Manila Herald Publishing Co., et al., petitioners, vs. Hon. Simeon Ramos, et al., respondents, G.R. No. L-4268, January 18, 1951

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Title: Manila Herald Publishing Co., et al., petitioners, vs. Hon. Simeon Ramos, et al., respondents, G.R. No. L-4268, January 18, 1951
extracted text: Manila Herald PitlilisHng Co., et al., Petitioners, Vll. Hon. Simeon Ramos, et a[., Re.�pondents, G. R. No. L-4268, Ja.miary 18, 1951. 1. PLEADING AND PHACTICE; DISMISSAL OF ACTION BY COURT MOTU PROPIO.-Scction 1 of Rule 8 enumerates the grounds upon which an action may be dismissed, and it :::; c \��:: i :t�t:t:xtite:s r:�:�:m�nt: hi t�e en ; Instance has 11o power to dismiss a case, wherein no motion to dismiss or an answer had been filed. Even if th� parties file memo1:,mda upon the court's indicati<Jn in which they discuss the proposition that the acticn wa:; cessary and was improperly b1·ought, this would not sup�:Jcs th �/:�; i :�::� i� ? ��:i:i �� l �;io!µ��:/�e C ��:�i!:�� and the inclusion of those therein pl'ovidcd excludes any other, under the familiar maxim, ''inclusio unius est e:ci clusio alterius." The only instance in which, according to e sa.id rules, the court may dismiss upon the conl't's own 1110tion an action is, when the "plaintiff fails to appear at e the time of the trial or to prosecute his action for an un;�� so �:.�:� e 0 1 ; n ti�\:�r! i _�: e ; 1 � �s:i 1;:1:i1ew�!�/�v�tl:: 1 : s a:; formal motion to dismiss, would be acting with grave abusl' s of discretion if n.ot in exc�ss of jurisdiction. ID.; PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; THIRD- PARTY CLAIMS.-Scction 14 of Ruic 59, which treats of the steps t.o be taken when property attached is claimed by any 0U1er person than the defendant or his agent, coutains ihe pro viso that "Nothing herein contai ned shall prevent such third person from vindicating his cbim to the property by any proper action." What is "proper action"? Section 1 of Ruic 2 defines action a<. "an ordinary suit in a r:r,urt of justice, by which one party pl'Osccutes another for the en for=ement or protection 0f a right, or thP. prevention or redresi; of a wrong," whi!e section 2, entitled "Commence ment of Action." says that "civil P.,Ction may be com menced by filing a complaint with the court." "Action" has acquirf'd a well-definf'd, technical meaning, and it is in this resti-icted scHse that the word •·action" is used in the above rnle. In employing the word ''Commrncement" the rule cl�arly indicates an action which originates an entire proceeding and put;; in motion the insll't1mt!nts of the court calling for summons, answer, etc., and not any intermediary step taken in the course vf the proceeding whether by the parties themsrlves nr by a stranger. It would be strange mdeed if the framers of the Rules of Court or the Leg-is lature should ha.ve emJ)loyed the term "proper action" in stead of "intervention" or equivalent expression if the in tention ·had been just th:it. Thf' most liberal view that can be taken in favor of the attaching p:uty's position is that intP.rvention as a means of protecting the thirrl-party claim ants' right is not exclusive but cumulative and suppletory to the right to bring a new, independent suit. It is signi ficant that there are courts which go so far as to ta.ke the \'icw that even where the statute expressly grants the right to intervention in such ca�es as this, the statute rlocs not exte11d to owners of Jll'r>JlPl'ty atta.ched, fol' under this view, "it is considc,red that the owncl'Ship is r.ot one of the ess,'ntial questions to be determinetl in the litig-ation between plaintiff and def(!J1dant;" that "whether the pro perty b2Jcngs to defendant or claimant, if deterw.ined, i.; C'lnsiderecl as shedding no light upon the question in con trovel'fY, namely, that defondant is indebted to plaintiff." <See 7 C.J.S. 545 and footnote No. 89 where extracts from the decigion in Lewis v. Lewis, 10 N W. 586, leading ca�e, are printccl.) ID.; ID.; ID .. - Separate action was indeed said to be the c<Jr rect and only procedure contemplated by Act No. 1901 inter·vrntion being a new remedy introduced by the Rules of Court 2.s addition to, but not in substitntion of, the old process. The new Rules adopted section 121 of Act No. 190 Ma.rch 31, 1954 THE LAWYERS JOURNAL 147 and added thereto Huie 24Ca) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.. <See I l\Ioran's Comments on the Rules or Court, 3rd Ed., 238, 23!).) Yet, the right to intervene, unlike the r ight to bring a 11ew action is not absolute but left to the sound dism·etion of the court to ullow. This qualification makes intervention less prefcmble to an independent action from the standpoint of the third-party clnima11ts, at least. 