Sebastian. C. Palanca, Petitioner vs. Potenciano Pecson, etc. et al., respondents, G.R. Nos. L-6334 and 6338, February 25, 1954

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Title: Sebastian. C. Palanca, Petitioner vs. Potenciano Pecson, etc. et al., respondents, G.R. Nos. L-6334 and 6338, February 25, 1954
extracted text: sent the petition for correction to the respondent Judge in Batangas, on September 24, 1948, and the respondent Judge acting on it immediately, issued his order the following day,· September 25, 1948. Why the plaintiff!! or their counsel did not fellow up th<'ir petition for correction or even their petition for extension of time, so as to insure prompt action, is not explained. In conclusion, I hold that a pet.ition for correction of a clerical, harmless, immaterial and non-prejudicial error i.n a decision or order, which error can neither prejudice nor mislead anybody, cannot and should not be allowed to suspend the period for perfecting the appeal. · Ill Sebastian. C. Palanca, Petitiom·r 1.1s. Potenciano Pecson, ete. et al., Respondents, G. R. Nos. L..6334 and 6338, Febru41"11 25, 1954. 1. SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; ATTORNEY)S LIEN; CASE AT BAR. ·- In Special Proceediil'l"s No. 12126 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, D was the attorney of P, one of thP heirs and an oppositor to the probate of the will of his deccMed father. P did away with the services of D who withdrew as P's counsel after the appeal from the decision of the court probating the will had been elevated to the SuPremc Court. On July 7, 1952, D filed in th<? testate prr,_ ceedings a notice of attorney's lien, alleging that he_ was counsel for P from Sept. 1950 until March 1952 and stating th€ reasonable \•aJue of his services as well as the unpaid balance; and praying that the statement be entered upon the records to be henceforth a lien on thr. property or money that may be advanced to P, or that may be ordered paid to him by the court. On July 9, 1952, D filed in the same · testate proceedings a petition, praying the court to fix and declare his sttorney's fees anrl to enforce the unpaid balance as a lien upon the property or money that may be advance'd in favor of P or upan any sum that may be ordered pa.id to the latter. HELD: Under Sec. 33, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court the attorney may cause a statement of his lien to be registered even before the rendition of any judgment, the purpose being merely to establish his right to the lien. 2. IDEM; IDEM; RECORDING OF ATTORNEY'S LIEN DIS.. TINGUISHED FROM ENFORCEMENT OF ATTORNEY'S LIEN. - The recording is distinct from the enforcement of the lien, which may take place only after judgment is secured in favor of the client. 3. IDEM; IDEM; SECTION 3 RULE 127 CONSTRUED IN THE LIGHT OF SECTION 24 OF RULE 127 AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT 636. - The provision permits the registration of an attorney's lien, although the lawyer concerned docs nqt finish the caS<? successfully in favor of his client, because an attorney who quits or is dismissed before the conclusion of his assigned task is as much entitled to the protection of the rule. Otherwise, a client may easily frustrate its purpose. Indeed, this construction is impliedly warranted by section 24 of Ruic 127, which is amended by Rep. Act No. 636. In the case of DaHke vs. Viiia, bl Phil. 707, it was already pointed out that the filing -:>f a lien for reasonable value of legal services docs not by itself legally ascertain and determine its amount especially when contested j that it devolves upon the attorney to both allege and prove that the amount claimed is unpaid and that it is reasonable and jusi:; the client having the legal right to be heard thereupon; and that the application to fix the attorney's fees is usua.lly made b<?forc the court which renders the judgment or may be enforced in a.n independent and separate action. 4. IDEM; IDEM; PROBATE COURT MAY DETERMINE ATTORNEY'S LJEN FOR SERVICES RENDERED TO OPPOSITOR WHO CONTESTED THE ALLOWANCE OF THE WILJ~. There is no \'alid reason why a probate court cannot pass upon a proper petition to determine attorney's fees, if the rule a~ainst multiplicity l'lf suits is to be activated and if we are to concede that, as in the case before us, said court is to a certain degr<?f' already familiar with the nature and extent of the lawyer's services. Ceferino de los Santos, Sr. and Ceferino de los Santos, Jr. for petitioner. Respondent Dinglasan in his own behalf. DECISION PARAS, C. J.: In · Special Proceedings No. 12126 of the Court of First Instance of Manils, Rafael Dinglasan was the attorney of Sebastian Palanca, one of the heirs and an oppositor to the probate of the will of his deceased father Carlos Palanca y Tanguinla.y. Due to the differences of opinion, Sebastian l'alar.ca did away with the ser-vicc3 of Atty. Dinglasan who in fact. withdrew a;; Palanca'.;: counsel afte!' the appeal from the d<?cision of the Court e>f First Instance of Manila probating the will ha.d. been elevated to the Supreme Court. On July 7, 1~52, Atty. Dinglasan filed in the testate proceedings a notice of attorney's lien, alleging that he was counsel for Sebastian Palanca from September 1950 until March 1952; that the reasonable value of his services is at. least P20,000.00; that Palanca · had paid upon account only the sum of !'3,083 leaving an upaid balance of !'16,917.00; and praying that the statement be entered upon the records to be henceforth a lien on the property or money tha.t may be adjudged to Sebastian Palanca, or that may be ordered paid to him by th~ court. On August 16, 1952, Judge Potcnciano Pecson ordered that the nc.tic.e of attorney's lien be attached to the record for all legal intents and purposes. On July 9, 1952, Atty. Dinglasan filed in the same ttstate prOceedings a pe"tition, pra.ylng the t:ourt of First lnstance of Manila to fix and declare his attorney's fee at not less than P20,000.00 and to enforce the unpaid balance of P!G,917.00 as a lien upon the property or money that may be adjudged in favor oi Sebastian Palanca or upon any sum that may be ordered paid to the latter. Sebastian Palanca moved to dismiss the foregoing petition, but the motion wa.s denied on August 30, 1952. Palanca'S· subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied for lack of merit. The action of Judge Pecson in ordering that A.tty. Ding. lasan's notice of attorney's lien be attached to the record and in taking cognizance of the petition to determine his fees in Special Proceedings No. 12126, is assailed by Sebastian Palanca in a petition for certiorari filed with this Court against Judge Potendano Fecson and Rafael Dinglasan CG. R. No. L-6334). On July 10, 1952, Sebastian Palanca filed in the testate proceedings a. petition 'for an advance inheritance in the ~um of P2,000.0U. On October 21, 1952, Judge Pecson issued an order suspending action on Palanca's petition until Atty. Dinglasan's petition to determine the amount of his attorney's lien shall have bef:n fina!Iy disposed of. His motion for reconsideration having been denied on November 7, 1952, Sebastian Palanca. instituted in this Court a petition for mandamus ag!linst Judge Pecson and Atty. Dinglasan 1G. R. No. L-6346>, to compel thE' respondent Judge to act upon l 'alanca's petition for advance inherita~ice. We a.re not here concerned -r:ith the nature and extent of thf> contract between Palanca. and Atty. Dinglasan as to the latter's professional fees, and the principal issues arising from the pleadings are (1) whether the notice of attorney's lien may be allowed at the stage when it was filed, namely, before final judgment ia favor of Palanca was secured by respondent attorney, and C2> whether the respondent Judge acted ;>roperly in entertaining the petition to determine Atty. Dinglasan's fees and in holding in abey. ancc Palanca's petition for adva.nce inheritance. It is contended for petitioner Palanca that Atty. Dinglasan not havinl: yet secured any decision or judgment in favor of the former, the notice of attorney's lien could not be allowed under section 33, Rule 127, of the Rules of Court .which docs not authori7.e a lien upon a. cause of action. Section 33 provides that an attorney "shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from after the time when he shall ha.ve caused a statement of his claim of such 1ien to be 128 THE LA WYERS JOU~NAL Match 31, 1954 entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or is suing such execution, and shall have caused written notice there. of to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shaU have the same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements." Under this provision we are of the opinion that the attorney may cause a statement of his lien to be registered even before the rendition of any judgment, the purpose being merely to establish his right to the lien. I The recording is diStinct from the enforcement of the lien, which may take place only after judg ment is secured in favor of the client. We believe also that the provision permits the registration of a.n attorney's lien, although the lawyer concerned does not finish the case successfully in favor of his client, because an attorney who quits or is dismissed before th£: conclusion of his assigned task is as much entitled to the pro tection of the rule. Otherwise, a client may easily frustrate its purpose. Indeed, this construction is impliedly warranted bf sec tion 24 of Rule 127, which as amended by Republic Act No. 686 p1·ovidcs M follows: "A client may at anytime dismiss his attor ney or substitute another in his place, but if the contract between client and attorne)' has been reduced to writing and the dismisi.al of the attorney was without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the client the full compensation stipulated in the contract. For the payment of such compensation the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments, for the payment of monf'y ·anr; executions issued in pursuance of such judgments rendered in the cases wherein his services had been retained by the client." The petitioner, however, argues that this provision cannot be availed of by respondent Dinglasan because there is neither a written contract for attorney's fee nor a sho:,ving that his dismissal was unjustified. This argument is without merit, inasmuch as if there was a writ ten contract and the dismissal was unjustified, Atty. Dinglasan would be entitled to the entirety of the stipulated compcnsa.tion, even if the case was not yet finished when he was dismissed. Jn situation like that of respondent Dinglasan the lawyer may claim compensation only up to the date of his dismissal. For the pay ment of such compensation he shall nevertheless have a. lien "upon all judgments, for the payment c>f money and executions issued in pursuance of such iudgments rendered in the cases wherein hfa �erviu:s have been retained by tl,c client." Section 24 does not state that the judgment must be secured by the attorney claiming the lien. The petitioner's further contention that respondent Dingla sa.n's remedy is to file a separate action for damages or for Nm pensation, is untenable. In the case of Dahlke vs. Viiia, 51 Phil. 707, it was already pointed out that the filing of a lien for reason able value of legal services does not by itself legally ascertain and d!'termine its amount especially when contested; that it devolves upon the attorney to both allege and prove that the amount claim eJ is unpaid and that it is reasonable and just; the client having the legal right to be heard thereupon; and that the a.pplication to fix the attorney's fees is usually made before the court which rendcra the judgment or may be enforced in an independent and separate action. We sec no valid reason why a probate court cannot pass upon a proper petition to dE!terminc attorney's fees, if the :rule a.ga.inst multiplicity of suits is to be activated and if we arc ti) concede that, as in the case before us, said court is to a certnin de gree alre:idy familiar with the nature and extent of the lawyer's services. In view of what has been said, it. is obvious that the respondent Judge neither a.cted without jurisdiction nor abused his discretion in the matter herein complained of. The petition for certiorari in G. R. No. L-q334 and the petition for mandamus in G. R. No. I6346 are hereby dismissed with costs against the petitioner. So ordered. Pablo, Padilla� Reyes, Bautista Angelo, Bengzcm; Montemayor; Jugo, and Lab-rador. - J .J. concur. Ma.rch 81, 1954 THE LA WYERS JOURNAL 129
Date: 1954
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