vietnam. A brief background of the events leading to the deci sion to send an engineering battalion to assist the belea guered people of South Viet nam is appropriate. Vietnam was formerly French Indo-China and one of the many colonies under French domination before World War II. In 1940 the Imperial Japanese Forces subjugated French IndoChina. Just as what hap pened in the Philippines, guerrilla forces sprouted in French Indo-China fighting against the Japajifise invaders. These guerrilla torcm con sisted of many elements among them, patriotic and nationalistic Vietnamese, to gether with an aggrupation of forces under communist leadership just as we had the Huks. When the Imperial Japanese Forces were finally driven out of French IndoChina in 1945 by British and Chinese soldiers of Generalis simo Chiang Kai-shek, the British government turned the country over to France. But the freedom-loving Vietnamese continued their fight for freedom to throw off the yoke of French do mination. The Vietnamese people were fighting a true nationalist revolution against the French, but the commu nists among them stole their revolution from them. Largely because of the loss of support among the French people at home, as well as the massive Chinese commu nist assistance diverted to French Indo-China from Korea after the Korean War, France was defeated at Dienbienphu. As a result, the Geneva Agreements of 1954 were ar Panorama rived at, which provided for the partitioning of Vietnam at tha 17th Parallel under international s u p e r v ision through the International Control Commission, com posed of India, Canada and Poland. The agreement also provided for free elections in 1956 leading to the reuni fication of the country. North Vietnam was under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh and his communist co horts; while South Vietnam was governed by Emperor Bao Dai with Ngo Dinh Diem as prime minister. Sub sequently, following a na tional plebiscite, Ngo Dinh Diem was installed as Pres ident of the Republic of South Vietnam. However, the communists of North Vietnam, support ed by the, communists of Red China, never intended to comply with the provisions of the Geneva Agreements of 1954. The North Viet namese regime rendered the International Control Commission absolutely im potent from the outset, re fusing even to permit the International Control Com mission to supervise the exodus of those who wanted to flee terror in the North and seek refuge in South Vietnam. Almost a million Vietnamese who had already seen the true face of com munism in the North fled to South Vietnam. If the communists had permitted proper functioning of the International Control Com mission, the total number of refugees would have been much greater. Another evidence of the communist North Vietnamese regime’s nefarious intent Was its retention within South Vietnamese territories of large military forces, which it instructed to go under ground, hide their weapons, and await instructions for future subversion. In view of this obvious communist duplicity, it is no small wonder that President Ngo Dinh Diem refused to permit nationwide elections in 1956. Mr. Diem felt that South Vietnam’s only hope lay in free elections under international supervision. He knew fhai communist North Vietnam with a larger popu lation than that of South Vietnam, could inevitably win an unsupervised election by simply delivering a 100 March 1966 45 per cent vote in the north ern sector of the partitioned nation — and nobody ques tions the communists’ ability to deliver a 100 per cent vote in areas under their com plete control. What happened in the two zones in the years immediate ly following the partitioning of Vietnam? In the commu nist zone of the North, there was economic stagnation, hardship and privation — all made even worse by the ruth lessness of communist met hods, ruthlessness that led in 1956 to a peasant upris ing in Nghe An province, which reportedly cost the lives of 50,000 peasants. North Vietnam’s gross na tional product decreased steadily. Meanwhile, in South Vietnam, there was dramatic t progress. In ten years school enrolment in creased from 300,000 to 1,500,000. More than 12,000 dispensaries and clinics were established. Under a land reform program beginning in 1957, some 600,000 acres of farm lands were distribut ed to 115,000 farmers. South Vietnam became once again a major rice exporting na tion. This was the contrast be tween North and South Viet nam — dramatically illustrat ed by only one set of com parative statistics: while per capita food production be tween 1955-60 dropped 10 per cent in North Vietnam, it rose by 20 per cent in the South. What happened was simply this: the life of the people irr South Vietnam improved so much that the communist regime in the North realized that it must abandon all hope of a poli tical takeover in the South; Ho Chi Minh and his col leagues realized that they must instead move for a mi litary takeover of South Viet nam. The North Vietnamese communists, following guide lines set down by Mao Tse Tung, decided to launch in South Vietnam what the com munists call a “war of na tional liberation.” Before 1959, the Viet Cong guerrillas in the South — that is, the forces left ’behind after the Geneva agreements, together with such recruits as they could gather through indoctrination, coercion and terror — were not a serious threat to the security of 46 Panorama South Vietnam. To be sure, they conducted a small-scale campaign of terror; in the period 1957 to 1959 they murdered or kidnaped more than 1,000 civilians. How ever, during that period the threat could be contained by South Vietnam’s own arm ed forces. However, when the com munists decided to launch their “war of national libe ration,” they greatly accele rated their terroristic activi ties in South Vietnam. This was followed by political or ganization. As early as 1959 Ho Chi Minh declared that the “communist revolution” must be brought to the South. Early in 1960 Ho Chi Minh’s military commander Vo Nguyen Giap, described Hanoi as "the revolutionary base for the whole country.” A September 1960 congress of the Lao Dong, the North Vietnamese communist party, decided to establish the "Na tional Front for the Libera tion of South Vietnam.” The first the outside world knew of the establishment of the Front was a Radio Ha noi broadcast on January 29, 1961. The communists then pro ceeded to form a South Viet namese branch of North Viet nam’s communist party, they named it the People’s Revo lutionary Party. It was dur ing this period that supplies, arms and men began pouring from the North into South Vietnam in increasing num bers. For a long time the North Vietnamese infiltrators into S. Vietnam were mili tary personnel of Southern origin — men who could blend into the surroundings of the areas from which they came and who could speak with the accents of their home regions. Ultimately, however, the supply of South erners in the North dried up and North Vietnam began infiltrating into the South entire regiments of the North Vietnamese Army. The purpose of the com munists* "war of national liberation” and “National Liberation Front” was to take over a large enough area of South Vietnam to enable them to set up the “Front” as the legitimate government” of South Vietnam. Indicative of the phony nature of • North Vietnam’s “Liberation Front” is that March 1966 47 not a single leading political or intellectual figure in the South, whatever his dif ferences with the government in Saigon, has joined the Viet Cong on its “Liberation Front” apparatus. Nor has a single one of the many religious, political, labor or student groups in the South rallied to the banner of the Front. The reason for this is sim ple: informed people in South Vietnam know that the “National Liberation Front” originated in the North, is controlled by Ha noi, and is completely sub servient to its communist masters. It is also worth noting that whenever com munist North Vietnam has sent “Liberation Front” re presentatives abroad, they have, always travelled under North Vietnamese passports. As a result of the flagrant violations of the Geneva Agreements by the North Vietnamese, which resulted in -the invasion of South Vietnam by communist forces armed by Red China and directed by Peking, the Uni ted States of America upon request by the legally consti tuted South Vietnam govern ment decided to lend its mi litary assistance to South Vietnam. There were no US combat forces in South Vietnam at the time the communists be gan to increase their aggres sion in 1960. However, in the words of President John son, “unchecked aggression against free and helpless peo ple would be a great threat to our freedom and an of fense to our own conscience.” Hence the United States ful filled its commitment by sending combat troops not for purposes of aggression but to fight side by side with the 500,000 Vietnamese troops in defense of the ter ritorial integrity of the free peoples of South Vietnam. This painful decision the United States had to make if only to show to the peo ples of the free world that she was ever ready to com ply with her solemn commit ments not only in South Vietnam but in any part of the globe. For it is abundantly clear, that should the United States renege from its commitments, it would be encouraging ad ditional communist subver sion and aggression through 48 Panorama out the globe. If the aggres sion against South Vietnam were permitted to succeed, in the words of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, “the forces of militant communism everywhere would be vastly heartened and we could ex pect to see a series of socalled wars of liberation in Asia, Latin America and Africa.” The United States is more than ever determined to stop communist aggression in South Vietnam just as it did in Berlin, Greece, Korea and Cuba, to mention a few. Historians will still re member that in these coun tries the communist forces of aggression were stopped in their tracks because of a firm determination of the United States of America to stop* communist aggression wherever it may be found. As President Johnson and his predecessors have repeat edly emphasized, the Ameri can objective in Southeast Asia is peace — a peace in which the various peoples of the areas can manage their own ways. America does not seek to destroy or overturn the communist regimes in Hanoi and Peking. All Am erica wants is that the com munists cease their aggres sions: that they leave their neighbors alone. The United States had sought to achieve a peaceful settlement of the war in Vietnam but the com munists had inevitably slam med the door. The commu nists would not discuss at a conference table unless the United States