Twenty years of the AFP

Media

Part of Philippine Armed Forces Journal

Title: Twenty years of the AFP
Language: English
Source: Philippine Armed Forces Journal Volume 9 (No. 2) December 1955
Year: 1955
Rights
Fulltext: -- ment over which, they felt, they would not have controL Military Consciousness Several years after Wood was relieved of his Philippine post, the Filipino leaders became military-minded. This new awakening was an offshoot of the worsening intcrnationai situation in the early SO's, particularly in the Far East, where the Japanese had launched a war of aggres~oion a· gainst China. Moreover, by that time there was already an as. surance that Philippine independence was forthcoming. In 1934, the Philippine Legislature passed House Bill No. 735, providing for the creatio11 of a Bureau of National Defense. Mainly because of budgetary limitation, the then Governor Frank ) Murphy vetot:d the Act, making the observation that further consideration of the problem of national preparedness would "1noke it possible for the Philippine Govermnent to avail itself of the knowledge and • of e~perts equipped by years of ezperience and study of the technical aspects of the militarv defense of the Philippines." Murphy's counsel prontpted Mr. Manuel L. Quezon, then President of the Philippine Senate and the highest Filipino official in the government, to request the U nited States Secretary of War . to recommend congressional amendment of an Act or 19 May 1926, which provided for t he detail of United States Army, Naval, and Marine Corps officers to a!JSillt the other American republics in military and naval matters. Through this amendment it was proposed to make the Act applicable to the Philippinea. ' Early in 1935, th<> United States Congress approved the l'CQUested amendment. This enabled Mr. Quezon, now P resident-elect of the Philippine Commonwealth, to secure the services of General Douglas MacArthur, whose second term as Chief of Staff of the United States Army was about to expire, concurrently as Military Adviser to the Philippine Commonwealth and Chief of a Philippine Military Mission of United States Army officers. It was MacArthur, ably assisted by a staCf of American and Filipino officers of the United States, who :'as ia~ciy mstrume,ntal 1n draftmg and cxeeuting the provisions of the National Defense Aet of the Philippine Commonwealth. lncidentally, upon his retirement from active service of the United States Army in 1937, MacArthur was rctained cas Military Adviser and was given the rank of field marshal of the Philippine Army. legal Basis The Commonwealth Con.stitution, ado'pted in 1935, elated among its declaration of principles the following: "Tile defense of the St«te is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfiltm-llnt of this duty all citizem may be ..-eqltired by law to f'"ender personal military or civil seT"Vice." As early as 15 February 1899, General Antonio Luna had worded this same Jlrineiple as "an i>lalienable right to defend our soil:' The right of the government to conscript its eitiU!ns in the train~:~~:~a~~- anny was thus clearly Commonwealth Act No. I, otherwise known as the National Defense Act, was approved on 21 December 1935. This established the legal basis for the organization of a Philippine Anny. However, it was not until u,e following month that Headquarters Philippine Anny and the component of the Regular Foree were organized under authority of Executive Order No. 11, issued by President Quezon on 11 January 1936. Exceuth•e Order No. II raised Colonel ,lose de los Reyes of the 10 Philippine Constabulary to brigadier general in the Regular Force and des.ignated Mm Acting Chief of Staff of the Philipptne Army. Brigadier General Basilio J. Valdes and Colonel Guilh;rmo B. f'rancisco were likewise designated as Acting Assistant Chiefs of Staff. FurthcrmorJ, the Executive Order transferred the PhilipJlinc Constabulary to fonn the nucleus of the Philippine Army, pursuant to provisions of Section 18 of the National Defense Act. At the outset, the Philippine Constabulary constituted almost two-thirds of the authorized Regular Force of 10,000 officers and men. The Constabulary, now reduced to the category of a division or the Philippine Anny placed under a Provost Marshal, f:ontinued to discharge regular police duties as heretofore. From its ranks were drawn teams of officers; and men who initially served as cadres in the various Philippine Army training centers. These cadres were charged with the primary duty of as!listing in the inlltruction of the 20-year old draftees who were called fl'lr military training from time to time. PC Seporated R('fore long, i\. was found inaopt·opriate th-1.t the Philippine C,;nstabulary, which was under a1·my control, should exercise police function!. Hence