Hernandez et al., petitioners vs. Emilio Peña et al., respondents, G.R. No. L-2777, May 19, 1950

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Title: Hernandez et al., petitioners vs. Emilio Peña et al., respondents, G.R. No. L-2777, May 19, 1950
extracted text: sold, but wiih a statement at the same time that said clain1 is secured by a mortgage duly registered, is not equivalent to filing the cla.im and docs not, therefore, constitute a waiver of said mortgage." <II Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court 3rd ed. p. 406). The payment alleged in the third assignment of error is not evidenced by any receipt, and there is nothing to support it except the bare declaration of the administrator's former attorney, Judge Bienvenido Tan, to the effect that, threatened with contempt proceedings for refusing to receive payment, the appellee Paz E. Siguion came to ~e him in his office and accepled the payment tendered by him. But the testimony is denied by this appellee, and we note that Judge Tan has merely inferred from what she told him on that occasion that she was then accepting the money tendered by him in payment for the debt, an inference not warranted by appellee's actual words, as may be seen from following testimony of Judge Tan: "Q Meaning to say that you personally paid her the mon'2!y? "A After the motion <to cite for contempt) was presented Mrs. Paz Siguion went to my office and told me that there was no need of presenting the molion rind for me to ask the court that she be declared in contempt since she was willing to accept payment. -And I told her that if she was willing to accept payment I have the money in my office. I took the money from a 'bayong' ~md delivered it to her but she said : 'Well, I am sorry I c&nnot carry this bag of money with me because it is very dangerous and besides I am going to the province. Will you please keep it yet in your office u:r.til I call for it?' That is what I meant that she accepted the payment. "Q And, the money, Judge Tan, remained with you? "A Yes, it remained with me. ''Q Until when? "A Until now. It is still in the office." Far from exp,ressing actual a.ceptance of payment and contequent significntion '.>f intentbn to have the money k~pt for her by Judge Tan as her depositary despite the fact that fie was attorney for the adverse party, appellee's words should rather be construed as a refusal on her part to receive payment, an intf!rpretation which would be consistept with her previous attitude in repeatedly declining to receive payment, as denounced in Judge Tan's motion for contempt, and also in consonance with What may be expected to be the natural reaction of any creditor to a tender of payment in the depreciated currency of those days <October, 19441. Indeed, had the money really been accepted, consirlering the amount involved, a receipt would surely have been required for the same; and not only a receipt, but also a release or discharge of mortgage. No such document, however, has been signed by Paz E. Siguion, it does not even appear that the money was counted. In the circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the lower court did not err in not finding that the mortgage debt has already been paid. As to the fourth and last assignment of error, the record does not show that appellant has in a definite and suitable manner invoked moratorium in the court below. That defense was neither pleaded in the answer nor made a ground for a motion to dismiss. On the other hand, the answer admits the allegation of the complaint that the moratorium on prewar debts has already been lifted by Republic Act No. 342 subject to the exception or condition therein specified in favor of debtors who have filed their claim with the · War Damage Commission, to which class the estate represented by appellant does not belong since it has not filed any war damage claim. All this reveals lack of ir.tention to resort to the defense of moratorium, espedaly when considered in connection with the allegation in the answer that despite defendant's repeated attempts to pay the debt, plaintiffs have i·efused to accept payment. It is true that at the conclusion of the trial appellant's counsel in open court asked for leave to amend his answer "so as to allege therein," to use his own language, "that the moratorium is unconstitutional." By this counsel probably meant to challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 342. But the petition to amend was withdrawn when it encountered determined opposition from the adverse party, and in any event the validity of that Act cannot be made an issue since moratorium has not been invoked as a. defense ground for a motion to dismiss. In view of the foregoing, and without passing on the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 342 because it is not a necessary issue in the case, the decision appealed from 'is affinn~d, with costs against the appellant. Paras, Fr.