Mining

Media

Part of The American Chamber of Commerce Journal

Title: Mining
Creator: Mitke, Chas A.
Language: English
Year: 1949
Rights
Fulltext: From the broader aspect, the construction and operation of a bus terminal capable of handling several hundred de partures and arrivals per day would require a collosal invest ment. The Government would obviously liquidate this invest ment and cover operational costs by charging operators for the use of the facilities. These charges would, without doubt, be far in excess of the current cost of operating their own termi nals and would probably require an upward adjustment in basic passenger and freight rates. In addition, the record of the Government in business vs. that of private enterprise speaks for itself. The chances for successful and efficient government operation of a project of this nature are very small. There are various theories on the causes and cure of traffic congestion in the City of Manila. Our traffic pro blems are not primarily caused by the large provincial buses or by the urban buses which operate on the city’s streets. Their capacity is 30 to 50 passengers each depending upon type, 5 to 6 times as great as that of the thousands of indivi dual jeepneys and other similar vehicles which crowd the main arteries of traffic, whose drivers pay little attention to regula tions or to the rights and safety of others. The elimination of a few hundred provincial buses from the bridge and crowded city traffic would have no apprecia ble effect on current congestion. The elimination of 2,000 jeepneys and their substitution by the use of 200 buses of 40 passengers capacity each, operated by a few reputable com panies, would do far more toward the desired end. It has been stated that it is feasible for provincial ope rators to utilize bus terminals and reduce their fares by an amount equivalent to the cost of the additional transportation called for plus extra baggage and freight handling charges accruing to passengers. Current rates between provincial points and Manila vary from 1 to IV2 centavos per passenger per kilometer. A passenger from a point in Laguna province, 100 km. distant from Manila, pays P1.00 for his fare from erfibarkation to a bus terminal opposite the Divisoria market. Under the central terminal proposal, he might have 5 centa vos deducted from that basic fare due to location of the ter minal south of the Pasig River. Additional charges, on the other hand, would involve at least 10 centavos fare in getting to his destination (possibly 20 centavos). There would also be a minimum charge of 20 centavos, and in many cases more than that, for cargadores’ service necessitated by the transfer. The disadvantage to the public is obvious. It is admitted that central bus terminals are succesfully operated in every large city in the United States, but the circumstances cannot be compared to those in Manila. In United States cities the urban service is maintained by a single bus company or at most 2 or 3 such companies whose operations are properly scheduled and efficiently operated under adequate and strict government supervision. Manila is served by literally thousands of operators whose fleets consist of from one or two small jitneys in many cases, to as many as 200 or so modern buses in others. With the exception ot the operations of the larger companies, fixed routes, schedules, and fares are not followed. We have a mass of public trans portation on the streets which it is impossible for the author ities to supervise except most superficially. The greatest stretch of imagination could not present a picture of the added bedlam that would be created in the traffic by the concentra tion of this accumulation of public carriers within and around a central terminal. The same comparative conditions prevail with respect to bus services from outside points into Manila when considering inter-city and cross-country land transportation in the United States. Here there are approximately 1,500 bus units of one type or another operating from provincial points to Manila and vice versa. Possibly 60% of these units are owned by re putable and efficient operators who have their own terminal facilities, which might vary in rating from excellent in some cases to poor in others. The rest of these vehicles are ope rated by irresponsible small concerns that have no facilities and pay little attention to schedules, routes, rates, and other regulations. The problem of housing these operations would be a serious one, whereas in a typical United States city not more than 2 or 3 operators are involved; schedules, rates, and routes are fixed, and the buses are all modern and of maxi mum capacity. In an American city terminal, passenger traffic only is handled. Into any bus terminal in the Philippines come not only passengers but large quantities of produce such as fruits, vegetables, and manufactured articles, in addition to the sub stantial numbers of chickens, pigs, and