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Supreme court decision - Right of asembly and freedom of speech.pdf

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extracted text: Supreme Court Decision - RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH Cipriano P. Primicias, as Gen, Campaign Manage·r of the Coalesced Minority Parties, petitioner, vs. Valeriano E. Fugoso, as Mayo1· of City of lllanila, respondent, G. R. N. L-1800, Jan. 27, 1948. FERIA, J. 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PUBLIC which is the power to prescribe regula1\JEETING; ASSEMBLAGE; MANDA- tions, to promote the health, n:orals, l\IUS.-Action for mandamus was insti- peace, education, good order or safety, Lted by the campaign manager of the and general welfare of the people. This Coalesced Miriority' Parties against the sovereign police power is exercised by the .llhyor of the City of Manila to compel government through its legislative branch the latter to issue a permit for the pur- by the enactment of laws regulatposc of petitioning the government for ing those and other ccnstituticnal and rndress of gri<!'Vances. The i·eason of the civil i}ghts, and it may be delegated to l\Iayor for refusing the permit is, "that political subdivisions, such as towns, muthere. is a reasonable ground to :believe, nicipalities and cities by authorizing their basing upon previous utterances and upon legislative bodies called municipal and the fact that passio,;s, specially on the city counci: s to enact ordinances for the :part of the losing groups, i·emains bitter purpose. and high, that similar speeches will be 3. ID.; PUBLIC MEETING; DISCRETION delivered tending to undermine the faith OF MAYOR IN ISSUING PERMIT TO and confidence of the people in their gov· HOLD PUBLIC MEETING; CONS· ernment, and in the duly constituted au· TRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION. thorities, which might threaten breaches -The provision of Sec. 1119, Revised of the peace and a disruption of public Ordinances, City of Manila does not conorcler." Held: As the request of the pe- fer upon the Mayor the power to refuse tit:on was for a permit ,:to hold a peaceful to grant the pe1·mit, but only the discrepublic meeting," and the1·e is no denial tion, in issuing the permit, to determine of that fact or any doU1bt that it was or specify the streets or pu.blic places to be a lawful assemblage, the reason where the parade or procession may pass. g: ven for the i·efusal of the permit can or the meeting may be held. This pronot be given any consideration. The pe- vision can not be construed as conferring tition for mandamus was granted. upon the Mayor power to grant er re2. ID.; FREEDOM OF SPEECH; ASSEMBLAGE; POLICE POWER; DELEGATION OF POLICE POWER.-The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully as,emble .and petition the government for redress of grivances, are fundamental pe!'scnal i·ights of the people recognized and guaranteed lby the constitutions of demccl'atic countries. But it is a sPttled principle growing out of the nature of well ordered civil societies that the exercise of these rights is not absolute for it rr ay be so regulated that it shall not be icjurious, to the equal enjoyment of other having equal right~, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is terrr.ed the sovereign "police power" Page 460 fuse to grant the permit, which would be ta·1tamount to authorizing him to prohibit the use of the stre.ets and other public places for holding of meetings, parades or processions, because si~ch a construction would mal<e the ord'nance invalid and void or vioJative of the constitutional limitaticns. 4. ID; RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY; FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS; PA· RADE OR PROCESSION; CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION.-A statute requir;ng persons using the public streets fer a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from the locol P.uthorities is not unconstitutional abl'idgment of the rights of assemb!y or of freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute is construed by the state co" rts, the licensing authorities are THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEW stricbly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a consideration of the time, place, and manner of the parade 01· prosession, with a view to conserving the pcblic convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing, and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license. 5. ID.; DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER 'I'O THE EXECUTIVE.-The Municipal Board can not grant the Mayor a power which it does not have. The powers and duties o.f the Mayor as the Chief Executive of the City al'e xeecutive, and one _of them is "to comply with and enforce and give the necessary orders for the faithful performance" (Sec. 2434(b) of the Revised Administrative Code), the legislative police power of the municipal board to enact 01·dinances regulating reasonably the exercise of the fundamental personal right of the citizens in the streets and other public places, can not be delegated to the mayor or any other officer by conferring upon him unregulated d'scretion or without laying down rules to guide and control his action by which its impartial execution can be secured or partiality and op· pression prevented. 