4. I D.; ID.; ID. - Q filed a civil action against B and secured prelimina .. ry attachment on B's propel'lies. :M: and P filed with the sheriff separate third-p. :nty claims alleging that tl1ey were the owners of the propc1ty attt>.chcd; and instead of intervening in the case, M and P filed an independent action jointly against the sheriff and Q.. The first case was pending before the branch of the court presided ove1· by Judge S, and the new action is bcfo1·e the brnnCh of the court. pr,.sidc·d O\"t:l' by Judge R. Can Judge R entertain a motion to dischal'ge the preliminary attachment in the action iiending before J udge S? Hehl: The sheriff is not holding the properties in question by order of Judge S; in -reality this is true only to a limited extent. Judge S did not direct the sheriff to attach the pi.rticnlar JH'Operty in dispute The order was for the sheriff to at.. t9.ch R's properties. He was not supposed to touch any property other than that of B, and if he did, he aetecl beyonJ the limits of his autho1·ity and upon his persori~I l'esponsi\Jility. It is true of con1·se that 1woperty in custody 1 1f the law cannot be intel'ferred wit.h without t.he permission of the proper court and property legally attached is 1 n·o1>erty in cuslodia leyis. But for the 1·eason just stated, this rule is confined to cases where the property belongs to B or one in which B has proprietary intel'e::it. When the shedff, acting beyond the bounds of his office, seizes M's and P's properties, the rule does not apply and interfc. rence with his custody is not interference with another court's order of attachment.. None of what has been said, however, is to be construed as implying that the scttinA" aside of the ·attachment prayed for in the case before J udge R should be granted. The preceding disc:ussion is mlended merely to point out that Judge R has jurisdiction to e.ct in the pl'emises, not the way the jul'isdiction should be exercised. Edmundo M. Reye:; and A11to11fo 8 u1'rcdo for petitioners .. Ba11sa and Ampil fo1· i·espondents .. DECISION TUASON, J.: This is a petition for "certiorari with J)l'elimina1·y injunction" arising upon the following antecedents: Respondent Antonio Quirino filed a libel suit, docketed as Civil Case No. 11.53i, against Apruniano G. Bones, Pt!dro Padilla and Loreto Pastor, editor, managing editor and rcnorter, respectively, of the Daily Record, a daily newspaper published in ?Jfa_ nila asking damages aggregatinrr f'90 000.00.. With the filing of this suit, tile plaintiff secured a writ of preliminary attachment upon certain office and printing equipment found in the p1·emises of the Daily Record. Thereafte1· the : Manila Hernld Publishing Co. lnc. and Pl'inters, Inc., filed with the Sheriff separate thh·d-party claims, alleging that they were the owners of the property attached. Whereuvon, the Sheriff rP.<1uired of Quirino a counterbond of P'41,500 to meet the claim of the Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc., and another bond of P59,500 to meet the claim of P1·inters, Inc. These. amounts, upon Quirino's motion filed under Section 13, Rule 59, of the Hules of Court, were reduced by the court to Pll,000 and Pl0,000 respectively. Unsuccessful in their attempt to quash the attachment, on Octo. be~· 7, 1950, the Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. and Printers, Inc. commenced a joint suit against the Sheriff, Quit,ino and Alto Surety & lnsumnC'e Co. Ille., in which the fonner sought Cl) to enjoin the ~atter from proceeding with the a.ttachmC'nt of tl1e properties above mentioned a.nd (2) P45,000 .. 