on 2G October 1936, President Queznn approved Commonwealth Act :fo. 88 creating the State Police. Jo,orce, which natioralized all police forces in the country into a separate organization. Thereafter the constabulary was relieved of its police powers and remained an integral part of the Philippine Army. Gen Oouglos MocArlhur ond Preo. Quezon go o•er the Commonweollh Ad No. J, oll>e•wioe known os the Notional Defense Act, opproud 011 21 December 1935 u T~ue ore ortille•r train .. , in the eodr reo" of the Commonwealth rtgime, "lonning one of t~ e big gun• at Camp del Prlar, P.A. arlillerr lraini"g center, After a little over a year or un~atis factor~· <oxistence, the Stat(' Police Fore(' was recommended by President Quezon til the National A.~S('mbly for abolition. In its place the Philippine Constabu lary waa to be reconstituted into a separate organization, distinct and divorced from the Philippme Army. In instituting thiS' change President Quezon said: "My proposal is that we se· parate the Constabulary completely from the military set;tions of the Army, and employ It to carry out, under the supervision of the President, those police functions tha; de12 volvt; upon the central gvvemment. 'I,;hus while every officer and matl will be indentlficd with the Army, will ret;Civc his basic distiplinary training therein, and will be the possessor of those military traditions and customs that place a premium upon personal integrity and hold performan·ce o( duty in higher regard than personal gain, the organization as a whole will be definitely separated, theoretically and practically, from the defenst• forces of the Nation." The separation was finally accomplished by Commonwealth Act NO. 343 of 23 .Tunc 1938, wl1i~h wa ~ implemented by Exc~utive Order No. \ 53, issued that same day. The close I"Clationship between the two organizations was main· -taincd . So, when there arose the national cri!lis in 1941 and it became expedient that the Constabulary units be made to dis~hargc purely military duties, its incor· 110ration with the Phili]>pinc Army was readily accomplished by the assignment Ol" indu~tion of its personnel into the latter This was feasible since Constabular!' officers were assigned from Army rosters, and all its enlisted •personnel were reservists of tho Army. Early Anny Set·up At il.!l organization on 11 .Jan· uary 1!136·, the Philip)Jine Army wa.s placed under the direct supervision of the President of th., l'hilippines, in his ~apacity a~ (!ommander·in-Chief. To effect better supervision by thl' civil authority, however, Commonwealth Act No. 430 was approved on 31 May 1939, providing fo1 the ~reation of a Department of National Defense which shall b.· "charged with the duty of supervising the nation~ defense pro· gram of thP country,'' and of "executive supervision" of such offices to be p\a~ed under it by the President. The act was implemented by ExecutivP 01-der No. 230, issued on 31 October 1939, which p\a~ed the Philippine Ar my under this new Department, The Honorable Teofilo Sison, former Secretary of the lntcriol", bocame the first Secretary of Nationa! Defense. Prior to 1939, another notable step taken to .insure the lkalthy development of the Philippin<l Army was the arproval of Commonwealth Act No. 408 on 14 Sept· ember 1!138, which establish~'([ "a system of military justice for persons subject to military law." The Army's "Art1des sof War" is the result of this act. The Rc~ular Forcol of thl' A1·· my ns provided for in the National Defense Act, cousi1ted of the General Staff Corps and the following arms and S('rvices: {l) Infantry; (21 C:walry: (3l Field Artillery; 4> Coast Ar· tillery; (5l Air Corps; ((;) Co:ps of Engineers; <7> Chemical Co1·ps; (8) Signal Corps; (9l0£f· Shore Patrol; (10) Adjutant General's Service; (11) Judge Advocate General's Service; (121 lnspcc,tor General's Service; <l3l Quartermaster Master Service; (14) Finance Sen•ice; <l5l Me· dical Service; (l(il Ordnance Service; (l7 l Chaplain Servlc,; and 081 CorJIS of Professors and Cadets of the Philippine Milital")' Academy Of the arms the Air Corps and tl1e Off-Shore Palmi now enjoy a wid"e degree of in· dependence since their elevation to major commands in 1947 and later to major services in 1950 'fhe Army as contemplated by the Natioua! Defense Act is es· sentially a "Citizen Army", socalled because it is largely ~om· posed of a trained reserve to bt> built up by conscription of 20· yeat·-old Filipino males at an nvc· rage annual rate or 40 thousand during the Commonwealth regime 13 and 3,~0 in the ])~st-war years. It should be noted, however, that before the war, military training instruction was given for a period of five-and-one-half months, whereas since 1948, upon resumption of military training, the period of instr<.Jdion has