Our army in the nuclear era

Media

Part of Philippine Armed Forces Journal

Title: Our army in the nuclear era
Creator: Antonio, Teoderico P.
Language: English
Source: Philippine Armed Forces Journal Volume IX (No. 5) March 1956
Year: 1956
Rights
Fulltext: OUR ARMY in the NUCLEAR ERA By Captain Teodorico P. Antonio, In[ Modern weapons have dislocated many elements of military art but have not rendered obsolete conventional forces to be needed to fight in a limited or unlimited nuclear war ';;JW ·'· ' ~ ·:~UfJ; HE Armed Forces of the Philippmcs exists because, in the words of Section 2, Article II of our Constitution, ''the defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all creation of an army of the Philippines and set down the m::onner, method, functions in which our armed forces may operate and fulftll the primary mission of defending the state. citizens may be required by law to Two Principles render personal, military or civil ser- Our army also exists and operates vice." In pursuance or this consti- within two broad principles enunciatutional provision, our Jegislabre en- ted o1· specifically provided in our acted Commonwealth Act No. 1, com- Constitulion. These are Section 3, monly known as the National De- Ad;icle ll which states; "The Phirense Act, which provided for the lippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts of what are called "conventional the genez·ally accepted principles of weapons." The atomic bomb, let international law as paz·t of the alone the Hydrogen bomb, and other law of the Natio~; and Section so-called "nuclear" weapons were not 25, Article VI which ptovides: yet in the arsenal of the big pow"The Congress shall, with the con- ers then, Today, in view of the cuZTence of two--thirds of all the existence of such nucleaz· weapons Members of each House, have the sole as well as of jet-propelled aircraft, power to declare war!' Briefly, the war has to be thought of as conelementary meaning of these two sisting of two types: (a) the "liprinciples in actual practice is that mited" war in which only conven our Armed Forces organization ex- tiona! weapons are us.:!d; (b) the ists solely for defense; it may not "unlimited" war, in which all wcacvcn plan for any waz· which is not pons, including the latest nuClear defensive in chal'Mtel·, or which ones, would be used. might be merely brought about by For nations this new concept inthe prosecution of wnm~r national volving two types of war has izilpolicies. posed new practical limitations, aside This \imitation of the kind of war f1·om those established in their conin which our Armed Forces may en- stitutions, or traditions. Nations, gage, or be used for is further tight- for instance, - and ours is one of ened by the constitutional provision, of them - which can never hope just cited, vesting exclusively in the to build an adequate arsenal of nuCongress "the powez· to declare clear weapons are "out of the runwar." Under our system of scpara- ning," so to speak, in any unlimittion of powers - the "presidential ed or nuclear war. Their field of type" as contrast.ed with the "par- possible action is now limited to the liamf'ntary type" - Congress is the limited war, As a consequence of -policy-making body for the nation, this new circumstance in our conWhat is known as "national policy" temporary world, the nature of the is thez·efoz·e necessarily defined by mis-5ion, or missions, of the armed Congress, yet in framing such a po- forces of small "non-nuclear"•. powlicy, though Congress has the sole ers like the Philippines has also unpower to declare war, it may not dergone a fundamental change, use war as one of the instruments Great Power's Needs for the prosecution of such a policy. To understand, however, the limiTwo Types or War lations of a small nation's military Our Constitution was framed and forces and potentials in the Nuclear adopted, and in the :-.rational De· Age, one must have a clear undertense Law which was enacted in standing of the military needs of a pursuance of its provisions, at a ti me great power like, say, the United when war was still thought of, and States. It is important for FilipiJ"egardcd, or prepared for in terms nos to have this understanding nf In modern t1me• our Armed Forceo mu•l hove e/e(lroni~ "'"'• eor1, ond bro1n1 thor con de tect on 099re1<or ond umulloneou<lf 91•e wornin9 lor deplo,menr of force1 to deotro1 enem1 before he reoche• hi• torget. Amertcan military needs and potentials, in this et·a, because they are intimately associated with the U.S. in defense and military matters, through the Philippines - United States Mutual Defense Treaty. What, then, arc the military needs of the U.S. in the Nuclear Age? The well-known American milimum, both for limited and unlumt ed war!