6. ID.; ORDINANCE; REQUISITES OF A VALID ORDINANCE.-Ordinances to be valid must be reasonable; they must not be oppressive; they must be fair and impartial; they must not be so framed as to allow their enforcement to rest in official discretion. 7. ID.; STREETS; PRIVILEGE OF CITIZEN TO USE PUBLIC STREETS MAY BE REGULATED.-The privilege of a citizen to use the streets may be regulated in the interest of all, it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied. 8. ID.; FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ASSEMBLY.-The fact that speech is likely to result in some' violence or in destruction of property is not en-0ugh to justify its supprssion. There must be the probability of serious injury to the state. SEPTEMBER, 1949 Among freerr.en, the deterrents ordinari. ly t-0 be applied to prevent crime are education and punishment for violations of the law, not abrigment of the rights of free speech and assembly. Ramon Dwkno for the petitioner. rhe City Fiscal for the respondent. DECISION F'ERIA, J.: This is an action of mandamus institu·ted by the petitioner, Cipriano Primicias, a campaign manager of the Coalesced Minority /Flarties against Va· leriano F'ugoso, as Mayor of the City of Manil,a, to compel the latter to issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at Plaza Miranda on Sunday afternoon, November 16, 1947, for the purpose of petitioning 1he government for redress of grievances on the grou111d that the respondent refused to grant such permit. Due to 1he urgen y o'f the case, this Court, after mature deliberation, issued a writ of mandamus, as prayed for in the :i:etifion on No·· vember 15, 1947, without prejudice to writing later an extended and reasoned decision. The right to freedom of speech, and to :peacefully a sEmble and pe:ition tpe goYernment for redress of grievances, arc fundamental pErsonal rights of 1he pecple rec_gnizEd and guaranteed by the constitutions of democrat~c countries. But it is a settled principle j!'rowing cut of the nature of well-orderEd civil societiEs that the exercise of these righ' s is not abrnlute '.or i•t maybe so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor inju· rious to the rights of the community or 1::ociety. The po.wer to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign "police power,". which is the power to prescribe regulations., to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is exercised by the government throu.gh its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional and civil rights, ,Page 461 and it may be• delegated to political subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities and cities by authorizing their legislative bodies called municipal and city councils to enact ordinances for the purpose. The Philippine Legislature has delegated the exercise of the police power to the Municipal !Board of the City of l\laniJ.a, which according to Sec. 2439 of the Administrative Code is the legislative body .of the .City. Sec. 2444 of the same. Code grants the Municipal Board, among. others, the, following legislative powers, to wit: "(p) to provide for the .Prohibition and suppression of riots,_affra.ys, disturbances and disorderly assemblies," (u) to regulate the use of streets, avenues, . . . parks, cemeteries and othe:r; p\iblic places" and "for the ab.atement .of nuisance in the same," and " ( ee) to enact all ordinances it. may deem necessary _and proper for sanitation and safety, the furtheranee of prosperity and the promotion of morality, peace, good order, comf'ort, ·Convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants." Under the above delegated power, the MuniCipal Board of the City of Manila, enacted S~cs. 844 and 1119, Sec. 844 of the Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibits as an offen·se -against public peace, and Sec. 1262 of the same Revised Ordinance penalizes as a mistlemeanor, "any act,-in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a ricit; or collect .with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlaw.ful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in- any lawful assembly.'' And Sec. 1119 provides.the following: ·"Sec. 119. Free for use of public. -The streets and public places of the city shall be kept free and clear for the use of the public, and the sidewalks and crossings for the pedestrians, and the same shall only be used or occupied for other purposes as provided ·by ordinance or regulation : Provided, That the holding of athletic games, sports, or exercises d_uring the celebration of -Page. 46~ national holidays in any streets 01· public places of. the city and on the patron saint day of any district in question, may be permitted by means of a permit issued by the Mayor, who shall determine the