been increased to ten months. Initially, in April 1936 all 20 year old Filipino maleg were required to register. Out of the rcgistra~ts 40 thousand were selected to undergo the five-andone-half-month military training. one-half of the number to train from January W June 1937 and and the other half from June to December 1937. By January 1938, when the first halt of the Be<:ond g-roup of trainees reported for training, the Philippine Army cot::J well count on u train~c~-~~erv~e~!r:i ~::;~~u:~~:~ envisioned thai. ~ithin the 10year Commonweaith period the Philippine Army would be .. bi~ to train a Reserve Force of about 400 thousand officers and men. The war, however, disrupt~d the training program. Nevertheless, by 1941 the Philippine Army had in its roster of reservists no less than 160 thousand troops from whom were mobilbed the men to constitute fhe ten reserve divisions inducted into the United States Army. Reserve Divisions For the purpose of recruitmg, training and mobilizatiop of national manpower and resources the country was divided into ten J• I •I ,. '. JlfilitCirv Districts, each of which was \mde'r a Dh;trict Commander. Tho latter, assisted by a spt.:cial staff, synchronized all activitied within his territorial jurisdiction, relative to th ' program of nation• al defense . In addition, in time of war the District Commander was made responsible for the defense of his territory. In this task he was directly under the control of the Chief of Staff. In the event oft foreign aggression, it was contemplated that the Reserve Force of the Philippine Army be mobilb:ed and constituted into divisions, which were drawn up on paper just as soon as enough men were trained and entered into the rolls of reservists. These divisions were given uniform designations so as to readily identify them with the districts from which their personnel were drawn. The method was to write down the numerical designation of the district. Now take the 11th Division. The first numeral 1 stood for lBt Uilitary District, while the other 1 indicated the fact that this division was the first W be organized from among the reservists of the 1st Military Distrift· Similarly, in the case of the Slst Division, figure 8 represented the 8th Military District, while J denoted that this wa::~ the first di· vision organized in the Cebu-Bo. hoi area. Should another division be organized within any of the ten districts it would be designated as the 12th, 22nd, or 32nd Division, as the case may be. Prelude to War The process ot buildup waB taking shape witb considerable headway when the world crisi1 set in. On 27 !lay 1941, the President of the United States proclaimed "that an unlimited 15 1tatio11al 'tmergency c~nfronts this cortntry, u•luch requzru that •ts military, naval, air and civili(!n defense bt pitt on the basil of rcndincss to repel any and all fl(:ts of aguressio11 dirtcted tou·ard an11 1mrt of the westeMl l!cmiBJJhere." '' Two mouths later, on 26 July Hl4l, under a provhion of the Tydings-l'llcDufrie Law, Pres· idcnt I<oosevelt called into United States Ar~y service "all the organized military forces of the Philippines'' and ordered that they be merged with the United States Army. Recalled to active duty, 1\facAz-tlmr was designateJ commanding general of the newly activated United Stales Arlny Forces in the Far East, popu nrly known as USAFFE. Shortly nrte1· n definite plan was evolved calling for the progressive activation and induction into the USAFFE of ten Phil· l'holo ~ltow1 20-reor-old IJ1orol• from Mountoln ipJli'\" Anny reserve division.{, Dolen•• Acl rook effed one to come from each Military • District. United States Army officers were assigned as inducting officer!:. To synchronize ~he commissioned officer as mstructraining and issuance of supplies tor. and equipmerrt to the inducted Late in July 1941, warning orunits, American army personnel ders were issued by HPA alerting were assigned 1\S instructors and unit advisers in each ol the Filipino divisions, generally on the basis of two officers per batta· lion and one non-commissioned officer per company. Special regimental units, like the Combal Company and the Medical Company, were ulso assigned one com. missioncd officer and one nonthousands of reservists who were due for call to active duty. On :~ August 1941, the personnel of ten infantry regiments, one pci--' division, reported to their respec· tive district mobilization centers. This was followed on 28 AugtJ6t by the activation of the officer!