Army Morale Procedures

Media

Part of Philippine Armed Forces Journal

Title: Army Morale Procedures
Language: English
Source: Philippine Armed Forces Journal Volume VIII (No. 10) October 1955
Year: 1955
Rights
Fulltext: Army Morale Procedures | Introduction NAPOLEON, the great stra tegist, have rated morale having a value of 3 to 1 compared with the materiel equipment of an Army. He recognized morale as an essen tial factor to victory. As the con ditions in combat give to it the sanction of life or death, it is little wonder that since time immemo rial maintaining the morale,of a unit has been the major responsi bility of any line officer. This res ponsibility is carried through in all modern armies. Early Semblance of Morale Activities In American history morale ac tivities began with Washington’s Armies. General Washington created a small traveling press to accompany his headquarters. Al though Congress was unsympathe tic, he used a one-man morale of ficer in the person of Thomas Paine. Paine marched with the troops. He was the first of the 18 L by Capt. Isidoro A. Estioko G.I. correspondents, and “The Crisis” was well known to Ameri can soldiers as were Bill Mauldin’s cartoons to the G.I.’s in 1945. In fact Paine’s sacrifices were as great as Ernie Pyle’s heroic feats in Iwo Jima or Benigno Aquino Jr’s reputation in Korea to the Fi lipino soldier. President Lincoln’s great concern over the defeatist Copperhead propaganda of the North during the Civil War should he reminisced. Equally great was the role of the civilian press in the Spanish - American War. How ever, the first approach to direct morale work on the General Staff level occurred in World War I. This was led by Brig. Gen. E. L. Munson at Camp Greenleaf in 1918. The school of Military Psy chology at the camp conducted mo rale programs including recrea tional, religious, and educational activities. The aim was not only to adjust the recruit in his first contacts with the Army but also to create an environment through which he could be adopted with re lative ease to his later army ex perience. Morale was usually* thought of in terms of entertain ment and welfare activities, which were managed by private civilian agencies under a government com mission. In the Philippines, with the Phi lippine Constabulary as a nucleus of the Armed Forces there was no such thing as deliberate morale upliftment. The pre-war Philip pine Constabulary’s high morale Members of the Women's Club hold meetings to discuss plans for the improvement of morale boosting activities. 19 was inherent in the organization, and any morale boosting activity just came by as a natural conse quence of work or part of the routine. Constabulary men were fully regimented. A serviceman had to undergo ten days probation period before his application for enlistment in the Philippine Cons tabulary was considered. And when accepted, he had to go through six months’ recruit train ing before he was considered a re gular constabulary soldier. His graduation in a Constabulary School was not even considered as an assurance of his call to active duty as an officer. Since enlist ment was held as a premium, the enlistee was well-adjusted to the rigorous constabulary life once he had been accepted. With the pas sage and implementation of the National Defense Act, the conti nuation of the services of unregi mented soldiers after World War II in line with the program of ex pansion, necessitated a concerted effort toward morale revival. Dis cipline in a Citizen Army like that of the Philippines presents special problems. Leaders seek to achieve a combination of discipline and ac ceptance of authority on the one hand, and of independent thinking and initiative on the other. On the former, the Filipino soldier is trained to do as he is told, but on the latter, he lives as a member of a social unit in which indivi dual initiative for his own benefit and for the group is encouraged. In a sense, this latter kind of dis cipline is a continuation of the soldier’s role as a citizen out of uniform. In this capacity, he is used to freedom of speech, and to Military areas have their own theaters. Projectors are brought to the field so that The AFP Special Services hold stage shows for the entertainment of soldiers. the chance for self improvement and advancement. This is now the center of morale programs among filipino soldiers. Morale Activities in Anti democratic Countries In the Japanese Army during the war, morale work was a very minor problem. The natural and cultivated nationalism of the Jap anese soldier was unparalleled in the Far East. As a nation driven wild by hardships and injustice, they either got to survive or per ish. For this reason a child born became a ward of the state. Their schools were an important link be tween the Army and the people, simultaneously strengthening their national defense. Their rigidly supervised educational system, Shintoism, and network of thought control all contributed to mould ing a people trained not to inde pendent thought but to accept and not to question. A Japanese sol dier was a well-regimented soldier. But we should not accept the fact that the Japanese Army was not interested at all in the welfare of its soldiers for even Geishas were found dead in Japanese foxholes during the liberation of Mountain Province in the Philippines. To the Soviets run a line of thinking almost parallel to the Japanese Army of Worl4 War II. To them the defense of the father 21 land was the most sacred, the most -cherished duty of a Soviet patriot. To the rejuvenated Soviet Army, improvements of morale were on the propaganda level. Trotsky wrote in 1919, “It is necessary to -create such a situation, such a frame of mind in the country, that a deserter- could find no place to “lay his head, hide Cain, who be trayed his brother.” Hence, capit al punishment upon verdicts of mi litary courts was used against de sertion and abandonment of posts. Complaints as to the severity of punishment were not permitted. Yet, the morale of the Red Army was very low. However, the great purge in 1937 more than strength ened the loyalty and discipline of the Red Army. Stalin turned - around and crashed the Soviet de mocratic