What does the joint preparatory committee's report mean?

Title

Language

English

Year

1939

Subject

United States of America - Foreign relations - Philippines

Economic and Political Relations

Rights

In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted

Fulltext

HA document which will go down in history— WHAT DOES THE JOINT PREPARATORY COMMITTEE'S REPORT MEAN? The report of an AmericanPhilippine Joint Commission concerns the very crux of Amer ican involvement in the Far East, and, from the long-range viewpoint, might be as impor tant to the United States and to world stability, as the Lima Conference and the refugee problem all rolled into one. For over a third of a cen tury, the Stars and Stripes has waved over those almost fabu lous islands, with their 13,000,000 inhabitants, and their immense resources—mineral and agricultural—and their strategic position a few hundred miles from the Asiatic mainland and directly in the midst of Japan’s oceanic sphere of influence. They are a buffer-archipelago between Japan and the East In dian possessions of Britain, the Netherlands, and France. They may soon be the nearest point to beleaguered China where a western power has still an am ple foothold. They may be the last door in the East which Ja pan has not slammed. On the surface, the report concerns dull economic subjects —trade relations between the United States and the Philip February, 1939 pines. Not a word is said di rectly in the report about re examining political relations be tween the two countries. There is no mention of an American naval base. And therefore many observers said: "Purely econom ic. No interest in this dramatic world.” Nothing could be farther from the fact. Actually, the re port contains the most specific recipe for keeping the Islands independent of their mighty neighbor to the north. That remedy is not a military guar antee from the United States, which would be most difficult to deliver. It is internal eco nomic stability, which in turn makes for political stability. In short, the report shows how the Philippines can save themselves by a gradual 20-year adjust ment to an independent econ omy to match the political in dependence now contemplated. The insular economy is now solidly knit into the American market. To cut those ties brusquely, in this world of trade barriers and prohibitions almost everywhere else, would clearly mean to throw the Phil ippines into economic chaos. 41 Even in 1941, when, under the Independence Act, an import tax of 5 per cent was to have been imposed on all Philippine exports to this country, restric tive effects such as unemploy ment and suffering would have been felt in the urban region round Manila. In a few years more, agrarian troubles prob ably would have been felt all over the Islands. And this eco nomic strain would almost cer tainly have brought political in stability along with it. Such internal disruptions would have been the best possi ble preparation for the interven tion of a powerful neighbor, ad vancing not only with the pos sibly specious lure of a compen satory market, but with military power of intervention just as soon as disorders gave the ex cuse. It is easy to see that the first contribution to Philippine self defense should be economic, and if the United States wishes to remain isolated from trouble in the Philippines, perhaps the best way is to take the easy steps now to see that the Islands are able to attain economic, as well as political, independence and stability. Certainly any Jap anese intervention in the Philip pines would put American pub lic opinion under an unprece dented strain. But will Congress see things that way? That is the rub. Congressional opinion has been dominated in the past by Amer ican producers, anxious to block Philippine competition. Such competition, of course, is noth ing like what it was before 1932. Now domestic sugar producers are well barricaded be hind a quota which enables the industry to flourish; cotton-seed and animal fats producers are also protected by an excise tax. But, alas, there is always the possibility that, if the Philip pines are under the American flag or enjoy special trade rela tionships, the present restrictions will be relaxed. So a considera ble part of Congress is unquali fiedly for Philippine independ ence, the sooner the better, eco nomically as well as politically. This school of thinking does not recognize that the royal road to involvement in the Is lands is to hurl them into eco nomic and political instability. To this group, isolation means simply putting your head into the sand and letting the wind blow. But the Joint Committee has prepared a very able document. It needs friends in Congress. It has White House approval. Yet it may have to wait long for enthusiastic sponsors on Capitol Hill, and violent controversy seems bound to arise. Once again, it will be a battle between 42 Panorama narrow protectionist interests and a broader type of world policy. It is an uphill struggle. The Committee's recommen dations are adroit. They stick substantially to the import tax system for the initial five-year period of 1941-45, and merely propose in essence to keep on raising tariffs by 5 per cent a year until the full 100 per cent is reached. The scheme sounds reasonable. If enacted, it can be Congress's greatest contribution to a stable Philippines and sta ble American relations with the entire Orient.—Erwin D. Canham, condensed from the Christian Sci ence Monitor. February, 1939 43

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