Construction power is combat power

Media

Part of Philippine Armed Forces Journal

Title: Construction power is combat power
Language: English
Source: Philippine Armed Forces Journal Volume IX (No. 6) June 1956
Year: 1956
Rights
Fulltext: ConJirudion pow•r m•oM rno~ing Jorgf quontiliu ol rnud, roc~ or 1now Abon, on eorl~·mo~ing moc~in• corri•• /ill dirt to o bridge opprooc~ in Kor•o Construction Power is Combat Power By Lieuten«nt Genera.l S. D. Sturgis, Jr. !R~p,ronud from !h ARMY \hruintl l EW o! our journalistic than the grim possibility of a miliprophets o! doom and dis- tary stalemate in any future war if aster are warning us that our military construction power !ails f Detroit continues to pro- to keep in balance with other eleduce aut<imobiles !aster than the menta of combat power. construction industry can pour con- To understand this there must be crete paving, the day will come when an appreciation of the role o! the all a,utomotive traffic in the nation engineer in modern warfare. In part, will grind to a halt, paralyzed from World War I bogged down in the coast to coast by highways bumper- trenches o! France because construeto-bumper with cars. tion equipment that could lift World This omen is no more fantastic War I armies out of the mud had I'IHLIPPINES ARMED fORCES JOURNAL not been developed in 1917-18. French could be built at the scene of preroads were torturous channels of mud vious assaults. The security of our through which military columns tenuous beachhead at Leyte hung in crawled or stalled while engineer the balance for many weeks because troops labored with hand tools to we lacked the construction resources spread rock in almost futile attempts -troops and rock aggregates-necesto keep essential traffic moving. sary to build quickly the all-weather When World War II began, the roads and airfields needed to supAmerican construction industry had port a breakout from the perimeter. come of age and Army engineers Similarly, in Asia, the appliution of were able to build the roads and military pressure on the Japanese bridges, airfields and ports that our from the mainland, which would have One of the largely unheralded instruments of victory in World War II was American construction power as typified by the bulldozer, the transit-mix concrete truck and other tools of our heavy construction industry in the hands of the Army's Corps of Engineers. These mobile machines built roads and bridges, airfields and ports, pipelines and supply bases all over the world. Example: Between D-day and VE-day Army engineers built 250 airfields in France at the rate of one every 36 hours World War II forces demanded. We been of immeasurable benefit to our had construction power adequate to combat operations in the Pacifil:", was the requirements of the maximum severely restricted by the shortage combat power of our armed forces. of military supplies, particularly gasTrue, our construction resources were oline, which prevailed until the Ledo never more than barely adequate, Road and its parallel pipeline were and occasionally were less than that. completed relatively late in the war. Throughout the Pacific area aft<"r Thus the construction power Or our mid-1943, the timing of our amphi- Army engineers was, more often bious assaults was determined very than not, •he limiting factor affectlargely by the rate at which bases ing combat operations on the ground and in the air. Consequently, it was complish that mission. To appreciatt> necessary for our field commanders the importance of this concept it must in World War II and later in Korea, be understood that the engineer in where engineer resources always were effect must fight a battle within the in short supply, to make the most larger battle being fought by the efficient possible use of their scarce command as a whole. While infanconstruction means. This conserva- try, armor and artillery concentrate tion was effected in several ways. their attentions wholly on the enemy, First, at all command levels en- the engineer member of the team gineer requirements and capabilities must concentrate partly on the enemy were carefully integrated into opera- but primarily on the natural obstationa! ll.nd logistical plans. The most cles of terrain and weather which important single factor in making must be overcome. This battle of this possible was the universally ac- the engineer against Nature, while cepted policy that gave the engineer an integral part of the total battle, of each Army command direct access frequently bears very little apparent to the commander and the principal relationship to it, either space-wise members of the staff. or time-wise. For example, the conSecond, the age-old principles of centration of engineer effort on the mass and economy of force were ap- preparation of stream-crossing sites plied to the employment of engineers for an uncommitted corps while aljust as to other members of the most all other resources of the field Army combat team. Within the army are supporting an already comfield army, for example, the army mitted corps, is a good illustration of engineer commanded or otherwise the apparent divergence of effort exercised direct control over all en- which can exist at a given time. gineer units