Our political parties

Media

Part of Panorama

Title: Our political parties
Creator: Recto, Claro M.
Language: English
Source: Panorama XII (10) October 1960
Year: 1960
Rights
Fulltext: OCTOBER 1960 Entered as second elaps mail matter at the Manila Post Office on Dee. 7, 1955 VOL. XII MANILA, PHILIPPINES No. 10 In the valley of decision Our Political Parties by Claro M. Recto or many years the nation r * has stood on artificial props. We have allowed alien and beguiling forces to chart for our people a course that does not lead to the realization of their legitimate aspirations. We have been made to fear new ideas, to abhor independence of thought and action, to shun examples, precedents and experiences of other peoples that have attained their goals. We have been basking in the feeling that all is well with us and all good things will come to us under the protection of powerful friends. So we have come of age with frail limbs and a lethargic mind, unable to stand on our own feet or to think for ourselves, light-hearted and com placent in an attitude of depend ency, with our most vital prob lems, such as national security and survival and economic recon struction, left in the hands of a guardian who has to look after his own more numerous and per plexing problems. The onrush of world events has reached such mighty propor tions that we can not but be shaken from our lassitude. The change in the balance of world forces which has ended myths of impregnability to nuclear devastation among the super-powers, has made us realize that, after all, we will still have to fend for ourselves for our survival. Every conscious nation that has a mis sion to accomplish and a destiny to fulfill is doing it. Peoples on whom we have hitherto wasted hardly a shred of sympathy and attention, are marching with firm determination on the same trail which the industrial nations of the West had to blaze to reach the summit of wealth and power. Self-help and self-reliance are the order of the day. It is time that we pondered and took stock of our situation, bearing in mind George Washington’s wise and prudent counsel in his political testament—his Farewell Address— that “it is folly in one nation to look for disinterested favors from another,” because “it must pay with a portion of its independ ence for whatever it may accept under that character.” tional dogma in Asia and Africa is still heing challenged in our midst by the pharisees and pro phets of the colonial-agricultural economy. And, what is worse, men of little faith and unrepen tant prodigal sons and foolish virgins of our own race, richly deserving the gospel’s appellation of * "a generation of vipers,” in dulge in the suppression of the teachings of Rizal which indoc trinated our people in patriotism, civic consciousness and national dignity at the supreme sacrifice qf his noble life. *T’ HE impact of our revolution against Spain on other Asian dependencies was formidable and there was a time when we were looked up to as the pioneers of freedom in colonial Asia. But that was only for a short while. Today we are only camp-followers of the mighty movement that is sweeping the under-developed countries of the world* But, sad to say, nationalism which is the soul of that movement and a na A nation’s political, economic and cultural life is of its people’s own making. Of course there are what we call the forces of history but it is for the people, in the present advanced state of civiliza tion, to channel them toward the realization of national objectives. We must accept, therefore, full responsibility for the backward condition of our economy, our political immaturity and pompous ness, our opportunistic mentality, our predilection for dramatizing minor issues to the neglect of long-range basic questions, and for our confusions and indecisions that have delayed for decades the progress of the nation. One of the most influential fac tors in the shaping of a nation’s life is its political system as de veloped by its political parties. I shall, therefore, comment as brief 4 Panorama ly as possible, on the manner tney have conducted the affairs of the nation, political and eco nomic, dfaring the first three-score vears of this century, and the impact of their actions on our mentality. is to bb deplored that our major political parties were bom and nurtured before we had attained the status of a free de mocracy. The result was that they have come to be caricatures of their foreign model with its known characteristics—patronage division of spoils, political bossism, partisan treatment of vital national issues. I say caricatures because of their chronic short sightedness respecting those ulti mate objectives the attainment of which was essential to a true and lasting national independ ence. All over the period of Am erican colonization they allowed themselves to become more and more the tools of colonial rule and less the interpreters of the people’s will and ideals. Through their complacency the new col onizer was able to fashion, in ex change for sufferance of oratorical plaints for independence and for patronage, rank and sinecure, a regime of his own choosing for his own and in his own self interest. o answer the question as to why the Americans embarked upon the conquest of the Philip pines is to define the role that our political parties actually play ed, or were allowed to play, be fore the attainment of independ ence. Shortly after the War of Se cession the United States saw the rise of corporations and the obli teration of the so-called American frontier. Her industrial capitalism expanded rapidly with the result that her domestic market became alarmingly insufficient for her mounting manufactures and farm produce. When in the 1890’s she was gripped by a major economic crisis, ner leaders in trade and finance