< and key men of the other regiments and special and technical 16 units of the ten ' ·cscrvc divisions. On 1 September, all o{ these ele· ments of the Philippine Army were inducted into the USAF FE. The ten regiments were immediately given combat training on the regimental level, while the other officers and key men were given intensive refresher courses to prepare them to take over the training of the men scheduled to report for duty at later dates. Meanwhile, by virtue of its in· duction on 15 August, the Air 17 Corps earned the distinct honor o( being the first component of the Philippine Army inducted into the USAFPE The preparation for the emergency was further intensified in September 1941, when USAFFE Headquarters authorized the opening of a "Division Staff School" at Camp Henry T. Alle11 in Baguio. This school turned out graduates who Inter on were to assume responsible command and stall duties in the regimE'nts and divisions, beginning mid-November of 1941. From September to the outbrcnl: of wnr, miscellnneous divisionnl and non-divisional clements of the Philippine A1·my were inducted into Inc USAFFE. Yet at the <>1ilbreak of hostilities not one of the ten divisions was at full strength. Mobilization had to be accelerated. And to fill up the a~ute need for manpower, volunteers wc1·e accepted fo1· service with the Philippine Army :md subsequently inducted into the USAFFE. Philippine Constabulary units in Manila and in the suburbs, like the 1st nnd 2nd J>C Regiments, wl1ich were activated in Bataan as the 2nd Regular Division, as well as the 1st Regular Division, PA, were also inducted to the USAFFE on the 17th and 19th of December, respectively. From thereon tl1ef Philippine Army was on war footing. The War Years Although it had acquired a semblance of a military organization, the Philipl)inc Army of .1941 was ill-prepa1·ed, especially to be pitted against a 1·uthless and powerful enemy who had long geared himscU to wage a war of conquest. Most of its troops :md officers were young reservists who despemtcly lacked combat training. On top of that they were forced to take the field with inadequate supplies and ob· ;;olete arms. In spite of its awful shorteom18 ings and clreaMul handicaps. the Philippine Army admitahlyactJ.uittcd itself in the f1eld o[ baltic. ]n the mala1·ious jungles of "Uataan and on 1wky Corregidor, it gave notice to the world of it::: tremendous capabilities to resist a cunning and powerful enemy. The delaying actions it fought on U1e mainland of Luzon prior to Rataan, han· since then bceome a classic in military tact1es. It was a heroic Philippine Army on Bataan which later on earned the lavish praise of Prime Minister Winston Churchill of • England. Asked in the Hou:<C' of Commons why Singapore fell in spite of its armaments and t1·oops, while Bataan stood, Churchill replied in effed that as a ~oldicr the Filipino had no equal! It was also the gallant Ph1lip· pin(> Army on Bataan and Corrcgidor which ••vokt·d from General Douglas MacArthur, thi~ undying testimonial in 1945: "Batnan and Corregidor the citadel of its integral defense made possible all that has happened since.' History, I am sure, will record it as one of the dccisiv<' balUcs of the world. Its long protracted struggle cnabl<'d tht' United Nation~: to gather sh·cngth to resist in the Pacific. Had' it not hrld out, Australia would have fallen with Incalculably di~a~trous results. Our triumphs of today belong equally to that dead anny. Its heroism and sacdficcs have heen clul>· acclaim{·rl. but the gn::at\9 ~trategic results' or the mighty defense are only now becom· ing fully apparent. The Bataan garrison was destroyed due to its dreadful handicnps, but no nrmy in history more thoroughlv accomplished 1ts m1ssion. Let no man henceforth speak or it other than as a magnificent victory.,. Physically the Philippine Anny of 1941-42 was defeated but ItS spirit was never conquered. During the Japanese occupation, the large majority or Its ranks and files went underground, striking at the enemy whenever and wherever they could best strtke. Stout-hea!"ted USAF FE men were among the countless heroes of the Philippine Resistance Movement. Their distinguished acts oC gallantry, put together, have become one distinct chapter in the story of the Philippine Army's participation that bruught .about the American success in tl1e last Philippine Army Reactivated BC~:ause its spldt was kept alive, it was a simple expedient to reactivate the Philippine Ar· my as soon as the American Forces of Liberation stepped on Philippine soil. On 23 October 1944, Headquarters Philippine Army was officially reconstituteo nt Tacloban, Leyte, mitially as the Philippine Army SC~:tion of USAFFE Headquarters. General Basilio J. Valdes, who had held the portfolio of National Defense 111 the exiled Commonwealth Government in Washington, D.C. resumed his old post as Chief ol Staff. ln the herculean task of rehabilitating the Army, Gen. 1P/oolo btlo• ,, on oirp/ont oitw of Camp l(eirhley, tonoo, in 19:l'O 20 Valdes was ably assisted by American and Filipino officct·~ who had come with the American Forces of Liberation, headed by Major General Clarlcs P. Stivers, MacArthur's G-1 since the formation of the USAFFE command in 1941. Five days later, President Sergio Osmci'ia issued Executive Order No. 21, reactivating the Phtlippine Army. This Executive Order had further authorized that 'tJ/1 per.