Trinidad Semira et als., petitioner vs. Juan Enriquez et als., respondents, G.R. No. L-2582, February 27, 1951

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Title: Trinidad Semira et als., petitioner vs. Juan Enriquez et als., respondents, G.R. No. L-2582, February 27, 1951
extracted text: II 'rrinida SemiTa et els., Petition.eTs Vs. Ju.an Enriquez et als., Res._ J)Oflden.ts, G. R. No. L..2582, Februa. TJJ 27, 1951. 1. APPEALS; MANDAMUS TO COMPEL ALLOWANCE OF APPEAL; CORRECTION OF ERROR IN RECORD. - Where the appellant timely called the attention of the trial court to a misstatement contained in its order denying appel lant's moti0n for recon.-Uderation, and timely filed "a motion for 15 da.ys• extension of the period for perfection of an appea1, it would be unfair and unjust for the trial court not to act on both motions for three months �d then to rule that the decision in t.he case had become final and eiecutory for the error was merely clerical and the period to appeal had expired even if the appellant was granted the 15-day extension. The appellant might have :resorted to too technical a mo\-e, bot this circumstances did nllt dispense with the duty of the trial judge t.o straighten out the n:cord of the cal!e for all purposes. The a11pel lant is expected to file a record on appeal ccinta.ining per tinent pleadings, motions and orders which are correct; and it cannot rightfully be contended that he is ready to do so before · the said order denying reconsideraticn is changed in the sense indicated in the appellant's motion for correction. 2. APPEALS; MOTIONS WHICH CAN BE BEA.RED EX PARTE; CORRECTION OF ERROR IN RECORD. - Although the appellant set his motion for correction for hearing five days after the 30-day period for perfection of appeal, the trial judge could and should have acted thereon on shorter notice not only because he· could dispose of it on his own motion (sec. 4., Rule 26) but because the mction might be heard ez paTte in view of the nature of thC' order sought and the short period left for perfecting the appeal <Moya. vs. Barton,. 43 Off. Gaz.., 836>. Although litigants are not justified in taking for granted that their motions would be granted (Bonoan and Y abut vs. Ven tura et al., 43 Off. Gaz ., 4.602), the courts arc bound to act-in proper cases-on all motions with sufficient dis,. patch necessary t.o allow the parties to avail themselves of proper remedies. This is implied in the mandate that "justice $-all be impartially administered. without nPCeS11) U.S. w. Melad, 27 Phil. US: People va. Cabrera. 43 Phil. 64.. sary delay" (sec. 1, Rule 12'). The inherent power of the court "'to amend and control its process and orders so as t.o make them conformab_le to law and justice" (sec. 5, Rule 124> ca.rries the -concomitant duty to correct its or ders on its own initiative or upon motion of the parties. This duty is not affected by the nature of the error sought to be corrected. Potencinno A. Magtibay for petitioners. Respondent Judga in his ·own be}µLlf. Ant07lio L. Azores for respondents Az�es. DECI SIO N PARAS, J.: In civil case No. 43 of the Court of First lns:tance of Batangas between Trinidad Semira and Isidoro G. Mercado, as plaintiffs, and Bienvenido Azores, Apolonia .A7.ores, Manuel Azores, Juana. Az.o � Jose R. Azores, Sinforosa AzorC!S, .Antonio Azores and Nor bert& Azores, as defendants, judgment was rendered in favor of the latter on July 7, 1944, notice of which was Neeived by coun sel for plaintiffs on August 7, 19.U. On August 30, 1944, counsel for plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration. On May 26, 1948, aft.er the record had been rtt0nstituted, the Court of First IRBta.nce of Batangas denied the motion for reconsiderati'ln, no tice o( which was received by cQunsel for plaintiffs _on J.ine 21, 1948. On June 5, 1948, that is, before receipt of the notice- of denial, counSt:I for plaintiffs filed a motion for an extension of , fifteen. days within which to perfect an appeal in case the mo tion for reeonsideration should be dt!nied. In the resolution of May 26, W49, the Court made it appa.r that the· defendants filed the motion for reconsideration and the plaintiffs filed an opposition thereto, when the fact was that the plaintiffs f.iled. t.hc motion and the defendants filed the opposition. In view of this mistake, the plaintiff filed, on the same day he received the order of denial, a motion for correction which was set. for ·hE:Bring on July 3, 1948. Failing to receive notice of an}" action either on the motion for extension or 9n the motion for correction, counsel for plaintiffs sent a letter of inquiry to the clerk of court. Thus prompted, the court issued &n order dated September • 25, 1948 -- r�ci.,·ed by plaintiffs on October 2, 1948, - holding that the judgment of July 7, 1944, had become final and execu tory for plaintiff's failure to perfect their appeal on time even if the motion for an extension of fifteen days was granted, the motion for correction filed by plaintiffs on June 21, 1943, not having suspended the time for appeal. A petition for mandamus was filed by the pl3intiffs against the Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ba tan gas as sole respondent, t.o <'Ompel judicial action on the motion for correction, to set -aside thC order of September 25, 1948, and to have the time for appeal declared suspended. In our resolution of March 23, 1950, we directed the petitioners to amend their petition by impleading as n:spondents the defendants