thought that the best way to solve it and avert new ones was to expand her economic fron tiers. The new thinking was sum marized by Senator Beveridge in 1892, in the following words: “American factories are making more than the American people can use; American soil is produc ing more than they can consume. Fate has written our policy for us; the trade of the world must, and shall be ours.” It was during this period, too, that the Western powers were "cutting the Chinese melon” by establishing their respective en claves and spheres of influence in that huge prospective market. Having joined the scramble for China late, and not possessing any enclave on Chinese soil the United States announced her October 1960 5 Open Door policy to preserve— that was the stated purpose—Chi nese territorial integrity and se cure equal trade opportunity. But America was not a Pacific power like Britain, Japan, Russia, France, and Germany, and tocompensate for this disadvantage she sought to establish nearby a springboard to the China main land. The Philippines was found to be the ideal springboard. The evolution of American thinking, which inevitably led to the Spanish-American war and the conquest of the Philippines, may be readily perceived in the following quotations. Theodore Search, President of the National Association of Manufacturers, as early as 1897 said: “Many of our manufactures have outgrown or are outgrow ing their home markets and the expansion of our foreign trade is their only promise of relief.” He' was1 followed bv the As sistant Secretarv of the Treasury, Frank A. Vanderlip, who said in 1888: 'Together with the Islands of the Japanese Empire, since the acquirement of Formosa, the Phil ippines are the pickets of the Pa cific, standing guard at the en trances to trade with the mil lions of China and Korea, French Indochina, the Malay Peninsula, and the islands of Indonesia to the south.” On January 4, 1900, Senator Beveridge, in sponsoring a Joint Congressional Resolution (S. R. 53) spoke in this guise: ‘The Philippines are ours for ever . . . ana just beyond the Philippines are China’s illimitable markets. We will not retreat from either, we will not repudiate our duty in the archipelago, we will not abandon our opportunity in the Orient. . . . Our largest trade, henceforth must be with Asia. The Pacific is our ocean. More and more Europe will manufac ture the most it needs, secure from its colonies the most it con sumes. Where shall we turn for consumers of our surplus? Geo graphy answers the question. China is our national customer . . . the Philippines give us a base at the door of all the East.” In the light of these pronounce ments it is not difficult to see in retrospect what Admiral Dewey was really doing in Hongkong in the last stages of the Philippine revolution against Spain, and how the sentimental fiction came to be woven that America could not bear to see us, orphans of the Pacific after the end of the Span ish rule, swallowed up by the Germans, English and Japanese who were waiting for the op portunity to fall upon a priceless booty. It was President McKinley and the American Senate who expli citly announced America’s purpose in taking forcible possession of 6 Panorama the Philippines in 1898, indirect ly but plainly revealing the rea son for the presence of Dewey’s fleet in Hongkong long before the outbreak of the Spanish-Amer ican war. McKinley said: "There is nothing left for us to do but to take them (thfc Philippines) all and to educate them all, uplift and Christianize them, and by God’s grace do the very best we could for them, as our fellow-men for whom Christ also died.” According to McKinley himself, when he made that fateful deci sion he was on his knees before the Almighty in search for di vine guidance, and that, right thereafter, and I quote, "I went to bed, and went to sleep, and slept soundly . . .” The unbelieving Christian Ad vocate of New York, in its issue of January 22, 1903, commented irreverently: "If seems probable that McKin ley confused the voice of the people with the voice of God, for he touched upon almost every string in the familiar harmony of imperialism.” As for the American Senate, that body merely supplemented the presidential statement with the adoption of the so-called Em ery Resolution, by adding the following, in the indicated order of priority: "And to make such disposition of said Islands as will best pro mote the interests of the citizens of the United States and the in habitants of said Islands.” Our attitude towards our erst while conquerors, incurably biased in favor of everything that comes from them, must have been based on this mystical belief in the "providential” origin of our his toric relations. Since nothing last ing can be built on such a delu sion, we must, in order to enable ourselves to evolve the rightful policies for our country in the fu ture, start ridding our minds of out-dated superstitions. rJnHE armed forces of the First Philippine Republic were still fighting fiercely, though disorgan ized and poorly equipped, against those of the mighty new con queror, when some wealthy and conservative members of the Fili pino community, aided and abet ted by the first Civil Governor of these Islands, W. H. Taft, later Presidept and, still late, Chief Justice of the United States, de cided to organize a political party. It was called the Partido Federal designed to cooperate, as its im mediate purpose, with the Amer ican military authorities in the task of coercing and cajoling the people into accepting American rule. Its platform, which had Gov ernor Taft’s blessings, decried fur ther resistance and advocated as its final goal a statehood in the American Union. Patronage was October 1960 7 promptly awarded to the new par ty by the colonial Administration and, in consequence, its