armed forces would be withdrawn from South Vietnam, something totally unacceptable to Am erica. Because of the precarious situation obtaining in South Vietnam,, the prime minister of the government of the Re public of Vietnam has sent a plea to our government for an engineering battalion with adequate security cover. The first request was made on April 14, 1965 when Dr. Phan Huy Quat, prime mi nister of the Republic of Vietnam, addressed a letter to then President Macapagal. President Macapagal in res ponse to the South Vietnam ese request recommended the approval of House Bill No. 17828 in 1965. In that year the Liberal-controlled House of Representatives approved the bill but the NacionalistaMarch 1966 49 controlled Senate headed by then Senate President Marcos failed to act on the same. The second request was made bn Feb. 2, 1966 when the Ambassador of South Vietnam to the Philippines sent a similar letter to Pres ident Marcos. To the credit of President Marcos, a Nacionalista, after having been apprised of all the facts surrounding the Vietnamese problem, he re commended to Congress the approval of a bill appropriat ing money for the sending of a Philippine engineering bat talion with the necessary security to South Vietnam. The issue, therefore, trans cends partisan politics. Both President Macapagal, a Libe ral, and President Marcos a Nacionalista, have agreed to send Filipino troops to Viet nam, just as in the United States three American Pres idents, namely, Eisenhower, a Republican, Kennedy, a Democrat, and Johnson,, an other Democrat, had seen fit to come to the military aid of the Republic of South Vietnam. Brushing aside all techni calities, the main questions boil down to these: Is it to the best interests of the Phil ippines and the Filipino peo ple to assist a beleaguered friendly neighbor who has asked for assistance in fight ing a common enemy? Is it moral and proper for the Philippines, a democratic country, to listen to the ad vice of an ally and benefac tor, the United States, so that we may heed the South Viet namese supplication? The globe is divided into two camps of contradicting and conflicting ideologies: the democratic camp which stands for freedom and the communist bloc which stands for slavery. Everyone realizes the fact that the leader of the free world is the United States and that we, just like South Viet nam, belong to the democra tic camp. The issue before us is the expansion of our na tion’s commitment in South Vietnam. I wish to make it clear that the issue is expan sion of a commitment which already exists. There are almost 70 Filipino personnel in South Vietnam today en gaged in medical, civic action and psychological warfare work. What is asked of us is to send engineering forces 50 Panorama so that the South Vietnamese government will be able to free more of its armed forces to bear the brunt of the fighting, as indeed they do. Would it not be more pru dent and advisable to help a friendly neighbor fighting for its very life against a common enemy, the commu nists, so that should we be placed under the same pre dicament we would likewise be able to request similar as sistance? For let there be no mis take about it, the North Vietnamese are merely fol lowing instructions of Mao Tse Tung whose Defense Minister Lin Piao, who is also Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and a Vice Premier has stated “the seizure of power by armed force, the settling of the is sue by war, is the central task and highest form of revolution.” Lin Piao has stated the objectives of the Chinese communists and that was to “establish rural base areas and the use of the countryside to encircle the cities and finally capture them” — to shape the army first and foremost on a po litical basis to seize the po wer of a state “ty revolu tionary violence” for, as Mao Tse Tung says, “political po wer grows out of the barrel of a gun.” Stake in Vietnam For what is at stake in South Vietnam? The United States, to be sure considers that its security, its vital in terests are at stake in South Vietnam. By the same to ken, the fundamental secu rity of the Republic of the Philippines is also at stake in South Vietnam. Let us analyze this. There has been a lot of talk about the immense im portance of South Vietnam; the unpleasant reality is that it is all true. By a whim of history that small and tor tured country has become pivotal both politically and psychologically, like Poland at the outset of World War II. Its loss to the commu nists could lead eventually to the loss of the entire Southeast Asian Peninsula, an area of more than two million square miles, with a population of more than 250 million. March 1966 51 The Southeast Asian Pe ninsula has obvious econo mic importance. It is a trade gateway almost as important as the Suez Canal. If it were barred to the major trading nations of the free world, air and shipping lines would be forced to shift round-theworld routes to places like Darwin in northern Austra lia 2,000 miles south of the present route through Ma nila. South East Asia is under populated and contains vast natural resources such as oil, rubber and tin — and most important of all, major sur pluses of rice. Its rice has been the goal of Chinese im perialism for centuries, just as it was for the Japanese in World War II. Today, Southeast Asia is Peking’s main hope for solving