The Philippine navy and anti-submarine warfare

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Part of Philippine Armed Forces Journal

Title
The Philippine navy and anti-submarine warfare
Language
English
Source
Philippine Armed Forces Journal Volume IX (No. 6) May 1956
Rights
In Copyright - Educational Use Permitted
Fulltext
t PHILIPPINE NAVf and RE N 1!: uf th .. ft<dds of activity eVt>n in ferrying !<pies and ,;a:boteurs, that nur navy still ha,; to exploit is Wt' havt: to dt:Vtdop an effccttvt• antt anti-submal inc warfare. Tlus actJVJ submarine force tmd a suppiPmentty, IIUIJJIIt:mt:nted by ade<1uatc ary nt'twork of watt'!" mines. Tht> 1mmining wonfa1·e, is of great impor- portance of thest: activ1tics beconwl'l tanct· in our job of mau1tainin~ even greater whom wo• considl.'r !IUJ command of the immcdiut.• wato•t·s country's 1\Uillt'l'OUs tslaudsunct ts)o•t.-: around us. To saft>guard our ship- beside any of which an t,mf1wndl>· pil1g and ultimatdy OUI nation :.ubn•arine may clandesttncly ;;urfaC'•· against uctivities of hostilt undt•J and pcrpt:lrate its acts, like conveywahl!· craft, whith are cmJ>loyc(i ing arms and :!Uflplics to thc Rcd PIIILIPPINii:S ARMED FORCES JOURNAL rhrealpooedbrhawleoub ... atineolaautnalianaloecutilrdemondoadequaleanli-oubmarine "'eaouteo an our patl Anli-oub,.,arine meaoureo booed an local familiatitf will> aur tc.pograpl>r will be effedive, eopecioHr if supplemented br o nelwor~ of wafer mine• mcited disstdP'ItS and Jmtttng enemy of th"s"' oc"'an-going may be a ~~­ agcuts ashore, 111 thl' same manner petition of a cheap way of challengthat Aml'rican submannl.'s ferncd ing freedom of tht> sea as G(·rmany u·ms and suppltcs to Fil.Amt'>lcan tried m World Wan· I and II Bn guenillas in the nciuity uf thl' Ta tain was lost if the Naz1 wolf-paf'k yabas coast dunng th .. Ja1•ane~c wet'(' tell alone to nibble the vreoccupation. cious tonnage of ships forJVing her Accenl un ASW lifo· lines. In an addres~. tu thto Facts abound that unde1·scon· th(' House of Commons on November 5, ne('d for puttinf:: more attention un 1940. Winston Churchill said that ASW (anti-submar·ine warfare). The mon: serious than the air raidl' has build-up of submannes by the com- been the recrudescenct> of the Umunists camp from 400 to fiOO op· Boat sinking in the Atlantic ap~rational units with a larg{' number proaches of our islands. "Dahgers I •' t ih the air are sudden and might greatly our advantage over hostile have become catastrophic, but the submarines in their encroachment on dangers to seaborne traffic mature our coastwise and internal sea lanes, much more slowly, then are more but natural barriers are not suffi. the Jess formidable, however, and if cient. Anti- submarine measures any way neglected they would touch based on local familiarity with our the life of the state." topography will be effective. Externally, the U.S. Navy can in- Kamlon demonstrated to some exsure immediate defense of moving tent how familiarity with the coasts areas such as convoys into the Phil- and terrain can help one against an ippines but our coastwise defense enemy. He knew when to hit badly presents a different problem. Local and to run on his tiny battleground know-how and ability must be with cunning, he being familiar with brought into play. How would the the exits unknown to the BCTs. A U.S. Marines or the U.S. Army come f!otiUa of shallow craft anti-submaout in our topography and terrain rine ships equipped with local knowlagainst our dissidents with their hit- edge of its battleground and strateand-run tactics? A submarine is as gica!!y-deployed wiU always be quite troublesome. The intricacies of our a discouragement to any submarine. reefs and shoals will, of course, be We alone can best defend our sea We clone can bell defend our 1eo lonu and in1ure freedom of lite uo. local know ltaw and abilil1 mud be braughl inla pla1 Ia ward off 1ubmorint aggreuou !hal w.