Memorandum of the Code Commision (continued from the February issue)

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Title: Memorandum of the Code Commision (continued from the February issue)
extracted text: MEMORANDUM OF THE CODE COMMISSION <Conlinlwl fnnn the February Issue) This memorandum comments upon proposed amentlnwnts tc Book Ill of the new Cvil Code. F,xccpt in regard lo succession, tile nl"ticles are consecutively dcalth with, tlrns: Arts. 712, 719, 721, c;tc. In the part concerning succession. the amendments are com .. mentcd upon by placing togefher those that are proposed by the same propon1::nt. Moreover, tho.;;c suggestions not coming from either Congressman 'folentino or Justic~ .1. B. L. Reyes are discussed tc.gcther. ARTICLE 712 J ustice .J. B. L. Rey1::s cdli<'iZCf' the placing of donation in Book III as 011e of the modes of acquiring ownership. The Cod~ C"lmmission knew tlml there were civilists v:ho disM agreed with this a.n:rngemcnt, amo11g them Sanchez Roman. However, aftei cal'efu\ consideration, the Commission pc1·fe1Tcll to retain the :ll'rang:emrnt of the Spanish Civil Code, for these reasons: 1. The 1"easo11ings of Sm1chez Roman did not quite convince the Commission. 1t should be noted that the Commission adopte<l the !'olution of Sanchez Roman conceming i11tellcctual creation uid prescription :rnd therefore induded th(Se two .mbjeCts among the modes of acquiring owne1·shi1}. However, in regard to donation, Sanchez Roman dicl not quitr convince the Commission, and pref~rred the reasons of Manresi; found in Vol. 6 of his comm~n taries where he discusses the grounds for not placing d'>nation among the contracts. Manl'esa says: "Atendiendo a estos preccplos, Ins donacionf·s entre vivos sen indudatlemente contratos, porque hay concurso de voluntades, hay objeto y causa. Scin contrntns f.!'ratuitos o <le purn ben'!ficencia, cuyo objetn es la dacion de unn cosa o de un dcr<'<!ho sobre esa cos.'\: "Pero este argumento es de aquellos que, pro probar denrnsiado, nada prueban contra la idea de! lcgisla<lor, al se1mrar la donacion C'omo un modo es11edal de adquirir. Coi\sentimiento, objeto y eausa hay en las sucesiones, en el matrimonio. et cet'era, y podrian estimar:;e tambicn contratos dC'ntJ'O de estos limnamentos generales que tanto abat·can. El Codigo 110 niega que pucda rstimarse como contrato la donacion, pcro la estudia aparte y la considcra como un modo especial de adquirir, p01~ue no ha podido menos de observar que son clemasiadas las especialidades que l)resenta respccto a los dem.'.ls contratos ordinarios, especialidades que la acercan bastante a las sucesiones. "A que obcdece esa esrrcialidad? La unica diferencia, dice Savi~y, entre el contrato y la donacion, consistr e11 quc aquf' puede aplicarse a toda clase de relaciones de derecho, mientras quc esta aplica solamente al dcrecho de bicnes. Pero no es esto solo : no ohedece le especialidad de la donacion a que sea su objeto la dacion de una cosa, y, por tanto, modo de adquirir y trnnsmitir la propiedad, porque lo mismo ocune en la compraventa, la permuta, el censo, etc., y a estos actos se Jes llam& contratos y sc incluyen cc.mo un modo distinto de transmiti!' r de adquiril'. No obedece tempoco la especialidad a que constituyan las donaciones un acto de pura libcralidad, porque cl mand.::ttario que administra gratuitamente los bienes de un amigo o pttrientr, el gcstor de uegocios, en ii:ruale.J casos. el quc voluntal'iamente y sin premio ni interes alguno prcsta un servicio cualquier'.I., obrr:n t.ambicn gratuit~.mc>nte y por mera libcralidad, y, sin embargo, cstos octos son tratados nor el Codigo entrC' los <'Ontratos. "El caracter especial d<' las donuiones nace de bs dos circunstancias reunidas a quc nos hemos referido, no de una sola de ellas. Notese que los actos gratuitos <le que hcmos hech:) mendon no constituyent modos de adquirir el dominio uo, consisten en la dacion de cosas. Notese que los otros modos de adquirir que, como