00 damages. This suit was docketed as Civil Case No. 12263. Whereas Case No. 11531 was being handled by Judge Sanchez or pending m the branch of the Court presided by him, Case No. 12263 fell in the brm1ch of Judge Pecson who iSsue<l a writ of preliminary injunction to the SheL·iff directing him to desist from J>rOCeeding with the atlachmcnt of the said properties. After the issuance of that preliminnw injunction, Antonio Qui1 ino filed an cx-pm·te petition for its dissolution, and J udge Simeon Ramos, to whom Case No. 122G3 had in the meanwhile been tr:msferred, grm1\.ed the petition on a bond of P21,000.00.. However J'uclgc Ramos soon set aside the order just mentioned on a. motion for reconsiderntion by the Mariila He1;ald Publishing Co. Inc. and Printers, Inc. and set the matter for hearing fo1· October 14, then c011tinnccl to October J 6 .. Upon the conclusion of that hearing, J udge Ramos rcquire_i lhe pa.rl'ies to submit memoranda on the question whether "the subject matte1· of Civil Case No. 12263 should be v~ntilated in an independent action or by mem1s of a complaint in intervention in Civil Case No. 11531." !\lcmonrnda ha,,i11g filed, His Honor declared that lhe suit, in Case No. 12263, was "unnecessa.ry, superfluous and illegal" and so dismissed the same. He held that what l\Janila Herald Publishing Co., Inc., and Printers, lnc .. , should <lo wns intervene in Case No. 11531.. The questi!;:ms th<!.t emerge from these facts and the at,1tuments are: Did Judge Ramos have authority to dismiss Case No. 12263 nt the stage when it was thrown out of court? Should the l\funila Herald Publishing Co., Inc., and Printers, Jnc., come as intel'"enors into the case for libel instead of bringing an indepenrlNlt s>..ction? And did Judge Pecson or Judge Ramos have jmisdiction in Case No. 12263 to quash the attachment levied in Case No. 11531"! In Case No. 12263, it should be recalled, neither a motion to dismiss nor an answer had been made when the decision under consideration was handed down. The matter then before the court wi1s a motion sccki11g a provisional or collateral remedy, connected with and incidental to the principal action. It was a motion to clissolvc the preliminary injunction granted by Judge Peceon res. traii1ing the Sheriff from proceeding with the attachment in Case No. 11531. The question of dismissal was suggested by J udge Ramos on a ground perceived by His Honor. To all intents and pur!\OSes, the < lismissal was decreed by the court on its own initiative .. Section l of Rule 8 em1me1·9.tes the grounds upon which an action may he dismissed, and it specifically ordains that a motion !!'I this end be filed. Jn the light of this express requirement we do not believe that the court had 11ower to dismiss the case without the rct1uisite motion duly presented.. 'fhc fact that the parties filed mcmorandu upon the court's indica.tion or order in which they discussed the proposition that the action was unnecessary and was improperly brought outside and independently of the case for libel did not su11ply the deficiency. Hule 30 of the Rules of Court 1n·ovides for the cases in which ai1 3ction may be dismissed, anrl the inclusion of those therein provided excludes any other, under the fa.miliat· maxim, friclusio iuills est exclusio alterius. The only instance in which, aC'cording to said Rules, the comt may dismiss upon the court's own motion an action is, when the "plaintiff f ails to ap11ear at the tilnfr of the trial or to prosecute his action for an ui.rcasonu\Jle length of time or to comply with the Rules or e.ny order of thc court." The Rules of Court are devised as a matter of necessity, intended to be observed with diligence by the courts as well as by the 1iarties, for t he orderly conduct of litigation and judicial rules which gh'es the court jurisdiction to act. We a re of the opinion that the comt acted with gl'a.ve abuse of discretion if not in excess of its jurisdiction in dismissing thP tase without any formal motion to dismiss. The foregoing conclusions should suffice to dispose of this proceeding f,..,r certiorari, but the parties have discussed the second question and we propose to rule u1ion it if only to put out of the way a probable cause for future conh'oversy ·and consequent delay in the disposal of the main cause. Section 14 of Rule 59, which treats of the stepi:i to be. taken when property attached is claimed by any other pe1·2ons than the defendant or his agent, contains the proviso that "Nothing herein contained shall prevent such third pel'Son from vindicating his claim THE LAWYERS JOURNAL March 31, 1954 to the property by any proper action." What is "proper action"? Section l of Ruic 2 defines action as "an ordinary suit in a court ~~e~~s~~~c~1~~e;;:l~\~n: ~-~;~~. ~~os:,~:1t~~·c:~~~~:~ ~~-1· r~~~-e::f~~ce~ wrong," while Section 2, entitled "Commencement of