in civil ease No. 4.3; and the case is now before us upon the corresponding ame.'"ld cd petition and the answer thereto. In our resolution of March 23, 1950, penned by Mr. Justice P�dilla, the following decisive pronouncement was made: "The petitioner, plaintiffs in the case in the court below, were entitled to expe<:t action hy the respondent cllurt on thci.r petitions for e'xten sion of time to perfed the app1?al and for correction of the or der of 21'.1 May 1948. The respondent court was in duty bound to decide and resolve the two petitions and it is unfair for it to declare without first complying with its duty to resolve J\nd de cide the petitions for extension of time to perfect the appeal and for correction of the aforesaid oriler of 26 May 1948." When the petitioners filed on August 30, 1944, the motion for reconsideration, they had .seven days out of the reglementa..ry30-day period for appeal. They also had the same seven days when their motion for an extensi-:>n of fifteen days was filed on June 5, 1948. On June 21, 1948, when the petitioners received r.otice of the ordel'" of the respondeet Judge denying their moiion for rcoonsideration and when they filed their motion for cor rection, they still had said seven days to perfect au appeal. Al though the .petitioners set their motion for correction for hea1" ing on July 3, 1948, the respondent Judge could and should have acted thereon on sho�r notice not onJy because he could dis126 THE LAWYERS JOURNAL March 31, 1954 pose of it on his own motion <Sec. -4, Rule 26) but because the motion might be heard ez pa.rU, in view of the nature of the order aought and the abort period left for perfecting the appeal <Mo:va va. Barton, '3 O. G. 836>. Although litigants are not justified in taking for granted that their motions would be granted <Bonoan and Yabut vs.. Ventura, et al., '3 O. G. 4.602), the courts arc bound to act - in proper cases - on motions with sufficient dispatch necessary to allow the parties to .,-ail themselves of proper remedies. This is implied in the mandate that "justice shall be impartially administered without unnecessary delay." <Section 1, Rule 124.) filed by plaintiffg...petitioners. On Janua.ry 21, 19470 the neon.. stitution waa again set for hearing on February 110 19-U, but upon motion for continuance by plaintiffs-petitioners' counsel, the same was re-set on February 26, 1947. Then f~llowed various motions by plaintiffs-petitioners for extension of time which defendantsrespondents termed "dilatory tactics'"• which resulted in a court notice of h~ing dated April 13, 1948, once more setting the bearing on May 11th of the same year. But on the latter date still another petition for postponeinent on, behalf of the plaintiffs waa filed. The last reconstitution hearing was finally held on May 26, 1948. The inherent power of tht- court "to amend and control ita I agree with. the trial court U1at the decision in this· case renproces:s and orders so as to make them conformabie to law and '1ered on July 7, 19« has become final The motion for extenjustiee," <Sec. 5, Role 124>, carries the concomitant duty to cor- Sion of the period within which to perfect an appeal did not sos-. rect its orders on its own initiative or upon motion of the t>ar- · pend the tunning of the 30-day period <Alejandro v. Endencia, 64 ties. This duty is not affected by the nature of the error aought Phil. 325>; neither did the petition for corl'f!<:tion suspend the to be corrected. In the case at bar, the petitioners timely called period for perfeding an appeal It may be that in some cases the attention of the respondent Judge to the misstatement ron- where the· error or mistake sought to be corrected is serious and tained in his order of May 26, 1948, and, more timely still, filed prejudicial, and ma.y mislead the parties and the courts, especially the motion for an extension of fifteen days to perfect an aP- the appellate tribunal to which the case is sought tc be elevated peal The respondent Judge, in his order of September 25, 1948, on appeal, a pCtition for correction may suspend the period; but ,admitted that, for unknown reasons,, he was not able to diepose in the present case, the . error consisting in mere transposition of of the two motions sooner, but ruled in the .same breadth that the: pa.rties, mistakenly attributing to the defendants the motion the judgment of July 7, 1944, had become final wtd executory for reconsideration, and imputing to the plaintiffs the opposition because tl:i.e error was merely derical and the period to appeal thereto, when it should be the other way, is a mere oversight, a c1erical had expired ever. if the petitioners were granted 16-day extension. error, unsubst.antial, immaterial and harm1ess, which can neithE:r The UI&fairness and injustice of th.is ruJing are obvions from the Prejudice nor mislead anyone. There was only one motion for fact that, while the respondent Judge in dfect admitted the necea- reconsideration of the decision in the whole record, · and that was sity of swift action on petitioners' motions, the petitioners are filed by the plaintiffs; and there was only one oppo.11ition thereto, made to suffer the consequences of his inaction. •md that was filed by the defendants. What is more, thE: order The petitioners might have resorted to too technical a move, mention.a the date of each pleading. So there was no possibility but this circumstance did not dispense with the duty of the re- of misleading anybody. The error was