contr:?.tos, estudia el Codigo, tienen todos m1a causa onerosa o remuneratoria. Notese, por ultimo (articulo 1,1871 que la condonacion, unico acto quc puede reunir los exprPMdos cRractcres, sigue las reglas de las donacio!leS, como que es una. verdadera rlonacion. " Hay, pues, un grupo espcci:i.l de actos, o ei se quiei-e de contratos, que a l mismo tiempo tiencn una causa gratuita y constituycn un modo de adquirir. Estc grupo esta formado exclusivamente por las donaciones. "Pero tambien es un modo de adquirir, con causa puramente gratuita, la sucesion tcstada o intestada. Luego las donaciones titJ11.en 11111J. naturaleza muy semejante a las sucesiones, I'nes de csta casi identid11.d de naturctleza, de esta estrecha rclacion entre ambas instituciones, 1iace fo1·zosamente y contra la volimtarl de todo legisludor que intendra. desconocerlo, la. especialiclad de la dmwcion cQmo modo de adquirfr. "Cierto que las donaciones producen sus efectos en \'ida. del donunte, y en las sncesiones csos efcctos se producen poi· la mucrte <lcl que dispone c fo los bienes; ciel'to que, como una eonS<.'Cuencia de los dicho, es inevocablc la donacion y puedc revocarse el testamento hasta 1.::t hora dfl la muerte. Pero ])tecisamcnte por eS(IS motivos. 2..mbii~ instituciones sin deju de ser semajantes no son identicas. Si bien el heredero, continua a veccs la personalidad de causante no hacemos mPncion de est.a circunstancia ponrne no es till caractcr distinto todas las sucesiones, y quc los legatarios y aun los mismos herederos, si aceptan la herenci2 a beneficio de invent-ario. suceden por testamento y 1 w confuden su pcrsonalidad con la del difunto. "Desde el momenta en que hay actos poi· los que se transmite ~ratuibmente la propiedad en vida, y actos por los que gratuitamcnte sc transmite In propiedad para despues de la mucrte, la ley tiene que impo ... er a unos y otros actos i~uales Jimitaciones. Como va a p1·ohibl'r a 1tn testador qite disponga libremente de s11s bienes para despnes de sit miterte. si consif-mtc 1ue se despre11dr1 de dlos rrm.t1dtame1de durflnte sit 1:ida? 0 ha.bin que supr imir las lcgitimas, o era necesario limitar las donaciones. "Ante esln tiecesidncl, las re(llas ge1ierales de fas contratos 110 podian sevir para fas donaciones. Y no sc diga que cada contrato tiene su modo de ser esnecial. dcbiendo fonms~mente seguir reglas distintas la compraventa que la sociedad, el mandato qui! la fianza, etc., porquc ni nos i·eferimos solo a las rcQ'\as esprciales. ni contrato a!i::-mio, como la donac10n, es. <lei mismo modo qne las sucesiones mndo de adquirir pm· titulo gratuito. ' 4Asi es que emneznmos por notar que muchos quP pueden contrnta.i· no nne>den hncer donacioncs, y qne, en camhio, puede>'l ser tfnne.tnl'ins y nun accntar <lonacionPs muehos quP no rine>den co11tratar. Raio el primer aspecto, cnmo van a .iustifica1· e>l padre o el tutor la necrsicb•d o la utilidnd de (]tie el hiio o el mcnor nal!'llTI don9.cion eimnle rle sus Menes? Baja el !'Cg11ndo, basta leer los articulos 62!'i y 626 nara convenecrse de one la can.<1cidad para :Hfquirir nor donaeion se acerca mas a la capacirlad pari:i. adquirir por here.,cia o le17.ado, y aun tiene menos tn1b<1s let?alrs. porque hay menos temor df" que sea oYLri·osa la adquisicion. "('ontinuamos vien<lo nue um>, pc1·sonn nue>de contratar snh,·e todns sns bie>nes. riero no torlos rmerle danarlos. y que nadif" nut'rle cl"r ni recihir rior via rle dnnacion mas de lo que pue<la dar recibir por tcstamento. "Vcmos. por ultimo. la esnecialidad de las reglas de b donacil'ln para. su resrision en el caso de que haya frande de acreedore>s. sus especinles causas de r cvocacion, su r+"dnccion por inoficiosl\s. y, en fin. las reglas que Hemm el Codi"'O ('TI el tral:ido de los sucrsion, y no se anlican a los contratos, sino soln a JP.~ dnnncio""~ de las nue ofrecen eiemnln los articnlos 811. 812 817. al 820, 825, 869, 968, 1.035. 1,039. 