Action,'' says that "civil action may be commenced by filing a. complaint with the court." "Action" has acquired a well-defined, technical meaning, and it is in this restricted sense that the word "action" is used in the al-ove rule. In employing the word "commencement" the rule clearly indicates an action which originates an entire proceeding and puts in motion the instruments of the court calling for summons, answer, etc., and not any intermediary step taken in the court of the proceeding whether by the parties themselves or by a stranger. It would be strange indeed if the framers of the Rules of Court or the Legislature should have employed the term "proper action" instead of "intervention" or equivalent expression if the intention had been just that. It was all the easier, simpler and the more natural to say intervention if that had been the purpose, since the asserted right of the third-party cla.imant necessarily grows out of a pending suit, the suit in which the order of attachment was issued. The most liberal view that can be taken in favor of !.he respondents' position is that intervention as a means of' protecting the third-party claimants' right is not exclusive but cumulative; and suppletory to the l'ight to bring a new, independent suit. It is significant that there are courts which go so for as to take th" view that even where the statute expressly grants the t·ight of inter\'ention in such cases as this, the statute does not extend to owners of property attached, for, under this view, "it is considered that the ownership is not one of the essential questions to be determined in the litigation between plaintiff and defendant;" that "whether the property belongs to def<Jnclant or claimant, if determined is considered as shedding no light upon the question in controversy, namely, that defendant is indebted to plaintiff." Sec 7 C. J. S. 54li a.nd footnote No. 89 where extracts from the decision in Lewis v. Lewis, 10 N.W. 686, a leading case, are printed. Separate action was indeed said to be the correct and only procedure contemplated by Act No. 190, intervention being a new remedy introduced by the Rules of Court as addition to, but not in substitution of, the old process. The new Rules adopted S('('tion 121 of Act No. 190 and a.ddcd thereto Rule 24 (a) of the Federal Rules of Procedure. CombineU, the two modes of redress are now SE:ction I of Rule 13(1) the last clause of which is the newly added prO\'ision. The result is that, whereas, "under the old procedure, the third person could not intervene, he having no interest in the debt <or damages> sued upon by the plaintiff,'' under the present Rules, "a third person clniming to be the ·•wner of such property may, not only file a third-party claim with one sheriff, but also intervene in the action to ask that the writ of attachment be quashed." <I Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 3rd Ed. 238, 239.) Yet, the right to intervene, unlike the right to bring a new action, is not absolute but left to the sound discretion of 'the court to allow. This qualifica.tion makes intervention less preferable to an independent action from the standpoint of the claimants, at least. Because availability of intervention depends upon th<r court in which Case No. 11531 is pending, there would be no assura.nce for the herein petitioners that they would be permitted to come into that case. Little reflection should disabuse the mind from the assumption that ·an independent action creates a multiplicity of suits. There can be no multiplicity of suits when the parties in the suit where the attachment was levied arc> different from the pa.rties in the new action, and i,:o are the issues in the two cases entirely diffrrent. In the circumstances, separate action might, indeed, be tht more convenient of the two competing modes of redress, in that intervention is more likely to inject c0nfusion into the issues between the parties in the case for debt or dama.ges with which the> third-party claimant has nothing to do and thereby retard instead of facilitate the prompt dispatch of the controversy which is the underlying objective of the rules of pleading and JJractice. That is why intervention is subject to the court's discretion. The same reasons which impelled us to decide the second que':I~ tion, just discul:!sed, urge us to take cognizance of and express au 011inion on the third. The objection that at