leaders were exclusively chosen for the juiciest and choicest positions in the government. Don Cayetano Arellano and Don Victorino Mapa, the two greatest Filipino jur ists of the time, and Don Floren tino Torres, were appointed Chief Justice and Associate Justices, res pectively, of the first Philippine Supreme Court. The great scholar Pardo de Tavera, together with Benito Legarda and Jose Luzurriaga became members of the Phil ippine Commission which was headed by Taft himself. Other prominent Federates were ap pointed Judges of First Instance, public prosecutors and bureau di rectors. rp o insure the supremacy of the Federal Party, liquidate the remnants of the resistance moveirient, discourage all inde pendence propaganda, and stabil ize the new regime, several ex pedients were resorted to: 1) mo nopoly of patronage for those af filiated with the Federal Party; 2) enactment of the Sedition Law (Act No. 292, November 4, 1901), which made it a criminal offense "for any person to advo cate the independence or separa tion from the United States, whe ther by peaceful or other means, or to publish pamphlets advocat ing such independence or separa tion”; and 3) approval of the Act of Brigandage or "Ley de Bandolerismo” (Act No. 518, November 12, 1902) under the provisions of which any person could be sentenced to death, to life or from 25 to 30 years im prisonment, for stealing a carabao if it could be proved, even by circumstantial evidence, that the accused was a member of an armed band organized for the pur pose of stealing carabaos or other personal property, without the need of establishing that he ac tually participated in the robbery but only that he was a member of the band. It is. well to remember that under this Act, within a period of ten years only, hundreds of Filipinos who remained in the mountains in opposition to the American regime were sent to the gallows, or imprisoned for life or for 30 or 25 years. These were General Macario Sakav and his fellow officers and their men, and hundreds of others. Separate crim inal informations were filed against them in the various courts of first instance of the country, and in all of them the different judgments of conviction were af firmed unanimously by our own Supreme Court. With reference to the Sedition Act it made impossible for Fili pino nationalists to organize them selves into political groups ad vocating independence, until after Panorama the middle of April, 1906 when the Act was repealed. It was for this reason that the Nacionalista Party could not be organized be fore 1907. Those were the years, accord ing to a Filipino historian and political writer, of "suppressed na tionalism.” *p olitical patronage, a charac teristic of the American party system, was established forthwith bv Taft himself under a policy of this tenor: "In the appointment of natives, the fact that the man is a mem ber of the Federal Party is a good recommendation for him for appointment for the reason that we regard the Federal Party as one of the great elements in bringing about pacification, and if a man is in the Federal Party, it is fairly good evidence that he is interested in the government we are establishing and would do as well as he could.” This frank, forthright statement presents the principal characteris tic of the new colonization pol icy, which was to establish a gov ernment with a semblance of Fili pino representation through trust ed Filipino agents enjoying the respect of the people because of their social position or intellectual reputation. For, in a country with such limited economic opportuni ties, men of intelligence and am bition had to look up to the gov ernment to further their personal advancement. Government ap pointments, carrying handsome emoluments and distinction, were adequate rewards for acquiescence, loyalty and cooperation. From 1901 to 1907 the Federal Party was the only one legally in existence. Not only was it the party in power; it was the party. It won, as was to be expected, all local elections prior to 1907. Its leaders, however, did not know how to make the most of the spoils system to strengthen the party. Doctor Pardo de Tavera, the head, was a great man and a highly educated Filipino, but he was not a politician. From the point of view of party politics and its connotations his direction of the Federal Party was a failure, w ith the popular sentiment fast crystallizing with a new note of urgency for self-govern ment and independence, the ab andonment of the statehood plan of the Federates, a plan which was openly discouraged by in fluential members of the American Congress, and the repeal of the Sedition Act in 1906, the Fili pino nationalists saw the oppor tunity for organizing themselves into a political group, and took full advantage of it. Thus the Nacionalista Party, which later made history, and a very brilliant one, came into existenc.e This was early in 1907. October 1960 9 The first encounter between Nacionalistas and Federates in the same year, to elect diputados to the First Philippine Assembly, resulted in a sweeping victory for the Nacionalistas. This madei it manifest that the Filipinos were unqualifiedly ready for independ ence, and that in the face of such an overwhelming popular senti ment even patronage and official pressure counted for nothing at the polls. The American adminis trators, practical politicians that they were, thought correctly that if they were to accomplish their colonial objectives, they would need the support of the triumph ant political group. Such support they could secure only by entrust ing to that group the distribution of government jobs and allowing its leaders freedom in their advo cacy of independence, in exchange no doubt for the group’s coopera tion in the execution of the essen tial policies' of the colonial