1.040, 1044, 1()46 a 1.048, etc. " Y como todas esta reglas no snn caprichosas, como ohcdecen a una verdadera necesidad y a.l'l'ancan de la naturaleza mis1nn di! h domicion, 110 hay ma~ remedio que reconoc"!r con cuanta ruzon el Codi~ espaiiol, siguie11d0o el ejemplo de otros muchos, h.:?. considc1·ado a las donaciones como un modo esoecial de> adqui1fr y las ha estm!i~do sep~radamente de Jos ce>ntratos." ltfa.rch 31, 1954 THB LAWYJmS JOURNAIJ 101 2 Aside from the fo1·egoing con!!idcl'ntions of ?o.'la1Hes~1, the Code Commission had in mind thC' distinction between actos ;uri~ dicos and contrn.tos. The former arc more under the control of Jaw tho.n of the will of the parties. Therefore, in adoption and marriage, for example, the parties arc not free to ap:rec upon the conditions of the marriage or adoption b~·ause the law steps in for i·easons of public policy to fix SJJedal conditions :rn<I lirnitalionP. The same thing occurs in regard to don2.tion; thus there is a limit as to the amount t.hat may be donated (Art. 750 to 752), incapacity to succeed by will is applicable to donations inie1· 'Vivus (A1·!. 740); donat ions have special wsys of revocation and reduction (Chap. IV, Title IJJ, Book III. ) in this conJlect.ion, Sanchez Roman himself, in spite of his reasonings, had to defitl<' donation ns "un acto de liberalidnd" and did not USC' the word "contrnto." He also admits that: "x x x si pucdc tener cl ucto indcpendientc existcncia jul'idica por In sola \"'lhmta.d dcl donant.e, y si bajo cste punto de vista, en sit orige11. la donacinn, coma consccucncia del dcrecho que tcuemc.s a disponcl· de lo quc cs nuest.l'o, ei. unica y exclusivamente un acto de nusetra libcrrima vohmtad, sin tener para nada en cuento. el consentimicnto de\ donatario, y m~ este sentido hemos co;isid11rado la cfrmacio1i en ~encral, ai <letcrminM sit 'wt1o·alez1i x x x." 3. But Sanchez Roman says that.: "una ,·ez conClrrricndo las dos volunt.a<les de donante, y donatario 1ior la uccptacion, csc acto unilateral vienc a com·crti1·sc en una relacion contractual, y la do11acion de simpla acto de bcndiciencia o libcrnlidad, transformasc en un contrato," Our comment is that the 1 1crfection of the· act of liberality by the donee's acceptance does not give rise to v.. contract but to a donation. 4. Lastly, there is something to be said in favor of Nn1>0leon's view that "f>l contrato impone cargas mutuas a los dos cont1·atantes, y por ttuito esta exoresion contrato 1 10 puede conveni!· a la donacion." A pm·e .gift being a shccr :let of generosity im1 ;oses no obligati011s on the doncc. Therefore, in the common nccept:mce of the word "contract," it can not properly be applied to a simple donation. , With rt>gard to the proposal of Justice Reyes that the title of t radition- should .be dealt with separately and not merely unde1· the Title on Sales, that suggestion should be discussed in connection with t he proPosed amendment adding Title VI 011 traclition. Title I . - OCCUPATION J ustice Reyes says that the Code fails to make an exception of goods found and sakagcd at sea, which ni·e governed by speci:i.l rules. <Salvage Act). He further says that the Code also fails to clarify t.he situation of the movables cast ashore by the seu waves and those £unk nnd lying in the water, at the bottom of the sea or rivers. Our comment is that, as to the ffrst point, this matter is governed by the Salvage Act P.nd should not be coYered again in the new Civil Code. With regard to the second class of cases, they should be the subject of special legi~lation. (See our comment under Art. 507.l J'itle II . - IN TELLECTUAL CREATION J ustice Reyes says that paragraph 4 should be & mended so al!I to read: "(4) . The discoverer or inventor with regro·d to his discovery or invention," omitting the words "scientist or technologist" in order that by the ejusden generis rule of interpretation t he sentence ma.y not be limited to technologically trained men. \Ve nre sorry to disagree with the proposed amendment hecause th& phrase "any other person" is broad enough to cover