>, "is prepare the Army to fight conventional wars, to stand guar·d in the Cold War, and to fight limited nuclear wars." The reason he envisions only "'limited nuclear wars" as the kind of nuclear wars the U.S. Army must prepare to fight is his belief that tary commentator (of the New York "land power, in an unlimited therTimes) Hanson W. Baldwin, in an monuclear war, would face almost article featured in a recent (Janua- insuperable problems: the pt·oblem ry, 1956) issue of the Army Combat of large-scale unit replacements - Forces Journal, has summarized with not merely battalions for battalions, sweeping relevance what a great pow- but regiments and divisions for· li er like America need to do in the quidated 1·egiments and divisions. way of preparedness under the con- The supply problem would be wc\1ditions of the Nucleat· Age. "What nigh intolerable. (He estimated that we must do," he said, in conclud- 'if an army march with all its soling a long exposition about the need diers a hundred yards apart, a On(' to develop land power to the maxi· megaton - million ton homb ho-e •t<ong inle<e•pto< unor. ond coosr ond no.olpo.,ol•o•wel/oscoo•to<lolle<yunol• of uceUent quolihes ond equopment would cause 16,950 casualttes; a forty-megaU:ln bomb wouid kill 01 wound 79,000 men. These figures .. take no account of the now great menace of radioactive fallout which so greatly extends the lethality of the thermonuclear weapon.') Under a rain of nucleaL· weapons no supply system could expect to kC(']l a pipeline full of supplies, least o'.all when rear-area d{'pots and lhc nauonal base bPhnu\ them would b, Wtth a littlP touch of ~arrlm11c ""if, M r. Ralclw.n tlwn aclmoni~hf'<l f",•,.rvonf': "Now ~uch a hmrtl·rl ,-.,], of Janel powo>r tn a\1-out nuclrar wat· nrf'<l not <li~may u~- If such a war <'VPr eomr~. all of u~. I thtnk. will hfl''(' \'('rr ILtnit<'cl rnl!'~ mdr•·d and probably l'l'r1f hnr( on~s" ( 1!1~ militar.\- lraders in the Philippmt·~own 1talic~) ('l)nvt'nt ional ForcPs :\PcPs!<ary Raldwin quoted Forrlg"ll SPcrPtary Harold Macmillan of Britain'!< incisivr logic on the need fm· "con q•ntional forces" e\·en in the Nuclear Age. " In (all-out) nucl<'aJ' wa1·," he (Macmillan) said, "there can be no victor. There can only be mutual and universal destruction. The ~anction (of all-out nuclear ' war) is so terrible, we must realize that men, however resolute, will shrink from ll<'rl' an• Mr. Raldwin's concluding parag-raphs: "In other words, the problem - the gTeat pro~lem - of our military planners is to otganizc and maintain armed forces capable of fighting any kind of war (lnywherc. (His italics) This, I know, tlisagree~ fundamentally with the massivr re taliation doctrine enunciated by Secretary of State Dulles. In fact, thr Srcrctary explicitly stated that the Unitrd States could not afford to using it - e\·en against unprovoked prepare to fift"hl any kind of wa1 aggression - unless they are con anywhere. I disagree with h1m. I vinced that to he conquered is worse say we cannot afford twl to prepar{' than to be annihilated. It follows to fight any kind of wat· anywhen• that ruthless and darinj;!' men, count· By this I do not mran all kinrl!; of ing on this hesitation and explotting for<'es - strategir ail', rlefen!iivr air, ot, mav risk minor anrl ev('n i<Ubstan- tactical au·, conventional land JlflW· tial acts of ag-~ression, becau!<e they et·, submat·ines, caniers, amphibioU!' believe that the sanction will never fo1-ces, airborne forces - should be be employed. In other words, the maintai!l('d at f!'l'('at strength, ready sanction may be madt.- impotrnt by instantly for war. I mean, rather, its ovet·whelming- stt'i.'ngth, Thus, that we must keep alive the art of what a1·e called rnnvrntwnnl fnrre.~ fightinfC any kind of war anywh<•re will ~till be 11ft.'e~suTy (Our italic!<), in the world, that wr must havr at not merely fo1 what might be calh:d least cadre forcrs of many difft>rpolice operations, but to take away ent types keyed to different misthis temptatton, and thus to inlet sions, capable of expansion in case pose against a{!gJ·ession, from what- of war. ever quarter, a delaying pl'riod." "If we do not maintain these diDulles View Dl"bunbd verse capabilities, we shall freeze, in We have quoted at length from a one-service, one-weapon, one-conMr. Baldwin, not only because his cept mould, not only tactics, but article is long and thorough in its strategy. And our foreign policy examtnation of the whole problem of will be rigidly tied to an infll'xible American defense, but also because strategic concept that