streets or public places, or .portions thereof, where such athletic games, sports, or exercises may be held: And provided, further, That the hoiding of any parade or procession in any streets or public places is prohibited unless a permit therefor is secured from the Mayor, who shall, on every such occasion, determine or specify the streets or public places for the formation, route, and dismissa.I of such parade or procession: And provided finally, That all applications to hold a parade or procession ·Shall be submitted to the Mayor not less than twenty-four hours prior to the holding of such parade or procession.'' As there is no express and' separate provision in the Revised Ordinances of the City regulating the holding of public meeting or assembly at any street or public places, the provision of said Sec. 1119 regarding the holding of any parade or procession in any street or public places may be applied by analogy to meeting and assembly in any street or public .places. Said provision is susceptible of two constructions: one is that .the Mayor of 1he City of Manila is ·vested with tmregulated discretion to -grant or refuse to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assem'b-ly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; and the other is that the applicant. has the right to a permit whic'"n shall be granted by the Mayor, subject only to !the latter's reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the purpose, with a view to preventing confusion by overlapping to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the ri&k of disorder. iAfter a mature deliberation, we have arrived at the conclusion that we must THE LOCAL GOVER,NMENT REVIEW adopt the second construction, that is, construe the provisions of the said ordinance to mean that it does not confer upon the Mayor the power to refu.se to grant the permit, but only the discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets or public places where the parade or procession may pass or the meeting may be held. Our conclusion fi.nds support in the decision in the case of ·Willis Cox v. State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569. In that case, the statute of New Hampshire P. L. chap. 145, Sec. 2', providing that "no parade·or procession upon any ground abutting thereon, shall oe permitted unless a special license therefor shall first be obtained from the selectmen of the town or from lieensing committee," was construed by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire as not conferrinrg upon the licensing board unfettered discretion to refuse to grant the license, and held valid. And the Supreme Court of the United· States, in its decision (1941) penned by Chief Justice Hughes affirming the judgment of the State Supreme Court, held that "a statute requiring persons using the pu1blic streets for a parade or procession to procure a special licen.s.e therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgment of the rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute is construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a c'.lnsideration of the time, place, and :r..ianner of the parade or procession, with a view to conserving the .public convenience and of affording ·an opportunity to provide proper policing, and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license, x x x." ·we cannot adopt the other alternative construetion or constru1e the ordinance under consideration as conferring upon the Mayor power to grant or refuse to grant the permit, which would be tantamount to authorizing him to prohibit the use of the streets and other public p.Jaces for holding of meetings,. parades or processions, beSEPTEMBER, 1949 cause such a construction would make the ordinance invalid and void or violative of the constitutional limitations. As the Municipal Board is empowered 011ly to regulate . the . use of streets, parks, and other pwblk places and the word '.'regulate," as used in Sec. 2444 of the Revised Administrative Code, means and includes the power. to control, to govern and to restrain, but can not be construed as synonymous with "suppress" or "prohibit" (Kwong .Sing v. City of Manila; 41 Phil. 103)., the Municipal Board can not grant the Mayor a power which it does not have. Besides, as the powers and duties of the Mayor as the Chief Exec:.itive of the City are executive, and one of them is "to comply with and enforce and give the necessary orders for the faithful performances and execution. of the laws and ordinances" (Sec. 2'434 ('h) of the Revised Administrative Code), the legislative police power cif the mu!licipal board to enact ordinances regulating reasonably the exercise of the fondamental personal right of the citizens in the streets and other public places, can not be delegated to the mayor or any other officer bv conferring upon him unregulated discretion or without laying down rules to guide and control his action by which its impartial execution can be secured• or partiality and oppresson prevented, In City of Chicago v. Trotter, 136 Ill. 430, it was held by the S1upreme Court of Illinois that, under Rev. St. 111. c. 24, art. 5, Sec. 1, whicb empowers city councils to regulate . the use of the public streets, the council. has no p0wer to ordain that no processions shall be allowed upon the streets until a permit shall be obtained· from the superintendent of police, leaving. the issuance of such permits to his discretion, since the powers conferred on the council cannot be dele'gated by them. