The crucial year in China

Title

Language

English

Source

Panorama XIX (5) May 1967

Year

1967

Rights

In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted

Fulltext

■ The so-called cultural revolution in Red China these days may be the advont of the downfall of Mao Tse-tung and his communist regime. This article is part of a speech of Dr. Han Lih-Wuh, Ambassador of the Republic of China in Manila. THE CRUCIAL YEAR IN CHINA On the New Year’s Day, the editorials of the People’s Daily and Red Flag in Pei ping declared 1967 as the year of decision for the "Cul tural Revolution.” They called for an all-out offensive against the "anti-Mao power group.” They also announced that "the great proletarian cultural revolution must go from the the offices, schools and cultural circles to mines and the rural areas so that all positions are captured by Mao Tse-tung's thought.” What is the cultural revo lution? The scope and na ture of this type of revolu tion can exactly be gleaned from the above. It is a power struggle based on ideological split, started by Mao Tset u n g and his associates against the dominating group at the time with ramifications that penetrate into the va rious levels of authority reaching the workers and far mers, spreading into a dou ble-barrelled attack on both anti-Maoism and anti-Communism. The leader of the group in power is Liu Shao-chi. Liu, a master of organization and intrigue, is being trick ed into probable impotency. However while Liu is down, he is by no means out. The anti-Maoist struggle is being carried on not by one leader but by a number of leaders and sub-leaders. While the campaign against Liu may presently reach a crescendo, the ax might yet be prevent ed from falling on him be cause of the innate strength of the opposition. This is indeed an ugly mess. Both the contestants in the struggle are in a quan dary. The year of decision may well turn out to be a year of crippling difficulties for the Chinese Communist regime. It might even be 22 Panorama fatal. However things may turn, the developments of the present year on the main land China will have farreaching effects both inter nally and internationally. A crucial year is in the unfold ing. Let us take stock of its background and view its prospects. In Peiping, as in Moscow, there have been purges, and purges in monolithic struc tures can be compared to the reshuffles in democratic so cieties. Previous to the pre sent upheaval, two notable purges have taken place in Peiping, the purge of North east leaders Kao Kang and Rao Sou-shih in 1955, and that of Defense Chief Peng Te-huai and Chief of Staff Huang Ke-cheng in 1959. In the latter purge, Liu was a collaborator of Mao and was subsequently awarded the chairmanship of the regime, replacing Mao himself. In the same reoganization, Lin Piao took over the defense post, Lou Jui Ching. In the posters put out by Red Guards in Peiping last autumn, it was related that the 1959 replacement of Mao by Liu was the result of force majeure rather than volun tary transition, thus sowing the seed for the present power struggle. Is this a real reve lation or a hind thought and make-up accusation of Liu? We have no documentary evidence for either case. Anyway, it would probably be fairer to say that the failure of Mao’s commune system and the impotence of his hard line international policy were among the more important reasons for the change. In the meantime, Mao’s poor health as well as advancing years may have encouraged Liu to bolder planning for the phasing out of Mao. This in turn might have caused Mao’s resent ment. But these are just con jectures. As distinct from ordinary urges, the present power struggle is dignified with the name "cultural revolution.” Compared to previous purges in Peiping and the numerous purges in Moscow, the "cul tural revolution” is unprece dented in the scope of its in volvement in that not only leaders are affected but also the masses and the military. May 1967 23 The “cultural revolution” was openly launched a year ago today. On April 18, 1966, the Liberation Army Daily, an official organ of Lin Piao in Peiping, pub lished an editorial with this airy title: "Let Us Blow the Trumpet of the Great Cul tural Revolution.” While the “cultural revo lution” was thus announced twelve months ago, its stage was set in 1965. At a meet ing of the Central Commit tee of the Chinese Commu nist Party in September 1965, Mao had declared that "we must criticize and repudiate the reactionary thought of the bourgeoisie.” But the Party was only under his no minal control; his voice was left i in the void. In Novem ber, he retreated to Shanghai where he started his moves against the power group in opposition to his thought. On November 