A new strategy for Korea
Media
Part of Philippine Armed Forces Journal
- Title
- A new strategy for Korea
- Language
- English
- Source
- Philippine Armed Forces Journal Volume 6 (No. 6) November 1953
- Year
- 1953
- Rights
-
- Fulltext
- ,(~~~~~K"R£A-? • ~ f •lf ' . .:- f € # I f ~.r-/ By !•i9adier Ge~eral S. L. A. MARSHALL, USAR A LTHOUGH Mao Tse-tung does nJt unlike the :caning of the Wall, which owe his pOwer to his reputation as a mili- could Le taken in at a glance, Mao's meantary genius, i~ 1936 he wrote a textbook ing was not understood hy the outside for the Red Army Academy which deserved world because his words were not read. a wider audience. The Strategic Problem of China's Revolutionary A.-my is not light reading for a Wet>k end in the country. It is a mixture of abstractions and concrete ideas, tactical maxims and philosophical platitudes. However, there has not been a clearer definition of Chinese military intentions since the building of the Great Wall. Only. Reprinted from tM August, 1953. Military Review, At one point, Mao noted that a good way to achieve deception is to make sure that in the initial stages of war the opposing side captures exactly the right prisoneh. If that was not precisely what the Chinese Communists did on entering the Korean conflict in 1950, then what happened must be dismissed as an ingenious coincidence. Further along, Mao pays tribute to the Brest-Litovsk negotiations as a pilot model for obstructionism by a revolutionary govMajor Gentral Wirliam F. Dean, !he hero of tlte Battle of Taejon who was only recently freed as a pri.'Joner of war by the Chinese communists in Korea, greets C01'1)0f'al Hrn«mJ.to Otian, wou.flded J.&th BCT soldier, in a Tokyo military hospit4l. The·e:rperie~e of such o!fice'l's as General Dean in tlte UN war in Ko'l'll!iC might furnish the key to a new strategy for the conduct of operations, if and wM3 the wuasy tntce i• broken b11 renewed hostilities. ' 6 PHIL/~PJNE ARM~D FORCES JOURNAL 1 . ernment when time is a m~·n need. Stall helps explain several thi\tgs. On the :l'ace them and confound them! the Chinese of it, this is such a si6y way to write knew what they were doin when they about war that no civilhed staff college first sat down at the Kaesong table, while would have felt justified in taking Mao our side--knowing Brest-Litovsk only as a seriously. However, the military meat is spot on a map where once upon a t ime So- still present amid the metaphorical hash. viets !Kld Germans parleyed--did not. His repeated emphas~ on victory a nd the The main theme of Mao's treatise on war neeessity therefor must inevitably raise is that revolutionary goverm'itents can al- some questions about our own ability to ways afford a protracted defense because understand the problem in Korea and the the sacrifice to strategic pressure from attitude of our main enem~ toward it. Filipmo soldiers m Korea cannot yet co•H~ home, Je:~pite ;wesent t..-uu. Threat of Tenewed and more bitter hostilities mnke lhe armi.~tice an uneas11 one. aud tiltPhilippine~ is sending over to Korea 11 new bat!alion combal team. without is more t han offset by consolida- '' Main enemy" means Communist China, tion of the political position within. As not the Soviet Union. While it may have events ha\'e proved, this was not One of been good e\edioneering to say that the Mao's idle philosophical platitudes; it fore- war ia run by Mc»eow, it is Simply not true. warned that Communist China would inter- Communist China is the great opponent as vene in any foreign war where it might ex- the strug~rle stands, and neither the 'Weappect to outstay its opponent. ons supplied by the Soviet Union ror the Whatever losses in terr itory are neces- auxiliary fanatiCl! from North Korea could gary, Mao said, are bargains when they keep the war going J month if China were Oecome stepping stones to ultimate vic- to quit. There would be nothing to resist tory. The idea is hardly radical. Mao the United Nations coalition if the Chinese simply agrees with General MaeArthu:.: Comll'IUnists backtracked to the Yalu. that there is no substitute for being the Therefore, it is to Communist China's winner at the final bell. Follow now his doctrine that we should pay heed if we musings on that subject: "A fool refuses are ~ distinguish betweeu a detour and to sleep and has no energy for the next the main road. day. In the market, a buyer must lose his cash to obtain his goods. If what we lose is A SoWtd PNpcMdtion territory and what we gain is victory over . Just u Mao's doef:rine supplies the the enemy plus return and expansion of reuoniDg which, from Comm'llnist China's the territory, war is a profitable business." "riew, wansnted the intervention and Because this is a tvnical nassa~. 