The military implications of SEATO

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Part of Philippine Armed Forces Journal

Title: The military implications of SEATO
Language: English
Source: Philippine Armed Forces Journal Volume IX (No. 6) May 1956
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Fulltext: HE shortest route to Paris of the initial Communist obje<:tivc, i through Southeast and South Asia, leave this hemisphere open to at and tht Middle East." This state tack. ment has been attributed to Lenin. It would appear that the conquest Perhaps in his concept for Commu- of Asia is the immediate goal of nist domination of the world Lenin the Communists, certainly of the considered these areas as presenting Chinese Communists. Mao Tse-tung, a fertile field for the torch or "red in a memorandum outlining a new fire" which he hoped would then program for world revolution, indispread rapidly to the Meditel'ranean eated that " ... the time has e0me eountrie~ c.nd e\·entually engulf the to look upon Asia as our immediatt entire Eurasian Continent and Afl'i- goal." He considered that under the ea. This would isolate the Western present circumstances, any vigot·ous Hemisphere and, after consolidation action in Europe such as inte1·nal PHILIPPINES ARMED FORCES J'OURtf.A.L revolution, effective infiltration, or Asia in accordance with President intimidation into inaction or submis- Eisenhower's peace address of 16 sion would currently be impossible. April 1953. The P1·esident, in this, However, he further considered that address, called for "united action" in such tactics in Asia would, for the this area and a basis for such acforeseeable future, yield an abundant tion had already been established tiy harvest. (See Figure 1.) the negotiation of security treaties In the implementation of Mao Tse- with Australia, New Zealand, and tung's concept, the spearhead of com- the Philippines, each of which callmunism has been provided with ad- ed for "the development of a more ditional impetus in Southeast Asia comprehensive system of regional se(Indochina) by the continuation of eurity in the Pacific." colonial policies and the suppression of the Nationalist desires of the in- Unified Position Needed digenous peoples of this area. With Th.: outcome of the Geneva Conno colonial aspirations but with an ference during the summer of 1954, active interest in obtaining world with reference to Indochina, confirmcommunism, the United States de- ed the need for a unified position cided to take action to meet the on the part of the United States threat of aggression in Southeast and her allies as pertained to South•UiflSIIIIIISIIII~IIDWITIIWIIITUIIII~I/OIIllBf. •fll.ltl.•UI'!Ail"liiiiUIAIDDFWIWil. WITIII"UPUI III. Delegote• to t~e •econd meeting of rl>e Council of Minide" ol SEATO notion• ore Jltown in anion of tl>e Sind Building, in ICoroc~i east Asia. Therefon:, Australia. The Unile!l States wa:; in a speciul France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the po:ition at Manila, becuuse it was Philippines, Thailand, the United the only one of the .~ignatories which Kingdom, and the United States met !lid not have territorial interests in at Manila, in the Republic of the the treaty area. For the others, the Philippines, in September 1954 in or- pact Wa.'l not only rm anti-Commuder to develop such a position. Ne- nist pact but also a regional pact. gotiations were conducted as full and Therefore, it dealt with any and all equal partners and a treaty known rLCis of uggres.~ion which might disas the "Southeast Asia Collective turb thG peacG of the area. Defense Treaty," Manila (SEATO) In elaborating fUJ·the1·, ?!h. Dulles Pact, was signed on 8 September considered that any significant ex1954. The treaty entered into force pansion of the Communist worlC on 19 February 1955, following the would be a danger to the United deposit of the inst1·uments of ratifi- States because international commucation with the Government of the nism thinks in terms of ultimately Republic of the Philippines. using its power position against the The Secretary of State, Mr. John Unit~d States. In a broad interpre-Fostt;r Dulles, has stated that: tion of the words of President Monroe in proclaiming his doet1·ine, Mr. cords of July 1!.151 raised a <tuesDulles fu1 the1· considered that Com· tion in the minds of some of the munist armed aggression in South- parties to the accords as to '.vhcth east Asia would endanger ou1· peace er these former members of the As· and security and call for counter sociated States in Indochina .::ould ~ • action on OUJ" part. actually join such n pact. This was