not assigned to subor- These characteristics of the engineer dinate cOmmands. By limiting the mission require centralized control number of units assigned to subor- over engineer operations at each dinate commands to the minimum command echelon to achieve flexibilnecessary for performance of nor- ity and preservation of unity in the mal missions, the army commander, engineer organization and to give it through his engineer, was able to the capability of performing indemaintain direct control over a sub- pendent operations. If during the stantial portion of the construction Second World War or the Korean power available to the army, a11d conflict, vital construction power had could shift that construction power been fragmented by dividing responalmost as quickly as he could shift sibility for the several elements of the fire power of his artillery res- the engineer mission, it is questionponse to the shifting tides of battle. able whether the limited construction Thirp., at each command echelon resources available to our army comresponsibility for the total engineer manders would have proved adequate mission was vested in a single indi- to the task of sustaining the mobility vidual who also was given control of our armed forces in battle. over the resources available to Looking to the ... future, new problems loom on the horizon. Just a! the imaginative reader can visualize the possibility of all traffic coming to a halt if a solution ro our high· way problem is not found, so the military engineer can visualize the possibility of military stalemate if the construction power of our armed forces is not kept in balance with the other elements of our combat power. Paradox: Larger requirements but lowered effectiveness At the present time, two complementary trends give cause for se- . . .IIIIL'-...rious concern. On the one h~nd, trends in the development of weapons and other items of military equipment are increasing requirements for construction in support of combat operations. On the other hand, certain trends in the formulation of organizational doctrine will, if continued, decrease the effectiveness of engineer operations in the field. Thi& seeming paradox deserves most careful consideration. The fact that mass destruction weapons are available to our potential enemies means that we must be able to avoid large concentrations of ments and increased dependence by men and matt\riel that would offer the Army upon air movement of lucrative targets. For the Army, troops and supplies. As vehicle denthis requires that we be able to ope- sity increases within the field army rate with relatively small dispersed so also will requirements for the units having a high degree of mobil- roads and bridges necessary to mainity so as to be able to concentrate tain tactical mobility. At the same for decisive action and then disperse time, expanded use of aircraft for again for safety. The heightened moving and supporting combat elemobility of the Army required by ments will generate requirements for these concepts, in turn, requires the the development of landing areas in use of substantially greater numbers ever increasing numbers and at ever ~ of ground vehides by combat ele- increasing speed. Inevitably these JUNE 1951 more and better air and land routes of communications for logistical as ~~' ;:e~e ~~m~~~~:a~e:o~:i~~s vul:e~a~~~~ Army engineers pedormed · I· ity of our military installations to , ro~:· ,;;d;;d;":::llt;:,;:::oz ::~io;:a:::sa~~~~:s ~~ga~ ~:ldm:7~~ tain an increased capability for restoring or replacing critical ports, depots, and other key facilities which might be knocked out by enemy ac· tion. Moreover, we must be prepared to construct in combat areas substantial numbers of protective works to insure against the loss of vital ~om mand posts and communications facilities without which the Army could not operate effectively. These requirements call for more construction power-not Jess! There is another aspect or nuclear war that will have a profound effect upon the engineer mission. Just as our forces must develop superior ~~-~~ :~~!ii~fti~~ t~e ~~:: ~u:~e~~ af~:~~ of the enemy if they are to avoid i. being destroyed by our atomic weapons. From our standpoint, therefore, it is just as important for us to hinder enemy mobility and force him into untimely concentrations as it is trends point toward augmented en· to maintain mobility and achieve gineer support for field armies. timely dispersion of our own forces. In addition to achieving greater One of the principal ways to disrupt tactical mobility, our future field enemy operations is to use engineer commanders must keep their logis- troops in their classic secondary role tical facilities dispersed so as to of hindering the advance of the minimize the likelihood of sustain· enemy. By judicious use of mincing supply losses which could cripple fields, demolitions and other obstacombat operations. This require· cles, enemy movements can be rement, coupled with the necessity for tarded and channelized to present expandtng our supply activities to lucrative targets for our nuclear sustain the mobility of combat ele- weapons. In the past this type of ments, means that we must have action by our engineers has been PHILIPPINES