a11y other person. The1·e is no ground to fear that if any layman, not a scientist, shOuld make a scientific discovery any cout't would deny him the right to have a. patent just because he is not a scientist. Moreover, there is nothing in the !aw on Patents which limits the 1:ight to give a patent to a scientist or technologist. In this connection Art. 742 provides that special Jaws govel'n copyright and pat.ent. ARTICDE 724 Justice Reyes says that this article should include trade-mar..:s and trade-names. The suggestion is accepted. Moreover, the word ''service-mark" should also be included. As amended, the a rticle should read as follows: · )5~ 'ART. 724. Special laws govern copyrights, patents, tmdP.ma.rks, service-marks and tn1de-names." Tit/I' Ill . [JONATJON ARTJCI.,E 725 J ust.ice Reyci; i·eiterntes his suggestion that this entfre tit.le should he transfened to nn appropriate place in Book JV on Obligations ~rnd Contracts. Reference is made to our comment under Arl. 712. ARTICLES 73.'l aml 754 Justice Reyes suggests the amr.ndment of Art. 733, by caning <lonations with a bUl'den, onerQllS < lonations, so that thP. 2.rticl.-. will not conflict with Ari. 754. There is no cont.radiction b1:tween Ads. 733 and 754 i:.ecause they refer to the same kind of donation with · a bu~den, although the donntioa in Art. 733 is looked at from the sta.ndpoint of the c'l."1se, while the donation in A1-t. 754 is vicw€d from the standpoint of effect, In both articles the thing doila.ted ii:: wo1·th more thnn the burden, Castan diVidcs donations on the basis of their cause, into simple and remuncrntory; and on the l.iusis of theh· effect, into pure, conditional and onerous. The vr:ry wording- of Art. 733 show;; lhnt a remuncratory donation may ca.i·ry with it a burden, that is to say, a donation motivated by a <lesi1·e to l'Q\\ al'Cl suvice;; n;ay impose a burden on the donce. This makes Art: 733 i:ntirely Nmsistent with Art. 754 where an onerous donation, Yiewed from the st::mdpt.i11t of its effect, also implies a. burden. In suppo1·t of the foregoing, we quote Caslan's "Dcrecho Ci\'il Espfliiol," iu his ex1 iositio11 of "D<.macion" < vol. 3, Jlp. !>6-~9): ":-:! . Sus rlaseS.x x x. "B, Por sn ca11sa o motivo. - Se dividen a este pccto las donaciones en simples y 1·emuw.eratorias. Son simples las que no reconoccn otras causa quc la. libel'alidart del donante; r remmicratori({s acqucllas a que alude el art. 619 del codigo civil, nl decir que cs tambien donncion la que se hace n una pc1·sona. por sus mc1·itos o por los sel'vicios prcstados al do. nante, siempre que no constituyan deudas exigi.bles x x x. "C, Por sus efectos. - Se dividen las donaciones en purns, condicionalis y onerosas. El Codigo se refiere a estns ultimas al d('cir quc son tambien clonaciones aquellas en que se imponc al donat2.rio un g:rnvamen inferior al valot· de lo donndo Cal't. 619), y quc las donaciones con causa onerosa se rigen por las reglas de los contratos, (art. 622L Pero esta nltimn disposicion hay qw~ 1mtende1· scra solo ar1ic<tble a las donacionrft fmpropm:J que fmpongan un g1·avamen equivale11tc at 1utlo1· de lo donado; p1tes rn las otras es natural q1 1e al excedentc de l<i donacion sobre el grrwamente se le a71liqmm las 1·eglas de la donacion." Our comment is that this la.st is a donacion r c'111me1·<itoria by its c<msa or tnoti'vo. AR'f/Cl,E 797 Congressman Arturo M. Tolentino suggests that Art. 737 be nmended so as tr, read as follows: "The dono1· must have th1; capacity to donnte at the time he mclt~s the donation and when he learns of its acceptance." Atty. R. l\1. Jalandoni also makes the same proposal. The reason adduced is that inasmuch us undel' Art. 734 dnne.tion is perfected from the moment the donor kncws of its ucceptance by the donee, therefore, the capacity of the donor r 1ust also exist at the said moment in order that the donation may be valid. However, the Code Commission docs not believe that Art. 734 should require the capacity of the donor at the time of t he accept. ance by the donec is conveyed, because if, for exr.mp!e, the donor ha.s become insane, his guardian's k.nowledg-c of the acceptance should be sufficient. In the case the donor should become a bank1·upt, the knowledge of the acceptance communicated to lhe assignee should like be sufficient. J ustice Reyes proposes that it should be made clear that bankruptcy or civil interdiction of the donor after making the donat.ion doc!'