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Wis. 585, 54 N. W. 1104, held the following: "The objections urged in the case of City of Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md. 217, were also, in substance, the Page 463 same, for the ordinance in that case upon its face committed to the unrestrained wiJ.1 of a single public officer the power to determine the rights of parties under it, when there was nothing in the ordinance to guide or control his action, and it was held void because 'it lays down no rules by which its impartial execution can be secured, or .partiality and oppression prevented,' and that 'when we remember that action or nonaction may proceed from enmity or prejudice, from partisan zeal or animosity, from favoritism and other improper influences and motives easy of concealment and diffietJlt to be detected and exposed, it becomes unnecesary to suggest or fo comment upon the injustice capable of being wrought umder cover of such a power, for that becomes apparent to every one who gives to the subject a moment,.s consideration. In fact, an ordinance which clothes a single individua·l with such power hardly falls within the domain of law, and we are constrained to pro"nounce it inoperative and void.' x x x In the exercise of the police power, the common council may, in i-ts discretion, regu· late the exercise of s:.ich rights in a reasonable manner, but can not suppress them, directly or indirectly, by attempting to commit the power of doing so to the mayor or any other officer. The discretion, to be exercised within the limits of the law, and not a discretion to transcend it or to confer upon any city officer an arbitrary au.thority, making him in its exercise a petty tyrant." In Re Frazee, 63 Mic'higan 399, 30 N. W. 72, a city ordinance providing that "no person or persons, associations or org~.nizat.ions shall march, parade, ride, or drive, in or upon or through the public streets of the City of Grand Rapids with musical instrument, banners, fl::?.gs, * * * without having first obtained the consent of the mayor or common council of said City;" was held by the Supreme Court of Michigan to be unreasonable and void. Said SuPage 464 nr€me Court in the course of its decision held: . "*** V\<'e must therefore construe this charter, and the powers it assumes to grant, so far as it is not plainly unconstitu1tional, as only conferring such power over the subjects referred to as will enable the city to keep order, and suppress mischief, in accordance with the limitations and conditions required by the rights of the people themselves, as secured ·by the principles oflaw, which cannot be less careful of private rights under a constitution than under the common law. "It is quite posrsi'ble that some things have a greater tendency to produce danger and disorder in the cities than in sma.Jler towns or in rural places. This may justify reason.able precat'rt:ionary measures, but nothing further, and no enterference can extend beyond the fair scope of powers granted for such a purpose, and no grant of absolute discretion to su•ppress lawful act.ion altoge~her can be granted at an. *** "It has been customary, from time immemorial, in all free countries, and in most civilized countries, for people who are assembled for common purposes to parade together, by day or reasonable hours at night, with banners and other paraphernalia, an.d with musfo of various kinds These processions for political, religious, and social demonstrations are resorted to for the express pu·rpose of keeping unity of feeling and enthusiasm, and frequently to produce some effect on the p:.iblic mind by the spectacle of union and numbers. They are a natural product and exponent of common aims, and valuable foctors in furthering them. *** When people assemble in riotous mobs, and move for purposes opposed to private or public security, they become unlawful, and their members and abettors become punishable. * * * "It is only when political, religious, social, or other demonstration$ THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEW create public disturbances, or operate as nuisance, or create or manifestly tlireaten some tangible public or priva:te mischief, that the Jaw iI!ll:erferes. "This ·by-law is unreasonable, be· eause it suppresses what is in general perfectly lawful, and because it leaves the power of permitting or restraining processions, and their courses, to an unregula'ted official dercretion, when the whole matter, 'if regulated at all, must be by permanent, legal provisions, operating generally and impartially." In Rich v. Napervill, 42 Ill App. 222, the question was raised as to the