ARMI::D FORCES JOURNAL important; in the future it may well vehicles having increased cross-counbe critical to our success in battle. trr mobility and, almost certainly, In any event, it is certain to require will eventually achieve some measure the employment of more of our avail- of success along these lines. Howable engineer means than ever be- ever, recent field exercises have defare. monstrated rather clearly that the In addition to the impact of nu- new vehicles available to us at preclear weapons, other developments sent have less, rather than more, are placing increased demands upon .cross-country mobility than their our military construction capabilities. World War II counterparts. r.IoreDuring World War II, our Army en- over, the improved capabilities of our gineers were able to provide operat- potential enemies in the techniques ing airfields for fighter aircraft in of mine warfare, coupled with the from one to 30 days. Even with the knowledge that cross-country operaadvent of the B-29, four battalions tions often detract from our ability of engineers on Saipan were able to to conceal our actions from enemy meet minimum operating require- aerial photography, raise many valid ments in 114 days. Now, however, questions as to whether improved there is hardly an aircraft in the cross-country maneuverability is, in Air Force arsenal that does not re- fact, an answer to our mobility proquire an airfield built to at least blem. 8-29 standards, and many require Similarly, it is often argued that much more; the day when a tactical increased air-transportability and the airfield could be built in 26 hours resultant placing of maximum rehas long since faded into history. liance upon aircraft for tactical Even Army helicopters are generat- movement of Army combat units and ing construction problems. In the supplies will go far toward reducing early days of helicopters, prepared requirements for construction" on the surfaces were never thought neces- ground. While this argument might sary for landing or take-off. How- have some validity if we ·had transever, new and heavier models have port aircraft capable of operating redeveloped serious maintenance pro- gularly from unprepared landing • '"l blems when consistently operated areas, it is reduced to absurdity when, from other than prepared pads of as a matter of cold practical fact, heavy duty pavement. These are by today's transport aircraft are even no means the only developments in more demanding than those of World military hardware that threaten to War II in their requirement;. for the overtax available construction re- runways and other operational facili· sources, but they do indicate the trend ties needed to assure all·weather opetoward increased construction re· ration. Despite experiments with quirements. vertical take-off and other aircraft Efforts are, of course, being made of unusual design there are no deto offset these increased construe- velopments presently in sight that tion loads. For example, the Army point toward anything but increasing is continuing research for combat construction requirements to support air operations. If we are to be real- ing positive actions taken to increase istic, therefore, we must face up to the effectiveness of construction powthe fact that for the foreseeable fu- er in war, are encouraging. Howture we will be confronted v>'ith the ever, concurrent with these actions, necessity for more, rather than less, there are developing within the Army construction support of combat ope- certain doctrinal trends which could, rations in the field. if carried into combat, undo much of In the face of a national shortage the good accomplished by these posiof engineers and a trend toward in- tive improvements. creased construction support require- In the successful exploitation of ments for our armed forces, it would construction power in World War II, be logical to expect that there would there were three principal prerequibe a concerted effort to de\·elop sites to effective employment of the means for improving the capabilities engineer component of the Army comof engineer elements. Such efforts bat team: first, full participation are in fact being made and in cer- by the engineer in all operational tain areas give promise of fruitful and logistical planning; second, cenresults. For example, in December tralized control and direction over as1955 the Secretary of Defense or- signed engineer forces; third, maindered abolishment of the SCARWAF tenance of the integrity of the encategory of engineer troops and re- gineer mission. These concepts, turned the aviation engineers and which proved so necessary in conservtheir mission to the Army. This ac· ing scarce engineer resources during tion by the Secretary of Defense was World War II and the Korean contaken not only to eliminate costly flict, will be even more important duplications in time of peace but, in the future. Despite this, it is more, importantly, to minimize com- alarming to find that there is curpetition for critical construction re- rently a tendency within the Army sources • in time of emergency and to ignore these tried and true conprovide greatly increased flexibility cepts in developing doctrine for the in the use of available