! not bar the effectivity. However, it is quite clear from the wording of the article, t.hat if the donol' loses liis capacity after making the donation, that does not rescind t h;:i donation, because it is cxprt!ssly stated thnt tht' donol''s capacity shall be determined a.s of the time of the niakin9 Qf t he donation. In other words, subsequent incapacity dees not <iffect the donation. THE LAWYERS JOURNAL J\l;nch 31, 1954 ARTICLE 799 Justice Heyes says that the word "void" should be changed to "voidable". However, the intention of the Code Commission is to make these cionations void from the beginning, because they are immoral or ngainst public policy. The fact that the last paragraph refers to an action for declaration of nullity does not mean that the donation is only voidable, because even if a contract is void from the beginning, a judicia.l declaration to that effect is necessary. Art. 1410 provides: "The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistencc of a contract does not prescribe." In this connection, A1't. 1409 provides: " The following con .. tracts arc inexistent and void from the beginning: "xxxxx . . "(7). Those ex1111ssly prohibited or declared void by law." The donations ii1 Art. 739 are among the transactions prohibitP.rl or declared void by law.' This is clear from the fact that the first lino! of Art. 739 clearly states, "Tl1e following donntio1ls shall be void.'' ARTICLE 741J J ustice Reyes proposes that the words "and vice verso!' shonld be added to .iccord with Art. 1028. The latter a1·ticle P\'Ovidcs: "The prohibitions mentioned in article 739, concerning donations inter vi11011 shall apply to testamen~P.ry provisions." In view of the clearness of Al't. 1028, the words "and vice versa" need not be added to Art. 740. ARTICLE 74£ There is no vagueness in Art. 742 because Arts. 311, 316 and 32(), clearly state who represent the child. · ARTICLE 7.$9. Last Par. Justice Reyes asks who is supposed to make the notificl!tion t<' the donor that his donation has been accepted. He states that it is doubtful if notaries he.ve the power undCr the Administratiw• Code, to make the notification. The last paragraph .of this article states lhat the dono1· shall be notified "in an authentic form." The notifica.tion need not lw. done by the notary; it may be done by the donee himself in writing signed by him, transmitting the separate instrument of acccpta:nce, which shall be in a public document, accordil)g to paragraph 2 ARTICLE 750 Justice Reyr.s p1·oposes th;1.t donations exceeding, say P500, be approved by the court in order to be valid. He says this would ioave ulterior litigation. The Code Commission believes that such requirement would be an expensive red-tape and would hamper the generosity of bene:actors. Before the donation is approved, creditors and heil'S would appear a.nd. make objections which may not be well founded With regard to the possibility of fraud on creditors, if an:v person wants to perpetrate such fraud, he usually makes a simulated sale of his prope1'ly. Therefore, to he logical, it should a!s'.l be required that all sales shall be appl'Oved by the court, becausl' they may be intended to defraud the creditors. We believe that the rcquiremment herein proposed by Justice Reyes will be an un<l,ue interference with the citizen's freedom of action. If he is violating the law, the st:;.tutes both penal ar.d civil are sufficiently comprehensi\·e to make him suffer the consequences. AR7'1CLE 159 Justice Reyes suggests that the last part of the first. pa.ragrapl. bi'! amended to read: "There shall be no right of accretion among them by reason of p, donee's i11capetcity, refuml or frtilure to accept the dt»mtin11, unll'ss the donor has otherwise provided." His reasons P.re as follows: 1. That predecease is not applicable unless the death takes place before t!le donation is perfected. 