Will de Gaulle's new constitution turn the trick. New hope for France.pdf

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extracted text: Will de Gaulle's new Constitution turn the trick? New Hope For France □ For the first time in many years there was hope last month that France’s cha otic political life might come to an orderly end. Of about 80 percent of the registered voters who went to the polls, 95 per cent voted for the Constitution which will give the country the much needed political stability. The voting was a personal tri umph for Premier Charles de Gaulle, who designed the new charter. But it was also a pat tern for France’s political fu ture. In a matter of months the nation which saw the downfall of several governments in diz zying succession, including that of the 4th Republic last May, will have a stronger president. And it is almost a certainty that Charles de Gaulle is going to be it. The new Constitution is de signed to correct the basic weaknesses of the French poli tical system. It will give the country a stronger executive, which it had lacked. The chief By F. C. Sta. Maria executive is elected for a term of seven years by an “electoral college” composed of 80,000 deputies, senators, and mem.bers of provincial and municipal councils. Thus, he is put into office not by direct popular vote but by what observers describe as a system that favors rural and conservative interests. As against the usual parliamen tary concept of government, the president will be a stronger person at the expense of the premier. Henceforth the president will have the power to: (1) nego tiate and ratify treaties; (2) ap point and discharge premiers; (3) dissolve Parliament after “consultation” with the pre mier; (4) control appointments to civil and military posts; (5) sign ordinances and de crees; (6) suppress political parties which he believes are detrimental to national sover eignty and democracy; and 30 Panorama (7) assume dictatorial powers by simple proclamation if he decides that there is a state of national emergency. These obviously are very broad powers unknown even to heads of such presidential types of governments as the United States and the Philippines. In the hands of an ambitious poli tician, such powers could easily make a dictator. It is significant therefore that the French peo ple overwhelmingly bestowed upon de Gaulle such unlimited prerogatives. This political phe nomenon can ,be explained in two ways, namely: (1) the French people realize the grav ity of the present crisis and know that nothing short of a drastic change could save the nation; and (2) the French peo ple have complete trust in de Gaulle. p arliament, under the new charter, is an emasculated body. It is permitted to meet twice a year for no more than three months at a time. It can pass laws but only in certain limited areas. Should a deputy accept a cabinet post or any other government position, he must resign from the Parlia ment. Whereas the premier is responsible to the assembly, the latter can force the premier, during its first year of exist ence, to resign on an absolute majority vote. After the first year the president can dissolve an assembly and keep the pre mier while awaiting the out come of new elections. There is also under the new Constitution a powerful nineman council which would have broadly the functions of the supreme court in the Philip pines. This body is composed of three members appointed by the president, three appointed by the president of the assem bly, and three by the senate president. It will determine the legality of certain acts passed by Parliament. Indeed, there is bright hope that the 5th French Republic will have the stability which previous governments did not enjoy. Since the Revolution of 1789, France has been four times a republic, three times a monarchy, twice an empire and once a semi-dictatorship. The 4th Republic which was estab lished in 1949 and which col lapsed last May saw the succes sive failures of more than a doz en premiers; General de Gaulle was, in fact, the twentieth since 1947. Under the old system there was a proliferation of political parties, with each candidate sel dom, if ever, owing allegiance to any single party. Coalition and appeasement were the or der of the day. Premiers had to be experts at compromise and at bringing together poli tically divergent elements. In November 1958 31 such a situation it was inevi table that a premier and his cabinet had a very uncertain tenure, which was subject to political vagaries and changes. This was the condition which de Gaulle’s Constitution seeks to remedy, if not entirely at least to a degree where a gov ernment could stay in power long enough to implement a workable program. 