trh-ial and waa known tc> spondent Judge to straighten out the record of the case for all the plaintiffs. So, what prC!judice or harm could have such an purposes. The petiti<;ners are expected to file ::i record on aP- error produced on th<>.m! peal containing pertinent pleadings, motions and orders which are correct; Blld it cannot rightly be contended t.hat they are J"l'ady to do so before the order of the respondent Judge of May 26, 194!1, is changed in the sense indicated in petitioners' motion for correction. Wherefore, the respondent Judge is hereby directed to correct t.he misstatement appearing in his order of May 26, 1948, as pointed out in this -:.pinion. The petitioners have seven da~•s from notice of the order affecting the necessary coJTections within which to ptrfect, if it is .so desired, an appeal !rom the judgment in civil case No. 43 dated July 7, 19«. So ordered with costs against the respondents otb.:r than the respt>ndent Jurlge. M<Wan .F~. Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla; Tuason; Rtyu; Ju.go; and Bautista Angelo. - J.J_ concur - MONTEMAYOR, /., dissenting: With all due respect to the Jeamed opinion of the majorit;y, I am constrained to dissent. I .!arulot give my assent to further prolonging this old case to the prejudice of the defendant!! in Civil C&Sl" No. 43 of the Court of First InstanCl" o( Batangas, who obtained a judgment in their favor as far back as July, 1944., all because of a clericrJ. and imm3terial error that had crept into, not the judgment or decision, but only the order de.'lying the motion for reconsideration. Of course, none of the parties ~uld b~ blamed for the loss of the records of the case thereafkr, but I am impressed by the claim of counsel for the respondents, based on the record. that as early as August, 1945, the Clerk of Court of Batangas had sent out notices of the loss of the records, and that reconstitution was set for bearing on November 19, 1946, but that due to the numerous petitions for postponement and extension of time, filed by plaintiffs-petitioners' counsel, the bearing dragged on and no action could he taken on the motion for reconsideration until May 26, 19'8, when the order of denial was rendered. The record shows that the h.?aring for reconstitution set on November 19, 1946, was not held due to a motion for continuance I am not in favor 'lf court.s' giving too much importance t<-i Errors of this kind, - clerical and unsubstar,tial, and allowing them to unduly prolong or even paralyze court proceedings, especiaJly when, as in the present case, there is reason to believe U1at the motion for correction was part of a design to delay such proceedings. The defendants who obtained a. favorable judgment as far back as 1944, and who have repeatedly complained to the trial court against the numerous petitions for postponement filed by the plaintiffs, in my opinion, have reason to term them a"S they did, "dilatory tactics", and the trial court fJOUJd appear to have realized it and sympathized with said defendants; and it seems that its order of September 25, 1948, declaring the period of appeal to have long expired because the petition for correction of the error did not suspend the running of the period for appeal, was partly influenced by such realization. Said the trial court on this point: "Indeed, defendants have time and again objected to the dilatory tactics adopted by the plaintiffs." The majority opinion seems to attribute the fault in not acting upon the motion for correction promptly, to the respondent Judge and inferentially, and· in part bases the judgment on that supposed fault or negligence. [n justice to the respondent Judge . it .i;;hould be stated that t.he fault or negligence, if any, may not be laid at his door. According to his a!lswer dated November 24, 1948, when the motion for correction w:.s filed by the plaintiffs on June 21, 1948, in the Court of First Instance of Ba.tangas, Judge Enriquez was not in the province of Batangas because he was then holding court sessions in the provinces of Mindoro and Marinduque during the months of June and July of that year. The following month of August, respondent Judge was assigned to hold sessions in Batangas, Batang::is. It ireems that there are two court branches in the province of Batangas, one holding sessiGns in the City of Lipa and the other in the town of Bat.angas.. The petition for correction was filed and kept in the Lipa branch. Natura.J.ly, respondent Judge knew nothing about it. It was only when counsel for the plaintiffs made an inquiry from the Clerk of Court in Lipa in September, 1948, that is, about three month!! after he filed his motion for correction, that said court official March 31, 195t THE LAWYERS JOURNAL 127 sent the petition for correction to the respondent Judge in Ba ta.ngas, on September 24, 1948, and the :respondent Judge acting on it imn1ediately, issued his order the following dayo September 25, H>48. Why the plaintiff!l or their counsel did not fellow up thC'ir petition for correction or even their petition for extension of time, so as to insure prompt action, is not explained. In conclusion, I hold that a petition for correction of a clerical, hnrmless, immaterial and non-prejudicial error in a decision or or der, which error can neither prejudice nor mislead anybody, can not and should not be allowed to suspend lhe period for perfecting the appeal. 128 THE LA WYERS JOU�NAL Match 31', 1954
Date: 1954
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