the Communist China’s massive food problem. Capture of Southeast Asia would tip the balance of world resources toward the communist bloc, dramatically reinforcing its limited econo mic power — and thus its military power, with a cor responding loss of strength to the free world. In effect, communist control of South east Asia would amount to collapse of the tenuous sta bility, the precarious balance of power between the world’s two major power blocs, with incalculably dangerous con sequences. Communist objectives in Southeast Asia have long been clear to anyone who cared to examine the facts. From the foregoing enu meration of facts, it is pa tently clear that loss of South Vietnam to the free world would eventually be a loss of Southeast Asia to the com munists, thereby causing a most serious threat to our national security. Viewed from the light of cold rea soning, is not our country fully justified in sending ad ditional assistance to South Vietnam as requested by her leaders? Certainly, it is to our na tional interest to defend and protect our democratic ideals, lest someday we lose all we treasure and enjoy. Lose to whom? No less than to a godless, ruthless, and auto cratic foreign power whose doctrine we abhor because it runs counter to every princi ple of democracy, justice and liberty that we have imbibed 52 Panorama and cherished, and whose system of government we thoroughly detest because it is a government of a mur derous clique whose god is naked power and whose law is murder and rape. Thirty-one nations belong ing to the free world have seen fit to send assistance to South Vietnam. They are: Australia, Republic of China, Japan, Korea, Laos, Malay sia, New Zealand, Thailand, Greece, Turkey, Pakistan, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, Ire land, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzer land, United Kingdom, Ar gentina, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guate mala, Uruguay, Venezuela and Canada. If countries ten thousand miles away from South Vietnam have extended their assistance to an ally, certainly we, who are only two hours’ flight away from Saigon should be more deeply concerned in putting out the flames of communism that would seek to encom pass the free nations of Southeast Asia, of which we are one. As often stated, we are a small nation. The basic phi losophy of our national de fense is collective security. This we have done by enter ing into treaties of collective defense with many countries in the world with whom we have mutuality of interests and with whom we share the same fundamental beliefs and ideologies. But let me present a more potent argument why we should send an engineering battalion to South Vietnam. It is an undeniable fact which all ultra-nationalists or super-nationalists will ad mit, that by ourselves we could never defend our coun try against Red Chinese ag gression. Our annual bud get for defense purposes dur ing the last fiscal year was P284 million, 92 per cent of which was for paty, allowan ces and retirement benefits of our Armed Forces and only 8 per cent was expend ed for training, operations and other purposes. Our armed forces consist of roughly 43,000 troops; 16,000 in the PC, 13,000 in the Army, 5,200 in the Navy and 8,000 in the Air Force. We have only 50 aircraft, and our Navy consists of only 50 ships, hopelessly in March 1966 53 adequate even to curb smug gling. Even if we were to spend our entire Philippine gov ernment annual budget for defense purposes alone, it would not be sufficient to maintain the US Carrier “Enterprise” on combat sta tion in the South China Sea for one year. We have, therefore, to de pend almost entirely upon the United States for our ex ternal protection. Remove the United States 7th Fleet and 13th Air Force and I should like to ask the ultra nationalists: where would we be? Red China could occu py the Philippines in 24 hours. Why did we enter into a military assistance agreement witl) the United States? Let me for a moment recall the circumstances. In 1933, my late father, then Senator Osmena, re turned from the United States as head of the Osrox Mission to Washington and brought back with him the Hare-Hawes-Cutting I n d ependence Act. It was neces sary for the Independence Act to become operative that the Philippine Legislature accept the same. In that year, however, then Senate President Manuel Quezon raised strong objec tions to the H-H-C Law. His reason was that the law granted the United States the right to establish mili tary and naval bases in the Philippines even after inde pendence. Mr. Quezon said it was incongruous for the Philippines, after having ob tained her independent sta tus, to have a part of her territory under a foreign power. He raised the same issues that the opponents of the Vietnam bill are now raising — national dignity, sovereignty, nationalism. As a result, the H-H-C law was rejected by the Philippine Legislature, which was then under the control of then Senate President Quezon. MLQ to US The following year, Mr. Quezon journeyed to Wash ington. He was able to ob tain approval of the TydingsMcDuffie Act. This law contained the same provi sions as the H-H-C Law with the exception that un der the T-M Law the United 54 Panorama Stales would no longer have any right to maintain mili tary and naval bases in the Philippines after the grant of