power. Taft, then Secretary of War nroclaimed the Speaker of the Phil ippine Assemblv the No. 2 offi cial of the Philippine Govern ment, a rank second onlv to that of the American Governor-Gen eral. From that time the partner ship between the representative of the new sovereign and the Filipino leader operated smoothly as pre-arranged. Professor Dapen Liang rightly commented: “During the later years of the Forbes administration legislation became largely a matter of pri vate arrangement between the Governor-General and the Speak er.” Forbes was succeeded by Har rison, and what follows is the appraisal made by an American writer of that period, D. R. Wil liams, of the relations between the American Governor-General and the leader of the “Filipino participation in the government: “During the Harrison admin istration, this (control of the pa tronage) lay with the Naciona listas,” whose chiefs “dictated ap pointments from auxiliary justices of the peace to Supreme Court justice.” The death knell tolled for the Federates and it was a “red let ter day,” if I may use the expres sion, for the Nacionalista leaders. There was general jubilation. But how long was it to last? ecause the broad colonial policies for the Philippines were pre-determined and formu lated in Washington, the limited authority given to the Filipino participation found expression mainly in the distribution of pa tronage and in the constant jock keying for positions of rank and distinction. Political patronage on the scale and in the strictly partisan man ner it was being administered, and the lack of autonomy of 10 Panorama provinces and municipalities in the administration of local affairs, particularly in the matter of rais ing their own revenues, placed these administrative units com pletely at the mercy of the cen tral government. Their growing needs, especially permanent im provements like markets, schools, barrio roads, made inevitable the continuous grants of aid bv cen tral government to the local gov ernments which practically made the latter veritable fiefs of the former, with the controller of the party patronage as the feu dal lord, whose will had to be obeyed in all matters of party business by the local chieftains under pain of political liquida tion. In such circumstances no opposition party could survive. In reality true party system became known in this country only since 1946 with the birth of the Lib eral Party, a splinter of the Na cionalista, motivated bv a purely personal rivalry between two Na cionalista leaders in the struggle for the Presidency. But on top of the party in power was the American colonial administrator, the prime source of government patronage, who could at will continue to dispense it or could withdraw with its im plied commitment to accommodate the administration in the attain ment of the latter’s own colonial objectives. The Nacionalistas were so aware of the political implica tions of the situation that they could not afford to displease the colonial power and alienate its good will. It would have meant the loss of their political para mountcy. They needed each other and, therefore, acted as was ex pected. Oratorical clamor for in dependence continued to thunder deafeningly and patronage kept on being distributed abundantly while economic policies were si lently but surely chaining the na tion to the oars of the colonial galley. With the government as the main employer and with econo mic conditions as backward as those of any other agriculturalcolonial country, the efforts of the people to insure their liveli hood were principally directed to securing government jobs. The limitation of opportunities out side the official world made cen tralization inevitable and the gov ernment omnipotent. This was the corrupting influence which impelled the astute and the am bitious to use politics as an in strument for personal advance ment in the social, official and economic spheres. Patronage and centralization became, therefore, the twin products of that peculiar colonial situation which seemed to fit the designs and wishes of both parties. October 1960 11 J^ut the gravest sin of Phil ippine politicking was the gross neglect to exert efforts to wards economic emancipation. So obsessed were the politicians with their power struggles and the dol ing out of the spoils of office that, either they did not foresee, or having foreseen, they completely neglected the economic problems of independence. Politics, with its enlivened election campaigns and its dispensation of patronage, be came a national sport which dis tracted and amused the people, in the same manner that bread and circuses distracted and amused the Roman populace, which did not mind whether it was Nero or Cincinnatus, or Cali gula or Marcus Aurelius, who was their Caesar. In our case while the more fortunate of us were living in comfort and luxurv with the fat proceeds of our privileged agricultural exports and the hold ing of high government positions, the nation was slowlv being con signed to perpetual economic slavery. Had our leaders been from the beginning more far-sighted, and had they prepared the people for the responsibilities of independ ence, in the same manner that a true Christian is trained to stand ready at every hour for his final accounting because death comes as a thief in the night, our sovereignty and independence would now be real and complete and on the other hand, our lead ers would not have exposed them selves to the charge that they did not sincerely desire independence that their outcries and agitations for it were just intended for poli tical effect, and that their sole aim was to win and retain the monopoly of power with its ac companying privileges. u nder Article IV of the Treaty of Paris Spanish ships and goods were admitted to Phil ippine ports on the