Aurora Paner, petitionaer, vs. Nicasio Yatco et al., respondents, G.R. No. L-2042, August 31, 1950

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Title: Aurora Paner, petitionaer, vs. Nicasio Yatco et al., respondents, G.R. No. L-2042, August 31, 1950
extracted text: IV Aurora Paner, Petitioner, vs. Nicasio Yatco et al., Respondents, G. R. No. L-2042, August 31, 1950. MANDAMUS: APRROVAL OF RECORD ON APPEAL; WRIT VOES NOT ISSUE WHEN APPEAL IS NOT MERITORIOUS. - An order denying petition for relief to set aside a judgment may be appealablc for which writ of mandamus may be granted to compel the trial court to approve the record !>n appeal, but when it is very evident as shown by the facts of the case that the granting of the writ would not profit the petitioner to obtain said remedy, for like a mirage it would merely raise false hopes and in: the end .;.vail the petitioner nothing, said petition for mandamus must be dismissed. Jlfarcelino Lontok for petitioner. Claro T. Almeda for respondent Batibot. D ECISIO N MONTEMAYOR, /: This is a r,etition for mandamus to compel the respondent Judge to approve the record on a.ppcal filed in Civil Case No. 7685 of the Court of First lnstant"e of Laguna. The facts ne cessary for an understan<ling and determination of this case are as follows: On April 11, 1921, Emiteria Miranda, widow of Maximo Pa. 'ner allegedly executed a. deed of sale of 1/2 of lot No. 751 of the Calamba Estate Subdi\.·ision c0vered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 91 in the name of Maximo Paner in favor of Severo Batibot for the sum of P"l00.00. In September, 1947, the heirs of Severo Batibot filed in the Court of' Ji'irst Instance of Laguna Civil Case No. 86 which after reconstitution, was given number 7685 of the same Court, against Emitcria Miranda and her granddaughter Aurora Paner alleging that in March, W43, the defendants, p!i.rticula.rly Emiteria Miranda, deprived the plain tiffs of the possession and ownership of the lot in question causing damage in the sum of P50, and asking that plaintiffs be declared the owners of 1/2 cf lot No. 751, and that they be paitl the damage · caused. Atty. Juan A. Baes, acting as counsel for the two defend. ants, filed an amended answer on September 3, 1947, alleging that the deed of sale above-mentioned was a forgery, and that defend. ant EmiteriA. Miranda had no knowledge of the execution thereof and that the mark therein a.ffixed was not hers; that the ori ginal owner of the land in question was Maximo Pancr, the de. ceased husband of Emiteria; that after his death he w11.s suc. ceeded by his son Maximina Paner, father of defendant AurorP. P:mer; and that in February, 1945, Maximina Pancr was mas sacred by the Japanese and he was succeeded by only child Auro /ra Paner. The answer prayed for the dismissal of the c�m r>iaint and for payment by the 9lainl;iffs of the sum of !"300.00 as damages. On the same date that the answer was filed, Atty. Baes filed a motion in court alleging that ddendant Aurora. was only three years old, and at the same time asking the court to appoint her co-defendant grandmother Bmitcria as her gurtrdian ad litcm. The case was he2.rd on September 3 and 9, during which evidence was adduced by both parties -· plaintiffs and defendants. 9n Sept ember 10th Emiteria took her oath as guardian ad litem of Au. rnra. On September 12th the trial court rendered its decision wherein it found that the deed of sale was genuine a.nd had been Culy executed by Emiteria Miranda. The court equally found that the land covered by the deed belonged to Maximo Paner -who had bought it from the Bureau of Lands since July 1 1910, be fore he married Emiteria Miranda, and that consequently, she liad no right to sell the same as her property. The trial court dtclarcd the dee--:i of sale null and void, but considenng the good faith of the buyer Severo Batil.iot, the court. sent,enced the de fendants to reimburse the purchase price of '200.00 to the plain. tiffs with interest at 6% per annum from the date of the dtcd, and further sentenced ihe defendants to compensate the plain. tiffs for the value of the improvements introduced by them or their predecessnr in interest. On behalf of the defendants, Atty. Ba.es filed a motion for re consideration and new trial, dated October 17, 1947, but his m0. Ma.rch 81, 1954 THE LA WYERS JOURNAL 129 tion was denied for lack of merit. He did not appeal. About two months later or rather on December 24, 1!:147, Atty. Marcelino Lontok, representing defendant Aurora Paner, filed a petition in the trial court asking tha..t its decision of September 12, 1947, be 'set aside, as against his clilmt Aurora Paner, or at least to permit her to file her appeal frcm said decision. The plaintiffs opposed said petitiC1n and the trial court by order of January 8, 1948, denied the :cia.me on the ground that. it was "not well-founded, and thal the decision in this case has become final." On January 21, 1948, Atty. Lontok filed his notice of appeal from the order denying his petition for reconsideration and prepared and submitted his record on appeaJ and the corresponding appeal bond. The trial court hy order of Feb. 9, 1948, refused to approve the record on appeal on the ground that it was filed beyond the reglementary period. As already stated, to compel the respondent Judge to approve said record on appeal, the present petition for mandamus was filed in this Court. In refusing to approve the record on appeal, the respondent Judge seems to have labored under the impression that the appellant and herein petitioner was appealing from the court's decision of September 12, 1947, this, judging from the ground or reason giwm for the refusal, namely, that the record on appeal was :!iled bc!yond the reglementary period. But in reality the appeal was being taken from the order of January 8, 1948, denying· the petition to set aside the decision of September 12, 1947, a petition 1•1·esumably based on Section 2, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. '!'hat order of denial was, of ·course, appea.lnble and if the record on appeal was otherwise proper nnd complete, the respondent Judge was bound to approve it and he may be compelled to do so by a writ of mandamus. · So, strictly and legally speaking, the present petition for niand::unus may be granted. However, before acting upon the petition, we may inquire into the facts involved in order to determine whether once the