10, under the name of Comrade Yao Wenyuan — a name that might have been assumed by Mao himself — a special article” on the New Historical Drama ‘Hai Jui’s Dismissal’ ” ap peared in Wen Huei Pao in Shanghai. This precipitated the at tack on intellectuals and writers and sounded the call for revolution against anti Party and anti-Mao elements. The drama piece "Hai Jui’s Dismissal" was written by Wu Han, Vice Mayor of Peiping. Wu and Teng To, Secretary of the Peiping Mu nicipal Chinese Communist Party Committee, together with Liao Mo Sha, member of the Committee, pen name of Wu Nan Hsing. After much hesitation and even re sistance, the Peking Daily was finally forced to there fore anti-Party thought. The three musketeers of the socalled Three-Household Vil lage Black Inn were urged. The Red Flag took a step further and asked: Who was the man behind the gang? The "hot pursuit” resulted in the dismissal of the first secretary of the Peiping Mu nicipal Party Committee, Peng Chen, on June 3, 1966. He was also relieved subse quently as Mayor. But this is only the first big assault on the opposition. As the editorial of the People’s Daily on June 10, entitled “Long Live the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,” sug 24 Panorama gested; all monsters must be swept away. The months of June and July 1966 witnessed feverish maneuverings on both sides to the struggle. Liu Shaochi was busy preparing a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (C.C.P.) to defeat Mao. On the other hand, Mao adroitly executed a military deployment around Peiping through Lin Piao. Teng Hsiao Ping, who had cooperated with Liu, got cold feet at the last moment perhaps because of the mili tary pressure. The Central Committee of the C.C.P., which has not met for four years and which should meet every six months, lasting from August 1 to 12, 1966. After protracted de bates and hard tussles, Liu was demoted from number two to number eight and Lin Piao shot up to number two. Lo Jui Ching was replaced to remove the military away from the reach of Liu. Tao Chu, who was in control of the south, was given later. Suspicious of Teng Hsiao Ping and not sure yet of both the Party and the military, Mao resorted to the employ ment of youths by organizing them into the Red Guards whose first rally was held on August 18. The openly pro claimed aim was to “protect Chairman Mao, destroy bour geoisie thoughts, and estab lish new proletarian culture.” But after having given vent to childish fantasy and eccen tricities, including toying with street names and des troying artifacts, the Red Guards were soon directed to attack the opposition, headed by Liu and Teng. The rampages of millions of youth from Peiping to Canton for the better part of a year is a pitiful and heart rending story. There were Red Guards and counter Red Guards. Everywhere they created havoc and confusion. What have they achieved for their original instigators? They have strengthened the hand of Mao and Lin and advanced the status of Mao’s wife, Chiang Chin. They have humiliated but not crushed Liu. On the other hand, they have made a mockery of the Communist regime and nearly plunged May 1967 25 the whole countryside into anarchism. To bring the Red Guards under control and to secure the intervention of the mili tary for a more effective showdown with the opposi tion, the Mao-Lin faction called nearly this year for a triple alliance: the party ca dre, the army, and the revo lutionary rebels, meaning the masses. The alliance is for the naked purpose of seizing power. In this alliance, the role of the Red Guards be comes minor. In fact, ele mentary and secondary schools, closed since last July, have been ordered to open in February and March, res pectively, and Red Guards were ordered back to schools. For wresting power from the anti-Mao and anti-Party op position, the triple alliance is to effect a grand alliance with all possible elements amenable to the revolution. After having wrested control in a city or province, it shall organize into something like the Paris Commune or revo lutionary council. Around the middle of March, the Central Committee of the C.C.P. ordered a temporary halt to the power struggle at the working levels in the countryside. The order stat ed, “Do not struggle to seize power in production bri gades and production teams during the busy period of spring cultivation.” This, however, spanned only a few weeks. The general cam paign seems to be in a stale mate but the specific drive against Liu and Teng appears to be in crescendo. This brings the so-called cultural revolution to its present sta tus. —From The Manila Times, May 9, 1967. 26 Panorama

pages

22-26

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