Three days that saved the World

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Part of Panorama

Title: Three days that saved the World
Language: English
Source: Volume XV (Issue No.1) January 1963
Year: 1963
Subject: Cold War, 1945-1991; International security; Peacekeeping forces; Peace -- International cooperation; United Nations peacekeeping forces
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Abstract: Never was the world so perilously close to war as it was in the last week of October, 1962 over Cuba. Here is the story as told by the London Observer’s diplomatic staff.
Fulltext: - Never was the world so perilously close to war as it was in the last week of October, 1962 over Cuba. Here is the story as told by the London Observer’s diplomatic staff. THREE DAYS THAT SAVED THE WORLD An hour before President Kennedy was due to broad cast in Washington on a matter of. “urgent national importance,” Adlai Stevenson stepped into a high-speed lift to the thirty-eigth floor of the United Nations building in New York. He walked into the offices of the Acting Secretary-Gen eral, U Thant, and, choosing his words with his customary fastidiousness, told him that the Russians had missile bas es in Cuba and that the United States intended to call an emergency meeting of the Security Council. It was six o’clock on the evening of Monday, October 22—the beginning of a selfcontained week of nightmare that ended almost as abrupt ly as it began. The week is still full of mysteries and question marks and it has no precedents or parallels. But the events of the next few days illuminated, with a sud den glare, the terrifying rules and moves of the nuclear chess game. Crucial clash The full import of Steven son’s news did not at once strike U Thant. Stevenson did not tell him that the President was about to an nounce a blockade, and did not wait for any discussion. But U Thant knew that he must expect a direct RussianAmericana clash, that would be crucial for the U.N., and for him. Ever since he had been elected to office a year before, the U. N. Secretariat had watched U Thant with in creasing respect. He had tak en his predecessor, Dag Hammarskjold, as his model: even the offices kept their antiseptic Swedish air, 20 Panorama though one or two abstract works of art had been replac ed with Renoirs and a strange assortment of Mexican and African sculpture. U Thant lacked Hammarskjold’s intellectual power or political subtlety, but he had the same dedicated independ ence. When Stevenson left, U Thant called in his main con fidant on the Secretariat, the clever soft-voiced Indian, Chakravarthi Narasimhan, his right-hand man through out the week. Together they listened to Kennedy’s broad cast, and then U Thant with drew for his customary re flection—the last quiet eve ning he was to have. Crisis gathers Next day the crisis gather ed speed. From Washington, Kennedy completed his open ing moves: the U.S. fleet de ployed off Cuba, the Western allies expressed their support, Stevenson tabled a resolution in the Security Council, de manding immediate dismant ling and withdrawal from Cuba of all offensive wea pons, endorsed unanimously by the Organization of Amer ican States. But from Moscow the west ern ambassadors reported a strange calm. The Soviet Council of Ministers had met in the Kremlin to hear the Defense Minister, Marshal Malinovsky, report on mili tary preparations. At the Foreign Ministry a tall/ Stalintype skyscraper, Vassily Kuznetsov, the Deputy For eign Minister, had summon ed the newly appointed American Ambassador, Foy Kohler, a quiet, wrinkled man who was the chief America# expert on Berlin. Khrushchev himself was ostentatiously playing it cool: while in New York an ex tremely worried U Thant was considering ways of calling for a truce, Khrushchev in Moscow went to see “Boris Godunov” at the Bolshoi, chatted afterwards to Jerome Hines, the bass singer from California who had sting the part of Boris, and found time to receive William Knox, American president of West inghouse Electric. As for the Moscow public they had not even been told about the cause of the crisis. In Washington and Eu rope the atmosphere became steadily more strained as the JANUARY 1963 21 public waited for the clash between American warships and Russian arms ships heading for Cuba. The New York stock market fell by 11 points on Tuesday, four on Wednesday; the price of gold went up, and shops in Los Angeles reported a heavy de mand for tin foods. Phone at side Everyone was watching the President. To his friends he seemed controlled and- reasonably relaxed. But throughout the week he was never more than a few steps away from a telephone. Ever since the danger of sudden nuclear attack, the telephone had become the most crucial part of the equipment: when ever he moved, the switch board moved with him, and even at the airport a wheeled trolley carried a telephone at his side. The "situation room,” just inside the west wing of the basement of the White House, was manned 24 hours a day by the President’s aides, including McGeorge Bundy and his deputy, Carl Kaysen. Equally important was the telephone between Washing ton and General Norstad, the cool and sophisticated commander of Nato. After Kennedy’s speech, he ordered American forces in Europe