The continuing fight for our civil liberties

Title

Language

English

Source

Volume XV (Issue No.1) January 1963

Year

1963

Subject

Civil rights

Civil rights organizations

Civil Liberties Union -- History

Rights

In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted

Abstract

In the fight for civil liberties, no single group has perhaps accomplished more in this country than the Civil Liberties Union. The following is a brief history of its first 25 years.

Fulltext

In the fight for civil liberties, no single group has perhaps accomplished more in this country than the Civil Liberties Union. The following is a brief history of its first 25 years. / THE CONTINUING'FIGHT FOR OUR CIVIL LIBERTIES r About 20 young profession als met 25 years ago to or ganize. The first meeting was one of simple comrade ship, with no decision being made as to the shape and nature of the proposed or ganization. In the next two meetings, the organizers appeared visi bly affected by the war clouds in the horizon. Japan had just begun a war with China. A fascist revolt was gaining the upper hand in Spain. German and Italian fascism were hurling a challenge to the rest of the world. Philippine government was showing signs that it was ready to take lessons from foreign fascists on peace, or der and discipline under a regime based on “G o d, Country, and Family.” An organization to defend civil liberties was in order. The A committee of three was formed to draft the objectives of the organization: Antonio Bautista (deceased), Jose B. L. Reyes and Paulino J. Gar cia. Another committee of one (Deogracias J. Puyat, deceased) was appointed to to recommend the name for the orgainization. The name — Civil Liberties Union of Philippines, and the object- O ives, approved by the organ- V. izers, showed that while the broad aim was to fight for nationalism, democracy and social justice in- the Philip pines, the focal point of the activities would be the de fense of civil liberties and the Constitution. From the moment it was organized until the Japanese action brought the Philip pines into the World War, the Civil Liberties Union was busy in the struggle for JANUARY 1963 35 the attainment of its object ives. The major struggles of the CLU may well be record ed. The most memorable was the fight for freedom of speech in the advocacy of boycott of Japanese goods. In a Congress for Democracy sponsored by nationalistic elements, Dr. Antonio Bau tista, then chairman of the Executive Commission of the CLU, advocated the boycott of Japanese goods as a means of weakening the war poten tial of a sure future enemy. Upon protest of the Japanese consul who claimed that such things could not be per mitted to happen in his country, our government saw fit to order the arrest of Dr. Bautista upon a charge un der *he Revised Penal Code (Art. 118) for inciting to war, and giving motives for repri sals. The CLU secretary im mediately filed bail for the chairman. When the secret ary brought the matter of bail for approval by the bodv. some members ques tioned the propriety and wis dom of bailing by the CLU. They were not in favor of Japanese boycott, and would have nothing to do with any thing that would incur the animosity of Japan. This was the first really serious rift within the CLU. Several members resigned. The CLU, however, continued its activities. The case was finally settled when Presid ent Quezon ordered the case to be dismissed. The CLU had a clash with President Quezon on the par ty-less system. He advocated a one-party system. When the CLU and other organ izations and elements called his ambition dictatorial, Que zon backed down, saying that what he meant was not oneparty but a party-less system, a system which was and is supposed to be in vogue in Portugal. Fortunately, how ever, Quezon soon forgot his one-party or party-less system. The Hartendorp case was another test which the CLU met with dignity. A certain sector was daily using the radio to discredit the public school system in America which it termed as godless and materialistic. Mr. A. V. H. Hartendorp took- up the is sue and wrote his replies in a magazine which was approv ed by the Department of Public Instruction for read 36 Panorama ing by teachers. Upon com plaint of his opponents in the debate, the magazine was or dered excluded from the schools. The CLU took up the matter in defense of civil liberties. Diplomatic action by the department prevent ed the issue from becoming more acute. The Jai Alai case was fun damentally a challenge to the nationalism objective of the CLU. The Agricultural and Industrial Bank (predeces sor of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and Development Bank of the Philippines) was giving too many big loans to foreign, specially Spanish, interests, to the prejudice of Filipino business interests. Jai Alai was one of those to which such a loan was granted. The CLU opposed the loan, and tried, through legal process, without success, to examine the books of the Jai Alai. The notoriety of the case caused the company to repay the loan before the war broke out. In the firm belief that the Constitution should not be treated lightly by any one, the CLU registered a vigor ous opposition to the amend ment of the Constitution approved by the legislature for submission to a national ple biscite. The CLU was not against amending the Cons titution. But it stood against what it considered to be has ty amendnemts which were obviously motivated primari ly by a desire to permit the re-election of the President. Just before the war broke out, the CLU got involved in the Soriano case. A citi zen of Spain, but residing in the Philippines practically all his life, Mr. Andres So riano filed an application to become a Filipino citizen in 1941 in the court of first in stance of Rizal. The CLU filed its appearance and in the November 1941 hearing of the case, contested the ap plication on the ground that legal requirements had not been set. The CLU’s oppo sition, however, was virtual ly quashed and Mr. Soriano was permitted to take his oath as a citizen before the completion of the regulatory period. A day or two before the Japanese entry into Ma nila, he was commissioned captain in the Philippine Army. After liberation, upon the sponsorship of Gen. JANUARY 1963 37 Douglas McArthur, he be came a citizen of the United States. The last pre-war battle of the CLU was with President Quezon. It started when the President, after the fall of France to the Nazis, and ex plaining the fall, castigated the “so-called freedom lov ing”. elements in the Philip pines and suggested that these elements were responible for the decay of nations and their defeat by aggressors. The matter came to a head when, in a speech before the faculty and student body of the University of the Philip pines a week before Pearl Harbor, he declared that the Philippines was not ready for war; he lambasted the CLU, and promised to hang every member from a lamp post. The CLU took concern, and in a body, drafted an answer which the leading Manila