·ria, Bengzon, Padilla Tttason~ Montemayor, Jugo and Angelf'. - J.J. concur Pablo, J., tvok no part. x Hernandez et al., Petitioners vs. Emilio Peiia et al., Respondents, G.R. o. L-!777, May 19, 1950, F. RCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER; DEPOSIT bF RENT URING PENDENCY OF APPEAL; EXTENSION OF TIME NOT ALLOWED. - Section 8 of Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that should the defendant fail to make the payment or deposit of the rent during the pendency of the appf':al, tho Court of First Instciice, upon motion of the plaintiff of which the defendant shall have notice, and upon proof of such failure, shall orrlcr the execution of the judgment appealed from. The court has no jurisdiction to allow extensions of time for such payment Leoncio C. Jimenez for petitionerS". Pedro Valdes Liongson for respondents. DECISJON OZAETA, J.: Ines Oliveros, as defendant in an unlawful detainer case pending before the respondent Judge Emilio Pe ii.a on appea.l from the Municipal Court, failed to deposit with the Clerk of Court the rent of P200 corresponding to the month of October, 1948, in accordance with the judgment of the Municipal Court. A motion for the issuance of a writ of execution was Tiled by the petitioners on Novem-' her 23, 1948, which was opposed by the respondent on the ground that her failure to make the deposit was due to the fact that she had instituted in this court a petition for cortiora.ri ~md prohibition <G.R. No. L..2602>, in which she prayed to be relieved of the obligation of making a monthly deposit of P200. Acting upon said motion and the reply thereto, the respondent judge on December 21, 1948, issued the following order: "The Court orders the defendants to deposit in Court the rents corresponding to the months of Oclober and November, .1948, within five days from the receipt of a copy of ";his c.rder, and should they ·fail to do so, it is hereby ordered that the corresponding writ of execution be issued." The above-quoted order, which is the subject of the present petition for certiorari and mandamus, is contrary tu section 8 of Rule 72 and the decisions of this court in various cases. Said rule provides that should the defendant fail to make the payment or deposit of the rent during the pendency of the appeal, "the court of First Instance, _ upon motion of the plaintiff of which the defendant sha.Jl have notice, and upon proof of such failure, shall order the execution of the judgment appealed from . . " This court has repeatedly held that the Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to allow extensions of time for such payments. <Lapuz vs. Court of First Instance of Pamp:mga, 46 Phil. 77; Arcega vs. Dizon, G.R. No .. L..195, 42 Off. Gaz. 2138 i Meneses vs. Dinglasan, G.R. No. L-2088, Sept. 9, 1948. ) The mere filing by the respondent Ines Oliveros of a. petition for cel'tiorari and prohibtion, praying that she be relieved of the obligation of making the monthly deposit,. did not ipso facto relieve her of such obligation, as the respcndent judge himself impliedly held by requiring her to make the deposit within five days. The order complained of is set aside, and the respondent judge is hereby directed to issue the writ of execution ptayed for by the petitionP.rS, with co1>ts against the respondent Ines Oliveros. Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor, nnd Reyes, - J.J.; concur March 31, 1954 THE LA WYERS JOURNAL 137 Agustina Paro,nete et. al., Petitioners, vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan, et a.I., Respondents, G.R. No. L-3791, November :19, 1950. PROHIBITION; OWNERSHIP OF REAL PROPERTY IN LITI GATION; ORDER REQUIRING ACCOUNTING AND DEPOSIT OF' PROCEEDS OF HARVEST W/Tll CLERK OF COURT, IM PROPER. - A trial court issuing an order requiring the party in possession of the property whose ownership is in litigation, to to makt> an accounting and to deposit the proceeds of the sale of the harvest with the Clerk of Court acted in excess of ils jurisdiction. That order, in effect, made the Clerk o( Court a sort of a receiver charged with the duty of re{:eiving the pro ceeds of sale and the harvest of every year during the pen dency of the case with the disadvantage that the Clerk of Court has not filed any bond to guarnntee the faithful dis charge of his duties as depositary; and considering that in actions involving title to real property, the appointment of a receiver cannot be entertained because its effect, would be to take the property out of the possession of the defendant, P.xcept in extreme cases when there is clear proof of its ne cessity to save the plaintiff from grave and inemediable Joss or damage, it is evident that the action of the resoondent judge is unwarranted and tmfair to the defendants Emiliano J,f. Ocampo for