Lucila ornedo, petitioner vs. Judge Eusebio F. Ramos et al., respondent G.R. No. L-2898, December 23, 1950

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Lucila ornedo, petitioner vs. Judge Eusebio F. Ramos et al., respondent G.R. No. L-2898, December 23, 1950
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or to a statute or ordinance, .to warrant declaratory relief. Any other matter not mentioned therei11 is deemed excluded. This is under the principle of e:tpTessio unius e.st c:ccltLlf~io 1JUeriu11. Now, does the subject matter under cor.sideration comE' within the import of the rme 1 The answer cannot but be in the negative, 1or it docs not refet' to any wl'itten instrument, st .. tute or ordinance. It merely refers to the su1ficicncy or probat1ve vs.J.ue of an oral evidence concerning a decree of divorce issued by a former judge, which the court trying the bigamy cnse has ample pow<!r .and authority to pass upon. This is not the OPportune moment to look into the correctness of the ruling of the court in said bigamy case allowing the presentation of oral evidence to pro•;e a decree o( divorce under the circumstances at present obtaining, for the bigamy case is still pending determination. This will be determined in due time when properly presented before this Court. For the purposes of this appeal, it suffices for this Court to declare that the subject matter of the petition dOC!s not warrant the granting of declaratory relief within the meaning of said Rule 66. Wherefore, the order appealed from 1s Affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs. Moron, Paras, Feria, Pablo; Bengzrm; Padilla, Tuason: Montemayor, Reyes, and Jugo. - J.J. concur. VIII Lucila Ornedo, Petitioner vs. Judge Eusebio F. Ramos et aL, Res. poncknt G. R. No. L-2898, December 23, 1950. CERTIORARI; CERTIORARI IS PREDICATED ON LOWER COURT'S POSITIVE ACTION BUT NOT A REMEDY FOR INACTION. - By its nature, certiorari is predicated on a positive or affirmative action that is injurious to the interests of the complainant. It is not a remedy for a lower court's inaction irrespective or the re;asons given therefor. F. /Jfilambiling for petitioner. Panfilo M. Manguera for respondents Mabute ans! Magna Labaguis. DECISION TUASON, J.: It appears tli.at Epifania Mabute applied in the Court of l"rist Instance of Marinduquc for letters of administration of the intestate estate of Severina Mistal, application which was docketed as Civil Case No. 656. Shortly thereafter Jacinta Ornedo filed a simjlar ~pplicatfon with reference to the estate of Juan Ornedo, Severina Mistal's husband who died after her. The latter application was docketed as Civil Case No. 659. Lucila Ornedo, Juan Ornl:do's illegitimate daughter whose mother he married after his first wife's death, and Natalia Mus.. nit, Lucila's mother, opposed both applications. It seems that the basis of ... the opposition, or the principal basis, was that the title to the properties of both decedents had already vested in L:...,Ja Ornedo by donation from her father. The two .iipplications, by agref'.ment of the parties, were heard jointly before Judge Mariano Melendres on July 9, 1946. On July 24, before the applications were decided, six cousins of Severina MiDtal filed a complaint in intervention which wns admitted. The intervenors claimed !l share in Severina Mistal's estate by agreement with Juan Ornedo as Severina's surviving es,pou~~dge Melendres having been assigned to a110ther judir;icl district before he could write his decision, and as the stenographic notes taken at the trial had been lost, the two applications for · letters of administration and the intervention were :igain set down for hearing and, a.lso by agreement of the parties, were consolidated for trial before Judge Enriquez who had succeeded Judge Melendres. In the second trial as well as in the first the owner. Ghip to the properties involved was submitted and in Judge En·riquez's decision adjudicated in the manner set forth in the next following paragraph. On July 31 Judge Enriquez dismissed both applications for letters of administrs.tion and the complaint in intervention. The reasons were; (1) all the property of Severina Mistal had passed to her surviving spouse, Juan Ornedo, by operation of law, Mistal having no legal heirs; <2> Juan Ornedo in life had donated his property to his daughter Lucila; and <3) the deed of pa.rti. t.ion between Juan Ornedo and the intervenors by vil"tue of which tho latter were assigned a share in Severina Mistal's estate, was, in the opinion of the court. VC'id and of nC' effect. The two applicants and the intervenors filed motions for reconsideration on ihe ground that "the decision is against the law." As J udge Enriquez this time had been detailed to unother province, like Judge Melendres before him, it fell upon the Jot of Judge Eusebio F. Ramos, .who had taken Judge Enriquez' s place, to act on the said motions ror reconsideration. Judge Ramos' decision or order rende1·ed on October 15 set aside J udge Enriquez's order or decision on the ground that "it Goes not appear that the origin&! hea.ring of the petitiou(s) in said cases have been duly published as required by the Rules of Court" so that the court, Judge Harnos opined, had acquired nu jurisdiction. But Judge Ramos did not stop here. With apparent inconsistency, he decreed the definite dismissal of Case No. 656 and of the intervention and held <U tha.t Natalia Musnit, J uan Ornedo's widow and Lucila Ornedo's co-opponent, had no interest in her deccascd husband's estate "at least <except> as usufructuary over a certain (portion> of the property," and <2> that "when Severina Mistal died her heir was her husband Juan Qr. nedo to t he exclusion of her cousins," the intervenors. In other words, although as he said, the C'Jurt had acquired no jurisdiction, His Honor went into the merit-a of