same terms as ships and goods of the United States for a ten-year period. Con sequently no preferential arrange ment between American goods and Philippine products could be established then without violat ing that Treaty or necessarily ex tending the same privilege to im ported commodities from Spain. Moreover, the establishment of preferential rates for the Philip pines at the time would have proved embarrassing to the Am ericans who were bidding for equal treatment in the China mar ket. When the 10-year period ended the United States approved with out loss of time the Tariff Act (Payne-Aldrich) of 1909 establish ing a limited free trade with the Philippines. This allowed the en try of American goods on a pre ferential basis and geared Philip pine agricultural production to the American market. Such was 12 Panorama the situation until certain Phil ippine agricultural products came to be a serious menace to power ful vested interests in the United States, which prompted her, at the irresistible behest of those in terests, to terminate, in form if not in substance, the colonial re lationship between the two coun tries. Thus, the hour for Philip pine independence struck when, according to a distinguished Am erican historian, already “the wis er Filipino leaders had ceased to desire it.” N o more dispassionate and cor rect anlaysis of the motiva tions behind the so-called “grant” of independence to the Philip pines could have been made than the one by Dr. Julius W. Pratt, Professor of American History of the University of Buffalo. From his book, “America’s Colonial Ex periment,” I offer to this select audience the following excerpts: “No chapter in the history of American policy towards its pos sessions was marked by such glar ing contradictions and inconsisten cies as that relating to the Phil ippines. Although political policy pointed steadily toward self-gov ernment and eventual independ ence, economic policy has steadily built up the Philippines as a source of raw materials for the American market and created an economy dependent upon conti nued free access to that market. Cp. 291) “The Independence Act of 1934, then and since adverted to the world as an exemplary deed of renunciation, found probably 90 per cent of its motivation in a cynical desire of American pro ducers close to the American mar ket to the Filipinos at whatever cost to the latter. Independence was granted when the wiser Fili pino leaders had ceased to desire it and upon terms almost certain to produce economic disaster in the Philippines, (p. 291) “As early as 1924 one writer had noted that independence for the Philippines was advocated by certain groups in the United Statse engaged in the production of beet and cane sugar, tobacco, and vegetable oils of the compe tition with their products of dutyfree commodities from the Philip pines. (pp. 301-302) “Of special interest, in view of the economic motives of the legis lation were its trade provisions. These were hardly generous. Throughout the transition period American products would conti nue to be admitted free of duty to the Philippines. Philippine im ports into the United States, on the other hand, would be sub jected to progressive restrictions, (p 306) "All in all, the economic out look for an independent Philip pines was gloomy enough. Cer OCTOBER 1960 13 tain features of the act were glar ingly unfair. The time allowed for economic readjustment was too short. The free market gua rantee to American products in the Philippines to the end of the transition period would postpone till independence any opportunity for the Philippines to make reci procal trade arrangements with other countries, (p. 307) ‘The United States was the first modern power to grant in dependence voluntarily to a rich colonial possession. American pub lic men have frequently pointed to the act as one of generosity and statesmanship, which other colonial powers would do well to copy. It is unpleasant to have to record that the law thrusting in dependence upon the Philippines showed little statesmanship and no generosity. It sacrificed the well-being of the Philippines for the supposed benefit of American farmers and workers, disguising the injury with the kiss of inde pendence. It was, of course, with in the power of Congress to res trict or tax Philippine imports and yet to refuse independence. But it is no valid defense of an ungenerous act to say that a still more ungenerous one was possi ble.” (p. 310) 0 ur free trade with the Unit ed States precluded the es tablishment of local industries, and, by channeling our farming activities towards a few selective export products, we prevented our selves from diversifying our pro duction and from attaining greater economic flexibility, growth and stability, while our domestic con sumption continued to increase far beyond our capacity to sup ply. As Philippine economy be came more dependent on the Am erican market and manufactures and our people became more ac customed to American products, the struggle against free trade be came increasingly hopeless to a point where it had to be aban doned altogether. The result was the sorry spectacle of confused leaders now debating on whether we can afford to be independent or not, now pleading for the ex tension of free trade after inde pendence, in mortal fear of los ing tariff preferences for our ex port products and of having to dispense with consumer goods to which we have been so accus tomed and which we could not produce. Those leaders, who had taken upon themselves the task of carrying to a successful con clusion the fight for freedom which our heroes and martyrs be gan in 1896, have sadly mistaken, so it seems, the shadow and van ity of personal power for the substance and honor of a true national independence. grievous a mistake, amount ing to official