The treaty area is defined as the primarily due to the fact that the territory of thP member states in at·mistice terms for the cessation of Southeast Asia and .he southwestern hostilitu:s in Indochina arc l'Xlreme· Pacific. (See FiJ;:"Ul"e 2.) However, a ly complicated and somewhat ambiprotocol to the treaty provides for guous with respect to thesc'·matters; th<> l'Xtcnsion of tt·caty b<>nefits to however, Cambodia, Laos, al!d Viet.. Laos, Cambodia, and that portion of nam welcome the mantle of pt·o. Vietnam which is not Communist tection that the treaty tn·ovided to controlled. These nations are not them. membl:'rS of SEATO because the at·- SEATO has thre•· main purposes: mistice provisions of the Geneva Ac- first, defense against open armed ,t){l!l'l'SStOn; St'l:Oild, dt'ft•IJ."t' ;.t~!;UIUSt II/ //1>• jJI!ftii'N llf Ul/1/ltiN/ flfl/1 •lfl/t •ubvt-rsum; .. ud thinl, th•· mqtn>vc· "r lerr•fury which II" !"''';,,. ''!I lllt'Ut nf t•rononuc anJ social <:<1ndi- unrHtimuus <!!f>'P~mn!f 110[11/ /, ,. . .,tt,' l u l.'<lllsid .... rino:: th .. military 1nq111 /#'/"''' """ ~il/d!J, """ u<lrl'''' tlwt it cations of th•· pad, Arttclt· JV ''""· •dll !1• ll•ut ~t'l'ltl ,,., ''' .,,,., //,. tatns s<mw uf th•· most important ''"""'""' r/rutfJI'r "' rut·.,nl<wn '' ill• provision~ of th .. tr<:at~· [t ·wts ilv <'illtslituliurml JIH•ces.~"" fntth any mt·asun·s by whtch th• Th1s parag-raph i~ bast::d upon th(· pat·ti .. s a~tt·t• tu takt· action a~o:utnst )Jonn.><· lluctnnt· princtple and fol· amwd a~:.:r•·ssion aud Jgatn:<t ht· lnws the pattern of oth~:r Unilt·d dangN .,f sub,·ersion and it>dt .·t·ct Statl•s -1ccurity trcati;$ in th•· l'act«Jo('Ktt·.;sum fie. Furlhf't, lht· ll!!'Tltlll<:nl <>f t·ach Under 11ar«gmph I •Jf Arlich• IV, M tht· parlic.; lo act t<> tltt•ct tl'u t•ach of th .. partit·s l' .. CtJO::Ilttt·~ thttt; common dttngf't' "in accordancc with .'l!I!Jrl'/<.~ivll ''II mtiii<N 11j <lfll!l"d it,; constitutional Jll'Ocess~:;;" lo:avc.~ to utlrH-k in the lrt:uly M'"'' 'l!fllitU<I ,,.,11 the jud~mcnt of t'UCh country the type of action to he taken in the tains no obligation bPyond ~onsulevent an armed attack occurs. tation, but it is considered that tht The danger from subve1·sion and primary purpost• of consultation is indi1·ect aggression is dealt with in to agree on measures to be takeJ\ paragraph 2 of Article IV which for the common defense. meets this difficult pJ·oblem more In o1·der to implement properly tkc explicitly than any othe1· security various pt·ovisions of thc treaty, Artreaty to which the United States tide V establishes a council in which has ever been a signato1·y-it Jll'o>- each pa1·ty is to be J"cpresented. The vides fur immcdiatc consultation by council provides for consultation with th~· parties whcncver any pa1·ty be- regard to military and other plan· lieves that tht· mtcl:"nly ,,f th., tJca- ning as th<· chang1ng situation in ty artta is lhn·alcru·rl by "th..r than lhl· treaty artta may require. armed allack. This ,arag-raph t·or.- The f1rst mcdmg of the St-:ATO fh~ mililar7 od•isar~ al !he SEATO "allan< met in Melba"'""• A<IJital•o lao! Januar7, !956, ..-here t~ey appta•ed lhe •odauJ oludieo mode by their Jlaff p/an"e" Counci .. opened in Rangkok, Thai- chiefs of staff on the staff planne1·~· land, on 23 Peb1·uary 1!.155. IJuJ·ing recommendations W<'l't: then considerthis meeting each of the council mcm cd jointly at a mc~:ting of th,. mili ber:~ agTeed, with che approval of tary advisors held Bangkok, ~heir res1wctivc govemmcnts, inter Thailand, dul"ing the period ~;-8 July r~Jiu, to designate a military advisor. 1955. It is coJlsidered that this proThe mission of these militaJ'Y advi- ccdm·e will bt used fo1· future meetsors is to make recommendations to ings of the staff plannc1·s and mili the council on military cooperation ta1·y advisors (the most r(.-eent bcundet· the treaty. They m'-~L pe- ing at Peal'l Harbor during- the periodically as required, formulate their riod 1-15 No\'ember 1955) thus en own L'Uies of procedure, and make ilUL'ing an orderly progression of coany necessa1·y o1·ganizational an·an~e- ordinal!!d military planning (joint plans will not be developed) in which The initial meeting of the military the problems and requi1·emcnts of advisors was held in Bang-kok, Thai each member nation, as well as the land, on 24-25 February 1955 with entire area, will receive full and Admiral Felix B. Stump, Jr., the careful consideration. United States Commander in Chief, The controlling Communist fo1·ce Pacific, representing the United in Asia is the Chinese Communist States. The magnitude of the plan- Party with the Communist military ning tasks beca~e obvious imm(.