validity of the city .ordinance which made it unlawful for any person, society or club, or association of any ki,nd, to parade anlY of the streets, with flags, banners, or 1transparencies, drums, horns, or other musical instruments, without the 'permission of the city cooocil ·first had and obtained. The appellants were members of the Salvation Army, and were. prosecuted for a violation of the ordinance, and court in holding the ordinance invalid said. "Ordinances to be valid must ·be reasonable.; they must not be oppressive; they must be fair and impartial ; they must not be so framed as to allow their enforcement to rest in official discretion . . Ever since the landing of the Pilgrims from the Mayflower the right to assemble and worship according to the dictates of one's conscience, and the right to parade in a peaceable manner and for a lawful purpose; have 1:.-een fostered and regarded as among the fundamental rights of a free people. The spirit of our free institutions allows great latitude in puiblic parades and demonstrations whether religious or political . . . . If this ordinance is valid', then may the city council shut off the parades of those whose notions do not suit their views and tastes in politics or religion, and permit like parades of those whose notions do. When men in authority are permitted in their discretion to exercise power so arbitrary, liberty is subverted, and SEPTEMBER, 1949 the spirit of our free institution violated. . . . Where the granting of the ;permit is left to the unregulated discretion of a small body of city aldermen, the ordinance cannot be other than partial and dis<!riminating in its practical operation. The law abhors part.iality and discrimiootion. * • *" '19 L. R. A. ip. 861) In the case of Tru,iillo v. City of i\tYalsenburg, 108 Col. 427, 118 P. (2d) 1081, the Su;preme Court of Colorodo, in construing the provision of Sec. 1 of Ordinance No. 273 of the City of. W:alsenbt1rg, which provides: "That it shall be unlawful for any person or persons or associatfon to use the street of the City of Walsenburg, Colorado, for any parade, procession or assemblage without first obtaining a permit from the Chief of Polic'e of the City of 'Wlalsenburg so to do," held the following: "l. The ·power of municipalities, under our state law, to reguJate the use of public streets is conceded. 35 C.SjA.., chapter 163, section 10, subparagraph 7. The privilige of a citizen of the United States to use the streets. . . may be regulated in the interest of all, it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordinatfon to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied. HaguH, Mayor, v. Committee for Industrial Or~aniza:tion, 307 U. S. 496, 516, 59 S. Ct. 954, 964, 83 L. Ed. 1423. 2, 3 An excellent statement of the p'Jwer of a municipality to im1pose regulations in the use of public streets is found in the recent case of Cox v: New Hampshire, 312 U. S. 569, 61 S. Ct. 762, 765, 85 L. Ed. 1049, 133 A.L.R. 1!>36, in which the following appears: "The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order fo assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public hil!'hways has never been regarded as inconsistent Page 465 with civil liberties !:rut rather as one of the means of. safeguarding the good order upon which they uJtimately depend. The control of travel on the streets of cities is the roost familiar illustration of this recogni· ti on of socia.J need. 1 \1\> 'here a restriction of 'the use of highways in that relations is designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot "be disregarded by the a:t.tempted exercise of some civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to nrotection. One would not be justified in ignoring the familiar red traffic light because he thought it Ms religious duty to disobey the municipal command or sough:t by that means· to direct public attention to an announcement of his opinions. As regulation of the use of the streets for parades and processions is a traditional exercise of control by local government, the question in a particular ca~e is whether that control is exerted so as not to deny or unwarranted'ly abridge the right of assembly and the opportunities for the communi· cation of thought and' the discussion in public places. Love! v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444, 451, 58 S. Ct. 666, 668, 82 L. Ed. 949 /953, Hague v. Comittee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S. 496, 515, 516, 59 S. Ct. 954, 963, 964, 83 L. Ed. 1423 .11436, 1437/; Scheneider v. State of New Jersey /Town of Irvington/, 308 U. S. 147, 160, 60 S. Ct. 146, 150, 84 L. E. 155 /164/; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 2'96, 306, 307, 60 S. Ct. 900, 904, 84 L. Ed. 1213 /1219, 1220/, 128 A. L. R. 1352. "/4/ Our concern here is the validity or non-validity of an ordin· ance which leaves to the u1ncontrolled official diseretion of the chief of '.POiice of a municipal corporation to say who shall, and who shall not, be accorded the privilege of. parading on its public streets. No standard of regulation is even remotely sug· gested. Moreover, under the ordinPage 466 ance as drawn, the chief of police may for ·any rE1ason which he may entertain arbitrarily deny this privilege to any group, This is authorization of the exercise of arbitrary power by a governmental agency which vi ol ate s the Fourteenth Amendments. People v. Harris, 104 Colo. 386, 394, 91 P. 2d 989, 122 A.L.R. 1034. Such an ordinance is unreasonable and void on its face. City of Chicago v. Trotter, 136 Ill. 430, 26 N. E. 359. See, also, Anderson v. City of. 