independence — only re fuelling stations. What happened afterwards is now part of history. When Japanese bombs fell on Phil ippine soil on Dec. 8, 1941, we were caught literally with our pants down. We were unprepared. As a result we were invaded and occupied by the Japanese hordes. Had we accepted the HH-C Law instead of raising the hue and cry of nation alism, America would have been assured that she could maintain military and naval bases in the Philippines. Such assurances would have compelled her to fortify to the utmost her naval and military bases in our coun try, -knowing as she did then that Japan was feverishly preparing to embark on a plan of establishing the socalled Greater East Asia Co prosperity Sphere. Had America done so, our country could have been spared the utter humiliation of being invaded and occu pied. It could have been impossible for Japan to con quer the Philippines just as she found it impossible to invade Hawaii. That I take it, was the reason why my father was willing to give the United States all the ba ses it needed for the protec tion, not only of its interests in. the Philippines but also for the protection of the Philippines and the preserva tion of the independence that the United States had pro mised her. History has proven the wisdom of my father’s atti tude. Had America fortified all her bases here to the ex tent that she would have, if the H-H-C Law had been accepted by the Philippine Legislature there would have been, I dare say no tragic surrender in Bataan, no death march and no humi liating surrender of Corregidor. But the bugbear of na tionalism prevented Ameri ca’s plan to fortify our coun try and as a result we suf fered subjugation. Due to the bitter lessons we learned from World War II, we, the Filipino people, apprehensive as we all were then of our future, speaking through our duly elected re March 1966 55 preservatives, authorized the President of the United States for the establishment of bases military and naval in our country. That was on July 28, 1945 or one year bdfiore the establishment of P h i 1 i ppine independence. What were our immediate objectives? First and fore most was to insure the ter ritorial integrity of the Phil ippines, our country. Second was to guarantee the mutual protection of the Philippines and the United States. The third was to insure the main tenance of peace in the Paci fic. After months of full and mature deliberation by our leaders the military bases agreement was signed by Manuel Roxas who was then President of the Philippines, and, Paul V. McNutt, first American' Ambassador to our Republic. The formal sign ing took place right in Malacanang on March 21, 1947. If, as it must be admitted, the Philippine defense is almost entirely dependent upon the United States and since we fully recognize that America is the leader of the free world in our fight against the forces of aggres sion, would it not be in keep ing with our national pride and dignity if when request ed by Uncle Sam, we should send a token force to South Vietnam in order to contri bute our share in the efforts to stop the enemy? I am heartily in accord with those who insist that we should maintain our na tional dignity and sovereign ty but not at the expense of our welfare and security. And what are we going to do with dignity and sove reignty once we are in the grip of the communists, once we have utterly lost freedom, even the freedom to advance stupid and ridiculous sug gestions? If we as a nation have to depend primarily upon America for our exter nal defense, would it not be in keeping with our national dignity and sovereignty if we were to accept America to do what she thinks should be done in the interests of our own security? On Feb. 2, 1966, I was pri vileged to listen to the bril liant speech of the distin guished gentleman from Batangas, a Nacionalista, who spoke against the Vietnam bill. On March 1, 1966, I 56 Panorama was again privileged io lis ten to the inspiring remarks of our distinguished colleague from Bulacan, a Liberal, who spoke in favor of the Vietnam bill. Here, indeed, was demo cracy in action — a way of life that we have learned to love, but which we may not be privileged to continue enjoying should the cause for which our allies are fighting in Vietnam fail. Is it not correct to state that what is advantageous militarily to the United $tates in this part of the globe would also be advan tageous to the Philippines? All over the world, in Eu rope, in Africa, in South Am erica, in Asia, the forces of democracy are locked in mortal combat with the forces of communism. Here in our little corner of the earth, in Southeast Asia, North Vietnamese soldiers equipped with communist guns have invaded South Vietnam in an effort to communize all of Vietnam and eventually all of Southeast Asia. The . United States, as the leader of the democratic bloc of free nations, in keeping with her solemn commit ments, has sent troops to South Vietnam in order to project the territorial integri ty of that country. The United States has no designs to proceed to North Vietnam, but only to contain subver sion and aggression in South Vietnam. Unless the free nations of the world, parti cularly the Philippines, will rally behind the democratic allies in containing commu, nist aggression in South Vietnam, we will some day wake up to find all of South east