petitionerS'. Jose, E. Morales for respondents Feliz Alcaras, and Fructuosa, Maxima and Norbcrta, all surnamed Vasquez. DECISI ON BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: This is a pelition for a writ of prohibition wherein petitioner seeks to enjoin the respondent judge from enforcing his order of March 4, 1950, on the ground that the same was is.;;ued in excess of his jurisdiction. On January 16, 1950, Felix Alcaras, Fructuosa Vasquez, Maxi ma Vasquez and Norberfa Vasquez filed a case in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the recovery of five (5) parcels of land against A&'Ustina Paranete and six other codefendants. (Civil Case No. 1020). On January 28, 1950, plaintiffs filed a petition fo"r a writ of preliminary injunction for the purpose or ousting the de fendants from the" lands in litigation and or having themselves placed in possession thereof. The petition was heard ez parte, and !t!' a result the respondent judge issued the writ of injunctior\ re quested. On February 28, 1950, the defendants moved for the re CClnsideratiOn of the order granting the writ, to which pla.intiffs objected, and after due hearing, at which both parties appeared with their respective counsel, the respondent judge reconsidered ,his order, but requirE'd the defendants to render an accounting of the harvest for the year 1949, as well as all future ha.rveste, and if the ban-est had already been sold, to deposit the proceeds of the sale with the Clerk of Court, allowing the plaintifb or their re presentative to be present during each harvest. This order was issued on March 4, 1950. Defendants egain filed a motion for the reconsideration oi this order, but it was denied, hen.::e the petition under consideration. The question to be determined is whether or not lhe respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in issuing his order of March 4, 1950, under the terms and conditions set forth above. We hold that the respondent judge has acted in excess of his jurisdiction when he issued the order above adverted to. That or de1·, in effect, m;i.de the C!erk of Court a sort of a receiver chargerl with the duty of receiving the procE:eds of sale and 1he harvest of every year during the pendency of the case with the disadvantage that the Clerk of Comt has not filed ar,y bond to puarantee the faithful discharge of his duties as depositary; and considering tlu,t in actioM involving title to real property, the appointment of a. re ceiver cannot be entertained because its effect would be to bike the property out of the possession of the defendant. except in ex treme cases when there is clear proof of its necessity to save tho:: plaintiff from grave and irremedi"a.Ue loss or damage, it is evident that the action ".lf the respondent judge is unwarranted :.i.nd un fair to the defendants. (Mendoza v. Arellano, 36 Phil. 59; Ago noy v. Ruiz, 11 Phil. 204; Aquino v. Angeles David, I-375; prom. Aug. 27, 1946; Y larde v. Enriquez, supra; Arcega v. Pecson, 41 Off. Gaz. <No. 12) 4884; Carmen Vda. de De la Cruz v. G uinto, 45 Off. Gaz. pp. 1309, 1311.) Moreover, we find that Agustina Paranete, one of the defendants, has bf'en in possession of the lands since 1943, in t.he exercise of her rights as owner, with her codcfend::wts working for her exclusively as lenants, anU that <luring· all these years said Agustina Paranete had made i;nprove mcnts thereon at her own expense. ThE"se improvements were made without 2.ny contribution on the part of the plaintiffs. Thf' question of ownership is herein invoh>ed and both parties seem to have documentary evidence .in support of their respective claims, and to order the defendants to render an accounting of the har vest and to deposit the proceeds in case of sale thereof durin� the pendency of the case would be to deprive them of their means of livelihood before the case is decided on the merits. Thr. situa tion obtaining is such that it Uoes not warrant the placing of the lands in the hands of a neutral person as is required when a re ceiver is appointed. To do so would be unfair and would un necessarily prejudice the defendants. While the respondent judge claims in his order of March 25, 1950, that he acted as he did because of a verbal agreement enter ed into between the lawyers of both parties, we do not consider it necessary tCI pass on this point because the alleged agreement j3 controverted and nothing about it has been mentioned by the respondent judge in hia order under consideration. Wherefore, petition is hereby granted. The Court declares, the Ol'der of the respondent judge of March 4, 1950 null and void and e11joi118 him from enforcing it as prayed for in the petition. Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla; Tuason; Montemayoi·; Reyes, and Jugo, J.J., concur. 138 THE LAWYERS JOURNAL March 31, 1954
Date: 1954
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