1t should have forewamed us of it. it hints A NI~ W STrtATJ-:r:f- "'OR KOf,rA ! at the ~rminal po\int: War is a "profitable of a supcrio,situation for the bluff and :~:~~::~" :i~~r~~~~:~~h a~~t :r~~= ~wt::~ ::~~:~~~~;J.th\~\' ~~c~~; ;h~~:s:n;!~r:,~·!~~ ritory and prestige. off with the1 victory then, after we had There is nothing uniquely Communist or efft-ctively conceded it to them? The anChinese about that proposition. However, swer is not to be found in the prisonerstating it underscorfS the fact that until repatriation issue, which was simply now Commu nist China has found the Ko- seized upon to tie up operations !Is long rean conflict a bargain. It has its vic- as possible while the Communists took a tory with the prestige of having defeated reading of o~r long-term intentions. Dura modern coalition that includes the ing the months the parley went on, the . ' f'EFTOK fighting m~n. tuke time out t" pruiJ toyethe-r dunn!/ a field mas~. T1;.ey /!(IJ"f {aced, 11nd perhapf< mall face ngain, together with other ma.n...poor n.lbeit mndnfle.r!ch nllie!l OJ! enemy who place" little ualue on human life. world's foremost power. Mao's armies have squatter's rights on the territory of a greatly weakened neighbor. His own domain remains inviolate. The war has become a tactical stalemate for the United Nation!! side, but it hall not been at any time a strategic stalemate for Communi!lt China. Nothing has happened to indicate that in the end the prize will be physically wrested from Communist China-and, accordingly, nothing has happened to put an insupportable strain on the working arrangements between Communist China and the Soviet Union. From the view of both partner!!, the deal is still a sound one. However, simple as the truth may be that the military credit of the Peking regime has never for a moment bel.'n in jeopardy, it counta for nothing 110 long as we will not see it. When the Chinese Communiata acted like victors at Panmunjom, we mistook the confl.dence that comes United Nation!! 11ide continued to weaken it!l relative po11ition along the front, encouraging in the enemy the belief that by fighting longer he could enlarge his victory. This wa!l a major mistake because it discounted the basic principle!! bY which war is conducted. Being more realistic than the people on our side, the Communi!lts lmow that the object in war is not the prevention of killing, but victory, enhanced prestige, and greater organizing power when the fighting ends. To men like Mao, the lives of a million or so Chinese mean nothing compared to the furthering of thei-r own po!lition a!l top dogs in Asia. Mao say!l a!l much. Yet we persi11t in the illusion that these men must in time give up because Chinese Communists are dying along the front line and our weapons are deadlier than theirs. ' PHILIA,INE ARMED FORCES JOURNAL .Acc('ptanceofStal~•t• Another myth of our ow . devising is the acceptance of stalema te sa tactical fact rather than as a condition in the American and United Nations mind. There has never been a true stalemate in Korea beeause we have never made a first-class effort there. We. have foug~t the entire war on a shoestrmg. In the early days of the war we took one great gamble that failed. Thereafter we have remained content to hold on with as little as possible. Instead of asking what must be done to gain mobility and stretch our power, we fold our hands and say it cannot be done anyway, and even if it could, it would change nothing. Several reasons arc advanced in justi· fication of the limited effort. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Council is not alone in singing "We i\lust Not Defend Ourselves into Bankruptcy"; the tune is a smash hit on Capitol Hill. Also, it is said that this is a United Nations conflict, and that we are only a large stockholder in a syndicate undertaking. However, this too is a delusion. If the conflict is won, it will be a famous victory for col• lective security; if it is lost, the beating will be taken by the United States, and oUr prestige will shrink the world over. We are up against what the Duke of Wellington meant when he said a great power cannot have any such thing as a small war, though it is not acknowledged in the conduct of our affairs. We do not even budget for the Korean conflict; it is financed und(lr the heading of "Miscellany" out of the petty-ensh drawer. The main object appears to be to make the unpleasantness as painless as possible to the taxpayer. Public relations has been substituted for generalship. We have forgotten that in war just enough is never quite enough and that success is bought by the strength of one's reserves. So it is that the Army is fretted by the desertion rate in the home establishment, though for the sake of economy its training