A Great president – when facing new issues
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Part of Panorama
- Title
- A Great president – when facing new issues
- Language
- English
- Year
- 1963
- Rights
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- Abstract
- Obituary from The Guardian, London, November 23, 1963.
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- ■ Obituary from The Guardian, London, November 23, 1963. A GREAT PRESIDENT - When Facing New Issues President Kennedy was, in many respects, an enigma to his contemporaries, and he is likely to remain equally enig matic to future historians. He was the youngest President ever elected—yet in spite of a certain youthful panache, his poitical style was on the whole curiously sedate. His personality was reserved and he found it difficult to express his emotions in public— yet he was a professional politi cian to his fingertips. Like Roosevelt he was a man of great wealth who joined the liberal wing of his: party out of conviction rather than inheritance—yet he never emulated the pass ion and drive of Roosevelt’s liberalism or identified him self, in the way that Roosevelt did, with the aspirations of ordinary Americans. In the last report the cast of his mind was pragmatic, not ideo logical; and his liberalism, though sincere, was of the head, not of the heart. John Fitzgerald Kennedy was born in Massachusetts in 1917. The history of his fa mily could serve as a case study of the social revolution which has transformed the po sition of America’s ethnic mi norities during the past forty years. His maternal grand father. John Fitzgerald (“Ho ney Fitz”) was one of the leaders of the Boston Irish community, Mayor of Boston, and three times a Congress man. His father, Joseph Ken nedy, was educated at Har vard, made a fortune in real estate and on the Stock Mar ket and became Ambassador to Great Britain. John Kennedy himself was educated at Choate School and Harvard; spent a brief time at the London School of Economics while his father was Ambassador; wrote a best seller “Why England Slept’’; and served with great courage and distinction in the US Navy. In 1946 he was elected to the House of Representa Decbmbkr 1963 45 tives, for one of the poorest districts in Boston. In 1952 he was elected Democratic Senator for Massachusetts, de feating Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., in order to do so. In 1956 he was the Demo cratic candidate for the VicePresident; and it is clear that from then on he hoped and planned for the presidential nomination in 1960. Hard campaign He was elected Preisdent in November, 1960, after one of the hardest-fought cam paigns in American history. His election would have been remarkable in any event, because of his youth. It was made doubly remarkabe be cause he was the first Roman Catholic to reach the White House. A Roman Catholic had been nominated only once before by one of the major parties; and Al Smith’s defeat in 1928 had been wide ly (if not entirely accurate ly) attributed to his religion. The memory of 1928 was one of the chief obstacles in Ken nedy’s path to the Democra tic nomination. He surmounted it in the only way possible: by de monstrating, in primary elec tions all over the country, that he was the most popular candidate in his party. When the Democratic convention met in Los Angeles in July, Kennedy was only a few votes short of the nomination; and there was no real doubt that he would receive it. He won it on the first ballot. The campaign that follow ed was fought on three ac knowledged issues — the slack state of the American econo my; the need for vigorous leadership in Washington to "get America moving again" and to rally the Western al liance; and the alleged inex perience of the Democratic candidate, in contrast to Vice-President Nixon’s sup posed political maturity. The unacknowledged issue was, of course, Kennedy’s Roman Catholic faith. How much the final result was affected by these issues is not.clear. What is clear is that Kennedy was elected by one of the narrowest margins in American history. VicePresident Nixon actually car ried 26 States to Kennedy’s 23, and won 49 per cent of the popular vote as against Kennedy’s 49.7 per cent. The geographical pattern of the results was equally disturbing to a President who 46 Panorama would be called upon to re present the whole nation, at a time of great international tension. On the Pacific Coast, in the Rocky Moun tain States, and in the Mid West, Nixon won a majority of the total votes cast. Only in the industrial North-east and in the traditionally De mocratic stronghold of the confederacy was Kennedy clearly ahead. This was to have an important bearing on the President’s strategy in office. The domestic record of the first eighteen months of the Kennedy Administration was a disappointment to most American liberals — though not, if the public opinion polls could be trusted, to the mass of the American peo ple as a whole. In the Senate the President was supported by a liberal majority. In the House of Representatives, however, the liberal Democ rats were in a minority. They faced a conservative majority made up of Re publicans and Southern De mocrats, working together against progressive legisla tion. In consequence, most of the domestic programme on which the President had campaigned during the elect ion — medical care for the aged, increased federal aid to education, and housing — was badly mauled or defeat ed altogether. Gave warning In part, this was because the President’s attention was, for much of the time, other wise engaged. In his inaugu ral address, he gave the warn ing that the news might get worse before it got better. His warning turned put to be an understatement. As Roosevelt’s first Administra tion was dominated by crisis at home, so Kennedy’s was dominated by world crisis abroad. The first, and perhaps the worst, of these crises was largely of American making. On April 17, 1961, the island of Cuba was invaded by a force