constr¥ction future. power in wartime theaters of opera- Trend: Subordination of engineers tions. in planning and operations Progress is also being made in Today's sporadic trend toward exother areas. For example, our en- elusion of the engineer from operagineer troops are being equipped tiona\ planning has produced a numwith bigger and better items o{, earth- her of episodes in field exercises moving equipment. New bridging which could have been disastrous in equipment is providing faster and actual combat operations. One remore effective means for crossing cent maneuver incident, although streams and other obstaCles. Flexible never officially confirmed, is indicapipelines are making it possible to tive of the inevitable end result of delive~ petroleum· to forward combat such a policy. In this case, the comelements more rapidly than ever be- mander of an Army unit made up of fore. All of these steps, represent- the combined arms happened to encounter his staff engineer in the Ions ;,.,ith few if any engineer means headquarters area a few days before under their direct control. The osa planned attack. When he casually tensible purpose of this doctrine is to mentioned his plan to attarlt down make each small combat element capa certain road net he was Stlrprised able of independent action by giving to have his engineer reply that the to it a little of each of the combat bridges on that route would not sup- resources available to the Army as port the combat vehicles to be used. a whole. Laudable as the objective Upon further questioning, the com- of this doctrine may be, the effect mander learned that the engineer, is much the same as if the convenwho was assigned to G4 and thus did tiona! artillery of a division were not have access to the commander or parcelled out on the basis of one G3, had furnished data on bridge gun section per infantry con:pany. capacities to the G4 some days be- Just as such a dissipation of convenfore but that these data, through in- tiona\ artillery pieces would nullify advertence or improper interpretation, the potential firepower of the army, had not been considered in planning so also would a parallel dissipation the operation. Moreover, the en- of engineer resources nullify its pogineer had not been brought in on tential construction power. Since the planning and thus had been un- victory in war is achieved by a comable to undertake, in advance, the bination of firepower and mobility preparatory measures necessary to and since the latter depends largely permit the Army unit to move over upon the effective exploitation of the proposed route - or any other available construction power, dissiparoute. While this projected example tion of either firepower or construemay seem extreme, it is not by any tion power would appear to be milimeans an exaggeration of what can tary suicide. For nuclear war a pohappen when a commander subordi- \icy of dividing and spreading artilnates his engineer wholly to a gen- lery pieces can, perhaps, be justified era] staff section having responsibil- on the basis that with atomic shells ity for only one phase of the opera- we have the ability to achieve mass tion. If this pattern of organization firepower with a single weapon and is adopted on a wide scale for the thus are not, in fact, dissipating our future (and there are many who artillery resources. However, no such think it should be) it could cost us argument can be seriously advanced many battles if not an entire war. with respect to engineer resource!' Trend: Dissipation of until the improbable day dawns' when engineer resources we can exchange our conventional Another disturbing trend which is bulldozers for nuclear powered traccurrently manifesting itself in tenta- tors having capacities in the megative Army doctrine points toward ton range. Yet, while our profesdissipation of engineer resources by sional military men would never ada policy which parcels out engineer vocate a policy of shrinking otir enunits to subordinate commands and pability to lay down mass artillery leaves commanders at higher ech+>- fires against the forces of the enemy, JUNE !!55 there ate some who seemingly would action, with respect to both time and cancel out our ability to mass our place, engineer operations must he foreseeable construction resources conducted on an independent, or quaagainst the obstadcs of nature which si-independent basis. This charactermust be overcome before the enemy istic of the engineer mission, in turn, can be engaged. This, too, could cost requires that engineer forces be capus battles and even a war. able of sustained action with a minimum of dependence upon other comTrend: Fragmentation of bat and support elements of the engineer mission Army. The third trend which is evident In the past, this capability for inin the current evolution of Army doc- dependent action has been achieved trine i& at least as serious as the by retaining under engineer control other two. This is fragmentation of substantially all the resources necesthe engineer mission. The engineer sary to accomplish the engineer mismission involves a battle against sion- construction personnel, equipnature within the framework of the ment, and supplies. Now, however, over-all battle