other livestock to be marketed, plus other items such as charcoal, firewood, coco 114 nuts, etc., that help to make up the load of any incoming pro vincial bus. The operators, controlling a majority of the provincial buses entering Manila and who have their own terminal faci lities, have developed the necessary procedure and technique for efficiently handling the loads described. Under a central terminal arrangement, the total volume of this type of traffic would be so great that it would be almost impossible to handle it efficiently. It has been stated that the central terminal plan would eliminate over-night street parking of buses. This could be eliminated very simply by the passage of proper citv regula tions and their subsequent enforcement. It is difficult to visualize in Manila a central terminal facility capable of housing a minimum of 700-800 buses, plus the office and main tenance space necessary in the cases of the many operators concerned. Bus operators as a group consider the plan to be unsound and impractical of operation. Note by Mr. Tenny: Advocates of the bus terminal plan appear to differ with the opponents of the plan, not on the basic points involved but only on questions of detail. Private rather than governmental operation is acceptable to the ad vocates of the plan if this could be arranged to the satisfaction of all concerned. The matter of the exact locations of the terminals is of secondary importance and there is no intention on the part of the advocates of the plan to cause the abandon ment of suitable terminals which have already been constructed by progressive operators. In view of the fact that the termi nal plan has been successfully adopted elsewhere, I believe that an acceptable local plan could be worked out which would take into full consideration all of the various facts brought out by both sides. Mining By Chas. A. Mitke Consulting Mining Engineer I AM a consulting engineer, and have made the Phil ippines my home since March, 1938. I am one of many Americans who like the country, and be lieve in its future. For this reason, after liberation, in February, 1945, I did not return to the United States immediately, but remained here to see what I could contribute toward the rehabilitation of the min ing industry. After considerable effort, over a three-year period, I succeeded in interesting the largest coppermining corporation in New York in properties in the Philippines. The corporation sent out an engineer, who remained six months, studying the properties and business conditions generally. In January, 1948, two additional engineers, one of them the late Dr. H. Foster Bain, came out for the same purpose, and an option contract was drawn up. It was understood that if preliminary investigations and drilling proved satisfactory, the American corporation would invest (apart from the purchase price of the property) some P50,000,000 in plant, townsite, equipment, wharf, etc. This would have given employment to many thou sands of Filipinos. It would have involved large ex penditures for monthly payrolls, purchase of local supplies, etc. and would have resulted in mining on a scale heretofore not seen in the Philippines. Everything was going smoothly, when a bill to license mining engineers was introduced in the 1948 Congress which was passed by both Houses. Besides containing many objectionable and restrictive fea tures, the wording of certain clauses in this bill (ac cording to the copper corporation’s attorneys and other legal authorities) would have prohibited Ame rican mining engineers from practicing their profes sion here unless a special treaty were entered into between the American and Philippine Governments. The matter was called to the attention of the Pres ident, and he vetoed the bill. It was immediately re introduced in the Special Session of Congress and was again passed by both Houses. Then it was vetoed a second time by the President. I was in New York at the time, endeavoring to enlist additional American capital for Philippine min ing ventures, and was with the head of the copper corporation when word was received from Manila of the passage of the Licensing Law a second time. He immediately told me that he was “so shocked” at the action of Congress in passing, over the Philippine President’s veto, adverse legislation which would not permit him to employ his own experts in the large mining undertaking he was contemplating, that he would cancel his option, as he felt that this was mere ly an indication of what he might expect in the future. He added that he would make his invest ments in countries that are more friendly to Ameri can capital. Thus, an investment of P50,000,000, American money, was lost to the Philippines. This was not sal vage or reconstruction money, but new capital; Its investment would have given a tremendous impetus to the entire mining industry, and would, unquestion ably, have done much to bring additional capital here. Lumber By E. C. Von