structure has been converted into a network of replacement depots which give the young soldier no chance to form ties with a unit before he is introduced to a foxhole. So it is that along the firing line in Korea, junior leaders are cheated of hardwon promotiof!S because f•he Bureau of the Budget has tried to save money at the wrong point. So it is that amid the cry that the Eighth Army is short of certain types of ammunition, the manufacturers of the same ammunition are at a loss to understand why such inadequate use is made of available capacity. So it is that we wasted two c'ritical yea~ before de· ciding that the provision of more equipment to build a strong Republic of Korea ( ROK) Army might be a' sound investment, and so it is that we are now getting on with it only because of the argument that it is one wry to save American lives. The Discarded Dook When the af.tificial fog envelops all policies pertaining to organization for war, it is not remarkable that there ts so little hard-boiled and realistic thinking about how to fight it to a decision. Yet war is generally fought forward, since the enemy lies that way. The usual highroad to success is to collapse his works and smack his backsides. The main object is to beat him on the main battlefield, the place where he has staked his fortune. At least those were the rules yesterday, although today we have thrown the booj away. Let it be mentioned that giving communism a thorough beating in North Korea might be a main step toward liquidating present hostilit'les, and the response is a lot of shopworn argument about why it does nol;.make military sense. "Fighting in the north will strengthen the Chinese by lengthening our supply lines while shortening theirs." This is not necessarily true, since we control the seas. Moreover, the same argument wouJa have invalidated almost every succesll.ful offensive plan in the history of war. "We caiH\ot win that way. If they are pushed_ into Manchuria, the Chinese Communists will fight back acros& the border." However, meanwhile, they will have suffered a first-class defeat. By attacking from their own soil, they would invite attack into it, which they do not seem to "It is the attenuation of their communications which makes them vulnerable to our air attack." What nonsense! Reducing their rear area would make possible a more perfect concentration of our air effort. . J "Our planes- cannot attack their lines and bases in Manchuria"-and why not? "It would not end the war.'' Who can be so sure about something that has not been tried? Mao wants victory; he is not likely · to soften until he sees it slipping finally from his fingers. "The Soviet Union might be provoked." T«e Soviet Union will not be provoked until the day it is ready for a third world war, and then no provocation will be necessary. • That is the list. The answers are academic and without military meaning if the United Nations cal.lSe has no real staying power and is rlow concerned mainly with foreclosing what some of its early champions have come to consider a bad business. However, the unwisdom of permitting large fo~ces to beeome pinned down in a strategically profitless area is quite another argument. All we are looking at here is the question of how best to employ these forces toward decisive ends if the commitment is to continue. home, we cannot bring off a decisive concentration this year. The index, therefore, points to 1954, which is also an eleetion year. To ask larger means now for an expanded military undertaking-which might bring success 18 months hence and then again might not-is a capital political risk. The President might nerve himself to it. But would his party follow hilll'? Educated Guessing War planning, if it is to work, must be kept secret in main detail. So while President Eisenhower may have given some indication of his program in his State of the Union message to Congress, the pressure points will not be finally revealed until there is action at the operating end. That has not stopped the Washington press corps from making some educated guesses, based on President Eisenhower's rescinding of former President Truman's order to the Seventh Fleet. Some of the items inelude: Chiang on Formosa, his quarantine Finding a sufficient answer to that ques- . ended, will be given increased training and lion is now the main problem before the material aid and will be encouraged to Eisenhower administration, and there are spread many alarms while being held back already several new roadblocks in the from any major excursions for a while, way. Increasing the defense budget is ab- at least. horrent to the new majority, but a bigger More military supply will go to the build-up cannot be achieved on fewer dol- French in Indochina to increase the presJars. Further, because of manpower short- sure from that quarter. age, lack of reserves in the theater, and More Americans, possibly three to four the scarcity of ready formations here at divisions, will be sent to Japan and held · ' 10 PH¥-IPPINE ARMED PORGES JOURNA-{· there in_ r_eadiness. . ' ~ _to be attempted, we sh<Juld get away from The'GhHia coast Will be ·~t under naval conventional defense in line. Atomic deblockade. . velopment has depriv~d it of any real ~here may be bombing of rail hnes, future, and in the Korean laboratory we ~:~~~=s(:~~~:::· i~'::r~t:er communications :~;~;d to~o::~.ing tactics that will also no~':e ~~:!