2. It is rare to meet an express repudiation of do11ations; most of the time, the donee will simply fail to1accept. With regard to the first reason, inasmuch a.s J ustice Reyes himself admits that dPath before the donation is perfected may give rise to accretion, therefore, predecease is one of the possibilitics foreseen in the a1ticle. The first paragraph, therl'fore, urovides that in such a case there shall be no right of a.ccretion, uniess the donor has otherwise provided. With regard to the second reason, failure to act is an implied repudiation. ARTICLE 760 Pa-r. 9 Justicr. Reyes asks why adoption in paragraph ~ should refer or.ly to a minor child, whereas Art. 337 permits adoption of a person of legal age. The intention of the Commission is that the subsequent adoption of a minor child f!hould be the only case where adoption may cause the revocation or reduction of the donation, for these reasons: 1. The adcption of a person of legal age is usually not to have an heir but only for purpose of expressing the adopter's affection. 2. The subsequent adoption of a person of age should not give the latter a chance to ask the donee for the revocation or reduction of donations previously made, because this would give him 1:.11 opportunity to meddle with, or inquire into, past generositiea of the adopter. The Code Commission believes that such would be a reprehensible a.ct of interference •m the part of the adopted person. ARTICLE 761 J u!'=tice J~C"y~s pr(lpnscs that the foul'th and fifth lines of this article be eliminated, that is to say, "taking into account the whole estate of the donor at the time of the birth, appearance or ndoption of a child." The question involved is whether the basis of computation should be the prQperty of the donor a.t the time of the birth, appearance or adoption of a child, or at the time of the donor's death. Justice Reyes says that it should be the latter. But inasmuch as the :iction is wmally brought during thl' lifetime of the dcnor, there is no way of computing his property at the t ime of his death, therefore, the only way to have an approximate cc·mputation is to take into account the prc..perty of the donor at the time of the birth or appearance or ado?tion of the child. But, Justice Reyes says, that testator may acquire sufficient assets after the nppeara.nce of the child to i·ender revocation or reduction of the donation unnr.cessary. Tn such a case the revocation may be rescinded or the l'eduction modified upon petition of the donor. There is some similarity in this way of computation to the case of the cvmpulsory dowry unC!er the olrl Civil Code. In ae-. cC'rdance with Art. 1341 of the vld Cocle. the compulsory dowry. consisted in one-half of the presumptive strict Iegitime. ARTICLE 762.769 Justice Reyes proposes the elmination of these two a.rticles for the reasons he stated in Art. 761. Inasmuch ns the reasons have been refuted, these tv.·o articles should be retained ' ARTICLE 'lfi9 Atty. R. M. Jalandoni proposes that th<' words " or from his legitimation. recognition" be eliminated from Art. 763 became, hl• says, the mere birth of a child of the ,fonor, whether the child be legitimate or illegitimate, is a ground for a revocation. It is true that even a spurious child is entitled to a legitime under the new Civil Code. However, the relation of parent and child, that is to say, paternity and filiation, must be jurlicially declared in order that th(' spuriQUS child may be entitled to a legitime. For this reason. the words "from the judicial declaration of fili?.tivn" are used in Art. 703. The words "birth of the first child" i·efer to a legitimate rl1ild ; "or from