Malay language issue.pdf

Media

Part of Panorama

extracted text: MALAY LANGUAGE ISSUE Troubles in recent years in Ceylon, India, Belgium and Canada have shown that the right to speak your mother tongue is one for which peo ple are ready to fight. Ta mils in Ceylon, non-Hindu speakers in India, Flemings in Belgium, and French Ca nadians have this urge to protect their language in common. But Ceylon, Bel gium and Canada have had to deal with two languages only; in Malaysia, there are four major languages in Western Malaysia, to say nothing of various Chinese dialects. Clearly, the ques tion of Malay as a single National Language is even more delicate than in the cases mentioned above, three of which produced blood shed. The constitutional date for the introduction of Malay as the single national language in Western Malaysia came on Aug. 31. The National Language Bill, which was passed on March 4, represent a significant concession by Malay leaders to the Chinese and Indian communities, and to those educated in English of whatever community. The Paramount Ruler may allow English for official purposes for as long as is thought fit; the central or any state gov ernment may permit the use of any of the communal lan guages; the courts will use English; acts and ordinances will be in English and Ma lay; and members of parlia ment may be permitted to speak English. Behind this sensible-sound ing compromise lies Tengku Abdul Rahman’s understand ing that to “force things down people’s throats whe ther they like it or not” would have produced com munal strife and administra tive breakdown. Instead, he has chosen "the peaceful way”, despite demonstrations from students at the Muslim September 1967 7 College in Kuala Lumpur (which had to be closed), de monstrations outside t h e Tengku’s house, and charges from the state premier of a Malay state that the compro mise was a betrayal of Ma lay aspirations and govern ment promises. On top of this, the influential director of the national language and literature agency, Syed Nasir, resigned over the bill. The opposition of the Ma lays to what they see as con cessions to English-speakers and the Chinese and Indian communities springs from their uncertain position in what they regard as their own country. Malays are in a bare majority over Chinese and Indians combined in Western Malaysia (in Ma laysia as a whole, Malays are in a> minority compared with all non-Malays). While they are well entrenched in poli tics, civil service, police and the army, the vast bulk of Malays, speak only their own language, are rural and agri cultural, and have a small stake in Malaysia’s commerce, industry and banking. Per haps 80 per cent of Malay sia’s economy is in Chinese hands. In addition, barely a quarter of the students at the University of Malaysia are Malays. This economic backward ness not only produces in security among the Malays; it is seen by them as being a direct result of the old colonial-based education sys tem. English-speaking schools were entirely in the towns; an English education was the key to further education, and as there were few Malays in the towns and no Malay se condary education, the sys tem favored Chinese and In dians. While Malay secon dary and university educa tion has expanded since in dependence, the proportion of Chinese and Indians with good education is still much higher. Malays feel that the use of the National Lan guage would not only indi cate that the country, though multi-racial, was basically Malay, but would iron out some of the glaring economic inequalities which actually harm Malay-Chinese rela tions. Naturally the Chinese com munity, who for over a hun dred years were regarded by the British as temporary in habitants and were allowed 8 Panorama their own customs, schools and teachers, are just as fiercely attached to their language. Chinese-language produced, and still produces, people orientated towards China, not to Malaysia. Po litically, the all-Chinese schools tend to be centres for the spread of communism. Where teaching in English and Chinese has been intro duced, the whole tone of the pupils has changed as a re sult. While, therefore, the integration of Chinese schools into a dual-language system with English has not been opposed, the obligatory use of Malay would have been seen as an attack on the Chi nese community and way of life. Politically, the conse quences would have been disastrous. As. it is, Tengku Abdul Rahman, Malaysia’s prime minister since independence, may have his greatest contri bution to racial harmony in Malaysia by personally devis ing and backing this compro mise. As recently as two years ago, there were no signs of deflection in the policy. The national language and literature agency was not on ly modernizing Malay — in venting Malay words for all the thousands of technical and modern terms for which there were no Malay equi valents — but was also run ning national language weeks, which were expanded into national language months. During these pe riods, everyone in govern ment was supposed to com municate only in Malay. As a result, little work was done. Singapore’s premiere, Le Kuan Yew, who was com mitted to Malay as the na tional language in his over whelmingly Chinese Singa pore, but kept Chinese, Eng lish and Tamil as official languages, was warning that to impose Malay would be seen by the other communi ties as an act of Malay poli tical chauvinism. Even gov ernment ministers spoke of fears of "language riots.” By the end of 1966, the tone was noticeably cooler. Tengku Abdul Rahman publicly stated that English could not be abandoned be cause it was an international language and the adminis tration would run down without it. — Forum World Features Ltd. 1967, Manila Bulletin. September 1967 9
Rights