~:~~:;;~ ~!w~h::/~;~t~! ~~~: Twi11'Tobruks where near the truth, it Sl'!llrcely promises Defense by 'bulkheads, or expanded a new era of firmness. Rather, like the beachheads, with fortified perimeters enFairy Queen in Jola11 thc, it makes our closing the base establishment along each weakness more besettingly strong. There coast, is the pattern that tits the situation. will be a build-up of material means by a One block could enclose Wonsan, with the· side that is impoverished for fighting men. opposite block enclosing the Pyongyang~::n s~:~~;:r::da::':l~l;:;y a;:l~;~n;o;0e; ~:)innampo ~rea. (See the map on page Anck of concentration. Against an enemy No field force would be needed te hold who has already proved that he will not the interzone ground, which is rough-lind be bluffed, we will threaten inore and largely road!ess country. Along that alley, spring less. By the slowest means known air interdiction wouid be given its main to warfare, blockade, we shall attempt to chance to neutralize a canalized enemy hasten victory over an opponent who is force. If lesser methods fail to discourage not dependent on sea commerce. the enemy, it might be Ute suitable time Some correspondents ha\'e already gone and place to undertake atomic counteratinto raptures over these measures. Maybe tack, after warning the civil population. it is again time to quote from Mao: "What On the west coast the tides make landis decisive is not determined by general ings more difficult, but a bulkhead there considerations. In military operations, the would cover the main supply routes selection of the direction and point of at- through Seoul and to the south. On the tack is based on the present situation of east coast, port facilities have been lhe enemy and the terrain. When supplies smashed flat. But in past wars we h~ve are plentiful, care should be tak~n against taken pride in the engineering genius and overeating; where there is a shortage, the material resources that enabled us to overonly problem is how to overcome hunger." coffie far greater lbstacles than these. Nothing has happened in the conflict's All this is easier said than done, and development to discredit the view that none of it is possible if the nation is sti!l North Korea is the decisive battlefield. looking for a risklees course. To exThere is no reason not to believe that we pand the enter prise would require an inrould win it by adding four to five full- crease in mobilization and all other costs, strength divisions, so that the Eighth which includes .the blood price paid for a Army would dig itself out and get mobile. major battle. The alternative is fa\> greater To employ the new units frontally cost over a long term, not only \~ dollars against a fortified line would be risky but in lives, national prestige, and resoluand foolishly wasteful when, by exploit- ti.on .here at. home:-al.l this for a slowing our one supreme advantage-amphib- burnmg conflict wh1ch m t.he end we probious power-we could turn the barrier ably would not win. and at the same time force the enemy What we now attempt is not our kind either to stand in the open or to flee. To o.f contest. A~ we are organi.l:ed in relareach once again for the Yalu would be tJon to the enemy, we are man-poor and not less foolish, because of the length of machine-rich. Whe? mobility fails for .l~ck t~e frontier, and equally ~~use a deci~:a~~~· r!~:/::~~~:fd:~~~s!a~~e:~:~:~ s1on cannot be won there 1f 1t cannot be life less. uwhile the game of matching forc_ed farther to the south whe_re t~c pearls is nothing between two dragon gods pemnsula nar~ws and :he .ground IS smt- of the sea, it is ridiculous between one able to defensiVe organu:at1on. beggar and one dragon god." So wrote FinaJly, if an amphibious maneuver were !\lao. IN the quivering peace that hangs over Korea today, Filipino troops wait with other UN allies for the final outcome of ~~: ~~~':e l~flt!~ti~r:ht~~r~h~ morale of the boys has to be kept high. To help achieve this, the AFP and the Manila Jaycen last month sent a troupe of movie stars and entertainers to cheer the 14th liCT officers and men.