his legitiffiatioH" refer to a Jegit;mated child; "recognition" refers to an ackn.:'lwledged natural child or a n:iturnl child by legal fiction; "or adoption" refer tv an adoptM child. And, lastly. thi; word<i "or from the judicial dedaration of filiation" refer to a spurious child. Therefore, the amendment would not be necessary or in order. ARTICLE 765 Justice Reyel'! proposes that this article should rnake reference to Art. 107 ai; an additional grvmid for revo!dng donations by reason of ingratitude. Art. 107 provides: "The innccent spouse, after a decree of legal separetion has been granted, may revoke the donatir>ns by reason of mal'l'iage made by him or by her to the off~nding spous&. Alienutions and mortgazes madl' before the notation <.'f the complaint for revocation in the Registry of Pr6perty sh'lll be \.alid. "Tl1is action lapses after four yea.rs following the date the decree b\.>come final." Ma1·ch 31, 1954 THE LAWYERS JOURNAL lt is not necessary to refer e>:pressly lo Art. 107 because par. I without the necessity Qf resorling to Art. 10'1. 1 of Art. '165 says: ''CU If the donec should commit some offense a.gainst tlle person, the honor or the property of the donor, or of Respectfully submitted, his wife or children under his parental auihority." Art. 107 is JORGE BOCOBO a mere applicaticn of the principle in par. 1 of Art. 765, so t hat Chairman, Code Commission revocation under Art. 107 may be effected under Art. 765, par. :\Janila, Febru:l!'y 24, 1951 · l\lEMORANDUJ\1 ON THF. PHOPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE PROVISIOKS THE NEW CIVIL CODE ON SUCCESSION (HOOK JU) EMBODIED IN HOUSE BILL NO. 1019. ARTICLE 719 This article defines testamentary succesFion but fails to define legal or intestate succession. It is proposed to have this article amended so ss to gi\'e the concept of legal or intestate succession. Jn the original draft of the Code Commisaion, legal or i11testate succession is defined in Article 799 thus: "Legal or intestate succession takes place by operation of law in the absence of a v:.>.lid will." The Code Commission agrees with the amendment. so that Al'ticle 799 will give the concept of both trstamentary an.d intestate successions, while Article 780 provides for mixe<l succession. ARTICLE 78i! An amendment to this article is pl'OJlosed to read thus: "Art. 782. An heir is a person called to th~ WHOLE Oll AN ALIQUOT PORTION OF THE INHERITANCE either bv the provisior. of a will or by operation of law. "Devisees and legatees are persons to whom gifts of real and personal property are respectively given by virtue of a will." The proposed amendment is not necessary because the word "succession" as used in t his article does not mean "property" but a right, and an heir · may not be entitled to the "whole or an aliquot portion of the inheritance" because of diBinheritance unworthiness. ARTIC~E 815 It is proposed to amend this Article so as to read, thus: "Art. 815." When a Filipino is in a foreign country, he is authorized to make will in any of the forms established by the law of the country in which he may be. Such will may be probated in the Philippines, AS IF EXECUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS LA ws.i• There is no serious objection to the proposed amendment, although it seems that there is no necessity for the same inasmuch a<:; if the will may be probated in the Philippines, it goc:i without snyiug that said will shall be considered as if executed in accordance with the laws of this country. ARTICLE 838 The last paragraph of this Article is sought to be amended by adding the following: "THE RIGHT OF fHE TESTATOR TO REVOKE HIS WILL, HOWEVER, SHALL NO'r HF. BARRED BY ITS ALLOWANCE DURING HIS LIFETIME." The proposed amendment is a superfluity because of the provisions of Article 828, which ordains that a "will may be revokeu by the testator at any time before his death", and which is in accordance with the principle that ~vel'y will is !'evocable. Moreover, Article 