Background od Sabah

Title

Background od Sabah

Language

English

Source

Panorama XX (6) June 1968

Year

1968

Rights

In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted

Fulltext

■ This is an interesting account of how the present government of the Philippines happens to claim a part of Borneo. BACKGROUND OF SABAH The issue of Sabah was first raised in the post World War II years in 1962 when the government of President Diosdado Macapaal in the Philippines came to fear that the heavily Chi nese populations of Singapore and the British colonies in Borneo were going commu nist. But the Philippine claim runs far back into history, and there are so many legal knots involved that hardly anyone except an interna tional lawyer can come to an approximate conclusion on \vho is right. Complicating the legal questions, of course, is the problem of what the people of Sabah themselves want to do. All of what is now Sabah, plus about 2,000 square miles of territory that presently belongs to Indonesia, were claimed by the Sultan of the Sulu archipelago in the late 18th century as a reward for helping the victorious side in a dispute over the succession to the throne of neighboring Brunei. The territory had once been claimed by Brunei, still a British colony, but never effectively controled by it. There is no legal evidence that Brunei ever recognized Sulu’s claim to the territory, but nevertheless, Sulu ruled it for about a century. In the late 1870’s a group of British and Hong Kong businessmen became inter ested in developing North Borneo. They bought out an American concern that claimed an interest in it, and agreed to pay the Sul tan of Brunei 5,000 straits dollars a year to cede it to them. Then, because of Sulu’s controls, they approached the sultan early in 187$, and for the sum of 5,000 straits dollars a year, plus royalties, he agreed to let them have it. The sultan later claimed he had done so at the point of a gun, but there seems 36 Panorama to be no evidence to support this. In any case, the sultan signed a document that ei ther “leased” or “ceded” — there is an argument about the translation of the Malay word “pajak” in the contract — the territory “forever un til the end of time.” On the same day, Jan. 22, 1878, the sultan named Baron Gustavus von de Over beck, an Austrian who work ed in Hong Kong and was associated with Alfred Dent, a London merchant, the “Datu Bandhara” (a nakay title of royalty) and “Sultan of Sankarakan,” and con ferred on him full powers of sovereignty over Sabah. Like many other fortune hunters of the time, Dent and Overbeck had a ; touch of larceny in their hearts. They agreed to pay the sul tan royalties on production in Borneo, but this was not included in the lease. Soon afterward, they formed the Sabah company in Hong Kong and thereafter consi dered themselves absolved of any responsibility for ro yalties. Nevertheless, the payment of the royalties continued — and did so right through the accession to power of the British North Borneo com pany by royal charter in 1881, conversion of the ter ritory to a British Crown colony in 1946, and its turn over to the government of Malaysia in 1963. The fact that the rent is being paid even to this day — into an escrow bank ac count in Manila while the sultan’s heirs fight over it — appears to be a strong legal argument in favor of the Philippines. On the other hand, the Malaysians contend that Spain, as the colonial ruler of 'the Philippines, agreed with the British and Ger mans — who had trading interests in the area — in 1885 to recognize British so vereignty over North Borneo in exchange for British re cognition of Spain’s sove reignty over the Sulus. The Malaysians also point out that a succeeding sultan on April 22, 1903, in a con firmatory deed relating to some islands off the coast, referred to the original do cument as a “cession,” and to the “Government of Bri tish North Borneo.” They also contend that the Philippines, if it really June 1968 37 thought it owned North Bor neo, could and should have raised the issue when it be came independent in 1946. The Filipino answer to this is simply that at a time when the government was faced with the difficult tasks of building a self-governing nation, repairing the war-ra vaged economy, and then de feating a communist rebel lion, it did nots have time or energy to put forward this claim. But whatever the legal is sue involved, the over-wean ing dispute concerns the fate of the half million people who live in Sabah, and the effect of the argument on the internal politics of both Malaysia ' and the Philip pines. Opce raised, the claim took on a life of its own. Filipino politicians and the violently nationalistic press of Manila hoped on it with fervor. Claims were made that a piece of soil had been sold illegally for a pittance, and demands that the government get it back at any cost were so strong that neither Mr. Macapagal nor his successor, President Ferdinand Marcos, has been able to let the issue drop. Because Malaysia is a friend and ally, the Philip pines has for the most part restrained its demand to a call for some sort of legal action to determine the ter ritory’s future. Until this weekend, four basic solutions had been pro posed at one time or an other, all of which were rejected by Malaysia. The Filipinos asked: To take the case to the International Court of Tustice (World Court) at The Hague. To take it to binding ar bitration by an agreed third party. To take it to the United Nations. To hold a plebiscite in the territory and let the people decide. ‘The Malaysians object to all four of ‘these proposals. They say they cannot jus tify in the context of their internal politics, telling the people of Sabah that their future is up for decision by outsiders over whom they have no control or voice. Nor could they afford to give in to demands for a plebiscite without risking the ruination of' the political Panorama base of Tunku Abdul Rah man’s government. Moreover, they say, to give Sabah in effect the right to vote on cession from Ma laysia through a plebiscite would be impossible to jus tify under the Constitution and could lead to later de mands from other wealthy states in the Federation for the same right. Lastly comes the question of sovereignty. Malaysia is a sovereign nation and can not be forced, short of war, to let another nation inter vene in what it rightly con siders its internal affairs. The only proposal so far that seems to have the ne cessary elements for solving the problem is that for put ting the question to the Sa bah people without infring ing on Malaysian sovereign tyBy asking Sabah whether it wants the case taken to the World Court, the gov ernment would not b*e per mitting a vote on cession, but only a vote on whether to proceed with legal reme dies. If the people of Sa bah are content in' Malaysia — and no one seriously questions that — they will vote no, end of dispute. If they were to vote “yes,” the government would still be able to fight the case through the World Court, and the preponderance of legal evidence does seem to be on Malaysia’s side, lease money or no. In addition, Kuala Lumpur would have advance notice that Sabah is unhappy, and could do the necessary to right the situation. The referendum should also satisfy the Filipinos, for even though they are natio nalistic, no responsible per son in that country would advocate taking in a territory against the wishes of the people who live there. And by permitting the Filipino press to observe the referendum and see that it was fair, the Malaysians would be neutralizing the most vocal and troublesome power in the movement to regain Sabah. — by U.P. In ternational, June 17, 1968. June 1968 39

pages

36-39

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