~rms of mty 11ationa!ity or c•ti.-:enllhip who 11re activrlu srruiny in rtcogrtized milita111 {orrtll of the PhiliJ1pine8 are con· ~idercd tu bt in the nctive sen•irc of the Philippine Army." Pioneer Post-Wor Units Availing itself of nn abundant !ogislical support given by the Ullitcd States Army, the :'l2nd Infantry Division, PA, was act!· vatcd on 1 Novcmbt-t• l!l<N, utiliz:ing as its nucleus Colonel Ruperta Ka1tgleon's guerrilla outfit - the Leytc Area Command. This division was immediately placed under the operational control or General Walter Krucgcr's Sixth Unite..! Sta~s Army, and had played a vital role in the lihcration or the whole island of Lcytc. On 12 November 1944 the lst Rr.placement Battalion was also adivated at Taclohan, Lcyte. This battalion was charged with the t·ccovery and proccssing ot surviving Philippine Army personnel of the USAFFE, ana co supply the pcrsonnel requirements of units being activated. 9Utl lat&>r, on 1" Novembet·, the 1st Leytc Comnany, Philippine Constabulary, was activate..! and gh·en the mission of maintaining peace and order in the liberated at·cas This was followed on 4 December 1944 with the achvalion of the 2nd Lcyte Company, Philippine Constabulary. HPA Transferred to lu1on The bulk of the American Liberation Fot·ces were shifted t.o Luzon, making thc landing on the beachcs of Lingayen Gulf on ~~ January 1945 Fifteen days later the 2nd Replacement Battalion wa~ activated at Dagupan. Pangasinan, and was given stmtfif.Ameti~on ltoops ~ounferoNock superior Japanese for~•• on lofoon. Hunger, foflgue and fo~k of supplie• finoJ/1 pul on end to their long ond hectic Jfruggle tar mission as its countcz·part in Lertc. In February 1945 Manila was recaptured and along with USAFFE headquarters, Headquarters Philippine Army was established in the city. As the volume of work increased tremendously, Headquarters Philippine Army was allocated bigger woz·king space. On 29 March 1945, the Headquarters was cstablished at the National University, but twelve days later it w:l.s transferred to the Legarda Elemcntary School Building where it was located up to 23 November of that year. The next day Headquarters was moved to the Ang Tibay Building at Grace f'az·k, Manila, where it stayed up to 5 August 1946, when it moved to its present site in Camp Mur22 phy. Army Rehabilitated The Philippine Army gained extensive combat experience during the liberation campaign, although most of its operations were undertaken in conjunction with the United States Army, under which it operated. On that acore the only exception was the United States Army For.ces 1n the Philippines, North Luzon (USAFIP, NLJ, a guerrilla unit in Northern Luzon. Assigned 9. definite sector or operation, this outfit accomplished its mission independently. Given the logis. tical support, but without any superivision !rom the American Army of Liberation, tbe USAFIP, NL, liberated the western hair of Northern Luzon, and a large portion of thP !\fountain Province and tl te Cagayan Valley. A (ter the establishment of USAFFE headquarters in Manila the rehabilitation of the Phil. ippine Army was undertaken in earnest. One of the fit•sf step taken to attain this end was the issuance by USAFFE llea<lquat·tet·s of an order requiring all Philip]Jine Am1y pet-sonncl of the USAF F E to report lo military control . Snbsequ('ntly, the establishment of more replacement battalions fot· officers and men or the USA FFE not in the ac:• tive lists of guenilla units, was ordered. The 3rd and 4th Replacement Battalions were activated in- Camp Murphy, wh tle thf' 5th and 6tl1 Replacement Battalions WP J 'C activated in Lanao and Iloilo, respectively. As the Slll'\'ivors of the USAFFE of 1941-42 flocked to the replacement battalions and recognition or incorporation into the Phtli]J· pine A1·my or all active and deserving guerrilla 8nits started, the NJtablishment or camp eomplements in Camp Olivas, Camp Murphy, Camp Ord, Iloilo, and at Calasiao, Pangasinan was also ot·dered. On 1 April 1945, the Central General Staff was reorganizo..