dereliction, on 14 Panorama the part of our leaders, can best be illustrated by an analysis of the platforms of the major poli tical parties which have domin ated the national scene the turn of the century. The Nacionalista platform of 1907 contained no economic pro gram at all. What follows, which is one of its planks, cannot be considered as having any econo mic connotation from the point of view of our discussion: “Our people are thoroughly adaptable to democratic institu tions and have men with suffi cient wisdom and intelligence to organize a stable government, and wealth and natural resources to maintain an economical public service, the more so when it is hoped that under their own law, the material conditions of the is lands will develop and increase satisfactorily for the benefit of the Filipinos.” The platform adopted by the two Nacionalista factions in 1921 dealt with generalities and made no mention of any economic plans. When the two factions re united in 1924, the platform they adopted also failed to make re ference to economic policies or programs essential to independ ence. It was apparent that our leaders had already come to ac cept limited free trade with its anti-industrialization connotation as the correct pattern of our eco nomic relations with the United States even after independence. here were, however, politi cal elements which saw the necessity of preparing the country for the economic responsibilities of independence, and of granting autonomy to provincial and local governments to release them from the domination of the central gov ernment and thus encourage the formation of opposition parties and insure free elections. At the height of the Speaker’s supremacy as national leader, a group of Nacionalistas led by General Sandiko seceded from the party to form a new group, the Partido Democrata National. It was launched in April, 1914 with a platform advocating industrial ization, markets for Philippine products, and protection to na tional commerce, trade and agri culture. But in the national elec tions which followed, the new party was overwhelmingly de feated. The people were still un concerned with economic prob lems; patronage and pork barrel were still the favored securities in the political stock-market. Sumulong’s Progresistas joined the Democratas and a new group was born in August, 1917: the Partido Democrata. This party advocated autonomy for local gov ernments, promotion of agricul ture, commerce and industry and development of our natural re OCTOBER 1960 15 sources. It, too, was disastrously defeated by the all-powerful party in power. The people remained apathetic towards tne economic future of the nation; to all ap pearances pork barrel and patron age were still the only things that mattered to them. Our masses continued to suffer from their age-old poverty, but the well-entrenched plutocracy and the politically-minded and active American-educated minority enjoyed a measure of colonial prosperity. The latter’s indifferent attitude toward economic nation alism helped the party in power in defeating Don Juan Sumulong’s attempts (1914-1934) to bring to the political forum a frontal discussion of our econo mic problems. Our political historians have dismissed with a few derogatory remarks such movements as the Sakdal in Southern Luzon in 1935. It was1 a mistake. The case for the Sakdals could not have been regarded as a mere tempo rary aberration, for the member ship of that party was numerous enough and loyal enough to elect in 1934—in the only province, Laguna, which was the seat of its organization—the provincial governor, the two representatives to the Legislature and the major ity of the local officials. But peo ple who rise up in arms under the banner of independence and economic emancipation do not risk their lives simply because some silver-tongued rabble-rouser tells them to. What may have im pelled them to take up arms could be the sincere belief that their poverty and' lack of opportuni ties would be remedied only if the Philippines were politically and economically free. They be came skeptical of peaceful solu tions. For while our political lead ers were orating on independence the mainstream of mass conscious ness was being directed toward liberation from total economic bondage: the bondage of a feudalagricultural structure which had been keeping them impoverished, and the bondage of foreign over all control of our economy, which gave them. no hope of improving their means of livelihood. ViceGovernor Hayden, who was here during the Sakdal uprising in 1935, described them as “hard working, family-loving people who exemplified the fine basic quali ties that are typical among the Filipino masses . . . they were desperately worried about earning a living for their women and children and genuinely concerned over the welfare of their coun try . . .” Not all, therefore, were apa thetic, or, as Filosofo Tasio in Rizal’s Noh would say: No todos dormian en la noche de nuestros abuelos. 