Kauffmann President, Philippine Lumber Producers9 Association THERE is a slight improvement in the local mar ket but not enough to satisfy producers as this is the time of the year when constructions should be in full swing. Exporters - are somewhat alarmed at the stiff competition encountered in the United States which has compelled them to reduce their prices consider ably during the past months. In view of this, they are now trying to secure a reduction of freight rates from the Associated Steamship Lines, to some what compensate for the drop in prices and to assure them of continued exports. They feel that ship owners would be more than compensated by the in crease in export thereafter. The minimum quantity established for loading at outports has been 150,000 board feet instead of the pre-war 200,000 and was to have been increased to the latter figure, effective February 28. This has now been postponed to May 31. Exporters feel that the 150,000 board feet minimum should not be in creased as this quantity can be loaded usually within 18 to 24 hours without entailing heavy overtime wages for the stevedores. Copra and Coconut Oil By Manuel Igual ( General Manager, El Dorado Trading Company, Inc. and Kenneth B. Day ; President, Philippine Refining Company, Inc. January 16, 1949, to February 15, 1949 FROM the viewpoint of Philippine copra producers 1 and traders, the period under review was a dis- j couraging one. In spite of the certainty of light : copra production in the Philippines and rumors of a ; 115 substantially oversold position, copra prices were forced to yield toj the downward pull of large cotton seed, soya, and tallow surpluses pressing on the United States market, and gradually drifted downward until near the close of the period. So strong was this influence that at one time a radical break was imminent, but the United States Government, faced by too rapid a contraction of oils and fats values and the consequent need of far greater price subsidies to farmers, took two steps. On Feb ruary 2, it de-controlled the export of indigenous in edible oils and fats (which proved relatively ineffec tive), and on February 10 it removed all oils and fats from IEFC control. These steps were taken with the hope that increased shipments of excess oils and fats to Europe would relieve pressure on the domestic mar kets and thus curb the decline, domestic prices having sunk to levels considerably below what Europe consid ered fair values. The catch in this action, however, was the plain fact that most European buying is predicated entirely on ECA dollars, and these dollars are available only in such quantities and for purchase at such prices as Uncle Sam may dictate. For a few days the markets hesitated on the theory that the de-control had already been discounted, but at the close of the period prices steadied, and the decline was, temporarily at least, checked. During this entire period the weak factors were cottonseed oil, soya bean oil, and tallow, which sank in price to as low as. 13-1/4C, 12c‘, and 8c1 per lb., re spectively, thus dragging coconut oil down to 13c c.i.f. N.Y. with large buyers sitting on the sidelines and rooting for an IK market. At 13<£, coconut oil is still comparatively overpriced, but it is in relatively short supply and for edible purposes becoming more attrac tive, although soapers, with the large differential fa voring tallow, are still using minimum quantities. In cidentally, soap sales are reported very slow, and the use of soapless detergents is on a sharp upswing. TO get back to the Philippines, copra opened the period with a steady market, sales at $190 c.i.f. P.O., and shorts indicating willingness to buy at $180 f.o.b. During the entire month comparatively little business was done, for sellers held back because of the light production and their conviction that copra was worth more. Buying was, therefore, largely confined to short coverings and sales were reported from as high as $195 c.i.f. and $200 f.o.b. to as low as $175 c.i.f. and $167.50 f.o.b. France bought some copra on f.o.b. terms, landed weights, which terms are un satisfactory to most sellers. Canada bought 1500 tons at $195 c.i.f., one of the largest sales of the month. As the period ended, markets looked better and offers were being solicited at $185 c.i.f. and $175 f.o.b., with sellers entirely uninterested and holding their small stocks for considerably higher figures. Of course, copra prices reflected oil prices and coconut oil dropped from 14-1/2 cents f.o.b. P.C. to 13 cents, at which figure some oil was sold for for ward shipment. Sales of bulk oil were reported at from 14c down to 13<? c.i.f. N.Y., but at closing, 14-1/2 c.i.f. N.Y. was indicated for reasonably prompt shipments. One sale of oil was reported to Italy at between 15 and 15-l/2<! c.i.f and Germany was in the market for oil as the period ended. Oil offerings were sparse, as copra replacement costs were prohibitive and supplies were very scarce.