'Wlellington, 40 Kan. 173, 19 -P;. 719, 2 L.R.A. 110, 10 Om". St. Om. St. Rep. 175; State ex rel. v. Dering, 84 Wis. 585, 54 N. W. 1104, 19 L.R. A. 858, 36 Am. St. Rep. 948; Anderson v. Tedfard, 80 Fla. 376, 85 So. 673, 10 A.L.R. 1481; State v. Coleman, 96 Conn. 190, 113 A. 385, 387; 43 C.J. p. 419, Sec. 549; 44 C. J., p. 1036, Sec. 3885. * * * "In the instant case the uncontrolled official suppression of the privilege of using the public streets in a lawful manner clearly is apparent from the face of the ordinance before us, and we therefore hold it null and void." The Supreme Court of the United States in Hague vs. Committee for Industrial Organization 307 U. S. 496, 515, 516; 83 Law. ed. 1423, declared that a municipal ordinance req1irin3" the obtaining of a permit. for a public assembly in or upon the public streets, highways, public pal"ks, or public buildings of the city and authorizing 1he dinctor of public safety, for the purpose of preventing riots, disturb~ ances, or disorderly assemblage, to refus~ to issue a permit when after investig:;.tion of all the facts and circumstances pertinent to the applica· tion he believes it to be proper to refuse to issue a permit, is not a valid exerc'ise of the police power. Said Court in the course of its opinion in support of the conclusion said: "* * * ~,herever the title of streets :md parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEW the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for ·purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public plac!es has, from ancient times, been a part of. the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a ciitizen of the United States to use the streets and pa11ks for com· munication of views on national quE:stions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but reiative, and must be exercised in subordination· to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of. regulation, be abridged or denied·. "We think the court below was right in holding the ordinanc'e quoted in Note 1 void upon its face. It does not make comfort or convenr ience in the use of streets or parks the sfandard of official action. It enables the Director of Safety to refuse a permit on his mere opinion that such refusal will prevent riots, disturbances or disorderly assem· blage.' It can thus, as the record discloses, be made the instrument or arbitrary su.ppression of free expression of views on national affairs for the prohibition of all speaking will undoubtedly 'prevent' such even. tualities. But uncontrolled offic'ial suppression of the privilege cannot be made a substitute for the duty to maintain order in connection with the exerci~e of this right.'' Sec. 2434 of the Administrative Code, a part of the Charter of the City of Manila, which provides that the mayor shall have the power to grant and refuse municipal licenses or per· mits of all classes, cannot be cited as an authority for the Mayor to deny the application of the petitioner, for the simple reason that said general power is predicated upon t:he ordinances enacted by the Mu1nicipal Board requiring licenses or permits to be issued by the Mayor, such as those SEPTEMBER, 1949 found in Chapters 40 to 87 of the Revised Ordinances .of the City of Ma· nila., It is not a specific or substantive power independent from the cor1·esponding municipal ordinances which the Mayor, as Chief Executive of the City, is required to enforce under the same S<ic. 2434. Moreover, "one of the sett.led maxims in constitutional law is that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority," except cer· tain policy of local government, specially of police regulation which are conferred u•pon the legislative body of a municipal corporate. Taking this into cbnsideration, and that the police power to regulate the use of streets and ot.