16 Panorama JUST before the outbreak of the Second World War our leaders realized the deleterious ef fects of continued economic de pendence on the United States, and they recoiled in horror, but, strangely enough, the only solu tion they thought possible was the continuance of preferential trade agreements over a period of readjustment. It was a solution that merely complicated and ag gravated the problem. It only postponed the impending disaster. Years of dealing with petty mat ters, of squabbling over the spoils of office and of big talk while picking crumbs from the Amer ican table, had so sapped the strength and courage and so dim med the vision of our leaders that they became incapable of opening a new path which would lead the nation to real political freedom through economic emancipation from alien control. The sterility of pre-war politi cal thinking on economic prob lems is reflected in the Naciona lista platform of 1935 which ad vocated a revision of the TydingsMcDaffie Act, “so that preferen tial trade with America may be allowed to continue after inde pendence and shall not be ter minated until the expiration of such period as may be considered reasonably necessary to permit the Philippines to make a proper ad justment of her economy.” This was the result of the prevailing political and economic fallacies of the time namely: that the special relations between the Philippines and the United States were mu tually beneficial, that the Philip pines could not live and survive without America, and that some how American benevolence would prolong the so-called adjustment period indefinitely. The war years and the rigors of enemy occupation gave us an opportunity to reassess our needs and our capabilities as well as our policies, to bring out the best in our own initiative, and to strengthen the national character. Many realized for the first time in those trying days that we could stand on our own feet if we only exerted the necessary effort, and make a fresh start on a more independent basis, politi cally and economically, after the war was over. fl ut the popularity of G.I. Joe, his jeeps, his cigarettes and his candy bars, the early handouts of canned goods and used clothing, rekindled within us the dying embers of old co lonial beliefs. Flushed with the excitement of MacArthur’s dra matic return, the people did not detect beneath the surface of mag nanimity the same old imperialis tic policies at work slipping round our necks once more the leash of economic control. The new party in power, a chip off the old NaOCTOBER 1960 17 cionalista, whose leadership could have set this country on the right road to economic independence, chose to accept, on the very eve of the nation’s independence, a reimposition of the colonial eco nomic control. Its new-found devise was the Bell Trade Act and its twin-sister legislation, the War Damage Act, which made payments dependent on our acceptance of the former, particularly its iniquitous “parity right” clause. The new imperial ists, led by a ruthless American High Commissioner, used the pov erty and devastation brought upon us by their war as a lever to get what they wanted. Inheritor of a pre-war political tradition of re liance on the United States with a blind faith in her benevolence and sense of altruism, the new post-liberation leader, thinking no doubt of the needs of his own administration, quickly capitulat ed. His new party accepted the Bell Trade Act and amended the Philippine Constitution granting parity rights to Americans in the enjoyment of our natural resour ces, and bartering future econo mic stability and the nation’s na tural resources for short-term gains and temporary accommodations. The pitiful and shameful surren der of our patrimonial, political and economic rights was almost complete. We became the only losers in the war we had just helped to win. It was a sad ex perience in Philippine-American relations. 'Derhaps because it was tem porarily out of power and therefore had the leisure and was at a better distance to view the national problems ip a clearer perspective, the Nacionalistas of fered to the electorate in 1949 a platform that expressed sorqe re cognition of the country’s need for industrialization, for develop ing our power resources and for attaining other economic objec tives. But the election in that year was the most cynical piece of fraud ever perpetrated in the history of our democratic experi ment and the Nacionalistas were defeated. In the Nacionalista platform of 1953 I succeeded in incorpo rating, with the help of Justice Barrera, Senator Locsin, Councilor Barredo and other nationalistic Nacionalistas the following planks: “Readjust the character of our economy from its present predo minantly colonial-agricultural sta tus to a progressively industrial system, thus removing unemploy ment and accelerating the attain ment of economic independence and sound national prosperity. “Remove present limitations on our economic freedom of action contained in existing executive agreements and trade agreements under the Bell Trade Act.” 18 Panorama For the first time in our poli tical history a major party came out with an unequivocal state ment for an industrial economy against an agricultural economy and continued foreign economic dependence and control. The victory of the Nacionalistas in 1953 was unprecedented, but because their' standard-bearer him self, as it turned out, did not be lieve in his newly-chosen party’s nationalistic platform, the Nacionafista goal of economic emanci pation through industrialization suffered, ironically, a resounding defeat. The new President, illadvised by his foreign advisers, tried to maintain our agricultural economy, reviving the pre-war mvth that we are essentially agri cultural and that we cannot hope to industrialize. Instead of abro gating the parity rights in the Vol tairian spirit of ecrasez I'infame, or at least of limiting their field of application, the same admin istration expanded them, through the Laurel-Langley Agreement, to all other forms of business ven tures or enterprises. "J t was at that period of our political history which saw my break with certain leaders of the Nacionalista Party. It was not motivated by personal consi derations. It was purely a matter of principle: whether we should continue our agricultural-colonial status, or industrialize in order to achieve real, true independ ence, and whether we should formulate an independent foreign policy and act accordingly, or continue to be retainers of the State Department. It was, in fine, a break between the growing le gions of nationalism and the wellentrenched forces