writ of mandamus is granted and the case is brought up here on appeal, the app.el~ ant has any chance, even possibility of having the basic decision of the trial court Of September 12, 1947, set a.side or modified; for if the appellant has not that prospect or likelihood, then the granting of this writ of mandamus and the consequent appeal would be futile and would mean only a waste of time to the ~rties and to this Court. This inquiry can easily be made from a copy of the record on appeal now before us as well as the pleadings filed by both parties. The whole theory of counsel for th(> petitioner in insisting in 6etting aside the judgment of September 12, 1947, agninst his client, ftie minor Aurora Paner, is that the cC1urt acquirc<l no jurisdiction over her person at least during the trial. He contends that inasmuch as the child's grandmother and g:ua-rdian ad litem did not take her oath as such guardian until September 10, 1947, that. is. after the hearing- of the case which was held on September 3 and 9, during sa.id hearings, the minor was not duly represented and the court acquired no jurisdiction ovu her. Furt.hennore, said counsel contends that her guardian ad litem had interests in the case adverse to that of her ward which accounts for said guardian failing or refusing to appea.l from the decision. The contention of counsel as regards jurisdiction is based on a tnere technicality. The r ecord fails to show the day when the court appointed the grandmother Emiteria Miranda as guardian ad litem of her gra.nddaughter, but in the absence of evidence on this point, it is reasonable to presume ~hat the appllintmcnt must have been made on the very day that the court was asked to do so, namely, on SC!ptember 3, 1947, the first day of the hearing. It is reasonable to presume that the respondent realized the importance a.nd 11ecessity of having a ininor party to a case duly represented in court during its judicial proceedings, and that he must have made the appoinbnent perhaps verbally before com. mencing the hearing. During the hearings held on September 3 and 9, 1947, the attomey for the defendants Emiteria and her ward Aurora presented evidence calcula.ted to prove that the lot claimed by the plaintiffs was never sold to them, evidence which can in no mannf'r be regarded as contrary to the interests of Aurora Paner. On the contrary, it was designed to keep whole and preserve Aurora's title to the property in litigation. Counsel for petitioner claims that Emiteria did not take her oath as guardian ad litem until September 10, 1947, that is, one day after the last day of the hearing. In the absence of any denial by respondents of this· claim, we shall assume it to be true. But even thet1, as long as during the court proceedings, Emiteria had acted as such guardian to represent . her wa.rd and protect her interests, her belated taking <Jf oath did not in any way adversely affect or prejudice the intrests of the minor. After all, the oath-taking was a mere formality. It should be remembered that when the decision WM rendl!rcd on September 12, 194:7, the grandmother Emiteria Miranda, had already taken her oath as giw.rdian ad litem and she was fully authorized to appeal from the decision. In fact, through counsel mid guardian and her ward filed a motion for reconsideration and new trial but v.hen that motion was denied they did not appeal. The reason for said failure to appeal is found in a letter written at the time by the defendants' counsel to the lawyer of the plaintiffs which quoted in part reads as follows: "I did not appeal the case because I believe that in doing so, the parties will incur more expenses than the 2.ctual price of the land in litigation." And, we are inclined to agree with the said counsel that considering the amount in\folved in the decision, it was really wiser to abide by said decision instead of taking an appeal, and paying t.hc necessary court and attorney's fees, with no definite guaranty or assurance .,f winning the case in the end. As to th(' alkged conflict in interests between the guardian and her wa.rd, we fail to see said divergence. We should bear in mind that the guardian was iio stranger to but a grandmother of the ward. In he1· answer tc the complaint in the trial court, said guardian far from claiming the lot in question as her own, said that it belonged to her ward as an inheritance from her grandfather, deceased husband of the gua.t"dian. In fact, in order to protect and conserve the property i;o that it. may go to her granddaughter and ward, whole and unburdened, the grandmother and guardian went to the extent of disclaiming and denying any previous alienation or conveyance of said property to the plaintiffs. All this fails to show any conflict of interests between guardian and ward. Now, cominrr to the petition filed in the trial court on December 24, 1947, to set aside the decision of September 12, 1947, although it was presumably filed under the provisions of Ruic 38 of the Rules of Court, sa.id petition made no mention whatsoever of .!taid ~ule and what is more important, it failed to allege any of the grounds on which a petition for relief is usuall1· based, namely, fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. As a matter of fact, after examining the re<:ord we 3.re unable to find that any of these grounds existed or could be successfully invoke by the minor, a.nd may be that was the reason why they were not alleged in the petition. And, if the case were taken to this Court on appeal and we were to examine the facts of the case from the record on appcai' as we have done now, we do not see how the decision of the trial court of September 12, 1947, even assuming it to be erroneous as not altogether in conformity with the l:i..w and evidence, can be set aside. From all this it is not difficult to imagine and believe that the trial court was not without reason in refusing to set aside its decision of Sept.. ember 12, 1947, and that it would not profit the petitioner to obtain the remedy of mandamus now sought, for like a mirage it would merely raise false hopes and in the. end avail her nothing. In view of the foregoing the petition for ma.ndamus is hereby dismissed without pronouncement as to costs,. Moran, Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, Bengzon; Tuazon and Reyes. J.J. concur. 130 THE LA WYERS JOURNAL March 31, 1954
Date: 1954
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