Small unit leadership

Media

Part of Philippine Armed Forces Journal

Title: Small unit leadership
Language: English
Source: Philippine Armed Forces Journal Volume IX (No. 6) August 1956
Rights
Fulltext: Armed Forces has counthe Huks by fighting in a manner betimes. At tht> height of the Huk power, we resorted to the employment of large groups to attack and dPstroy equ~lly large enemy targets. Tl,e Huks then \\·ere usually prone on large concentrations. After a few years, the Huks, much decimated, decided to disperse into small groups made up of from five to twelve men under a sub-commander. Their idea has been to render themselves more mobile and easy to conceal from the AFP troopers. With this idea followed, they are able to •r:...oi!!E~-iiiiia: :~oru;,~::P~o~~~ryt~:~h s~~~i~!:· From 1952 to the present the Huks not only have followed but also have perfected the dispersal method of moving around and operating in the field. Except during their highlevel conferences, . the Huks avoid concentrating themselves in large numbers. Today even the top Huks have to content themselves with a few picked men to provide them security. The shift in Huk tactics called for rapid and determined adjustment on the part of the AFP. Not to be outdone, and .to meet realistically the demands of the new situation, we russes;sed our fight against the Huks and came up with some tricks of our own. One adjustment of the AFP is the placing of more and more reliance on the employment of small hardhitting units on a grand scale. These units are usually self-sustaining. They are self-sufficient. They can operate by themsel\'eS under any condition of terrain and weather. Mobile, Mlrl ;lenetrating ~ of such units as a tactical group could easily be controlled and handled. However, its ultimate usefulness and success in operation is dependent upon the type of leadership it is provided with. Normally, an NCO is detailed to lead a small unit, except in the exe,cution of highly sensitive pressing missions, such as raids, probing tasks, liquidation missions, or capture of live enemy. During such delicate missions, a commissioned officer is assigned to lead. Under this type of troop employment the~·e arises an imperative need fora high qualityof small·llllit leadership. The more dispersed the men are in the type of operation adoJited, the g-reater is the demand for small fn many Battalion Combat Teams unit leaders who can act on their and Philippine Constabulary Comown initiative and can be relied mands as well as in Air and Navy upon to accomplish their missions task forces we find quite many and at the same time control and NCOs and ranking Pvts who have safeguard the men placed under their demonstrated abundantly the ability direct charge. to lead. For any combat unit to succeed, Master Sergeant Del Moro of the it is not enough that they be headed 26th BCT has many times successby non-commissioned officers or fully led small units against roving ranking privates. Such non-coms bands of the Lapu-Lapu Unit, RECO and ranking privates must be of the 4 in Bondoc Peninsula type that fulfills the requirements Master Sergeant Francisco Raquel of a good combat leader. of GHQ, AFP, when he was with It is true we have had small-unit the 16th BCT, accounted for numeleaders who have proven their worth rous dead, captured and surrendered in the anti-dissident' campaign. The Huks in a display of a fine degree exploits of Staff Sergeant Pastolero of leadership in small-unit operations in the Panay Island could rightly in Longos and the surroundi,ng Bay justify our genuine pride in Filipino towns of Laguna province. soldiery. The same could be said The coolness, steadfastness, courin the case of !!laster Sergeant Ad- age and determination with which lawan who led the team that put an Staff Sergeant Francisco Ladrera of end to the life and gory adventures the 2nd BCT led his unit in the ceof Capadocia in the craggy, trench- lebrated raid on OB 4 at 'Pacabit, erous highlands of San Remigio, Pa- Catanauan, Que:~:on, on 26 August nay Island. 1955, never fails to evoke the adthe Filipino soldier is not Jacking in Sergeant Galimba of the same BCT the basic ingredients for effective twice led a team of five men and combat leadership. Yet the need eaoh time polished off the target in- for more and better sma!l-unit leaddicated. First at Villa Perez, Gu- ers in the Armed Forces continues maca on 7 February 1955, he was to mount in intensity. The enemy respOllSible for the capture of Comdr is mobile, wily, deceptive, resourceWashington and the killing of a mi- ful and determined. To get him is nor Huk. Then at Burgos Ilaya Pi- our mission. \Ve have to overcome togo, midnight 2 May 1955, he ef- him. We can overcome him by befected the killing of Comdr Wilmer ing more mobile, more wily, more and wounding of Comdr Emmy of deceptive, more resourceful, more deOB 1. termined than he is. We possess the The late M/Sgt Camacho of the resources and the means to do it. Rangers highly deserved all the ho- Only we must do it correctly and nors posthumously hestowed upon in the right measure. him by the President and the Chief We have to employ small units to of Staff for splendid leadership shown locate the enemy. We have to emin a difficult and dangerous mission. ploy small units to destroy him. But To do away with Comdr Eddie Villa- such small units must be provided pando, terror of the Batangas-Cavite effective leadership. That leadership area, and his fanatical aides was a must come from the NCOs and rankchallenge that called for a high le- ing Pvts in all our military organvel <If leadership. izations. These NCOs and ranking ·These and a hundrM other iso- Pvts must be those who can apprelated cases ill the past reveal that ciate the exacting demands and requirements of the type of operations ing usually come out providing siwe are now pursuing milar leadership to small units in For these NCOs and ranking Pvts combat operations. to be entrusted with the command Once we observed in the 2nd BCT of small units in the operations a. staff sergeant who v.:a_s reliable. in against the Huks, they must be ful- his performance o~ milit~ry duties. ly qualified to lead. He was demonstratmg traits of leadership. We marked him as a potenTo qualify them devolves upon tial. When the day came for detheir officers. Leadership courses signaling a good NCO to lead a must be prescribed and taught all composite team to strike at Comdr. NCOs and ranking Pvts. It will be Balmori's group at Tagbacan llaya, noted in this regard that other ar- Catanauan, Quezon, on 9 January mies of the world exert as much ef- 1956, we readily picked on him. He fort in running Non-Commissioned e:Kecuted his mission magnificently. Officers Schools and combat leaders His name is Staff Sergeant Artemio schools as they extend in conduct- Las Marias. He is now Acting First ing higher level types of military Sergeant, Hq. & Hq. Sv. Co., 2nd training. Non-commissioned offi- BCT. cers and outstanding privates must There are many channels that ha,·e been screened for leadership could be exploited as reliable gauges ability before they are given any of leadership ability among NCOs command of small units. The recog- and ranking Pvts. Officers could nition of this felt need and the de- watch the enlijlted personnel while pendence on small unit leaders for the they are on-the-job training, at reultimate success of the anti-dissident hearsals, in field work and in actual campaign should spur us to device combat. Those with the ability to means by which this need can be lead wilt ine,·itably emerge above supplied. thei,r fellows. It is not difficult to discover men Other expedients or measures may possessed of the ability to lead. E:K- be resorted to. But one thing stands perience has shown that those en- paramount: officers must see to it listed men who are observed to be that small units employed in the op· demonstrating leadership in the erations against the Huks and the classrooms, in the octices, in exer- outlaws are provided the proper cises, in routine details and in train- leadership. Appendl• II of "leodership lor Filipln<H (Copyright 1956 by Mendou • crnd Guncrb•l ffl'modm• ll,lh• moH• rofl110r11i11g iJoll•of petJonofpr• f•r•nc.,bufloiUmyoflic.tJ lh• oblie<>lion to /• o111, 10 gro"' in lh•ir pro /enion i1 d•orfy a publk duly. -G• n.OMWitadley