-rr endongtr our life line• of marilime !rode. Our nalionol defen•e lieo in counlering !Item suming tht- lt•adershiJI arHl pursuit launching capal.:it~· of tht· -<uhm;" ;,,. of the internal dcfomse of the ~en the further we kt-t'l' a hustilt• suitlanes if our· economy and countr'y m;1rine away from our shon'"· tht> must surl'ive. Although the U. S. safer we wilt be. Navy and the U.S. Air Force are trring to keC]I air superiority which Our Navy in This Field is vital in a well-rounded defense, The Philippine Na1·y wa~ introthe PhiliJipines should not relr on duced to the art of anti-submarint• them alone. We must pitch in our wurfar·e when, uft('r thc libt•ration, best. she acquired !:uhmarinf' chast•rs. Submarine aggressors will endan· These submarine chus('rs m•• the ger our life lines of maritime trade wooden-type, the l'at1·ol Craft v.;ith mines and torpedoes. Our na- Sm~dl, the steel-hull Patrol Craft, tactics in submarine warfare, we are still operating with weapons and tactics used in the P<'riod of World War II. Anti-Submarine Warfare Idea The idea behind anti-submarine warfare is to strategically outfox those "pirates" or "ambu~hers" at sea by stationing anti-submarine ships as "good shepherds" to ships that are gathered togl.'ther into a convoy. These anti-submarine ships lay a pattern of early detection of the submarine in the Jlath of the convoy to allow the convoy to sidestep the blows. Once the submarine, which chooses its battlefield, is discovered, she runs for cover into the depth and the anti-submal'ine ships search and attack to kill. Hence, the convoy is safeguarded. But the anti-submarine ships should not consider the safety of the con\'OY as permanent, nor should it underestimate a submarine though alone. In answer to the question of anti~ubmarine ship versus submarines, Admiral Arleigh Burke, U.S. chief of naval operations, said that "not long ago we felt the anti-submarine ship was ahead of the game. Now the Patrol Craft Escort, and the nuclear propulsion seems to be putAuxiliary Minesweepers. ting submarines ahead again." In the navies of the big powers, There is a need for strategic pathe art of anti-submarine warfare is trol systems of detecting submarines givl.'n intensive impetus and exten- and for an effective hunter-killer sive effecti\·eness by destroyers team of destroyers, dl.'!itroyer escort, which make the unfriendly subma- or patrol craft. rine the hunted instead of the hun- Mining Warfare ter. For maximum anti-submarine warfare effectiveness, auti-subma;1 Local anti-submal'iM warfare rine ships, though the most effl'l'nel'dS a boost. With thl' advant:'e- tive submarine killer, are not enough. ment' of technological weapons and They must be supplemented not on .. - ly by anti-submarine aircraft patrol but also by mining warfare. !\lining warfare invoh·cs the strategical mining of our waters. We must have mine layers and a large quantity of mines. This system fouls up submarine routes and protects our sea PHILIPPINES ARMED FORCES JOURN<t\L the peacetime duties of patr~lling our coastline against infiltrators, pirates, outlaws, and other violators of our laws in addition to training of the regulars and !'eserves. Winning warfare must be supplemented to the anti-submarine endea~~:~snei: ;~!~~in~he th::m~0rin:Ur~\~i~~ ;::~i tr:~ne i:~:~c~~fm:u:n:0i,:p~~~ have little room to operate. ment our na\'a] defense through The aggressor submarine should be expected to lay mines in our sea lanes. There is therefore a need for a ready fleet of minesweepers to sweep daily the water highway!;. mining and mine sweeping our waters and shore lines in wartime. We should be realistic about the purposes and needs of maintaining the fleet in operating condition. TechComposed of numerous islands and islets beside any o/ which a hostile submarine may clandestinelu surface and do sabotage work, Philippines needs to exploit anti-submarine war/are to protect her life lines of maritime trade and insure her national securitv Conclusion nical weapons have a special budIn evaluating our na\'a] defense, getary and personnel requirement we look to the U.S. Navy for external for maintenance and advancement. protection and guidance. Neverthe- A flotilla of Destroyers, Destroyer less, we can best defend our own Escorts, Patrol Frigates, Minesweepwaters with local knowhow. Combat ers, and a submarine for training activities cannot be learned in war- exercises, must be maintained to time. Months of training and ref- build up the muscles of ow: naval reshers at intervals will guaranty arm. When "doubting Tomases_" the ability of anr navy in war. Like question our sincerity to stand on the fighter before he goes up on our way of life or our loyalty to the the arena, the navy must train hard cause of democracy is cha!lenged, let and enthusiastically if she is to win. us be ready to say as the Honorable What we need now is enough anti- Churchill once said, "The Navy is s~:~bmarine ships, while carrying on Here."