to a state of "awareness” — the first of three pre-arranged stages of preparation' for trouble in Europe which he had introduced about 18 months before. As the tension increased, Norstad came under heavy pressure from Washington to move to a further stage of preparedness — involving the issue of ammunition (includ ing nuclear warheads) and the dispersal of nuclear bombers. It is now known that he resisted this pressure, arguing that it would be wrong, as long as the crisis was confined to the Carib bean, to take what might ap pear to the Russians as pro vocative measures in Europe. The neutralists As the world prepared re luctantly to face war, all sides looked hopefully towards the U.N. But, from U Thant’s vantage point, the outlook was increasingly grim. On the Wednesday morning the leader of the Cypriot dele gation, Zenon Kossides, to 22 Panorama gether with six ether neu tralist leaders, called on U Thant to plead for him io intervene. U Thant consulted closely with Omar Loutfi, his com fortable-looking Egyptian un der-secretary, and then pre pared a careful message to Khrushchev and Kennedy, bravely objecting to the “ex traordinary” nature of the blockade and calling for a fortnight’s truce|—a demand that went further than the neutralists’ own suggestions. The message was delivered that evening to the Security Council; some delegates be lieved that U Thant was threatening to resign (echo ing Hammarskjold at Suez) if the Americans used force. By the end of the day there was some relaxation: Wash ington had reported that some Russians ships had al tered course, and Khrushchev had mentioned casually to William Knox in Moscow that he was still thinking of coming to America. On Wednesday afternoon U Thant himself ordered that the annual U.N. concert, giv en by the Leningrad Orches tra, should proceed as usual. Then, on Wednesday night, the spotlight tempora rily turned on a remote old man in Wales — Bertrand Russell, who was sitting in his bedroom slippers in his rented villa, Plas Penryhn, with his dog Peanut. Five cables Russell’s activities provided a curious entracte to the world crisis — as if a drama tic critic had strayed on to the stage by accident. Ever since he had listened to Ken nedy’s midnight broadcast, Russell had been in a state of unusual agitation. That night he sent off five cables — which were phoned through via Manchester — to Kennedy, Khrushchev, Mac millan, Gaitskell and U Thant, in that order. Copies of the cables were read to British newspapers, which ig nored them. For the next two days Rus sell tried to mobilize media tors, including Schweitzer in Africa, Pablo Casals, in Puerto Rico, and Cyrus Eat on, Khrushchev’s eccentric millionaire friend, in Am erica; he also proposed sum moning an -emergency meet ing of the Pugwash scientists. JANUARY 1963 23 He appealed to the British Press “to allow the people to know of the grave danger facing mankind,” and pre pared an angry leaflet headed You Are To Die, which was printed at its own expense by the Cuban Embassy in Lon don. Frosty answer The Press took no notice at all until at 7:30 on Wed nesday night the Tass Agen cy in Moscow suddenly put over the tape a long, concil iatory reply from Khrush chev. Abruptly the boycott of Plas Penryhn was transform ed into a siege. The tele phone was blocked with calls from all over the world, ask ing for Russell’s original Khrushchev’s letter (which he had not then seen — the actual letter still hasn’t ar rived), Next morning there were 36 journalists at the house. Russell found himself, for the moment, in the midst of the triangle of Washing ton, Moscow and the U.N. The only leader who did not in the end reply person ally to Russell’s cables was Macmillan, who sent a frosty answer through his secretary, Phillip de Zulueta, saying “Your views have been not ed.” On Thursday, at the U.N. after Khrushchev’s letter to Russell, the atmosphere was still strained, but more hope ful. Kennedy replied fo U Thant, saying that Stevenson would enter preliminary talks as U Thant had asked, and Moscow reported that Khrushchev, too, had agreed to talks. Stevenson and Zorin exchanged allegations, but some contact had at least been achieved. The next day Khrushchev told U Thant that he had ordered Russian ships to stay out of the interception area. Kennedy said that every thing possible would be done to avoid confronting Russian ships outside that area. The dreaded clash at sea had been averted/ and the first part of the crisis was over — with the U.N. as the undisputed peacemaker. Force hint But a second and more serious crisis was only just be ginning— the three days in whicn the world could have 24 Panorama been lost, but was saved. For although Khrushchev had indirectly given Kennedy a mild public answer, he had not committed himself to re moving the missile bases from Cuba. On the contrary, Am erican air surveys showed the Russians were working fever ishly to complete them. The removal of these bases was Kennedy’s declared aim, by negotiation if possible, but if not, Washington in creasingly hinted then by force. The blockade might stop more missiles coming in, but it could not stop the Rus sians from finishing the bases already started. The speed with which this second crisis developed was dictated by the speed of the