Asia, including Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, Malay sia, Singapore and even the Philippines firmly in the grip of communism. The argument has been advanced that by sending an engineering battalion with adequate security cover to South Vietnam, the Philip pines would be involved in war. Such being the case, it has been said that we would be subject to retaliar tion. It is my confirmed opinion that in the global conflict between the forces of communism and the forces of democracy, there can be no neutralism. The commu^ nists will attempt to invade March 1966 57 the Philippines if it suits them regardless of whether or not we are involved. Past experience in this country with the Huks is a matter of historical record. And it may be added that, although the major threat of the Huks was reduced in President Magsaysay’s time, the Huks are still very much in existence in this country. And today’s newspapers quote our Secretary of Jus tice, Jose Yulo, as stating that some prominent mem bers of the local Chinese community are active in com munist subversive activities in this country in support of Peking. The revered names of President Magsaysay and President Laurel have been mentioned as having oppos ed the sending of troops to Southeast' Asia in April of 1954. For this reason, it has been argued that were they alive today, they would con tinue to maintain the same stand. In April 1954, both Pres idents Magsaysay and Laurel opposed sending troops to Vietnam because they ex pressed opposition to the dis patch of Filipino military forces to fight on the side of a colonial power that was attempting to maintain its hold over a colony. In those days, the Vietminh, though they were certainly led and dominated by communists, were composed largely of Viet namese who were fighting for the independence of their homeland from France. To day, the situation is entirely different. The government in South Vietnam, an inde pendent and sovereign gov ernment, has called for our assistance in repelling a com munist aggressive movement which seeks to destroy South Vietnam’s independence. It is the intention of the democratic allies to prevent the spread of communists that they will be met with resistance wherever they at tempt aggression, to convince the communists that they must stay within their terri torial limits. The commu nists should have learned those lessons in Korea, Greece, Berlin, Malaysia, in the Philippines and Cuba, where free nations reacted with firmness and determina tion. It is clear that the les son must be taught again today in Vietnam. 58 Panorama In order to fulfill proper ly its role as co-chairman, the United Kingdom cannot be placed in a position of making too obvious a com mitment on either side. How ever, the United Kingdom has provided a British advi sory mission in South Viet nam for about five years. This mission, composed of veterans who participated in putting down the communist insurgency in Malaya, has provided valuable advice and assistance to the South Viet namese, and has worked in cooperation with the Malay sian government in arrang ing training for more than 2,000 Vietnamese military officers in Malaysia. The United Kingdom has also provided considerable economic support to South Vietnam, including labora tory equipment for Saigon University, typesetting equip ment for the government printing office, a cobalt deep ray therapy unit for the Na tional Cancer Institute arid much equipment for the fa culties of medicine, science and pharmacy at Saigon Uni versity, the Meteorological Service and the Agricultural School at Saigon, the Atomic Research Establishment at Da-Slat, and the Faculty of Education at Hue. The Uni ted Kingdom has also agreed to provide 50,000 British pounds sterling worth of diesel fishing boat engines. It is said that Thailand has provided no troop in South Vietnam, but the Thais have supplied a mili tary air detachment with C-47 pilots, navigators and maintenance men. They are now on duty flying opera tional transport missions for the Vietnamese forces. In addition, they have provid ed cement and zinc roofing materials and have provided jet training for Vietnamese pilots in Thailand. Thai land has an incipient com munist insurgency movement of its own to contend with in Northeast Thailand. It is making a valuable contri bution to the anti-communist struggle in Southeast Asia by committing its armed forces and police to internal defense. Moreover, Thai land’s distinguished prime minister said during his visit to these country two weeks ago that Thailand is pre pared to do more in Vietnam if necessary. March 1966 59 The size of Australian and New Zealand troop commit ments in Vietnam is small but both Australia and New Zealand are deeply commit ted to the defense of the Ma laysia-Singapore area, and maintain large forces there. No one can doubt the im portance of keeping those forces where they are. The stability of that area would be jeopardized if they were moved. Australia, in proportion to its resources and popula tion, has made a major con tribution in Vietnanj for the past several years. In addi tion to sending a crack in fantry battalion, 100 spe cialists in jungle warfare and an air force unit which files daily logistical support missions for the Vietnamese forces, Australia has provid ed a million Vietnamese text books, 3,300 tons of corru gated roofing