international opposition within the Red Army by eliminat ing the low-cultured generals for the educated military leaders which was necessary for its moderniza tion and mechanization. Hence, Marshal Timoshenko’s energetic and intelligent work in rebuilding the discipline and improving the morale of the army in the months preceding Hitler’s attack upon So viet Russia,, had an excellent ef fect. At present, it is quite im possible to offer an evaluation based on sufficient authentic evi dence. In contrast to armies accustom ed to free institutions was the German Army. Education in Ger many was mental, and physical preparation for total war. The pro grams of morale stimulation were essentially the same for soldier and civilian. Except in detail and ex tent of application, German morale programs in World War I and II were similar. Propaganda consis ted of heroics and reports of glo rious victories, sinking of enemy ships, enemy weaknesses, vast pre parations fur the final offensive, promises of glory and the New Order. In World War II this pro paganda was greater because in war the civilian was her partner. Morale discipline was strengthen ed through lectures on such sub jects as “Love and Sacrifice for Fatherland, One Reich, One people, and One Fueh rer.” Soldiers gathered toge ther every day for explana tion by their officers of current political events so that all might have immediate participation in them. German psychologists dev eloped remedial programs for homesickness, suicidal tendencies, sex desire and individualism. Homesickness therapy consisted of frequent furloughs during early adjustment to Army life. Experi ments were conducted to control fears of isolation, bombardment, gas and panic among soldiers. Notable Changes and Improvement Were there changes in our line of thinking in so far as morale ac tivities and implementation are concerned? Taking the United States as an example, the War Department early in 1940 estab lished in the office of the Adjutant General a Morale Division. It in cluded a sub-division to handle va 22 rious types of recreations, award of decorations and morale public ity. While there was no marked difference between morale activi ties conducted in Word War I, yet for the first time it fixed on the army direct responsibility for the morale of the troops. Results of the research units under General F. H. Osborn, tended to show that the provision of recreation and welfare activities which had been over-emphasized was not a major factor in the maintenance of high morale. There were indications that absence of adequate facilities would tend to depress, but that such factors as job assignment, competency of commissioned and non-commissioned officers, and a sense of duty and responsibility in the accomplishment of any mission were of far greater importance. In the years that followed, the Morale Division changed its name several times till it. finally became Information and Education Divi sion. Since it had no direct con trol over either personnel assigament or army training, it turned its attention to the information and education of the army. As a result, the Division had taken a major part in the establishment of various publications, radio broad casts, film showings, and educa The Troop Information and education Division, GHQ, AFP, through its Non-Miiitary education Branch, established the AFPSEM for EM's educational advancement. 23 tional advancement of personnel. Recently, physical privations were instituted in training camps to prepare the mind of the draftee in case of capture in the future. Dean Keppel of Harvard Uni versity believes that three patterns are possible in the modern army for an effective administrative or ganization on morale. Authority may rest with (1) the line organ ization; (2) central administra tive office with field representa tives; and (3) a combination of both. Under line administration, the commanding officer is respon sible with little help in policy training from higher echelons. In the second, morale officers are ap pointed to army units under the direction of a chief morale officer. A combination of these two is the more common today. Hence, spe cial staff sections are responsible for over-all analysis of factors af fecting morale. Specifically, the Special Services Division is res ponsible for providing active pro grams of entertainment and re creation, while the Information and Education Division, provides opportunities for personal advan cement while in uniform. Present Set Up of the AFP In the present set up of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Morale Boards in the Headquar ters of Military Areas consist of the Personnel Officer, PRO, TI & E Officer, Medical Officer, Chap lain and Special Services Officer. These boards meet whenever di rected by the commanding officer or upon call of the Chairman. They advise the commanding of ficer about the state of morale of the command and make such stu dies in morale as may be directed. They coordinate the activities and consolidate the reports of the Bat talion morale boards. The Battalion Morale Board is composed of the Adjutant and S-l, Operations Officer, Battalion In telligence Officer, Battalion Sur geon, TI & E Officer, and Special Services Officer. The Battalion Commander designates the Chair man. When an army chaplain is available, he is authorized to, sit. with the board and participate in its deliberations. The board as sists the commander in the imple mentation of policies and direc tives from higher headquarters re lative to morale. It is believed that the creation of these boards will emphasize the responsibility of unit commanders of being informed constantly of the morale of their commands. In a nutshell, morale boards should be on the lookout for signs of lower ing morale and immediately inform and advise their commander so that they can adopt timely mea sures to maintain a higher state of morale. However, one should not overlook the idea of developing plans and policies that may affect the motivations and attitude», of personnel. It would theoretically be desirable therefore to have a qualified research unit immediately available to provide information when these plans and policies are made. 24