once suggests itself to entertaining in Case No. 12263 the motion to discharge the preliminary att&.chment levied in Casc> No. 11531 is that by so doing one judge would intel'ferc with ancither judge's actuations. The objection is superficial and will not bear analysis. It has been seen that a sepa.rate action by the third-party who claims to be the owner of the property attached is appropriate. If this is so, it must be admitted that the judge trying such action may render judgment onlering the sheriff or whoevr!r has in posH'l!Sion the attached property to deliver it to the plaintiff-cla.imant N desist from seizing it. It follows further that the court may make an interlocutory order, upon the filing of such bond as may be necessary, to release the property pending final adjudication of the title. Jurisdiction over an action includes jurisdiction over a.n intci:locutory matter incidental to the cause and deemed necessary to preserve the subject matter of the suit or prot<'ct the parties' interests. This is self-evident. The fault with the rcsp011dcnts' argument is that it assumes that the Sheriff is holding the property in question by order of the court handling the ease for libel. In reality this is true only to a limited extent. That court did r.ot direct the Sheriff to attaeh the particular property in dispute. The order was for the Sheriff to attach Bol'!'es', Padilla's and Pastor's property. He was not :~~:.:s:~dtoif t~~echdi~~Yh~n:~t:~ty .:::~~ ~~:n li~~~! ~~ .t:seau~~~e~:; and upon his personal responsibility. It is true of course that property in custody of the law ean not be interfered with without the permission of the proper court, end property legally attached is property in custodia fegis. But for the reason just stated, this rule is confined to cases where the pro~ perty belongs to the defendant Ol' one in which the defendant has proprietary interest. When the sheriff acting beyond the hounda of his office seizes a stranger's property, the rule does not apply and interference with his custody is not interference with anoth<'r court's order of attachment. It mar be argued that the third-party claim may be unfounded; but so may it be meritorious for that mattE>r, Speculations are • however beside the point. The title is the very issue in the case frr the recovei·y of property or the dissolution of the attachment, and pending final decision, the court may enter any interlocutory order calculated to preserve the property in litigation and protect the parties' rights and interests. None of what lias been said is to be construed as implying that the setting aside of the attachment prayed for by the plaintiffs in Case No. 12263 should be granted. The pre>ceding discussion is intended merl'ly to point out that the court has jurisdiction to act in the premises, not the way the jurisdiction should be exercised. The granting or denial, as the case may be, of the prayer for the dissolution of the attachment would be a proper subject of a new proceeding if the party adversely affected should be diSsatisfied. The petition for certiorari is granted with costs against the re!'pondents except tho respondent Judge. M01·an, Paras, Ferin, Pa.blo, Benyzon, Padilla,· Montemayor; Rtyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, J.J. concur. (I) Section I. When P ropeR.-A person mny. At: ny Pd:iW or o trinl, !ic 1'<'r· 1n'lled lw the court, in it• d h~lion, to inuirvcne in r,n ""'ion if;,~ h11s leg:il ln• tcrqt in the matU!r in liti1mtion or ln the suce~s of <'ither of the r·11...;ie1. or 11n ln· t<ir,~t as:rainst both. or when he la llO eituuted 111 to l\fo aoVHllCI~ nf~..:r.tr•I by a ,Jlat1·i· bl'tion or o!hcr dl&POBltion <.of 1•ro1 ierty In the custody of til~ ~Ollrt <•t of an (>lfi~r thereof. RECOGNIZE THEIR RESPECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY <Continued from page 111) (which, by the way, is repl'esentcd not only by the Supreme Court but also Ly the Court f)f Appeals, Court of F irst Instance, municip::;,I and justice of the peace court!', and even such' other commissions and boards as are exercising quasi-judicial powers). As tr.is Convention closes and the conventionists return to their own localities, it is my fervent hope and pica that all concerned will' evc1 · be responsibility <'Onscious. Happy New Year to all. Ma.1·ch 31, 1954 THE LAWYERS JOURNAL 149
Date: 1954
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