continued Russian buildup. Washing ton thought that Khrushchev might simply be playing for time, hoping the crisis would gradually peter out, leaving Russian rockets still in Cuba. Mr. Kennedy had warned in his broadcasts that if the offensive preparations in Cu ba continued, "further action would be justified." Now, inspired leaks to the Wash ington Press corps ominous ly began to speak of possible American bombing attacks on the missile bases. If this was part of the war of nerves, the Russians had already shown — more gent ly — they could play the same game. In Moscow on Thursday, Marshal Malinov sky made the closing speech at an army conference on ideological questions. Soviet forces, he declared, were in a high state of readiness. A shortened version of the speech was published in the Army’s paper. About 15 youths demonstrated outside the American Ambassador’s residence, a handsome domed building in a square near the Embassy. They were chased away by militiamen. With the new crisis in mind * U Thant had sent, pressed by the neutrals, an other message to the two leaders urging restraint. But he was a little reluctant to push himself forward. Sir Patrick Dean, the chief British delegate, commented sympathetically: "If U Thant is always the ham in the sandwich, he’s bound to be eaten in the end.” U Thant was also in touch on Thurs day with Betrand Russell, who had three letters from JANUARY 1963 25 the Acting Secretary-General during the week. ‘End. this madness* At 2:30 a.m. on Friday, Russell had a reply to his sharp cable to Kennedy which had wound up "End this madness." It had been lost for three days at the White House among 53,000 other telegrams. Kennedy, more politely told Russell: "I think your attention might now be directed to the burg lars rather than those who have caught the burglars.” That night Russell, helped by his secretary Ralp Schoenman, sent more cables to Kennedy, Castro and Khrush chev. At Portmadoc tele phone exchange the night operator said: ‘Don’t you ever get any sleep, you two?” But the role of the sleep less philosopher was over. Even the' public mediation of the U.N. was taking se cond place to secret diploma cy and this was increasingly direct between Washington and Moscow. At the U.N. the American delegation, sensing hostility, quietly dropped its initial plan — io provoke a Soviet veto at the Security Council and then carry the American resolution immediately be fore the General Assembly. Instead it accepted a U.A.R.-Ghana proposal to suspend the Security Council discuss ions until U Thant had had a chance of trying to arrange a compromise. Secret messages On Friday morning Adlai Stevenson went to Washing ton for instructions on the minimum terms the Ameri cans should demand. That afternoon, he, Zorin and the Cuban Garcia were all re ceived by U Thant on the thirty-eighth floor. They were ushered into different waiting rooms to avoid meet ing. Stevenson left the build ing saying “That is a good time for quiet diplomacy.” Then, expecting a tough round of negotiations, the American delegation was as tounded to be called up by Washington at 11:30 on Fri day night — after dawn in Moscow — and told that Ken nedy had just received a secret message from Khrush chev going far beyond the compromise that U Thant had been trying to. negotiate. This was the third of four 26 panorama secret messages that are known to have passed be tween Kennedy and Khrush chev during the crisis. There are believed to have been others, but no one outside the White House and the Kremlin knows for sure. There is no direct tele phone line from the White House to the Kremlin. (Though during the past year the Swedes had suggest ed installing such a tele phone link as one way of preventing war by accident.) But this time Kennedy and Khrushchev corresponded se cretly with each other through their embassies. As soon as he came into office, Kennedy had made a point of establishing as close a contact with Khrushchev as possible through the Am erican ambassador in Mos cow. Until recently it was the veteran Russian-speaking Llewellyn Thompson, who had just been replaced by Foy Kohler. Thompson could see Khrushchev at al most any time and, back in Washington, was one of the President’s most trusted ad visers on how to deal with Russia. The text of Khrushchev's message to the President on Friday night is still secret. It is said not to have been published by the Americans because of its violent and vituperative language. But, behind this smokesr-een, Khrushchev made the key move of the week. According to Kennedy’s reply to the message, the Soviet leader ad mitted in it for the first time the presence of bases in Cuba, reassured the Ameri cans they were in Soviet not Cuban hands, and agreed to take them out in return for no more than the assurance that the Americans would not invade Cuba. New twist It was clear later that this was the turning-point of the crisis. But at the time the outside world, ignorant of the message, could see only a rapid slide towards war. Evidently Khrushchev had at last been convinced that if he did not withdraw his mis siles the Americans might reaHy attack them. That Friday evening as his vital message was on its way to Washington, Mr. and Mrs. Khrushchev attended a con January 1963 27 cert given