of Cuban refugees, hos tile to the pro-Communist regime of Dr. Castro. The invasion had been planned on American territory with the knowledge, and indeed the enthusiastic consent, of the American Administra tion. Short of giving the in vaders American air cover, or reinforcing them with Am erican troops, President Ken nedy could hardly have made 47 his support of the invasion more obvious than it was. This, of course, was a breach of international law and a serious affront to the suscep tibilities of the uncommitted nations. Worse still, the moral and political losses incurred by supporting the invasion in the first place were not red ressed by the gains that might have accrued from mi litary success. If the inva sion had succeeded the Uni ted States would have looked to the neutral world like a successful bully. In the event, she looked like a weak and unsuccessful one. Liberal support Cuba apart, however, Ken nedy’s foreign policy deserv ed — and on the whole re ceived — the support of libe ral opinion in his own coun try and in the rest of the world as well. His interna tional aims can be considered under three heads. In the first place he had to hold the line against renewed Soviet pressure in Europe, and to prevent the NATO alliance from disintegrating under that pressure. Secondly, he showed more anxiety than any of his predecessors had done to reach agreements with the Soviet Union on dis armament and on banning nuclear tests — and if that proved impossible, he wished at least to minimize the dan gers of accidental nuclear war, and of the escalation of a conventional war into a nuclear one, by changes in American defence policy. Finally, he realized the neces sity for a more vigorous pro gramme of aid to the undev eloped world, both in order to prevent the spread of com munism and on moral grounds. For a short time imme diately after Kennedy’s elec tion it seemed that the new Administration might be able to reach agreement with the Soviet Union more easily than its predecessor had done. During the election cam paign itself, international re lations had been almost in abeyance. The fight of the U-2 and the collapse of the Summit conference in the summer of 1960 had led to a period of tension; but the Russians seemed to realize that there was little they could do, one way or the other, until the presidential elections were over in the United States. 48 Panorama Now that the elections were over they seemed inclin ed to believe that the new President (who had, after all, announced publicly that he would have been prepared to apologize for the U-2) would follow a substantially different policy from his pre decessor; and accordingly they treated him at first with a certain wary cordiality However, the honeymoon did not last long. In June, 1961, President Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev met at Vien na, for an informal summit conference. The main sub ject of their discussions was Berlin. It quickly became clear that the positions of the two sides were as far apart as they had ever been. The Russians insisted that West Berlin must become a demi litarised “free city” and that East Germany must be recog nized as a sovereign State. They threatened that if this were not done by interna tional agreement they would sign a seperate peace with East Germany. They claim ed that in that event West ern rights in West Berlin would automatically lapse, and that the communications between West Berlin from West Germany would auto matically come under East German control. Sky darker The Americans replied that Western rights in Berlin arose out of the Potsdam agreements of 1945 which could not be unilaterally abrogated by the Russians; that the status of West Berlin would therefore remain un changed no matter what treaties the Russians chose to sign with their East Ger man satellites; and that no agreement on the future of Germany would be accept able to the West unless it promised to unite the coun try in peace and freedom. For the rest of the summer the international sky grew steadily darker. Khrushchev launched a war of nerves of the kind Hitler had employ ed in the thirties; Kennedy replied with an adroit mix ture of firmness and concilia tion. The Russians renewed their threat to sign a separate peace with East Germany and boasted of the size of their rocket arsenal. In Aug ust the crisis reached a still more acute stage. On Aug ust 18 the East Germans sealed off their sector from December 1963 49 the Western sectors of the the city and built a wall around West Berlin. In re ply the Western garrison in Berlin was strengthened, Vice-President Johnson was dispatched on a visit to West Berlin to stiffen the morale of the Berliners, and for a whie American and East German troops glowered at each other across the sector border. At the end of the same month, the Russians announced that they would carry out a series of atmos pheric nuclear tests, thus breaking the moratorium on such tests which had been in existence for three years. To all this President Ken nedy replied by making it clear that the West was pre pared to fight, if necessary, for the liberties of the West Berliners and Western rights in the city. At the same time he took care to avoid making provocative gestures which might confront the Russians with a choice be tween losing face and making even more provocative ges tures themselves. The line between appeasement and unnecessary firmness was an extremely delicate one; and Kennedy trod it with great skill. In doubt By October it was becoming clear that the crisis, though still menacing, no longer threatened to explode into physical fighting at a mo ment’s notice. Meanwhile, both sides made tentative approaches to negotiation. The end of the West Ger man election campaign on September 17 removed an element making for rigidity in the Western camp; and the end of the party Congress in Moscow in October did the same for the East. In October there was a meeting between the Secre tary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, and