>d and Headquarters Philippine Army ceased to be a mere section of USAFFE headquarters. It attained a status similar to that of 1941, when the Philippine Army was inducted to the USAFFE. o,. lalaon, t~t rodio wo• !Itt la•t rtmaining link willt tht auiJide world. lti<Jtt Manila fell, it. local otatiaM braad~oJI o ""Voice a/ Fr .. dano"' prapoganda 23 Thereafter, .Headquarters Philippine Army assumed the rcsponsibilit)· of activating its own units and assigning its own personnel, wit!il the concurrence of USAF FE hcadquaJters. Units were activated as fast as oHicers and men were J·ecovel'ed and process!'d in the replacement battalions and camp complements. This step wa!; taken to insure a steady 11upply of manpower needed as replacements In the combat areas and in the projected invasion ot Japan. By July 1945 a total of 98,255 oHicers and men were organized into Philippine Army units or wt·J·e unilergoing processing in the casual camps, OJ' attached fot coll\bat duty with the United Stat<'S Army About 18,000 of this num~r, compQsed for the most paJ't by personnel of the USAFIP, NL, was glated to form a division to accompany the Amedcan Army earmarked for the invasion of the Japa11ese mainland. l n the meanwhile, civil govern~ rnent was reestablished and in the absence of a nati'onal police force, the central government had to rely on the army to restore and preserve peace and order in the libeJ·ated areas. This brought about the issuance of Executive Order No. fi l, dated 7 June H1'45, authorizing the establishment of a Military Police Command. Two weeks after, General Orders No. 8G of IIPA activated the J\tilitaJ"y Police Command, which wag placP.d under the joint of prueni.PAf, ;, rolu,. ot pr .. wor z,.blaft fi-'d supervision of the United States number, the United States ArmJ Army and the Philippine Army. immediately inaugurated a proIt was charged with the main- gram of demobilization which was tainance of law and order, the carried out in three phases., enforcement of military ordeu Phase one called for the inacand regulations, and in assisting tivation of all units ordered ac· the civil gove•·nment in enforcing tivated but not actually orgaf\· thu civil Jaws except in thu ac- ized. This included the revertive combat areas,and at exempt- sion to inactive status of all ofed resen•ations. In addition the ficers and men in the casual Milita•·y Police Command a~ist- camps, and the demobilization o! ed in the reorganization and su- all authorized guerrilla unit.s that pcrvision of the activities of the were attached unassigned to the civil police forces that were being United States Army. Phase two formed. included the demobilization ot activated units, while phase three Oemobili:z:otion called for the demobilization of The sudden C('ssation of hostil- so many of the oHicers and men ities: in August 1945 found the so that by 30 June 1946, the dale Philippine Army with an overall of turn over, the Philippine Ar,trength of approximately 250 my would have a strength of apthousand officers and men. Since proxlmatdy 37,000 officers and there was no more need fo•· this 26 Turn Over By 31 January 1946, the Philippine Army still had a strength of 140 thousand. Demobilization was therefore stepped up anti by the time the Philippine Army, now called tfe Army or the Philippines, passed on from the control of the United States Army to the Commonwealth Government, it had a total strength of 35,'743 officers and men. Of this number approximately 20 thousand were in the Military Police Command. T he 35,'743 troops, which wo:re contained in a ''Turn Over Troop List," represented a compromise between what the Army of the Philippines wanted and what the United States Army authorities were willing to tum over. In that list were included many units which the Army of the Philippines was forced to accept. Military supplies 1md equipment we1·e a lso turned ovCr to the Commonwealth government, pursuant to the provisions: of the United States Military Assistance, Pact. Although most of the~ supplies nnd equipment were under the category either of Class "C" or Class "D" and were of poor condition, they represented a huge financial saving for the impoverished Philippine Government, these supplies a nd equipment having a requisition value of severa l hundred millions of dollars. Also there were t urned' over or earmarked to be turned over certain United States Army and Naval reservations, such as Catnp Wallace in La Union, Camp Henry T . Allen in Baguio, Ft. McKinley and Nichols Field in Rizal, and the Tsland o! Corn·gidor. Jl>i• ;, 0 picl•Jt• of rl>e ceremoni•• inducling rl>e I' A. oir corp• into rl>e USAffE I'Jore rl>e number of plone• tl>e Army l>od or rl>e lime. II woo nry inodequole 26 Rehabilitation Program Followi~g the inauguration ol the Republic of the Philippines on 4 July 1946, Headquarters Army of the Philippines started a training program for its ptn·· sonnel. This step was deemed imperative in order to bring back the old prestige of the Army which had suffered tremendous set-back. In line with this program, the "Military Training Command" was activated on 2 January 1947, pursuant to General Orders No 12 of HAP. This Command was charged with the supervision