}J,er public places has been delegated or rather conferred by the Leg· isla.ture upon the Municipal :Board of. the City (Sec. 2444 (u) of the Adrninistrative Code) it is to be presumed that the Legislature has not, in the i;<ame breeth, conferred upon the Mayor in Sec. 2434 (m) t.he same power, spe· cially if we take into account that its exercise may be in conflict with the exercise of the same power by 'I.he Munic!ipal Board. Besides assuming arg'Uendo that the Legislature has the power to confer, ar.d tn fact has conferred, upon the mayor the power to grant or refuse licenses and permits of all classes, in• dependent from the ordinances enacted by- the Municipal Board on the :matter, anrl the provisions of Sec. 2444 (u) of the same Code and' of Sec. 1119 of the Revised Ordinances to the contrary notwithstanding, such grant of unregu· lated and unlimited power to grant or refuse a permit for the use of streets and other public' places for processions, parades, or. meetings, would be null and void, for the same reasons stated in the decisions in the cases above q!1Qted, specially in Willis Cox v. New Hampshire supra, wherein the ques· tion involved was also the validity of a simi.Jar statute of New Hampshire. Because the same consti:tutional limitation applicable to ordinances apply • Page 467 to statutes, and the same objections to a municipal ordinance which grants u~restrnined discretion upon a city officer are applicable to a law or statute that confers unlimited power to any officer either of the municipal o.r state governments. Under our demo· cratic system of government no such unlimited power may be validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of national emergency. As stated in State ex. rel. Garrabad v. David. supra, The discretion with which the council is vested !s a· ·legal discretion to be exercised within the limits of the law, and not a discretion to transcend it or to con· fer upon any city officer an arbitrary authority making in its exercise a petty tyrant." · ' It is true that Mr. Justice Ostrand cited said provision of Art. 2434 (m) of th~ Admnistrative Code apparently in support of the de<!ision in the case of Evangelista v. Earnshaw, 57 Phil. 255-261, but evidently the quotation of said provision was made by the writer of the decision under a mistaken conception of its purview and is an obiter dictum, for it was not necessary for the decision rendered. The popular meeting or assemblage intended to be held therein by the Communist Party of the Philippines was clearly an u111lawful one, and therefore the Mayor of the City of Manila had no power to grant the permit applied for. On the contrary, had the meeting been held, it was his duty to have the promoters thereof prosecuted· for violation of Sec. 844, which is punishable as misde· mcanor by Sec. 1262 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila. .For, according to the decision, "the doctrine ar.d principles advocated and urged in the Constitution and by-laws of the ?aid Communist Party of the Philippines, and the speeches uttered, deli· vered, and made by its members in the pulbHc meetings or gatherings, as above stated, are highly seditious. in that they suggest and incite rebellious conspiracies and disturb and obstruct the lawful authorities in their duty. Page. 468 The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing t.he permit is, "that there is a· reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances an<l upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted au•thorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order." As the request of the petition was for a permit "to hold a peaceful public meeting," and there is no denial of that fact or any doubt that it was to be a lawful assemblage, the reason given for the refusal of the permit can not be given any considera· tion. As stated in the portion of the declsio;:i in Hague v. Committee on Industrial organization supra, "It .does n:Yt make comfort and convenience in the use of streets or parks the standard of official action. It enables the Director of. Safety :to refuse the .permit on his mere opinion that such refusaJ. will prevent riots, disturbances or disorderly assem· blage. It can thus, as the record discloses, be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression of views on national affairs, for the prohibition of all speaking, will un· doubtedly 'prevent' such eventualities." To this we may add· the following, which we make our own, said by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his <!oncurring opinion in Whitney p. California, 71 U. S. Law 5d. 1105-1107: "Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify sUJppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burned women. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irraHOl!lal fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reason· aible ground to fear that serioas evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be ·reasonable ground to believe that the danger (Continued on page 474) THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEW Our Local ... (Continued from page 459) HON. RICARDO D .. MIRANDA Provincial Governor of Davao Personal Circumstances. - Born in Loon, Bohol, on J aliuary 11, 1904; married to Leonor Francisco with whom he has so far no child. Educational Attainments.