Security is it worth the bother

Title

Language

English

Source

Philippine Armed Forces Journal Volume 6 (No. 6) November 1953

Year

1953

Rights

In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted

Fulltext

t't ~ecurity -9.w~111 ~? Ttlos•: of us who handle documents bearin~!; a security classification no doubt have asked ourse,ves whether security is wor1 1 the bother. Every day before going to dinner or before leaving the office for the day, we deliberately clear our desks of classified material, locking it away carefully in a ~teet cabinet or safe. We then check our a.astepaper baskets to make sure they contain no notes, drafts, or earbons whkh could have a security classification. Or do we? Perhaps we are in a hurry to leave. Perh:q's the noon hour seems too short a,; it is ! Perhaps we think that this security business is a bit over done anyway! Why, much of the stuff we handle and which bears a security classification we can read in the newspapers! Surely the security people do not consid~r a locked tiling cabinet a safe place for classified documents! Anyone really wanting to could break it open! The arguments all sound quit~ logicalhut are they? Two Cate~:ories En~my ag~nts may be divided into two cal~!:)OI·ies: those who are members of an organi~ed espionag~ rinJ!- with the tnsk of obtaining specific information of a top secret or secret natur~-and those charged with the collection of casual informution-that is, information which in its~lf may not be highly classified, but which, when collateO with information from other soun::es, will supply the enemy with facts from which he may deduce intelliJ!ence of far-reaching importance. the task of countering the activities Thi$ orhclt: ~los beet> digetttetl 111 th.· Military Rev1ew {ron~ an aiticle i~ the. Australian Army Journal of Febn.ar11. HIS:l. .'j() of an organi~o!d espionage ring belongs to the various civil and military security or counterintelligence organizations, and may be called "detecti\'1! security." The efficient countering of casual collection of information by enemy agents is the responsibility gf every individual who has access to classified information, and may be called "protective security." Nevertheless, a high standard of protective security by individuals and departments handling classified information is the first requirement, if det.e<:tive security is to be effective. The more attention paid to the protection of classified information the harder is the task of the enemy agent in securing or collecting such information, and he may be forced into taking risks, which will lead to his "discovery" by detective security measures. Espionage Ring In order to secure a particular it'em of highly classified information, the espionage ring must first learn of the existence of sue!\' a document, and if it is in the top eecret category the knowledge of its existence should be the right of only a select few.;_ The next task is to "infiltrate" the select few, with the aim of Jeartling who is responsible for the document; who has access to it; who typed it; and, if it is in a safe, wh&. has the key or knows the combinatiq_n. Having ascertained this information, the next step is to study the habits and background of those who have access to the document or who are responsible for its custody. When do they leave their offices unattended? Have they ever been members of subversive undercover organizations, such as certain }'Outh movements or peace and pacifist bodies? If they have, they will be considered as possible targets for subversion. Are they in financial difficulties! If so, they may be open to bribery. And so it goes on! Considerably detailed ,, " ,, .SEC4TY -• 1' IT ~~~~fll TilE BOTIIER? • ;, and patient research which will take time a document wh~h, from a practical point and money must be undertaken-and nll of view, cannot be classified abov• "rewith the.aim of borrt.IWing, stealing, view- stricted." Ho,'Cver, even when the general ing, or photographing the documents con- potent.ial source of information has been cerned. discovered, the agent would still be ignoHow do the casual agent. operate-the persons who are not seeking specific knowledge, but who are trained to take advantage of ans. opportunity to collect classified information! These agents require less organizing, a~d "?II be a co_nstant so~rce ,or information 1f protective sec::ur1ty IS weak or nonexistent. They may be members of the office staff, typists, messengers, janitors, watchmen, or mess employees-in fact, anyone who has ready access to an establishment where classified information is held. Three Queationa As a casual enemy agent, you would probably ask yourself three questions: I. What type of information is required! 2. Where is this information to be found? j! How am I going to get it? Let us examine probable answe!'S to these questions! Firat Anatcer During peace, the type of information that a future enemy' will require is that which will assist him most during the early stages of a war. As far as the Army is concerned, such information might include details of operational and administrative plans to ~put into effect at the outbreak of war; details concerning developments and improvements in arms and equipment; details of the organization of certain special units to be raised in war; stra~egic supply information; military aspects of pacts with foreign powers; and proposed and current activities of certain intelligence agencies. SeeONl Anauoer Where is the information to be found? The ~t way to get a general answer to this question i8 to consult the telephone directory of the headl(uarten ctneernedrant concerning the locations of the actual containers (safes and cabinets) of • the information in which he is interested. Still, he has foll.nd out in which offices he is most likely to gain cagual access. T!'ird Answer Now how is he going to get it? The essence of the work of a casual agent is to avoid arousing suspicion, and consequently he is not generally prepared to adopt burglar-like methods to obtain hi~ information. If office doors or cabinet.~ are forced open, then this will probably be disc::overed in the near future and steps can be taken to change any plans which may have been compromised by );is inspection of the document, and he is not likely to get additional information from the same methods. Consequently, he will adopt less noticeable methods-the use of skeleton keys to inspect office desks during the noon hour and during morning or afternoon breaks; the examination of wastepaper baskets for dassified waste (drafts, carbons. and notes); the exploitation of carelessness by the staff, where office doors or cabinets are not locked or wtjere the key to a locked cabinet is left lying in an unlocked desk drawer; by visiting the occupant of an office and scrutinizing or secretly photographing documents on the desk when the user is called out of the room for a moment; and by listening-in to the telephone in the hope of hearing information over crossed lines. These methods are easy, and from an examination of history, it has been found that they bring excellent results. If we examine them in detail, it will be :found that they are easily countered by the individual who is sec::urity conscious. Are these methods being employed in Australia today! There is good reason to belieye that they are, and they are certainly being employed in countries which will be our allies should another world Ask yourself the following questions: 52 PH!L~PPJNE AR'.II;!J FORCEr JOU~JAL 1. What classified information do I Security is as strong as its weakeet hnn<Ke or am I responsible for? link, and if that weak link is an indi2. How many ways cou!J this infonru~.- vidual, then that ir.Jividual, either eontion be obtained from me by an enemy scioualy or unwittingly, is betraying hia agent? country's secrets to the enemy. Be sure 3. How can I ensure that none of these you are not a weak link in the nation's mt.thods is used to get this in.formation security-you will be if you regard security from me? precautions 1113 not worth the bother.

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