by a Cuban orches tra in the Tchaikovsky Hall. In Washingtonn that night it must have looked as though the game was won. But on Saturday morning more dis turbing news began to come from Moscow. A large or ganised demonstration took place outside the American Embassy and Moscow Radio announced that it would be broadcasting an important statement. Most Muscovites expected a call-up of the re serves. Instead it was an of fer to America to swap the Soviet bases in Cuba for the American missile bases in Turkey, which was received in Washington with bewild erment and alarm. It coin cided with news that Rus sians round the Cuban mis sile sites were firing at Am erican reconnaissance planes and had shot one down. Had Khrushchev suddenly changed his mind? Or had he lost control in the Kremlin and been forced to take a tougher line? Whose finger was now on the trigger on the other side? A mystery Paradoxically one of the most frightening thoughts of a frightening week was that Khrushchev might no longer be there. But as one Am erican diplomat said: "We must remember our aim is to dismantle the bases — not to dismantle Khrushchev.” Just why Khrushchev back tracked on Saturday is still a mystery. In his reference to a Cuba-Turkey deal, the So viet Premier mentioned Wal ter Lippmann. The wizened elder statesman of the Am erican Press, in his column the previous Tuesday, had first made the heretical sug gestion of a Cuba-Turkey ex change — to the fury of the State Department, who thought the Russians would interpret it as official kite flying. But there were signs that a deal over Turkey had been considered in Washington as one possible bargain in later negotiations with Russia. The Turks themselves object ed to the Americans taking their missiles away. The brink On Saturday evening, Pres ident Kennedy replied to both Khrushchev messages. He rejected a deal over Tur key. He was ready, he said, 28 Panorama to talk about disarmament generally, provided the Rus sian missiles in Cuba were "rendered inoperable.” But he offered Khrusshchev an other way out. He gave him the promise the Soviet Pre mier had asked for in his secret Friday message — that America would not attack Cuba if the Soviet missiles were withwdrawn. American officials at the U.N. spread the word that unless an agreement were reached with in the next few hours the U.S. would take direct mili tary action to wipe out the bases. This was the brink. For no one knew what Khrush chev would reply. For the next fifteen hours the ten sion reached its peak. And nerves on both sides were stretched even tighter when, on the Sunday morning, an American U2, straying off course above Siberia, was sighted by the Russians. While the world waited anxiously for Khrushchev, the man who seemed least worried of all was President de Gaulle. He was far more concerned about his referen dum. On Saturday afternoon he went down to his country house at Colombey-les-deuxEglises and did not come back to Paris until Tuesday. In London on Saturday night, it was realised that the situation was heading for dis aster. Macmillan had seen Khrushchev’s u n published letter to.Kennedy of the< day before and believed that the risk of war was greater than at any time in the crisis. Late on Saturday, he sum moned Butler, Thorneycroft and Home, who were joined by Heath when he got back from Brussels. They discussed t he situation and the Prime Minister spoke to Kennedy on the telephone The ministers met again at 9:30 on Sunday morning, when there was still no sign of a statement from Khrush chev. With the help of his col leagues, Macmillan drafted a letter to Khrbshchev, which was finished by 11:15. By noon it had been typed, cod ed and transmitted to Sir Frank Roberts in Moscow. Sense of relief But the letter was not needed. By 2:15 the tele printers at Admiralty House, and everywhere else, tapped January 1963 29 out the next of Khrushchev’s message agreeing to the Pres ident’s terms. At the U N. on Monday morning there was a sense of immense, overwhelming re lief. Ambassador Zorin gave a lunch for members of the Security Council. Stevenson arrived in good humour, and, as a joke, pulled out a newspaper cutting about the Ghanaians asking for wea pons to repel elephants. "I expect they were Am erican elephants,” said Zorin. “No,” said Stevenson, “the elephants wore red.” — A LEARNED IGNORAMUS The specialist “ knows” very well his own, tiny corner of the universe; he is radically ignorant of all the rest. Here we have a precise example of this strange new man ... a human product unparalleled in history. For, previously, men could be divided simply into the learned and the ignorant, those more or less the one, and those more or less the other. But your specialist cannot be brought in under either of these two categories. He is not learned, for he is formally ignorant of all that does not enter into his specialty; but neither is he ignorant, because he is a “scientist,” and “knows” very well his own tiny portion of the universe. We shall have to say that he is a learned ignoramus, which is a very serious matter, as it im plies that he is a person who is ignorant, not in the fashion of the ignorant man, but with all the petu lance of one who is learned in his own special line. — Jose Ortega y Gasset. 30 Panorama