-Loon Primary School graduate, 1916, valedictorian; Loon Intermediate School graduate, 1919, valedictorian ; Bohol High School graduate, 1926, valedictorian; Associate in IArts, Un.iver_ si:ty of Manila, 1934, valedictorian; ·Bachelor of Laws, same university, 1938, salutatorian; and admitted to Philippine iB'ar in 1938. Experiences and Activities :-Barrio school teacher and elementary school principal; clerk and acting municipal treasurer in Loon, Bohol, 1927; clerk in :the former Bureau of Audits and f;ield audit clerk in Negros Occidental and Davao, 1928-1933; clerk, ·Generai -Land Registration Office and Department of Justice from 1934 to 1937; Secretary to Assemblyman Quimpo of Davao in Page 474 Supreme Court ... (Continued from page ~68) apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one • • • . "Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did not fear political change. They did not exalt order at the cost of li·berty. * * * "Moreover, even imminent danger cannot justify resort to prohibition of these functions essential to effectiv.e democracy, unless the evil apprehended is rela:t.ively serious. Frohibition of free speech and assembly is a measure so stringent that ·it would be inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively trivial harm to society. * * * The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough fo jus:t.ify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the state. Among freemen, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent crime are education and punishment for violations of the law, not abridgment of the rights of free s·peech and assembny." (Whitney v. California, U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep., 71 Law. Ed., pp. 11061107.) In view of all the foregoing, the petition for mandamus is granted and, there appearing no reasonable objec( Continued on page 475) 1938; Member. Provincial Board of Davao in 1941; Acting Governor of Davao at outbreak of war on Dec. 8, 1941, and of Free Davao up to September, 1942; and Ac:ting Governor of Davao during the Osmeiia Administration (up· to June 15, 1946). Practised law up to the elections on November 11, 1947, when he was elected Provincial Governor of Davao for a term expiring in 1951. lfobbies.-Reading and bowling. Motto :-Work, work and work: THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEW ANCIENT JUSTICE IN THE BISAYAS RAJAH BENDAHARA KlALANTIAW These are the laws which I lay at the feet of the Rajah Besar and request that they be established for the government of the Bisayas and ·their posterity. Competent men,. knowing the an· cicnt · ways of the Bisayas, were assemb!ed r.nd, af.ter consulting and advising relative to the old usages, compiled in conformity thereto this code of Und::mg Undang or Institutes. Let them be known and descend to posterity, that men may· not act according to their own .wills and inclina· tions, but that order and regularity may prevail, as well during prosperity as adversity, a:i:Jd that what is established be not done away. If these laws are attended .to, no one <'an question the authority of the datos for authority will have been conferred upon them by the Rajah lBesar. the highest authority in the land, that they may administer the law in their res:pective towns, and whoever shall not atlmit this awthority will offend against the law of the land. · THE BEGINNING OF MANILA'S LAST ROYAL DYNlASTY SULTAN-EMPEROR NAKODA RAGAM J am the Sultan Bulkeiah in Bor· nf'o where I rule from the city of peace, Dares Salam, on the river Brunei. In Magindanaw, and in Sulu, whence comes my incomparable wife, Empress Lela Men Chanei, men call me Rajah Baguindia. And now in Maynila I am Sultan and Emperor. Twice have my fleets ~!tacked Selurung, which you style Lusung, and this time I have c'onquered. The boastful Dato Gambang, your late ruler, lies de&d, and a princess from his house shall become a wife of mine to carry on the dynasty of Pasig. Our son will be your lord. and, because you es( Continued on page 489) SEPTEMBER, .1949 'PR.ONUNCIAMENTOS (Continued from page 456) conversely physical health is hard to keep unless one is happy and contented. * * * FERNANDO CALDERON-Money alone does not make life worth living. Nay, in most instances it blinds and renders him insensible to agony and suffering of his fellowmen. There can be no genuine feeling of satisfaction without the honest thought of having served faithfully and well, regardless of financial return. * * * ----«O»..---N eW Legislation ... (Continued from page 485) ditor or district health officer ·as herein fixed shall not take effect until after one·half thereof shall have been provided for in the General Appropria.tion Act. Sec. 3. All acts and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed. Sec. 4. This Act shall take effect on July l, 1949. Approved, June 10, 1949. ---oOo--SU PRE ME COURT (Continued from page 474) tion to the use of the Plaza Miranda, Quiapo, for the meeting app.lied for, the respondent is ordered .to issue the corresponding permit, as requested. So ordered. Moran, C.J., Pablo, Perfecto and Bcnzon, JJ., conc·Jr. Paras, J., concurs in a separate opinion. Briones, · J., concurs in a separate opinion. Hila.do, J., dissents in a separate opL. nion. Tuason, J·., dissents in a separate opinion. . Padilla, J., takes no part. --:-o-:-Youth i!> a blunder; Manhood; a struggle ; Old Age a regret. -DisraeliIn youth the days are short and the ~·ears long; iii old age the years are short and the days long.-Panin.Page 475
Date: 1949
Rights