Mr. Gromyko; and this was followed by a prolonged “probe” of Soviet intentions by the Americans. In the following eight months it looked as if Kennedy would be prepared to offer a limit ed degree of de facto recog nition to East Germany in return for international con trol of the access routes be tween West Berlin and West Germany; but the precise de tails of an agreement remain ed in doubt. They were still in doubt by June, 1962. In the first eighteen months of his Administra 50 Panorama tion, at last, President Ken nedy’s disarmement policy had produced equally little in the way of tangible results. This was not, of course, his own fault. In 1961, with the Russians threatening to sign a separate peace with. East Germany and ending the moratorium on nuclear tests, no progress was possible. In 1962 some progress was made, but it was still painfully slow. Another attempt was made to negotiate a controled ban on nuclear tests, but although the Americans were now willing to make more concessions than they had of fered in the past, agreement seemed as far off as ever. Cuban crisis In the sphere of compre hensive disarmament the out look was slightly more en couraging, perhaps because of the increasingly important part played by the neutrals. These prospects were sud denly and brutally interrupt ed by the Soviet decision to install nuclear missiles in Cuba,, only miles from the coast of Florida. For a few days at the end of October, 1962, the world approached nearer to the brink of ther monuclear war. President Kennedy heard what the Rus sians were doing on October 17. Rightly or wrongly he and his advisers believed that Soviet missiles in Cuba would tilt the strategic ba lance decisively against the West. They knew from their intelligence sources that the Russians were racing against time to make the mis sile pads operational; and they knew that once the launching pads were opera tional, the heartland of the American continent would be vulnerable as never be fore. It seemed clear that they had to act at once. In ‘quarantine’ On the night of October 22 President Kennedy an nounced that the United States had put Cuba into “quarantine.” The “quaran tine” would be enforced by the United States Navy; and all ships carrying offensive weapons to Cuba would be turned back. He also anounced that he had directed “continued and increased close surveillance of Cuba and its military buijd-up”; that the United States would regard any nuclear attack launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western December 1963 51 hemisphere as an attack on the United States. Finally, he called on Mr. Khrushchev to “halt and eliminate this clan destine, reckless and provo cative threat to world peace.” The following day the Latin American countries decided to support the United States. On October 24 Mr. Khrushchev announc ed that the Soviet Union was ready for a summit meeting, and the US blockade went into effect. But the first cri sis point was still to come. It was known that Soviet ships were on their way to Cuba. If they tried to break the American blockade, they would be fired upon. If they were fired on, war might re sult. A new turn On October 25 the first Soviet ship reached the Am erican blockade. It was in tercepted and allowed to proceed. Next day, the cri sis took a new turn. The White House announced that development of Soviet missile sites in Cuba was still con tinuing at “a rapid pace”; and the State Department added that if offensive pre parations in Cuba were to continue "further action” would be justified. This was the second major crisis point. Mr. Khrushchev had been warned that the Russian mis siles must be removed, and so far he had not done so. Soon President Kennedy would have to act: by pin point bombing of the sites, by a parachute assault, by a massive invasion of Cuba or by a nuclear strike against the bases. On October 28 Mr. Khrushchev finally saw the folly of persisting, and announced that the Soviet missiles bases in Cuba would be dismantled. Anxious mo ments were still to come, but the crisis was over. Edge of catastrophe Firmness coupled with caution had prevailed: and it is clear in retrospect that both elements were equally important. For President Kennedy had steadily refused to launch a surprise air strike against Cuba, as some of his advisers had suggested; he had made every possible effort to leave the Russians a chance to retreat without los ing face. No one will ever know whether he was right about the magnitude of the threat the Soviet missiles seemed to represent. There 52 Panorama can be no doubt, however, that his handing of the threat showed statesmanship of a high order. Over Cuba, one of Pres ident Kennedy’s advisers said.. afterwards, they had felt in Washington as though they could be "within five mi nutes of destruction." Both Mr. Kennedy and no doubt Mr. Khrushchev as well real ized that they had been to the edge of catastrophe; and both tried to withdraw from it as soon as they could. President Kennedy’s part in this was notable. Cuba re presented a victory for him and his country; but he steadily refused to boast about it, or to humiliate his opponent. Instead, he made every effort to reach a gen uine understanding with the Russians, International relations slowly took a turn for the better. In January 1963 "ex ploratory taks” were held in New York between Russia and the United States, in an atempt to establish a founda tion for a ban on nuclear tests. Towards the end of the month Mr. Khrushchev sud denly announced that he was prepared to accept the principle of on-site inspec tion; and for a short time it looked as though a full-scale agreement might soon be reached. But these hopes proved over-optimistic. Endless hag gling took place over the exact number of on-site ins pections to be allowed in a year. The West insisted on seven; the Russians stuck at three. By the summer it had become clear that the Russians were not prepared to accept any inspection, and