0 ne problem which the next president of France has to solve is Algeria. While the results of the referendum in this revolt-torn colony sus tained de Gaulle to an amazing degree (97% voted yes), there is no indication that France’s top headache will be cured over night. The North African reb els have proclaimed a provi sional government with head quarters at Cairo. Under the banner of the Front de Libera tion Natiohale (FLN) and the energetic leadership of Ferhat Abbas, the self-proclaimed pre mier, the nationalists have vowed to make Algeria free at any cost. In answer to de Gaulle’s pleas for a “peace of brave men,” the FLN has turned a cold shoulder. They are will ing to negotiate, but in a neu tral country, and not Paris as suggested by the French pre mier. The Algerian problem cannot be minimized. It is of such a magnitude as to make the dif ference between success and and failure for de Gaulle’s na tional program. Over 400,000 French troops have been forced to be kept in Algeria to fight the rebels. France is reputedly spending two and a half mil lion dollars daily to fight the war. If the 5th Republic is to pursue successfully its plans of economic expansion and poli tical stability at home, the ex penditure in North Africa must stop, or at least be drastically reduced. France cannot afford both. The Algerian nationalists know this for a fact, and thereby lies their strength. They are aware that de Gaulle must solve the Algerian problem first before he could succeed in con tinental France. The FLN also knows that a decisive victory is not necessary; by pursuing indefinitely a guerrilla warfare, it could succeed in sapping the Paris government of its econo mic, and possibly of its poli tical, strength. On his part, the French war time hero who has made a spectacular comeback, showed an admirable mastery of the Algerian situation. Strength ened by his overwhelming vic tory at the polls, de Gaulle last month instituted stern measures calculated to control his own compatriots who have taken ad vantage of the confusion in the 32 Panorama colony. First to be disciplined were the military. He ordered General Raoul Salan, command er of French fores in Algeria, to: (1) get the generals and colonels out of Algeria politics; and (2) let the Moslems, in cluding those advocating com plete independence, to campaign freely for election. 'J' he order shocked Salan and many of the extreme right-wingers in the colony, who expected to be rewarded for their “loyalty.” In fact, many of the soldier-politicians had rather expected to ride on de Gaulle’s personal popularity to greater personal glory. They were disappointed. Major General Jacques Massu, leader of the May revolt in Algiers, at first protested, then resigned as president of the Committee of Public Safety — the anti-rebellion organization. He was followed by 11 other officers. A planned general strike fizzled out at the last moment. Once more de Gaulle had asserted his supremacy. Another ambitious politician, Information Minister Jacques Soustelle, who actually master minded the Algerian revolt and who had hoped to become pre mier with de Gaulle’s election as president, was likewise dis appointed. The premier flatly refused to play partisan poli tics when he overruled efforts to create a pro-de Gaulle party out of the fragments of the other political parties, and thus to assure his and de Gaulle’s election. Inducement held out to Al geria and, for that matter, the other French territories comes in the form of a provision un der the new Constitution for greater political autonomy and the continuation of subsidy from the mother country. In the forthcoming election Moslems, who constitute nine-tenths of Algeria’s population, will have a fair chance of representing the country in Paris. In pre vious years, the one million half-breeds of predominantly French descent wielded abso lute political power over the rest of the population. If, as planned by the new Charter the Moslems could get elected and consequently have a voice in the government of France, it is not unlikely that the Algerians would stop cla moring for outright independ ence. This possibility, plus the fact that they will continue to have economic ties with France and an aid of half a billion dollars annually, might turn the trick. This of course is only speculation ; whether the rebels, who have lost 70,000 of their followers in the last three or four years of warfare would jump at the French bait, is another matter. November 1958 33 An encouraging sign was the release recently by the rebels of four French military prison ers and the freeing of 10 reb els by the French. If the elec tions, which are scheduled for November 28-30 should, as ex pected, see at least 47 Moslems deputies to the French assem bly, the Algerian situation may yet prove to be less difficult than predicted. 0 ther French territories had a similar chance to vote in last month’s referendum to either stay within the French community or to quit. The only colony which gave a resound ing vote of No to continued dependence upon France was the French Guinea in West Af rica. This country thus auto matically becomes an independ ent nation by repudiating de Gaulle. Other French possessions — including Senegal, Niger and French Somaliland —must choose to either remain as ter ritories, become integrated as departments of France, or be come federated republics. Ma dagascar chose to be such a re public within the French com munity. The next two or three months will show some definite tenden cies in France’s new pattern of government. While the numer ous economic problems will con ceivably stay on, it is admitted by observers that there is a great promise for France under Charles de Gaulle. The Algerian problem must still be resolved. France’s strained economy, with its dangerously sinking inter national reserves, would still have to be strengthened. But the future definitely seems brighter than either the past or the present. And much of the future is on the palm of de Gaulle’s hand.—Philippine Journal of Education. Plus and Minus The ever-increasing documentation of the Unit ed Nations has been expanded by yet another new document. It is a 5,700 word report by a committee which it set up to study the problem of how to cut down on the documents of the world organization. * 34 Panorama
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