for Vietnamese military dependent housing, 15,570 sets of hand tools, 16,000 blankets, 14,000 cases of condensed milk and a 50kilowatt radio broadcasting station. Hundreds of Viet namese have been sent to Australia for training. Australia has also provid ed' surgical teams, civil en gineers and dairy and agricul tural experts. And further more, Australia announced that it is tripling the size of its combat forces in South Vietnam, bringing them up to a strength of approximate ly 4,500. Australia is a richer nation than the Philippines, but we overlook its small population — considerably less than half the population of this country. New Zealand, a nation with only one-tenth the po pulation of the Philippines, has not only sent engineers and artillerymen to South Vietnam, it has provided New Zealand pounds equi valent to $200,000 for a science building at the Uni versity of Saigon, equipment for a technical high school and is training 62 Vietnamese in New Zealand. The South Vietnamese were wise to decline an offer of Chinese Nationalist volun teers. It is vital that Red China not be offered an ex cuse for sending "volunteers” into the Vietnam conflict as she did in Korea. The response to communist aggression in Vietnam should 60 Panorama be a measured response, care fully calculated to convince North Vietnam that it must leave its neighbors alone, and not a response that would trigger Red China interven tion. I feel that Red China would view Nationalist China volunteers in South Vietnam as a fulfillment of Chiang Kai-Shek’s threat to “retake the mainland”, and would enter the war openly and not just clandestinely. As it is, Nationalist China has provided to South Viet nam far more than we have. They have sent. an agricul tural team composed of more than 80 men, a military psy chological warfare team, a surgical team, and an elec trical power mission. They have provided half a million mathematics textbooks, elec trical power substations, pre fabricated warehouses, agri cultural tools, seeds and fer tilizers, as well as providing training for more than 200 Vietnam in Taiwan. Mr. President, what I de plore far more than the in accurate allegations about the relative contributions of other countries to the defense of communist aggression is the clear implication on the part of those who make such charges that since they feel that some other nations have failed to fulfill their obliga tions, they believe that this country is thereby, exonerat ed, absolved of all responsibi lities, to fulfill our obligations. One can just imagine the impact among the members of the free world, and par ticularly the United States, should the Philippines fail to extend the assistance re quested by our South Viet namese ally. The last thing that we want the United States not to do is to back down on her commitments. Can we afford to back down on our own commitments? Numerous attempts have been made to use the good offices and the power of the United Nations to move the Vietnam conflict from the battlefield to the conference table. To date, all such ef forts have failed. On Jan. 31, 1966, the United' States formally requested the Uni ted Nations Security Council to consider the situation in Vietnam and to recommend steps toward a peaceful solu tion. However, the commu nists reacted as they always have in the past. The very March 1966 61 next day following the Uni ted States request for action by the United Nations Secu rity Council the North Viet namese regime reiterated its stand that the UN has no right to deal with the Viet nam question and that any UN Security Council resolu tion on the Vietnam ques tion would be null and void. In order for the UN to take collective action in Viet nam under United Nations auspices, it would be neces sary to have Security Council approval. As everyone knows, this would require a unani mous vote in the Security Council which would ob viously be impossible, since it would be vetoed by the So viet Union. Individual members of the SEATO can assist and are assisting .in South Vietnam in response to individual re quests from the government ,of South Vietnam.- As we all know, South Vietnam, as one of the protocol states of the SEATO Treaty, can call for SEATO assistance to repel aggression. However, the SEATO Treaty also provides that collective action by the eight SEATO members must be based upon a unanimous vote. Here again, as in the United Nations Security Council, we cannot expect a unanimous vote. France, one of the eight SEATO powers, has already taken the posi tion that the Vietnam pro blem can be solved only by "neutralization” of the area. In South Vietnam help must be based upon the in dividual decision of free na tions in response to South Vietnam’s request and not upon collective action under the provisions of either the United Nations charter or the SEATO Treaty. The questions has been asked, can we afford to send an engineering battalion with security cover to South Viet nam? I feel that the question should be: "Can we afford not to afford it?” For cer tainly, we cannot put a price tag on liberty and freedom. It has been said that the 2,000 Filipino troops that will be sent to Vietnam will not be sufficient to tilt the balance in favor of the free world. Would it not be bet ter to contribute our share, no matter how little, in put ting out the fire in the neigh borhood? 62 Panorama