Accent of the King Battle

Title

Language

English

Source

Philippine Armed Forces Journal Volume 6 (No. 6) November 1953

Year

1953

Rights

In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted

Fulltext

By M1jor LEANDRO N. LONZAME, FA ,( D UR Army is greatly wanting in one of its most essential elements,' a strong, welltried artillery corps. It is regrettable to note that the Field Artillery component of the Armed Forces, has not been accorded the same attention lavished on other army components. There are two reasons why attention has not been focused so much on it. first, because the modus operandi of the 'liMBs, who are the objects of almost all AFP operations, does not warrant the employment of the artillery by our troops, and secondly, because the present financial difficulties of the AFP require that we spend only for immediate needs. Thus most of our cannoneers are presently employed as infantryll;len, and, po"ibly, already think as such. The situation seems justified, but when we think of the grim and threatening international scene, we see cause for alarm in the fact that without a sufficiently ,.·(I strong field artillery our preparedness program is utterly incomplete. True, we have artillery units, but thest batteries have been reduced to cadre strength and the funds for them are just enough to keep away the rust from the big guns. There are a good number of artillery officers and enlisted men in our Army, graduates of foreign service schools who can impart to others their knowledge, but employed as they are as foot soldiers it is doubtful whether they have heard of the latedt trends in artillery and whether they have retained their old knowledge. Pnst Experiences Soldius who fought in Bataan in the last war know the vital importance of artillery pieces in battle. To men harrasscd by an overwhelming enemy force, the sound of big guns on their side is a great booster of morale and fighting spirit. The battle of Bataan is past, but the importance of artillery - the 1. . I 2 PH!LJPblNE AR!IIED FORCES JOURNAL I "King ~f Battle" rcmain~~rowing by experience has shown from continuous / the day. The battle in ~rea is just training on the lates artillery tactics one testimony of the incre sing import. and methods of coordination. of this form of ground support. Artillery is the only ground weapon that can return barrage with barrage. It is the Ol'\ly weapon that can strike where rifles, machine guns and mortars can neither reach nor bear down on the enemy with effect. It is the only weapon, indeed, which produces the sound which to the ears of those firing it is a ..&a~l' synff>hony. But the mere presence of artillery pieces and men who can fire them is not enough. The experiences of our boys 't"ho fought in Korea attest to this fact. In Korea they were supplied with all the necessary artillery pieces, but they have realized that for effectiveness mere knowledge of how to fire them is insufficient. There is ~ coordination needed, made possible through efficient communication. And this ability to coordinatE> for effective fire power is acquired only, A School Is Needed A school that c~ turn out officers and men well-grounded on the intricate operations ":lnd problems of artille~~h~otei~;!~ti~hi:: :~f~~;: ~n~ro~~~ -~~~ h~::~sn i:rt~~~~~t~~~~.tifr:~ ~~ have the ATU, but this institution is primarily concerned with and designerl for training -enlisted reservists. Even at that it is woefully unequipped. It has but one transit, not an artillery transit even. There is only one tape, built up of several broken segments inconveniently linked together. With this, we can not even expect artillery surveys that are accurate. Of course, problems are doled out to th'e students in the ATU, fire direction procedures are studied, and observation techniques 11.re With artil/el"JJ betng 11panng/y used in armed forcu operati011s in the field agatnst dis~dentif, li_ttle attt:ntio11. hns bee11. yivtlt the artilltT'II compo11ent of the AFP, umter bewatls. Most of our artillery men are emplofled as in{ant7'11 men tmd · po!BiiHy think a.~ such. ·' ACCENT ON THE .. ;lNG OF sA1-TL8" j United Nations soldiers fire on communist positions in Korea ;ust before the #llrrent truce Wll8 dulo.red. The Korean war lias underscored the importancr' of artilleYJI aa effective fire support for ground operations. :~, reviewed. Only ille officers of the ATU profit; they have the original knowledge. The equipment existing are inadequate for giving the neophytes more than a fundamental knowledge of artillery. And almost all the other officers who should profit, like the offi· cers of the ATU, at'e either caressing machine guns in classrooms, leading patrols 1ll the field, or performing everything but artillery functions. There is also the SRC, which produces some artillery men, but again this school iS primarily infantry. Some EM who Kraduate from it are basically FA and are eommiuioned in the artillery, but \Mre have been but a few. Chances are thote few are now also employed u infantrymen and have become ruaty as far aa artillery knowledge is cone~rned. The ROTC eontributu aome graduates. but how much real artillery trainha g do they .-n Would U... lfl'l.d· uates be able, at a moment's notice, to meet the many exacting requirements of artillery operations? And there is that trand military institution, the Philippine Military Academy. It is a source of artillery men, but the number produced by it is not enough and, like the others, also need training to make them qualify fully as artillery officer!i. We should not delude ourselves. We need fl school which is purely for the study of artillery, well-equipped, ad· vanced, complete, capable of turning out just the number and kind of artillery officers and men we need. Solving the ProbUm. The problem ie obviously how to place in constant readiness a sufficiently strong FA and at the same time do it within our limited financial meane. We cannot. due to limited funds, activate aU artU.Ltry officers and men and maintain FA unita in continuous trainin .. I I 4 PH/Lllj?INE ARMED FORCES JOURNAL ~ SCJJarateJy. ~ · all the scattered arti ery pieces and . . . '· instructors and add hat is lacking. Ag~un, tl1e solution b01\s . . :>wn to the Moreover, -present artil ery units may be creat1on o_f a purely artillery sch~l stationed within the school campus complt!te m every respe~t: To th1s which can be the base of actual operaschool can be sent for tra1mng not only tiona in which students can time and new-corners but also old otficers a~d again be required· to participate as a men to keep the knowledge fresh tn part of their practical and realistic them and keel? them abr~st of new training. • developments m artillery tactics and strategy. }8~n~e bhave:~bli::;~~ie~~c~u~~~h':; .. Artillery o1ficers and men, currently real artillery officers and' men who can employed as infantrymen, can be sent be mobilized at a moment's notice in to the school in continuous rotation. In case of an emergency. It is the only this way the present campaign against way of fillin~ up the gap that current the HMB will not be affected inimical· field operations cause. It is late for ly. The school will entail little expense, a start, but it would be better to start fflr it is just necessary to consolidate now than later. A Russian 1!0-mm mortar captured by UN troops in Krwea from the Chin.u~:~ and North Korean communists. TJ1c Russians ,.ecoguized the imp,.tance, and made full and effective tt.St, of big guns in the last wa,. against Germanv. Artillery will plalf the S"ame indispmsabre and vital 7'ole in any futu,.e waf".

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