prrmtt~ u~ no h1s concluding parag1·aphs pos(' a frreJom of action. Yl't the art <>f stat·tling logic and point of view diplomacy, the an of politics, th<· whtch arr not vel considered orth0-- art of stratr.c:y and war i::. th<' art rlox amnng hnth nur politiral and of chokP w., ri><k df"fE·at in lh''"'' or war if we put all our military problem is vastly different f1·om that ~>ggs in the nuclear basket. of America, the primary mission of ·'For all thes~> n~a!:ons 1 believe our Armed Forces i~ necessarily one in land power and its continued va- of limit~>d defense - against any l1dity as an elt>m•mt o~ national row- possible attack from the outside - P.l. Role In Nuclear Age Our armed forcl's, though qUJte modest in proportions, have !wen con('f'lvcd essentially as a land power - the bulk is the infantry, capable of mechanization and supported by and the maintcnanct> of intet·nal security. What is meant by a "limited defense" mission? It means, in lerms of calculable hazards that wl' now face in our region of the globl', the task of foiling a possible invader - who is not a nuclear powarmor, •vith field artillery units, er - in the air, at sea, and at the coast artillery corps, engmeenng beaches. The nature of this "limjt corps, and supported or assisted in ed defense" mission, in tum, imposthe important missions by the other es UJIOn us the kind of militat-y arms set·vices, the air force and the naval or units which require emphasis in units. With the premises and con- our training and preparedness efc\usions laid down by Mr. Hanson forts. It stands to reason that •f Baldwin, in the excerpts from his our major task of defense is in the article just quoted, we may now dis- air, at sea, and on the beaches, we cuss with som!! relevance and logic ha'"e to have stron!Z interceptor the nature of our Armed Forces' units, coast and naval patrol units mission or missions in the Nuclear of adequate strength, and coast arAge. tillery units of excellent qualitie!< Since we lack the capabilities to and equipment. build armed forces for a nuclear In our case, then, - assuming alwar, and the nature of our defens<' wars that the possible invader of II is esl>m<>led 11><>1 i/ <>n ormy marched ... ;11> <>II ils so/die" o hundred yord1 Qporl, o one·megolon - mil!ion·lon - bom~ would couse 16,950 coou<>llies, <> f<>rly-megolon bomb ..-ould kill or wo>Jnd 79.000 men, ucludong the m•noce of rod>OO<I,.e lol!ou> Auuming al..,ays that tha pouible invader al aur >hare• ;, nat <> nudaor oawer ~ th ~ kind ol ""deterrenf" powet we nud to build to the ufmo.t ol our ruources available mu>f con.ist ol •tran9 interceptor unih, cooot potrolo one/ coast ortdlery eotablio~m e Mo our shores is not a nuclear powe1·- litary aspects. The enemy, through the kind of "deterrent" power we its agents or tools, may undermine need to huild to the utmost of our our economic strength, or sabotage resources available for the purpose sound economic projects, or under. must consist of strong interceptor mine political morale by promoting units, coast patrols, and coast artil· dissension or sowing confusion; i( lery establishments which, all toge- the enemy should succeed in doing ther, would make any possible at- all these - or what is worse, if tack against us by a non-nuclear through ineptitude in the art of power so costly that it would not strengthening and consolidating our likely be undertaken except by the democracy we incur such weakness· most reckless and foolhardy. This es ourselves - then our military de· is, however, only one aspect of "li- fensc potential would be very much mited defense." The other aspect is weakened, and we could be easily our Armed Forces' task against in- overwhelmed. Or, what w o u I d filtration o.nd .~ubversion by the ene· amount to the same thing, we might my. be plunged into internal civil strife, Demands of Second Aspect with the enemy within and on the The struggles of nation~ and be- outside rapidly exploiting our intertween ideologies in our time always necine war to his tremendous adinclude economic and political com- vantage and gain. ponents, aside from the purely mi- To cope with the twin dangers of Ovr armed forces, rl>ovgl> qvile modeJI r~ proportions, have bee~ cancei•ed euenlrolly as 0 land power - rhe b~lk is the i~fa~lry, capable of mechonizalian a~d s~pporlfd by armor, will> field artillery unih, caa•t artillery carps and all>er services infiltt·ation and ~uhvNsion our defense forces, then, need to build an adequate and highly efficient countE'r-intelligence ('Orps. Such a corps mu~t be capable of ferreting out and countE'ring E'fforts or activities of the f'nemy not only in the military ~phPrf' but also