newspapers, for reasons they did not divulge, refused to publish whether as news or as paid advertisement. The war automatically closed the issue. The war did not end the activties of the CLU. It merely changed the nature of the struggle. Defense of civil liberties or of democracy and social justice became unne cessary and impossible. The emphasis changed to nation alism, the defense of country against the invader. A cor responding change in the methods of struggle necessa rily had to be made. Several members began conversations on guerrilla warfare a few days after Pearl Harbor. A meeting was call ed wherein the CLU was de clared “dissolved.” Within three weeks after the Japan ese entry into Manila, ten CLU members organized the Free Philippines as a resis tance group. Four CLU members paid the supreme sacrifice for nationalism: Ra mon de Santos, Rafael R. Roces, ‘ Jr., Jose Apacible, and Antonio M. Bautista. The survivors in the group sought no recognition or re ward. Immediately upon libera tion, the CLU reorganized, and resumed its activities. The emphasis had somewhat changed from that of the pre war days. While the ques tions of civil liberties, demo cracy and social justice al ways concern the CLU, the defense of nationalism, i.e., of 38 Panorama the national interests of Fili pinos, had become the main problem. In early 1945, just after the end of the Japanese occupation, the CLU became aware of a move to wean the Filipino people from their cherished aspiration for nat ional freedom, and imme diately opposed attempts for a re-examination of Philip pine independence, of which the then High Commissioner Paul V. McNutt was obvious ly the spokesman, as revealed in a statement from Tokyo, that “the majority of the Fil ipinos are not necessarily in terested in independence.” When the Bell Trade Act, which provided for, in the words of President Osmena, an “unjust? trade agreement and also for parity rights for American citizens and corp orations was passed by the 79th Congress of the United States, the CLU tried to mobi lize public opinion for the re jection of the trade agreement and parity by the Philippine legislature and later by the people. Approval of the pa rity amendment was railroad ed, through the “ouster” of several senators and congress men known to be opposed to such measures. Forthwith, the Military Bases Agreement was signed under which the Philippines leased many bases for 99 years, and granted the right of extraterritoriality to the U. S. The CLU tried to dissent but its voice was drowned in the general re joicing over liberation by the Americans. The CLU later opposed the Quirino-Foster Agreement under which prac tically all offices of the exe cutive department were staff ed with American advisers selected b y Washington. Then the CLU agitated for an all-out revision of the trade agreement, first during the administration of Pres ident Quirind and again that of President Magsaysay. A committee,, headed by mem ber Claro M. Recto (now de ceased) submitted a confi dential memorandum to Sen ator Jose P. Laurel, head of the Philippine negotiating panel, in which the CLU urg ed the elimination of all pro visions in the trade agree ment which negated our po litical independence with res pect to several economic mat ters. In the home front, the CLU was the first non-parti san group to recognize the January 1963 39 basic character of the politic al dissidence in Luzon. It urged the government to con sider the politico-socio-econo mic origins and motivations of the dissident movement, and to realize that military and police measures were not the proper solution. The correctness of the CLU pos ition was recognized by the Mag saysay administration, which initiated some reme dies. In the meantime, the on slaught on our independence and nationalism brought about, as expected, other pro blems. For one thing, there were the moves to curtail ci vil liberties in order to deny them to those opposing the objectives of those in power. The CLU busied itself in de fense of the Constitutional separation of powers especial ly with respect to the so-call ed emergency powers of the President, and in seeking the early restoration of the sus pended privilege under Pres ident Quirino of the writ of habeas corpus, which is the first and last guarantee of all the other civil liberties. During these controversies, the position of the CLU was necessarily a delicate one, rendered even more delicate by the realities of the cold war. The CLU was subject ed to pressures and even pro vocations not only by some of the national leaders but also by some foreign organ izations. The pressures and provocations were treated with silence and patience. Then in 1954, under a some what new different atmos phere, the CLU welcomed an investigation by the CAFA. The CLU came in force for the hearing, with a defense panel headed by Members Recto, Tanada, Teehankee, Fernando, Crudo, David and Abola. The result was the exoneration of the CLU. In the meantime, the dan gers inherent in the recogni tion of the extraterritorial rights were becoming more and more visible. The CLU called for a re-examination of the ^Military Bases Agree ment. In the original or pre liminary Philippine panel, which actually negotiated with American counterpart in 1956, at least one CLU member was retained. The Philippine panel stood its ground firmly. The CLU urged in a memorandum to 40 Panorama the panel that the 99 year lease, which it considered to be tantamount to perpetuity, be substantially reduced to 25 years. Under the then pre vailing realities of world po litics, our position appeared to be very reasonable. It was conceded in principle by the American panel. But the other demands for the elimi nation of provisions curtail ing Philippine sovereignty, such as extraterritoriality, were adamantly opposed by the American panel, and the negotiations ended in a dead lock. Today, the fight has shift ed back to the politico-eco nomic field. American big business interests, through their government, had de manded more and more con cessions for their foreign di rect investments in the Phil ippines. Both the CLU, and members Recto and Tanada, as senators, assailed every at tempt to increase alien eco nomic domination in the Philippines; and the various foreign investments measures, supported by foreign inte rests, were the natural targets of these attacks. The CLU is resolved to re main a staunch proponent of every move aimed at remov ing every obstacle to the pre servation of the national in dependence, and the national security, the essence of which, as Member Recto had always taught, is the freedom from foreign dictation. If what we call happiness consists in harmony, clarity, unity with oneself, in the consciousness of a positive, confident, decisive turn of mind, if, in short, it is peace resident in the soul, then obviously happiness is a state far easier for the sons of spirit to arrive at than for the children of nature. — Thomas Mann. JANUARY 1963 41

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