How to tell a communist

Title

Language

English

Source

Panorama Volume XVII (Issue No.8) August 1965

Year

1965

Subject

Communism

Rights

In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted

Abstract

To avoid Communism one should understand its basic principles and ideals rather than make a wholesale condemnation of entire groups who are under public suspicion

Fulltext

■ To avoid Communism one should understand its basic principles and ideals rather than make a wholesale condemnation of entire groups who are under public suspicion. HOW TO TELL A COMMUNIST It is extremely difficult to answer the broad ques tion: what is communism? Communism may refer to a political party which in this country is tiny and despised. It may refer to a set of prin ciples, which have had a thousand different exponents from the days of the Essenes to those of the Cominform. It may refer to a general movement, which at various times has embraced very di verse sects. In 1918-20, Russian com munism was a new force in the world, and being new, untested by realities, it had a natural appeal. Since it had replaced Czarist Russia, it might be represented as a liberating force. To be sure, much was heard even then of the crimes and op pressions of the Bolsheviks. They might be excused or palliated, however, as a na tural reaction against the old autocracy or as precautionary in character. For some years after 1918, communism naturally made a strong appeal to young idealists in particular; to youths who believed that the world could be regenerated in happier form. A believer in Russian communism can take no shel ter behind hazy idealism. He is a believer in a police state of the most ruthless character, with a system of secret arrests, dictated con victions, purges and concen tration camps. It is vital in the present situation for us to under stand this. And to under stand it we must have a clear perception of the great dif ference between the theories held by the liberal on the one side, and the Communist on the other. True liberals of all shades of opinion, including ortho 32 Panorama dox Socialist, agree to the fundamental principle that majority rule shall be loyal ly accepted so long as it res pects the basic rights of minorities. The Communist, however, rejects this principle. His party doctrine is Communist rule or general ruin. To him an opposition victory at the polls is simply the signal for corispiracy, sabotage, and secret subversion. As a mi nority, the Communists give no deference to any majority; they reject all the rules of the democratic game; they concoct plots, infiltrate at all weak points, cripple every machine they can touch, and stand ready at any moment to seize power by force. The problem of coping with such elements is there fore simplified. We are not concerned with a movement; we are concerned with a mi litant minority, alien in alle giance. Unceasing vigilance is essential and in certain areas of government activity such as the armed services, State Department, and the agencies concerned with ato mic energy, it is necessary to insist on a security check. But precautions regarding these limited sectors of na tional activity are not diffi cult to take; the records, as sociations and expressed ideas of employes or prospective employes can readily be tested. If we are to have a care ful policing of governmental agencies — and it is certain that those offices and depart ments which deal with na tional security must be po liced — we should at least have the work done with a careful regard to all parts of our Bill of Rights. If we grasp these facts, it is easier to approach the question: how can we deal with the dangerous Commu nists without hurting useful radicals and liberals? It is easier to answer because we can approach it without any sense of panic. One reason why our internal situation is so healthy is that radicals and liberals have been allow ed free scope for expressing their opinions; another rea son is that from 1929 on ward many of their more August 1965 33 valuable ideas were adopted and applied. Repressive activities always defeat their own end. They arouse widespread antago nism, father the extremist doctrines at which they are aimed, and create martyrs and a martyrology — the most powerful known agen cies of propagandism. We need not worry about the Socialist; they are the fiercest opponents of Soviet ideas. We need not worry about the Utopian Commu nists; they can’t but detest the Russian perversion of their ideals. We need not worry about liberals, who are the bulwark of our own system. Repression is an indispen sable part of the Soviet regime; it is not needed in the United States, and is hostile to every American tradition. Precautions against treason we may well take, and we can always punish individual violations of our statutes; but beyond that no arm of the government can afford to go. We may well recall the words of Charles E. Hughes at a time when a sweeping attempt to deny radicals their rights simply because they were radical had carried away the New York Assem bly: ‘‘I count it a most serious mistake to proceed, not against individuals charged with violation of the law, but against masses of our citi zens combined for political action, by denying them the only resource of peaceful government; that is, action by the ballot box and through duly elected repre sentatives in legislative bo dies.” If we restrict the security check to its proper and very narrow areas, and elsewhere guarantee free opinion, free speech, and a free vote, we are safe. — By Allan Nevins, condensed from the New York Times Magazine. In some states it is a crime for a wife to ran sack her husband’s pocket. In my state it is merely a waste of time. — V. N. Fair. 34 PANORAMA

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