the controversy. With regard to case No. 659, th!' set-a.side order was in keep. ing with the theory of lack of jurisdiction. With reference to this case, the order was that "the hearing of the petition x x x be published as required by la.w, the- dat.e of the hearing to be set at next calendar of this Court." The present petition for certiorari was brought by Lucila Or. nedo without he1· mother, her co-opponent to the application for letters of administration, a nd makes Judge Ramos, Jacinta Or. nedo :ind the intervenors responi:lents. For answer, the respondents queation, among other thingi;, the a.vailability of certiorari tC' review Judge Ramos' order, it being contended that the res-. pondent Judge did not act outside or in excess of his jurisdiction and that there is plain, speedy and adequate remedy by appeal'. The issues and the arguments have been cnmplicatert anJ confused by the inclusion in the proceedings below and in the V&Jious orders, of matters not quite gennanc to t he right of the applicants to appointments as administratrixes, such as the conflicting claims of ownership tn the properties. The order complained of presents two i.spects which should be taken up separatP.ly for clarity's sake. And before we proceed, it is well to ta.kc note that Judge Ramos' order is not assailed jn so far as it refers to case No. 656 which, for that reason, will be left out of the following discussion. · As has been seen, Judge Ramos did not render a decision on the merits o( the application in Case No. 659; he merely directed that the application be published and he postponed the hearing thereof to th(' next calendar of the court after such publicatiOn should have been made, It is at once obvious that this order is not a cause for complaint on the part of Lucila Ornedo. The postponement of the hearing and the publicatioii of the applica.tion are · not the concern of the opponent, except perhaps for the delay they would en. tail. The cost of publication is to be defrayed by the applicant, and the opponent is in possession of the questioned prop~rty to the exclusion of all others and is not being bothered in the enjoyment of its produce. In this aspect of the case the petitioner clearly has no ca.use of action. The true reason, not plainly apparent on the surface of the pleadings and the memoranda, for the seen'ling paradox of the applicant's acquiescence in or delense of the respondent Judge's order and for the opponent's vigorous cxc.eption thereto is, that in setting a.side Judge Enriquez's order, Judge Ramos destroyed an advantage Lucila Ornedo had already achieved. Judge En. riquez's order not only dismissed the application for letters of administration but made a definite declaration that Lucila. Or. nedo was the absolute owner of the properties sought to be placed under judicial administration. By this award the opponent had, March 31, 1954 THE LAWYERS JOURNAL l3S in a manner of speaking, won the first and very important round of the contest which Judge Ramos' order set at naught. It iS' said, with good reason, apropos of this feature of the case that the respondent Judge was wrong in saying that the application had not been published. Lucila. Ornedo's counsel points out that the required publication was made in La Nueva. Era� a. newspaper of general circulation in the province of Marinduque, before the first trial, and that copies of the periodical carrying the notice plus supporting testimonial evidence were introduced at tha.t trial held by Judge MelendreS'. Lucila Ornedo's counsel also calls attention, with support of precedents and authorities, to the fact. that with the consent or acquiescence of the parties concerned, title to property in­ volved in a testate or intestate proceeding may be litigated and adjuclged by th!! proba.te court. Lucila Ornedo tiid not do so but she could also cite the fact that the movants' motions for reconsideration of Judge Enriqucz's order did not impugn the suf­ ficiency o( the publication, nor did they attack the court's juris­ diction to give judgment on the conflicting claims of o.:mership between the parties. Even so, certiorari does not lie. Relief must be sought by other mode of procedure. The error, if error was committed by Judge Ramos, was one of omission and not commission. To set aside Judge Enriquez's order was within Judge Ra.mos' jurisdic­ tion, in much the same manne!" and to the same extent that Judge Enriquez, if he had not been replaced, would have authority to change, modify or reverse his decision or order. Judge Ramos' order amounts simply to a refusal, notwith .. i;tanding the parties' 3.grecment, to determine the validity of the alleged donation executed by the now deceased Ornedo in favor of his daughter, partly because, according to the Judge, the ap­ plication for letters of administration had not been published, and principally because, in his judgment, this ma.tter should be tried in a separate, ordinary action. In the last analysis, the peti­ tioner's contention could only be that in the present state of the proceedings in the court below Judge Ramos should decide' the motions for reconsideration and affirm Judg'e Enriquez's order without requiring· a new publication 0/1 the application for let.. ters of administration. By its nature, certiorari is predicated on a positive or affir­ mative action that is injurious to the interests of the complai11·ant. It is net a remedy for a lower court's inadicn, irrespective of the reasons given therefor. Upon lhe foregoing considerations, the petition for certiorari is dismissed without special finding as to costs. Momn, Feria, Paf,lo, Br:n9;;,m, Padillo, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, and Bautista Angelo, concur. Mr. Justice P.1ras voted for dismi£sal. 136 THE LAWYERS JOURNAL March 31, 1954
Date
1954
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