~ stt·ength in the area being p1·ovided diately at this initial meeting and primal"ily by the Chinese Communists. action was initialed to isolate the As a military power they provide major problems pertaining to pact the one probable fo1·ce of aggression planning for the area. When ~his which must be considered a cunent was accomplished, planning tasks threat to the countries of South and were then referred for development Southeast Asia who are now strugto a staff planning group of the ling to maintain their independence. military advisors. For military purposes the Chinese After detailed consideration of Communist front should be reg-arded ) the problems involved, the staff plan- as an entirety because if the Chi ners met at Baguio, Republic of the nese Communists engage in open Philippines, in April and May If}55 11rmed aggression, it would mean and developed recommendations on that they have decided on general cct·tain plans and courses of action war in Asia. In this event they fo1· the consideration of the military would ha\'e to take into account, in advisors. addition to SEATO and its fo1·ces, The milita1·y advisors ~onsidered the mutual defense treaties of the and forwarded the recomtnendations United States with the Republic of of the starr plannen, together with Ko1·ea and the Republic of China, the advisors' comments, to thei1· re- and the fo1ces maintained undet· these spective chiefs of staff for apJirOv- t1·eaties. Thus general war would al. :rhe resulting comments of (he confront the Chinese Communists WHAT IT IS -PHILIPPINES ARMED FORCES JOUJI.N,AL with operations which would not be able to make their contribution tomutually supporting and would make wa1·d strengthening the defense of cliffJcult the rapid cor.centration of the area by specific force commit· force on their part due to theil· in- ments. adequate means of transportation. Conclusion No material change in the milita- SEATO nations ]Jossess together ry planning of the United Statl!s is adequate military power for employ· ""(:ontemplated by the United States ment in the pact area. The United participation in SEATO. It is con· States in pa1·ticular has ground, sea, sidercd that reliance shall be placed and air forces now equipped with for military defense of the pact area new and powerful weapons of preupon mobile allied power which can cision which, if employed in suppo1·t strike an aggressor wherever the oc- of pact operations in the ev('nt of casion may demand. That capacity ovett Communist aggression, would should be sufficient to deter aggt·es- ensut·e the complete dest1·uction of sion and obviate the necessity for a military targets without endangerbuildup of large static forces at all ing unrelated civilian centet·s. Therepoints. Nevertheless, it was consi- fore, the SEATO Council, after de1·ed at the November staff plan- analyzing the milita1·y factors per· ncr's meeting at Pearl Harbo1· that taining to the pact area, concluded each member nation must be continu at their February meeting that the ~" • ously alert not only to its own na- available military powers offe1·ed tiona! security and objectives, but to hope of detel'l'ing open armed aggresthe requi!·('ments necessary to main- sion against the pact area. tain the security of the treaty area. It is desired to emphasize '.hat It was further considered that these SEATO: is not a panacea for all 1·equirements could be developed on· the ills of the area; complements ly by realistic, aggrPSsive SEATO oth<Jr United States treaties in, conplannin!'!'. tiguous areas; is consistent with the At present, United States plans provisions of the United Nations ca!l for maintaining at all times Charter; varies from NATO in that powerful naval and air fo1·ces in the the United States is not committed ' J western Pacific capable of striking to stationing forces in the area; and at any aggressor by means and at proVides for coordinated rather than places of our choosing. The respon- joint planning in conjunction with sibi\ities of the United States are so other pact countries. \·a.~t and farflung that it is consideJ·ed it would se1·ve all interests [Reprinted from the MiliTARY REVJ~Wl best not by ea1·ma•·king forces for A&OUT THE AUTHOR particular a1·eas of tht> Far East, but lieutenant Colonel Hullh F. Qu .. nin ;, pre· b~ developtng the deterrent of mo- •entlr with the Office ol the Aui<tont Set· b1le striking power plus strategical· relorr of Delen•• Afloir<, Oflin ol the I{_ ly placed reserves. However, other Aui<lonl Secrelar1 al Defense lar lnlerna· treaty mPmber~ rna)' dC('m it desir tiona/ Securitr Aflol,.,