The woman labor law

Title

The woman labor law

Creator

Morabe, Emiliano

Language

English

Source

Panorama XIV (5) May 1962

Rights

In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted

Fulltext

The Woman and Child La bor J^aw with its “equal pay for equal work” feature has been one of the two most fun damental pieces of legislation ever passed for women during the decade. The first of these measures was that granting the right of suffrage to wo men. Hence, from political equality the female sex has advanced to economic equal ity, so that now our women do not only have the right to vote and be elected to public office just like our men, but for work of equal value they are entitled to get the same pay as our male workers. Emiliano Morabe The Woman and Child La bor Law, which is known as Rep. Act No. 679 as amended by Rep. Act No. 1161, contains two provisions which have scared many employers from employing women. The first requires the payment of ma ternity benefits to women who become pregnant during work (Sec. 8(c)) and the se cond prohibits the discharge of women except for miscon duct (Sec. 12(c)). Under the latter provision, it would be unlawful for an employer to discharge any women worker for causes not attributable to the fault of such woman worker. Unfortunately, this econom ic equality envisioned by our women is but an illusion. Be cause of the law, hundreds of women are denied or eased out of employment. This fact is admitted even by dep artment of labor sources. Employers are not entirely to blame for this ironic si tuation, for the law supposed to be for the benefit of wo men is turning out, in actual ity, to be an anti-women le gislation. The law’s glaring defects call for scrutiny and reexamination. THE WOMAN LABOR LAW May 1962 23 It is not my intention to suggest the removal of the maternity protection afforded; by law to women. I personal ly believe our women work ers need such a protection. However, there is validity in the complaint of owners or managers of the average and marginal firms who are re quired to pay maternity be nefits in addition to sickness benefits under the Social Se curity Act. They claim that women workers, bed-ridden for maternity reasons, are no different from other workers who become sick and are en titled to sickness benefits. Both are paid during the pe riod of their disability or un productiveness. Yet, as far as the employer is concerned, he must pay more for women workers because he has to grant them maternity as well as sickness benefits. Personally, I see nothing wrong in combining materni ty with social security bene fits. The Philippines is about the only country where these two benefits are dealt with separately. Even the United States, where private enter prises are relatively more prosperous .and more eco nomically sound than ours, does not have such maternity law as we have. In fact, the International Labor Organ ization has advocated for the inclusion of maternity allow ance “within the framework of sickness insurance.” (Art. 667 of the ILO Labor Code). The Havana Resolution con cerning the conditions of em ployment of women provides that “maternity allowance should be provided by means of a social insurance scheme.” If the Social Security Sys tem can invest in projects that have nothing to do with social security, obviously be cause it is saddled with enor mous accumulated funds, I cannot understand why it should not be able to pay for the maternity benefits of wo men workers. After all, em ployers’ contributions make up a major portion of the SSS fund. The other highly objection able feature of the Woman and Child Labor Law is Sec. 12(c) which penalizes an em ployer for dismissing a wo man worker for causes not at tributable to her fault. While apparently there seems to be nothing wrong with this pro<= vision, in actual operation it puts an employer in an eco nomic straight-jacket and may even be considered a “business suicide.” The phrase “for causes not attributable to the fault of the worker” has assumed a definite meaning and inter pretation. .These causes may 24 Panorama be a natural lag in the bus iness, closing of a establish ment because of lack of raw materials or reduction in de mand and other similar causes. (Congressional Re cord for the Senate, Vol. 1, pp. 322-323) Literally interpreted, Sec tion 12(c) may mean that an employer cannot dismiss wo men workers even if the es tablishment in which they are employed has become bank rupt for legitimate business or economic reasons, or has been wiped out by fire or other catastrophic event. As she does not commit any mis conduct, a woman worker is therefore almost employed for life. She cannot be dismissed even,if the employer is forced to close His business because of a business depression. Simply because this cause is not attributable to her fault! Can one, therefore, blame an employer for being extra cau tious in hiring women work ers? Aside from causing a patent injustice to an employer, this provision in the Woman and Child Labor Law is also dis criminatory to men workers. Discrimination in favor of women may be justified by (1) the nature of the employ er’s business and (2) the cha racter of the work. (Miller v. Wilson, 235 U 375; State v. Bunting affirmed in 243 US 426) On these considerations are based our existing laws regulating the hours of wo men in certain industries or in jobs involving the lifting of heavy objects. A sweeping discrimination against male workers, without any consideration to the na ture of the job, such as is pro vided in the law above-men tioned, is unfair to men. Fur thermore, it is unconstitution al and violative of ILO Con vention No. Ill, to which the Philiopine government is a signatory. This ILO conven tion prohibits any discrimina tion in employment by reason of sex and other considera tions. This provision is unfair and discriminatory to men because it gives women a greater se curity of tenure than what prevailing law gives to men. Where the conditions of the work or the job are the same, there should be no difference in the fixity of tenure for both women and men work ers. In fact, it is for this rea son of equality that women have advocated — and which the law has granted — equal pay for work of equal value for both men and women workers. A law that gives women greater security of work than men under identi may 1962 25 cal conditions would consti tute class legislation. Perhaps the main purpose of Sec. 12(c) is to prevent the apparent discrimination against the employment of women by reason of their married status or sex. These circumstances (married status and sex) are, indeed, beyond the fault of women workers and should not be a motive for their discharge. While such may be the intention of Congress in passing the amendments to the Woman and Child Labor Law (Sec. 12(c)), the actual wordings of the law do not reflect this in tention of the Legislature. The present Woman and Child Labor Law should be amended in order to eliminate the disastrous effects of its objectionable features not on ly upon the employment of women but also upon the ad ministration’s industrial ex pansion program. Any un reasonable or oppressive la bor law only serves to dis courage, instead of encourage, industries from expanding or from making further invest ments, which are necessary for the creation of more job opportunities for the people. The amendment to the law should consist in (1) the transfer of the responsibility for payment of maternity be nefits from the private em ployers to the Social Securi ty System (2) the rewording of Section 12(c) so as to pu nish only the dismissal of wo men workers by reason of their sex or married status, and by placing women work ers on the same level as men in cases of economic lay-offs or dismissals. In passing these amend ments, the present Congress would be doing a real service to our women, because then the prevailing prejudice they have against the employ ment of women, which most employers wouldn’t dare ad,mit openly would be re moved, and a new era of real “economic equality” for our women workers would be ush ered. “Theobold, I don’t believe you’ve been listen ing to a word I’ve said.” “Oh; I beg yoyr pardon, dear. I thought you were rehearsing your speech for the Woman’s Club.” — Judge. 26 Panorama

pages

23-26

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