of colonialism. I took pains to explain the issue of nationalism to our people in the 1957 Presidential campaign and, although I lost, I sincerely believe that the task of bringing to the attention of my country men the need for a nationalistic orientation in our political and economic life, which my fellow crusaders and I have set for our selves, has borne fruits beyond our expectations. We should all feel gratified that the present administration has decided to follow the nation alist planks of the Nacionalista platform which the Nacionalista standard-bearer in 1953 discarded so disdainfully. The present ad ministration, by its advocacy of the Filipino First policy and its acceptance, at least in principle, of the need for real industrializa tion, has at last come to grips with the true vital issues in this period of our national existence. Of course, one may say quite candidly, that nothing more than a modest beginning has been made; in fact, on some aspects of nationalist policy, notably in dustrialization, the Administration October 1960 19 has acted in a curiously half hearted manner, as if it were not yet fully certain of the course it must take, or as if there were powerful extraneous forces work ing on it. The Administration should show, I suggest, greater vigor and determination now that it has started to move in the right direction. The problem of corruption still plagues the government. It can not be helped. How much of this should be ascribed to the present Administration is any body’s guess. But if we are fair, we must admit that there was a tremendous backlog of it that has been received from previous ad ministrations. The Opposition par ty which, for all the oratorical protestations of its titular head, is still basically anti-nationalist, has tried to make graft and cor ruption an overpowering political issue despite its own questionable record, little realizing that it is colonialism that has been mainly responsible for this cancer that is gnawing at the entrails of our body politic. But with power-poli tics still as a primary concern of our political parties there can be no permanent cure for graft and corruption. Only industrialization and eventual economic emancipa tion will provide our people not only with economic security and well-being but a greater latitude of economic opportunties which will minimize the influence of government patronage and allow merit to become the yardstick for employment and promotion. •"pODAY the nationalist struggle is far from won. There are elements in both parties that seek to perpetuate colonial rule. Alien economic interests are trying hard to oppose and to sabotage the movement. Spine enemies of na tionalism are fighting it frontally. Others, masquerading as nation alists, are boring from within, act ing as fronts for powerful foreign interests, or seeking to emasculate its meaning by trying to limit its operation to our cultural life alone so that the nation’s econo mic exploitation by aliens may continue undisturbed behind a pleasant facade of cultural rela tionship. But these anti-nationalists must realize that their hours are num bered, that everywhere there are unmistakable signs that the peo ple are experiencing a reawaken ing of the nationalistic faith which animated and gave mean ing and substance to the lives of their forefathers, and of a grow ing awareness and understanding of the vital importance of reshap ing our policies with a view to freeing them from alien control, so that, after our economy shall have passed into Filipino hands, this and future generations may at long last come into the full fruition of their heritage. 20 Panorama If the party in power is cour ageous and loyal to its goals and the people are steadfast and deter mined, we shall be able to era dicate once and for all from our national politics the dual role of serving God and Mammon at the same time which our political par ties have been playing since their inception, with such disastrous re sults for the nation. After fourteen years of inde pendence it is certainly time we developed a political leadership whose sole allegiance is to the people, whose sole concern is the welfare of that people, and whose sole desire is an unquestioned obedience to the people’s will. After fourteen years of independ ence surely there could be no earthly reason why our political parties should still allow them selves, wittingly or unwittingly, to be used as instruments of co lonial rule. Our people must de mand undivided allegiance from the men they have chosen to govern this country. And they must be vigilant and profess lo yalty only to the leadership that best expresses their will and only for so long as such leadership continues to express and obey that will. ¥ ¥ * Verdict A new YORK attorney made such a bombastic closing argument that the jury seemed over whelmed by his sheer volume. As the reverberations died away, his opponent rose. “Listening to the thunderous appeals of my learn ed friend,’’ he began, “ I recalled an old fable. A lion and an ass agreed to slay the beasts of the field and divide the spoils. The ass was to go into the thicket and bray to frighten the animals out, while the lion was to lie in wait and kill the fugitive as they emerg ed. In the darkest part of the jungle, the ass lifted his awful voice and brayed and brayed. “The ass was intoxicated with his own uproar, and wanted to see what the lion thought of it. With a light heart, he went back and found the lion looking about doubtfully. “ What do you think of that?’ said the exultant ass. ‘Do you think scared 'em?’ ‘“Scared 'em?’ repeated the lion in an agitated tone. Why, you’d ’a scared me if didn’t know you were a jackass!’ ” The jury’s verdict went to the quiet lawyer. October 1960 21
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