that a full-scale ban was therefore impossible. Then on June 10 President Kennedy made a last effort to break the deadlock. In a striking speech at the Am erican University, he an nounced that the United States would not resume at mospheric tests so long as other countries also abstained. He called on his own country men "not to fall into the same trap as the Soviets, not to see only a distorted and desperate view of the other side, not to see conflict as inevitable." At the same time it was announced that a high-level conference would be held in Moscow in July to look for a way out of the impasse in which all previous December 1963 S3 conferences had been bogged down. The conference was success ful; and by the end of the summer a treaty had been signed banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under the sea and in outer space. World opinion In itself, the test-ban treaty meant comparatively little. It contained no measures of inspection or control; and the only real sanction behind it was the pressure of world opinion. But in spite of its limitations as a disarmament treaty, it had immense signi ficance for world politics. For the first time since the Cold War, the great nuclear powers had agreed to restirct their own freedom of action in the interests of world peace. At the least it was a step in the right direction. The danger of nuclear war still remained, and would re main. But it was now possi ble to hope for further steps to a geniune detente between East and West. Paradoxically, the prospect of a relaxation of tension be tween East and West led to a renewal of tension within the Western Alliance. Pres ident de Gaulle was adamant ly opposed to any detente with the Russians in the fore seeable future. It was an open secret that many West Germans were alarmed by the possibility that a detente with Russia might lead to some form of recognition for East Germany. Apart from these fears, the Alliance grew increasingly divided by the thorny pro blems raised by its own nu clear arsenal. Britain insisted on retaining her own inde pendent nuclear deterrent; and at Nassau at the end of 1962 President Kennedy was reluctantly persuaded to sup ply Polaris missiles to Bri tain, on certain conditions, when the British V-bomber force became obsolete. Mean while France was equally determined to become an in dependent nuclear power; and there seemed to be a real danger that West Germany would soon follow suit. In January, 1963, President de Gaulle vetoed Britain’s application to join the Eu ropean Common Market — in terms which implied a fundamental hostility to Am erican leadership in the At lantic alliance. This was fol lowed by a series of pinpricks culminating in a decision to 54 Panorama withdraw the French Atlan tic fleet from its NATO as signment. In order to isolate France, and contain West Germany, President Kennedy put forward a proposal for a “mixed-manned” NATO nu clear force. The proposal was received with little en thusiasm. West Germany was eager to join the mixedmanned force; but the other allies were suspicious. Mili tarily the proposal had little value; its political benefits were at best dubious. At the time of President Kennedy’s death, its fate was still in doubt. The only certainty was that the legitimate de mands of the European allies for a voice in nuclear strategy would somehow have to be reconciled with NATO soli darity. Here President Ken nedy’s successor faces a major unsolved problem. He faces another problem — almost as grave, and also unsolved — at home. In the summer of 1963 the Am erican domestic scene was transformed by a massive re volt of the Negro community — North as well as South — against discrimination and inequality. In the first two years of its life, the Kennedy Administration had had a disappointing record in the field of civil rights. The promise of his election plat form had not been fulfilled; the hopes of the Negro com munity — and of white libe rals as well — had been dis appointed. But after the race riots in Alabama the Administration at last began to act, and it acted with courage and de termination. A sweeping civil rights bill was placed before Congress, more-farreaching in scope than any thing which had ever been attempted in this century. More important still, Pres ident Kennedy -threw the weight of his office behind the civil rights movement in a way that neither he, nor his predecessors, had pre viously done. It is too soon to tell what the immediate future holds in store for the American Negro. What is certain is that President Ken nedy in the end earned a distinguished place in the list of those wno have tried to make the American dream a reality for the coloured tenth of the population. Fulfilling promise President Kennedy was the youngest President ever elect 55 ed; and for the first half of his presidency he seemed to be feeling his way. Apart from the disaster of the Bay of Pigs his policies were thoughtful, judicious and sometimes even wise. But there was a curious lack of passion and urgency in the way he presented them to his countrymen. After the sear ing experience of Cuba, this changed. On strictly political issues, the domestic performance of his Administration remained disappointing — less because of any faults of omission or commission on its part than because of stubborn conser vative opposition in Congress and an apathetic public opinion. But on civil rights he had at last begun to fulfill the promise of his election campaign and on the sup reme issues of peace and war, he had proved himself a great President. THE PONTIFF'S HOPE “We pray God that the sacrifice of John Ken nedy1 may assist the cause promoted and defended by him for the liberty of peoples and peace in the world. . . . We deplore with all our heart this event. We express the hope that the death of this great states man does not bring harm to the American people, but reinforces its moral and civil sense and strengthen its sentiments of nobility and concord.” — Pope Paul. 56 Panorama