777 provides that "the right to the succession t ransmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." ARTICLE 878 The following amendment to this Article is suggested: "Art. 878. A suspensive term OR CONDITION IN A TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION does not prevent tho instituted heir from acquiring his rights and transmitting them to his heirs even before the arrival of the tem1 OR THE HAPPENING OF THE CONDITION." The Code Commission begs to disagree with the proposed amendment for the following reasons: 1. This Article of the new Civil Code avoids the conflict be. tween Articles 759 and 799 of the Spanish Civil Code. 2. Article 878 of the new Civil Code speaks only of a "suaprnsive term" which does not prevent the instituted heir from acquiring and h-a11smitting his rights to his own heir! ever. before the e.rrival of the term. The law allows the acquisition and ti·ansmission of 1·ights before the arrival of the term because the ''term" or pe-riod is sur~ to C01n6 although the exact arrival may not be ascertained. Condition is an uncertain event, so uncertain tha.t it may not happen; hence, the instituted heir should not acquire nor transmit any right to his own heirs before the ful fillment of such sus1n·nsive condition - which fulfillment gives rise to his right to succeed. 3. Article 884 of the new Civil Code providca that "conditions imposed by the testator upon his heirs shall be governed by the 1·ules established for conditional obligations in ali matters not provided for by this Section." Jn uccordance with the pro\ isions of the new Ci\'il Code on conditiorn> ~l obligations, the fulfillment of sµspensive condition gives rise to. a.n obligation .ol' right as t he case may be. Hence, if the said suspensive condition is not fulfilled, no right or obligation at'ises. ARTICLE 10!7 No. ( 4) of this Article is pror-oscd to be amended to read ao; followA: •• (4) Any attesting witness to the execution of a will, th~ spouse, pa1ents, ni· children, or any one claiming under such witness, spouse, parents, or children, UNLESS THERE ARR THREE OTHER COMPETENT WJTNESS TO THE WILL." The Code Con1mission has no 'Jbjection to the pr'.>posed amendment. This Article is also proposed to be amended by adding No. <5> whieh reads: "<5> THE NOTAHY PUBLIC BEFORE WHOM THE WILL IS ACKNOWLEDGED." The Code Commission also accepts the proposed amendment. An amendment to Article 1035 is proposed to read as follows: "Art. 1035. The person excluded from the inheritance by reason of incapacity SHALL LOSE HIS RIGHT TO THE LEGITIME, BUT SHOULD HE be a child 01· descendant of the decedent and should have children or descendants, the latter shall acquire his right to the legitime. 4'The person so excluded l'hall not. enjoy the usufruct and and administration of the property thus inherited by his chil. dren." We cannot accept the above amendment for three reasons: 1. The use of the word "person" in the first line may imply tha.t there may be persons entitled to the· Iegitime although they are not compulsory heirs. 2. The causes of depl'ivation of succession by reason of incapacity may apply to persons other than compulsory heirs. <Set #<\rticle 1027 and 1032>. 3. The provisions of Article 1035 as they nl'e in the Civil Code do not need any clarification. ARTICLES ON SUCCESSION PROPOSED TO BE REPEALED I N HOUSE BILL NO. 1019 ARTICLE 799 This Article of the new Civil Code provides: "Art. 793. Property acquired after the making of a will shall only pass thereby, as if the testator had possessed it at the time of making the will, should it expressly appear by the will that such was his intention." · 1'he Code Commission believes t.hat the above provisions should 1'€main in the Code for t.he following reasons: 1 . Jt is necessary to prevent the occ~rrence of mixed succission. 2. Theo law should favor testate succession as much a.s "'' THE LAWYERS JOURNAL March 31, 1954
Date: 1954
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