of trainee instructions, the R.O.T.C., and ·the training in the service schools .. Prior to this date, on 3 June 1946, the Reserve Officer's Service School, which later on became variously designated as the "Ar· my Ground Forces School," the '"Philippine Ground Force School," the ·'Armed Forces of the Philippines Service School", and the "Philippine Army Service School" was reactivated. It did not open its door, howeve_. until 6 February 1947. Also on 6 July 1946, Headquarters of the R.O.T.C. was reactivated, but it was on 7 September 1947 when R.O.T.C. instructions resu1ned, initially in seventeen colleges and univerai· ties throughout the country. The Philippine Military Aca· demy, which had been converted into an institution of collegiate level under a provision of the National Defense Act, effective in 1986, was reestablished on. 28 June 1946. It. first post-war class began olf '7 April 1947. A• in the pre-war years the PMA is charged with preparing the officers for the Regular Force. Army Reorgani:red In line with the "Government Reorganization Plan• contained in Executive Order No 94 of President Roxas, dated 4 October 1947, the Army was drastically revamped. New nomenclatures were adopted and major com· mands were formed as integral parts of the Army. Implementing this Executive Order, General Orders No. 228 was issued on 24 October, chang. ing the designation Army of the Philippines to Armed Forces of the Philippi?US. Headquarters Army of the Philippines was changed to HeadqJUlrtl'rs Nation· al Defense F!»"ces, while the Military Training Command and the "Off-Shore Patrol" became the Philippine Ground F'orce and ~e Philippine Naval Patrol, respectively. The Air Corps which previously had been renamed Philippine Army Air Force and later redesignated as Philippine Air Force on 3 July 1947, re· mained under the later nomendature. The designation and fur,ctions of the members of the Central General Staff and the Special Staff nmained as in the previous years. The staffs arl' now caliE"d National Del en.-11 Ge116ral Staff and National De{entJe Special Sta!f, respectively. The composition of the Special Staff Wal'l hiked with the addition of a HU· toriml Divillion, a 'kPuarch and Development Division, an Educational and Recreation Division, and the Public a11d Legislative Relations D'ivillion. Taking a lesson from historital precedfnt, it was thought best that the Armed Forces should cease to discharge police functivns which it had been performing through its Military Police Command since June 1945. 'lhls resulted in the recoMtituUon of the Philippine Constabulary into a separate agenq, ano.l just as in the pre-war years, it was placed under the Department of the Interior. The Philippine Constabulary was to be reconstituted out of the Military Police Command, and since the latter was engap:ed in the peace and order campaign, thl' immediate transfer of the MPC units to the PC was d£>· ferl·ed. The- inactivation of the MPC, simultaneous with the ac· tivation ol the PC was effected only on 31 December 1947 with the issuance by HNDF of General Orders No. 269, The PC, since that date assumed the status it enjoyed during the Commonwealth regime. A total of 12,000 officers and men were transferred !rom the Armed Forces to the Philippine Constabulary on 1 January 1948. In addition around 8,200 officers and men of the AFP were attached to the PC to enable the latter to carry out ita prime mi~1\0n of restoring peace and or· der, especially in the dissidentinfested regions. , Also instituted was the imu:· tivation of the ten Military Dis· trich. In their places four Mi· li!ury Areal were activated by General Orders No. 164, HNDF, dated 5 May 1948. The rthlitary Areas have since then taken over the functions devolved in the ml· Jit.ary districts. latest Changes Although the formation of the major command~; proved a sue· cessful experiment, the maximum f'fficiencv was not attaine!l. On 30 March 1950, therefore, upon the recommendation of the National Defense General Staff, President Quirino issued Exeeutive Order No. 308, merging t ht' Philippine Constabulary with thr Anned Forces, making It OM mo1·e major command In addi· Uon the Phi/ippi11e Scrz•ict Com· mond, to take chargr of the lo.~tistical needs of the Armed ForCf'S, was activ~ted and became the fifth major command of the AF'P. The Tf'Organization which followed as a consequence of the rromul.