in the economk, political and cultural fields as wpl] It~ officer:< and ranking men have to hP pquipped •with broad knowledge and firm backgrounds on the dynamir:< of 1lemocratic institutions; ~faU:<E' in this kind of battle of idea~. or competition of economic and politifal system, a superficial or :<ketchy understanding of democratic dynamic~. an inadequate grasp of the institutions of freedom, could merely play into the hands of the Pncmy. It is here, in the field of counterintelligence - and we rna~· add counter-propa~~:anda - where the nation, mar just1fiab\y pour the major portion of its allocations for defense, lwcaUSE' it i~ in this field where, just so the methocl~ adoptPcl arl:' sound and effective, there can be no pos- , sible wastage of milita ry appropriations. Good and efficient counterintelligence and counter-propaganda, aside from keeping the enemy at bay, also perform the role of constantly contributing to the strengthening and development or a people's democratic institutions. Whether the battle is ever joined, in military terms, or never at ail, the nation loses nothing, but on the contrary constantly gains from hig-hc-radl:' ('ount('r-intelligence and coun. t('r-propaganda effort!'. and expenditurE'S. It may also be added, at this juncture of this discussion, that these "limited defense" ta~k~ or ·missions of our Armed Forces are ones of long-range validity. Th('ir nature will not change from year to year, nor perhaps from thi:< decade to the next, re~~:ardless of how the world situation mar turn out in the foreseeable future. Commitm ents So far WP havp spoken of the "limitPcl dPfpnse" mission of oin ArmI. ("d Forces from n strictly "insulat·" mitcd" defenst> missions, from an point of ,·iew; that is, as though we "insular" JIOint of view, - that is. were not closely associated in de- the air interceptor units, the coast fcnsc with the U.S. The nature of artillery, the coast and naval pa the mission of our army, as dis- trois, finally the infantry as a whole cussed so far, is offered as the va- -would be the ones which could lid one whether W(' belong to a military alliance, with specific obligations under Ruch an alliance, or we ~land alone uncommitted to any military grouping of powers. In actual fact, however, and by the logic of our political history, we are inumatcly associated in defense with the United States, and through her, with other flowers, as in the SEATO. By reason of this association, it is entirely conceivable for us to be involved in what Baldwin has called "limited nuclear Wars"; because of such a Jlossibility, our Armed Forces acquire what we may call "special" or "treaty" missions; that is, obligations to perform, a role to play, in ~he event oUI' nation is involved in any kind of war up to "limited nuclear war" by reason of our treaty commitments. In such an eventuality it is easy to see that our own Am1ed Forces' special mission would be confined perhaps tt) the tactical levels. The strategic mi~~ions, in the planning of which we may not participate actually, are out of our hands. They are mainly America's wtth whom, of course, we would closely coordinate in all steps or ('(forts in whkh we han• a role tn pla~ Substantially, in such an involvt'mcnt in any kind of wa1· up to the "limited nuclPar" variety, the same units we have emphasized 111 discussion ('If our Arme.-\ Fo1·ceg' "h· most fruitfully discharRe our sha)'{' in the larger effort of defense. The U.S. strategic air command will discharge its missions, the U.S. na\'y will fight the sea battles if there be an}', and anY heavy bombing to be done will haw~ also to be assigned to the U.S. forces in the area. Conclusion Such, in outline, may be our Armed Forces' tasks in the Nuclear Age. It is obvious that if we are to be adequately and competently Jlrepared to accomplish those tasks, or missions, we shall need to pursue a continuous training program, a much expanded troop information and education campaign and a speedy modernization of equipment an<l weapons suitable to missions that our armed forces arc ca!lcd upon to discharged and accomplish. We need C011Stantly to have our bearings struight, and both our military plan. ners and the Congress, as we!\ a~ t)Ul' foreign polky-makers, must al ways see our Armed Forces' proh ]ems in the right perspective, ami with sufficient sympathy not to begrudge them their minimum requirements in budgetary appropriation!! from year to year. A nation's defense is always costly, the maintenance and preservation of a people's freedom is eYen costlier; but paraphrasing a well-known general's dictum, only those who are fit to re~ main free are willing to defrar the cost <>f freedom