against the enemy. there is a tendency on the part of Because the engineers' battle fre. Army planners to develop organizaquently is out of phase with the main tiona! doctrine on the basis of funcPIIILIPPINt:S ARMED t'OHCES JOURNAL tions rather than missions. In the t),c responsibilities of the army encase of engineer organior.ation, this gineer can be likened to those of a functional concept separates engineer division commander. Hf: must be supply and maintenance and, some- able to close with and defeat the times, other engineer activities such forces of nature just as the division as mapping, from engineer construe- must close with and defeat the fortion functions and places each under ces of the· enemy. Consequently the separate command. The effect of army engineer must have control such a separation is to charge the en- over those supply and maintenance gineer construction commander with activities which are most intimately responsibility for the execution of related to his mission to much the missions without giving him author- same degree as the divisio'\ comity over functions which are essen- mander has control over the supply tial to the execution of those mis- and maintenance activities which are sions. vital to successful accomplishment of In support of this fragmentation tihe division's mission. Both can policy it is frequently argued that rely upon support elements of higher the infantry commander must de- echelons. Neither can afford to rely pend upon ordnance, quartermaster, upon parallel echelons for furnishand other services for the supply and ing support which is integral to acmaintenance support he needs, there- complishment of the assigned misfore why cannot the construction sion. commander depend upon other serv- No responsible commander has yet ice elements for the supplies and been convinced that a division should equipment needed to accomplish his be shorn of the supply and maintemission? The answer, of course, is nance functions most intimately that he can and does. However, linked with its success in battle. Yet there is one important difference be- there are those who seriously protween the engineer supply and main- pose that the engineer shouid be ditenance function and similar func- vested of his control over those suptions of the Ordnance and Quarter- ply and maintenance functions upon master Corps. Engineer supplies and which successful accomplishment of engineer maintenance are used pre- the engineer mission depends. It can dominantly in the performance of only be hoped that these comman" engineer missions, whereas the Ord- ders will recognize in the future, alii nance and Quartermaster Corps pro- they have in the past, that such. Jragvide equipment and supplies prima- mentation of construction power can rily to the combat arms including only lead to reduced combat power engineers. on the field of battle. In the face Moreover, the engineer at any of the almost overwhelming mang·iven echelon of command, is res- power resources of our potential eneponsible for conducting operations mies, it would certainly appear foolwhich, as pointed out before, are both hardy for us to dissipate the one key sustained and independent in nature. advantage that we still retain - suWithin the field army, for example, perior technology. Yet if we divide and dilute our construction resour- mobility the combat potential of his ces we most certainly will be dissi- force would remain virtually unpating :1 large and crucial clement tapped. 1n the future the success of the technological strength which of field commanders in achieving is our keystone to victory in war. mobility is going to depend increasingly upon the effectiveness with Construction power is an essential which they exploit their engineer reelement of combat power sources in overcoming the obstacles In the future, as in the past, vic- imposed by weather and terrain. tory will be achieved by the com- Like the traffic on our national highmander who makes the most effec- ways, our military operations could tive U1je of firepower, mobility and grind to a halt if we do not make shock action on the battlefield. Since provision for timely and effective apat any given point in time firepower plication of construction power to and the capability of the command problems of mobility in the field. for shock action are fixed to a con- New weapons and new techniques in siderable extent by tables of organi- warfare are creating new demands zation and equipment, supply levels, for construction which will strain and similar factors over which the our engineer resources to the limit. commander has little or no control, It is imperative, therefore, in develop· it follows that mobility is the one ing doctrine for the future that we real variable among these three ele- recognize construction power as an ments of combat power. Stated clif- essential and integral element of ferently, any commander who could combat power and avoid any action achieve 100 per cent mobility would which would fragment, dissipate, or have little difficulty in developing otherwise detract from its effective the fUll combat power of the forces employment in furtherance of the availabl~ to him; conversely, with no over-all mission of victory in war.