~tation of Executive Order . No. 308, pruned the Special Staff of its Historical Division and its Public and Legislath·e Relatiof111, Division The former was first placrd under the Philippine Setv· ice Command, where it wu certainly out of place, then tranafen-ed as a sedion of G-1. Still later, the Historical Division wal returned to G-2 under which it 28 was originally organized as a bra11ch p1'ior to October 1947. The PLRD, on the other hand, was inactivated and its functions was taken over by the Public Information Office :md the Ch·il Affairs Office, both of thc Department of National Defense. The E ~ R became the Spe<:ial Sen•ices. The latest of the ~pedal staff sections in GHQ is the Troop In~ formation and Education Division which was created in September 1952, with the Historical Branch, , of the O!fice of the A/C of S, G-2. flS nucleus. In March 1953, the Civil Affairs Office ami tHe Public Information Oflice were released· from Department to GHQ control. The Civil Affau·s Office was deactivated. It.s main function as a physchological warfare agency of the Armed Forces was delegated to the Troop Information and Education Divi&ion, which Cor a while was redesignated as Office of Inform•tion, Education and Pay-War. ~~ =~~~~~ u:::r~:ti~ff~!fi~~ the Chief of Staff. In March 1954, the Public Afaiu Office, with identical functions as the former Civil Affairs Office, was reactivated by GHQ, relieving the Office Information, Education and Psy-War of ita psy-war activities. The latter reverted to its original organizational aet-up as Troop Information and Education Division. The present set-up of the Armed l<'orcea stems from Executl vc 29 fi,.rd.,r ofr•gi•lroloon of aU 20r•or old Fifipin., moles lor mililorr lfoi" ing woJOn I April 1936. Wor b•oh ourolt•r le .. thon fi• e rear~ Order No. 38:1 of President Qulrino, issued on 23 December 1!150 Headquat·ters Armed Forces of the Philippines, tx-came knowr. as General Hef1.dqtmrters, Armed Forces of the Philippines, wJlile General Headquarters, Philippine Constabulary became known as HeotlqWLrters, Philippine Constabulary, which was the same nomenclature it had in the prewar years. Also, the major commands were abolished and in their places: were activated four major services, namely: th" Philip· pine Army; the Philippine Constabulary; the Philippine Navy, which is the new designation of the Philippine Naval Patrol; and the Philippine A if' Force. The Philippine Ground Foret and the Philippine Service Command were entirely abolished. The functions of the PGF insofar as supervis1oti over the trainee instruction, the ROTC and the service 11chools is con· cerned, have been taken over by the Philippine Army Training Command. The Battalion Combat Teams-, '-the combatant ann of the Philippine Army, which previously were under the Philippine Ground Force, are now controlled by the Chief of Staff. AFP through the .-\rea Command The functions ol the Philippine Service Command have been absorbed by General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines. Defense Structure Strengthened Tn 11pite of the multifarious difficulties being encountered, considerable headwnys in the AFP rehabilitation has been achieved. True enough there has been a dearth of facilities due to budgetary limitations-, but the more important cogs in the national defense structure have been set in motion. The ROTC and the universe.\ military tra.ining, the two most essential elements in the bulldup of the Citizen Army. have been reestablished. Giga.ntic progress has a.lso been made in the ruonstitution of organized re~-erve units and in the organization of new ones. Mobili:tation plans in case of emerge-ncy have been readied, and was successfully put to test durin~ the recent mobilization or thousands or reservists, for duty during the national elections in 1951, 195::1 and this y~ar . Surely, manpower for the Citizen Ar my will never be a prob'1em since even with the lukewarm attitude of some of the Filipino youth toward military training, there re· main a manpower reservoir con· sisting of the big number of military registrants who since 1!:148, could not be aceommodaU>d in the training camps for lack of accommodations and upkeep mo· ney. And finally it is mentioned that more than ever before there is need for a definite and !ltrong program of nationo.1 defense. Pal"ticularly so becau~e the coun· try is now inevitably linked wilh the world's most ticklish affairs. The Armed Forces has expanded within the country's financial capabilities, but there still remains so much room for improvement. •• Out of the Philippine Army, which was a product of a great successful experiment, was born the present Armed Forees of the Philippines. ThiS' organization is comparatively,young - just 20 years of age- and is still in the process of building, but ha~ carried out its various com· mitments with magnificent results. It had !ought in two major campaigns and has broken the backbone of the communi;t or~t"anization in the country. It has an ambitious prog-ram for national defense and to be able to work this out succeBifully, It needs a sympathetic administration and the people's full support and understanding.